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Abstract 
Since the introduction of Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) of 1972, European 
Union-Egyptian economic relations have been governed by two major trade 
agreements: the 1977 Cooperation Agreement under the GMP and the 2001 
Association Agreement conducted within the framework of the Barcelona process of 
1995. The impact of the former agreement was minimal on Egypt's economic growth 
because of its limited financial and technical scope and the growing trade deficit in 
favour of the EU. The latter partnership agreement has been more successful due to 
its comprehensive approach and the wide range of issues covered, including foreign 
direct investment (FDI). The aim of this thesis is to examine whether the recent EU- 
Egyptian partnership has contributed in any way to sustainable growth in EU direct 
investment into Egypt. The underlying premise and argument of this thesis is that 
despite the modest growth in EU FDI flows into Egypt, in particular during the three 
years following the signing of the 2001 agreement, the significance of this 
partnership lies in the opportunity it offers to provide dynamics that, if implemented 
successfully, lead to an increase in Egypt's industrial capacity, an improvement in its 
domestic situation, and an expansion of its regional market, in a way that makes the 
country more attractive to foreign investors. 
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Introduction 
Since its establishment in 1957, the European Union's (hereafter, EU, EC or 
Community) economic relationship with Egypt has primarily focused on trade. This 
is particularly true of the three agreements that have governed Euro-Egyptian 
economic relations to date: the 1972 Preferential Trade Agreement, the 1977 
Cooperation Agreement, and the 2001 Association Agreement conducted within the 
framework of the Barcelona process of 1995. The main objectives of these 
agreements were to assist Egypt in its economic development through economic and 
financial assistance and by enabling Egyptian products to access the EU market. The 
first and second agreements failed to achieve their objectives. There is a growing 
body of literature examining the recent EU-Egyptian Partnership Agreement to 
determine whether or not this could have a more significant impact on Egypt's 
economic growth. ' Most of this literature has primarily focused on analysing trade 
and trade-related aspects of the relationship, but insufficient attention has yet to be 
paid to the impact of this partnership on the growth of EU direct investment into 
Egypt since its establishment in November 1995. 
' See for example: Dean de Rosa & Mohamed Kamal Saber, "Regional Integration Arrangements in 
the Middle East and North Africa: an Analysis of Egypt's Foreign Trade and Development Interests", 
Center for Economic, Financial Research and Studies, Cairo University, Occasional Economic 
Papers, Vol. 13, June 1999; Ahmed Ghoneim, "Determinants of the Egyptian Exports Market Access 
to the European Union", Center for Economic, Financial Research and Studies, Cairo University, 
Research Projects, Vol. 10, December 2000; Gamal Siyam, "The Partnership Agreement and its 
Impacts on Agriculture in Egypt", Center for European Studies, Cairo University, European Papers, 
Issue No. 1, June 2004; and Omneia Helmy, "Arab Free Trade Area and its Implications for Egyptian 
Exports", in Nassar, Heba & Aziz, Alfonse (eds. ), Egyptian Exports and Challenges of the 21st 
Century, (Cairo: Center for Economic, Financial Research and Studies, Cairo University, April 2000), 
pp. 307-355. 
17 
1. The Purpose of the Study 
In order to address this gap in the literature, this study attempts to examine the 
impact of the EU-Egyptian partnership on the growth of foreign direct investment 
(hereafter, FDI) into Egypt, especially from the EU. The importance of this 
examination is threefold. The first is the growing role of FDI in global economic 
development. In the Far East and South East Asia, unilateral efforts to liberalise their 
economic and trade policies attracted record FDI over the past fifteen years. 
Empirical evidence also shows that this becomes easier to achieve when a country 
accesses large regional economic areas. The Association of South East Asian Nations 
(hereafter, ASEAN), Portugal and Spain's accession into the EU in 1986, Mexico's 
entry into North America Free Trade Area (hereafter, NAFTA) in 1994, and the 
accession of Central and East European countries (hereafter, CEECs) into the EU in 
May 2004 have been the most notable examples of this. FDI has become the most 
2 See for example: N. Freeman & F. Bartels, The Future of Foreign Investment in Southeast Asia, 
(London: Routledge Cruzan, 2004); W. Thomas, Western Capitalism in China: a history of the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange, (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2001); C. Kwan, D. Vandenbrink & C. Yue, 
Coping With Capital Flows in East Asia, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998); K. 
Cao, The Changing Capital Markets of East Asia, (London: Routledge, 1995); and T. Ito & A. 
Krueger, The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in East Asian Economic Development, (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 2000). 
3 The impact of regionalism on FDI and economic growth has been examined intensively in relation to 
the access of Spain and Portugal to the EC in 1986, the accession of Mexico to the NAFTA in 1994, 
the impact of EU enlargement in 2004 on the FDI growth in the new ten member states, and finally 
the FDI in the ASEAN region. A. Bende-Nabende, FDI, Regionalism, Government Policy and 
Endogenous Growth: A comparative study of the ASEAN-5 economies, with development policy 
implications for the least developed countries, (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1999); J. Panglaykim, 
Japanese Direct Investment in ASEAN: the Indonesian Experience, (Singapore: Maruzen Asia, 1983); 
J. M. Campa & M. F. Guillen, "Spain: a boom from economic integration" in J. H. Dunning & R. 
Narula (eds. ), Foreign direct investment and governments: catalysts for economic restructuring, 
(London: Routledge, 1996); Laurence Carter, Frank Sader & Pernille Holtedahl, "Foreign Direct 
Investment in Central and Eastern European Infrastructure ", Foreign Investment Advisory Service 
Occasional Paper, No. 7, (Washington D. C.: The World Bank, 1996), pp. 12-25; and Irene Lovino, 
"Acceding countries still attractive for foreign direct investment: 1997-2001 data", Eurostat, Statistics 
in Focus, Brussels, theme 2-51/2003. 
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viable and accessible alternative source of foreign capital as foreign economic 
assistance is steadily declining. It also allows for the avoidance of political 
concessions often associated with foreign economic assistance. 
The second factor is the importance of the 1995 Barcelona process and the 
subsequent partnership agreement that followed from it to the existing Euro-Egyptian 
economic relationship. 5 The new agreement differed considerably from the previous 
one in its objective and substance, and went beyond trade and trade-related issues to 
cover economic, industrial, agricultural, financial, scientific, technological, 
environmental and social cooperation, the fight against crime, drugs and money 
laundering, the freedom of movement of capital and the promotion of FDI. 6 It aimed 
to maintain Europe's economic, commercial, political and historic ties with Egypt, as 
well as the wider Middle East and North African (hereafter, MENA) region, while 
providing the country with an opportunity for political reform and economic 
liberalisation. 
The third aspect of this study is an examination of the assumption that regional 
arrangements and partnership agreements lead to a significant increase in FDI flows 
4 The most obvious model for the interconnection between economic assistance and political and 
security concessions was the US$5 billion economic package offered by the US to Turkey to allow the 
US armed forces to access Turkish territories during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The deal did not go 
through because of the refusal of the Turkish Parliament to allow foreign troops to use their soil 
during Iraq invasion. However, this is not always the case with foreign economic assistance as some 
agreements could provide generous packages such as that between Egypt and the US during the 1991 
Gulf War, when Egypt was relieved of approximately US$7 billion of her military debts to the US in 
return of her active role in the liberation of Kuwait. 
s The Barcelona process was established after the Euro-Mediterranean Conference held in Barcelona, 
Spain, on 27-29 November 1995. The conference was attended by 27 delegations, representing the 15 
EU member states and 12 southern Mediterranean countries, including Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, 
Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, the Palestinian Authorities, Israel, Turkey, Malta and Cyprus. 
6 Ministry of Foreign Trade, Texts of the EU-Egyptian Partnership, Cairo, Issue 180, July 2002 
(Arabic version). 
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from developed to developing partner country. The necessity of such an investigation 
is to examine why Egypt saw a sharp decline in its FDI inflows from the EU after 
2000 at the time when the EU became the main source of FDI capital worldwide. In 
2003, the EU accounted for 49 per cent of global FDI outflows. 7 An investigation 
into EU-Egyptian Association agreement can also provide some insights into the 
prospect of EU FDI into Egypt. It is also hoped that the findings may ultimately help 
us to understand why Egypt, despite the existence of comparative advantages in a 
number of areas, occupies a relatively lowly position in the global investment regime 
and has yet to achieve an early stage of the so-called `investment development 
path'. 8 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2004, 
(Geneva: United Nations publications, 2004), p. 100. 
$ J. Dunning and R. Narula defined 5 stages to identify systematically the FDI position of a country in 
relation to its economic development. Stage one is where the country's investment comparative 
advantages are insufficient to attract inward FDI because of the limited domestic markets, 
inappropriate economic system and policies, inadequate infrastructure and facilities and strong 
government intervention in the market. Stage two is where the country offers some incentives to 
attract inward FDI, most of which takes the form of import substituting manufacturing investment. 
There is a rise in inward FDI but outward flows are highly marginal. Stage three reflects the relatively 
high level of economic growth of the country, which becomes more of FDI exporter than importer. 
The rate of inward FDI decreases while outward FDI grows to take advantage of global markets. 
Technological capabilities replace labour intensive activities in the production process and 
government may have to play essential role to attract inward direct investment through structural 
adjustment programmes. In stage four, the country achieves high level of market competitiveness, in 
which domestic firms are not only able to compete with foreign companies in domestic markets but 
capable of seeking opportunities beyond their national borders. Outward FDI continues to grow fast as 
firms seek to maintain their competitive advantage by moving their operation from losing to high 
profitable regions. Inward FDI tends to target asset-seeking investment. Production processes and 
products are the state of the art, using capital-intensive production techniques because it is cheaper 
than labour intensive. The government has a supervisory and regulatory role. The fifth and final stage 
is achieved in highly industrialised states, where the inward and outward FDI continue to increase, 
and economic activities are more internationalised. The USA represents the model example for the 
standardised production and the capacity of the state to upgrade its technological and human 
capabilities. J. Dunning & R. Narula, "The investment development path revisited: some emerging 
issues" in Dunning & Narula (eds. ), Foreign Direct Investment and Governments, (London: 
Routledge, 1996), pp. 1-41. 
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2. Objectives of the Study 
This study has three main objectives. The first is to provide a descriptive analysis of 
EU direct investment into Egypt since 1972, the year that the Community began to 
effectively expand its external ties with southern Mediterranean countries, including 
Egypt. This analysis will help Egyptian officials in their decision making regarding 
EU FDI, and fill the current gap in literature on this topic. The second objective is to 
examine the effect of EU-Egyptian partnership conducted within the 1995 Barcelona 
process on the growth of EU direct investment into Egypt between 1996 and 2004. 
This will determine whether this partnership has brought any fundamental changes in 
the value, and pattern, of EU FDI into Egypt, and whether this development is a 
sufficient measure for the attraction of FDI, particularly from the EU. The third 
objective is to determine the main internal and external factors that affected EU 
direct investment into Egypt during the period under consideration. 
3. Themes, Argument and Literature 
The literature review described below shows a huge gap in research on EU FDI into 
Egypt. This study seeks to fill this lacuna by analysing in detail the development, the 
pattern and the static and sectoral distributions of that FDI into Egypt's main 
economic sectors between 1972 and 2004. It will be shown that during this period 
EU capital flows tended to shift from one economic sector to another according to 
the development, restructuring, modernisation and regulations governing investment 
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in the concerned sectors. This shift was evident in the banking sector, whose share of 
total EU capital flows decreased from 56 per cent prior to the Barcelona process to 
only 2 per cent between 1996 and 2004. Meanwhile, the share of manufacturing and 
infrastructure increased from 39 per cent and 1 per cent to 64 per cent and 22 per 
cent, respectively during the same period. This study also shows how EU FDI into 
Egypt lacked consistency and sustainability over the 33-year period under 
consideration. One of the most prevailing patterns of EU FDI has been the periodic 
single investments made by numerous companies from EU member states. The 
clearest example of this was the one off investment of US$300 million by Spain in 
2001, out of a total Spanish FDI in Egypt of US$329.5 million between 1996 and 
2004. 
The underlying theme throughout this work is that despite the existence of 
Egyptian comparative advantage in certain areas the growth of EU FDI has been 
limited and ineffective in the country's economic development between 1972 and 
2004. With the exception of the FDI boom of the mid-1970s, Egypt's share of EU 
FDI outflows has been marginal compared to the growing role of the EU in global 
investment and the level of capital flows from the EU into other economies in Latin 
America, Eastern Europe and East Asia. 
This study is the first to show that the development of Euro-Egyptian economic 
relations has yet had little effect on the growth of EU FDI into the country. It argues 
that neither the two major EU frameworks of the 1972 Global Mediterranean Policy 
and the 1995 Barcelona process nor the two bilateral cooperation agreements of 1977 
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and 2001 had an immediate impact on the growth of EU direct investment into 
Egypt. Analysis shows that the resurgence of the Community's FDI into Egypt 
during the early 1970s was not due to the Global Mediterranean Policy of 1972, but 
largely due to the 1971 constitutional amendment and the legal changes of 1971 and 
1974 that offered guarantees against nationalisation and allowed foreign investors to 
buy assets in local firms. It also shows that the cooperation agreement of 1977 failed 
to sustain the record EC FDI of US$1.6 billion in 1975, which gradually decreased to 
reach US$66.8 million in 1993. 
Similarly, this thesis shows clearly through analysis of previously unused data 
that neither the 1995 Barcelona process nor the Association Agreement of 2001 
directly contributed to the rise of EU FDI into Egypt between 1996 and 2004. 
Indeed, the growth of EU FDI into Egypt between 1996 and 2000 was largely due to 
the acceleration of privatisation and the improvement in the country's 
macroeconomic conditions following the successful implementation of the 1991 
Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme (hereafter, ERSAP). This 
level of FDI growth was not sustained between 2001 and 2004, despite the signing of 
the EU-Egyptian association agreement of June 2001. 
However, this study shows that the Barcelona process has had significant impacts 
on Egypt's domestic situation. This was apparent through the substantial financial 
and technical assistance provided through the MEDA programmes and European 
Investment Bank (EIB), allowing for further investment in infrastructural projects 
vital to the attraction of foreign investors. The Industrial Modernisation programme 
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attempted to assist small and medium sized enterprises and to strengthen the role of 
the private sector in the country's economic development. Successful 
implementation of these measures will eventually stimulate internal political, 
economic, legal and institutional reforms, which aim to readjust the legal framework 
and prepare the domestic market for the conditions of free trade. 
This study is also the first to show that the growth of EU FDI into Egypt has 
largely been associated with the country's economic liberalisation. This argument is 
explored and proven through an examination of the Infitah policy of the mid-1970s 
and the ERSAP of the early 1990s, which were followed by remarkable increases in 
EU FDI into Egypt. The former policy reoriented the Egyptian economy from a 
centralised socialist system to a semi-capitalist one. This introduced the principles 
and rules of the free market to the Egyptian economy and opened up the market to 
FDI. Analysis shows that the introduction of this policy in 1974 led to an increase in 
Egypt's FDI inflows from US$522 million in 1974 to US$4.6 billion in the following 
year, of which US$1.6 billion was invested by the EC member states. It also shows 
that the latter policy improved the country's macroeconomic conditions, particularly 
gross domestic product (GDP), inflation and its exchange rate policy, all of which 
restored the confidence of foreign investors in the Egyptian economy. 
This study also highlights the strong links between the growth of FDI and 
privatisation. The data examined shows that the introduction of privatisation in the 
early 1990s stimulated the growth of EU FDI into Egypt, which increased from 
US$38.2 million in 1991 to US$114.7 million in 1995, and that the acceleration of 
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this process in the following five years led to a further increase in EU capital flows 
into the country of US$307.3 million and US$673.9 million in 1996 and 1998, 
respectively. As the ERSAP came to an end by the late 1990s, the failure of the 
Egyptian government to continue its economic reforms and the slow down in 
privatisation, together with the 2001 global economic downturn, led to a sharp 
decline in EU capital flows into the country. They reached US$32.8 million in 2004, 
the lowest rate since 1990.9 
As well as highlighting this vitally important need for economic liberalisation, 
this study also sheds new light on some vital dynamics in both the Barcelona process 
and the 2001 association agreement that can lead to a significant improvement in 
Egypt's attractiveness to foreign investors. The creation of the ongoing Euro- 
Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010 increases the size of Egypt's regional 
market across Europe, Asia and Africa. Both also encourage south-south economic 
cooperation and thus allow Egypt to integrate with its southern Mediterranean 
partner states in order to benefit from added value such as the cumulation of rules of 
origin. It also shows for the first time how the financial and technical assistance 
offered by the EU, particularly through the Industrial Modernisation Programme, can 
have greater impact on small and medium sized enterprises and thus increase the role 
of the private sector in the country's economic development. However, the outcome 
of these mechanisms can only be beneficial if Egypt continues its political and 
economic liberalisation. 
9 In 1990, Egypt's FDI inflows were severely affected by the country's financial crisis of the late 
1980s, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August of the same year, and its subsequent regional political 
tension due to the build up of an international coalition and preparation of the Gulf War which started 
in January 1991. The impact of these events led to a dramatic decline in Egypt's FDI inflows, which 
decreased from US$245 million in 1989 to US$73 million in the following year. EU capital flows into 
Egypt also decreased from US$147.7 million to US$24.7 million during the same period. 
25 
This thesis is not only an original contribution to knowledge but is based entirely 
on primary data collected from the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones 
(GAFI), the Ministry of Investment and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry, 
Egypt. The thesis's arguments and conclusions are also supported by data collected 
from a number of unpublished and published official documents and reports from the 
Egyptian government, the EU Commissions, the United Nations, the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It has also drawn on a significant 
number of published materials, the majority of which are relevant but unrelated 
directly to EU FDI into Egypt. The most relevant literature dealing with the topic 
during the Barcelona era focused primarily on the Euro-Mediterranean partnership 
and the creation of a Free Trade Area by 2010. The impact of these events was 
examined in three major works by the Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies in 
Cairo, the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, and Reading 
University. 
The study conducted by the Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies and edited by 
Galal and Hoekman in 1997 argued that trade agreements often affect state economic 
growth by improving the incentives regime confronting producers and consumers, 
thereby fostering growth. They also enhanced the credibility of the government's 
commitment to economic liberalisation and an outward investment-friendly policy 
stance. 1° This work drew a comparative analysis on the experiences of countries such 
as Mexico, Tunisia and Morocco to show that Egypt was being held back from 
10 Ahmed Galal & Bernard Heolanan, Regional Partners in Global Markets: Limits and Possibilities 
of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements, (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1997). 
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achieving a sustainable high growth rate by its limited trade openness, low savings 
and investment, and insufficient domestic competition. It concluded that the recent 
trade agreement would have dramatic effects as Egyptian industries would face 
greater competition. Analysis of FDI dealt solely with Tunisia and Morocco. 
Thereafter, an argument sustained by a number of case studies on the impact of the 
partnership on Egypt's pharmaceutical industry, the textiles industry, the services 
sector, included in this work. l l 
Distant Neighbours was edited by Nazih Ayubi in 1995. It examined the 
development of EU economic relations with the Middle East and North African 
(MENA) region. 12 While the majority of the work focused on trade, two important 
studies covered European FDI in the MENA. 13 Susan Strange et al and Louis Blin 
highlighted some of the main aspects challenging European investment in the MENA 
region, though they made no specific reference to Egypt, and ended their chapters in 
the period before the Euro-Mediterranean partnership was established. The study 
conducted by the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) and edited by 
George Joffe in 1999 dealt with the same partnership from global and regional 
11 Arvind Subramanian & Mostafa Abd-El-Latif, "The Egypt-European Union Partnership Agreement 
and the Egyptian Pharmaceutical Sector" in Ahmed Galal & B. Heokman (eds. ), Regional Partners in 
Global Markets, pp. 178-203; Hanaa Kheir El-Din & Hanaa El-Sayed, "Potential Impact of a Free 
Trade Agreement with the EU on Egypt's Textile Industry", in Galal & Heckman (eds. ), Regional 
Partners in Global Markets, pp. 205-237; and Mahmoud Mohieldin, "The Egypt-EU Partnership 
Agreement and Liberalisation of Services", in Galal & Heokman (eds. ), Regional Partners in Global 
Markets, pp. 238-255; Drusilla Brown, Alan Deardorff & Robert Stern, "Some Economic Effects of 
the Free Trade Agreement between Tunisia and the European Union" in Galal & Heokman (eds. ), 
Regional Partners in Global Markets, pp. 71-97. 
'2 N. Ayubi, Distant Neighbours, the Political Economy of Relations between Europe and the Middle 
East/North Africa, (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1995). 
13 Susan Strange et al, "European direct investment in North Africa: the investors' perspective" , 
in N. 
Ayubi (ed. ), Distant Neighbours, pp. 225-252; and Louis Blin, "French investments in the Arab 
World", in Ayubi, N. (ed. ), Distant Neighbours, pp. 269-300. 
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perspectives. 14 Some chapters included focused on economic, political and security 
aspects in the partnership, 15 while others looked at the issue of immigration. 
16 There 
are also a number of related studies that focused hypothetically on development in 
the region, particularly after the establishment of a free trade area around the 
Mediterranean basin. '? 
A review of the literature published by Egyptian government departments and 
economic centres in Arabic and English revealed that the majority of these 
institutions paid most attention to trade and trade-related aspects at the expense of the 
FDI factor in the EU-Egyptian economic relations. The newly founded Ministry of 
Investment (established in June 2004) has been preoccupied with restructuring and 
14 George Joffe (ed. ), Perspectives on Development: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, (London: 
Frank Cass Publishers, 1999); Grahame Thompson, "Globalisation versus Regionalisation? ", in Joffe 
(ed. ), Perspectives on Development, pp. 59-73; Alfred Tovias, "Regionalisation and the 
Mediterranean", in Joffe (ed. ), Perspectives on Development, 75-87; and Nadia Salah, "Global Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership", in Joffe (ed. ), Perspectives on Development, pp. 39-58. 
15 R. Gillespre, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997); G. Joffe 
(ed. ), Perspectives on Development: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, (London: Frank Cass 
Publishers, 1999); Claire Spencer, "Building Confidence in the Mediterranean", Mediterranean 
Politics, Vol. 2/2; M. Lister, The EU and the South: Relations with Developing Countries, (London: 
Routledge, 1997); B. A. Roberson, The Middle East and Europe: Power Deficit, (London: Routledge, 
1998); and G. Joffe, "The economic factors in the Mediterranean security", The International 
Spectator, Vol. XXX, No. 1-4, pp. 75-87; S Callaya, "The Euro-Mediterranean process after Malta: 
what prospects? ", Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2; I. Lesser & A. Tellis, Strategic exposure: 
Proliferation around the Mediterranean, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996); N. Kovalsky, Europe, the 
Mediterranean and Russia: perceptions of strategies, (Moscow: Russian Academy of Science, 
Interdialect, 1998); and Y. Boyer, "Europe's future strategic orientation", The Washington Quarterly, 
Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 141-153. 
16 S. Collinson, Shore to Shore: the politics of migration in Euro-Maghreb relations, (London: Middle 
East Programme, RIIA, 1996); M. Baldwin-Edwards, "The emerging European immigration regime: 
some reflections and implications for southern Europe", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 35, 
No. 4, pp. 497-519; and J-P Garson, "Opening Mediterranean trade and migration", The OECD 
Observer, No. 209, pp. 21-24. 
" M. Schiff & L. Winter, Regional Integration and Development, (Washington D. C.: The World 
Bank, 2003); J. Brohman, Popular Development: rethinking the theory and practice of development, 
(Oxford: Blackwell); Eberhard Rhein, "Euro-Med Free Trade Area for 2010: whom will it benefit" in 
Joffe (ed. ), Perspectives on Development, pp. 3-15; B. Hoekman & S. Djankov, "The European 
Union's Mediterranean Free Trade Initiatives", The World Economy, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 387-406; R. 
Pomfret, Mediterranean Policy of the European Community: a study of discrimination in trade, 
(London: Trade Policy Research Centre, Macmillan, 1986); and N. Richardson, "Trade blocs in the 
New World Order and implication for the Middle East" The Jerusalem Journal of International 
Relations, Vol. 14, No. 2. 
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preparing state-owned companies for privatisation, while the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry focuses on increasing exports to the EU. 18 The Centre for Economic and 
Financial Research and Studies at Cairo University has completed several studies on 
EU-Egyptian economic relations, most of which dealt solely with determinants of 
Egyptian exports, institutional barriers to Egyptian exports, regional arrangements 
and Egyptian trade. 19 They concluded that the EU-Egyptian partnership could 
increase Egyptian exports to the EU, if firms managed to improve the quality of their 
products and benefited from the cumulation of the rules of origin. 
20 Two other 
important works helped to provide an understanding of recent developments in the 
Egyptian economy. The first dealt with the institutional and policy challenges and the 
second examined the impact of privatisation on the economy. 21 Both of them 
concluded that much more ought to be done in the area of institutional and policy 
formulation and that privatisation should be accelerated in order to improve the 
country's business environment. 
Moreover, a study at King's College London highlighted the problems facing the 
creation of a legal infrastructure in Egypt, and how these problems affected the 
18 Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry, Collective Foreign Trade Report, Cairo, Vol. 3, No. 12, 
August 2004, pp. 36-42. 
19 Hanaa Kheir El Din, "Egypt's Exports under liberalisation: Performance, Prospects and Constraints, 
1980-1998", in Heba Nassar & Alfonse Aziz (eds. ), Egyptian Exports and Challenges of the 213' 
Century, (Cairo: Center for Economic and Financial Research and Studies (CEFRS), 2000), pp. 3-32; 
Samiha Fawzi, "Institutional Barriers to Egyptian Exports", in Nassar & Aziz (eds. ), Egyptian Exports 
and Challenges, pp. 41-65; S. El-Shawarbi, "Estimating the impact of Egyptian exchange rate on 
exports", in Nassar & Aziz (eds. ), Egyptian Exports and Challenges, pp. 76-139; Ahmed Ghoneim, 
"Anti-dumping practice under GATT and the European Union rules: prospects for the Egyptian- 
European partnership agreement" in Nassar & Aziz (eds. ), Egyptian Exports and Challenges, pp. 184- 
249; and Ahmed Ghoneim, "Determinants of the Egyptian exports market access to the European 
Union", Center for Economic and Financial Research and Studies, Research Projects, Vol. 10, Cairo, 
December 2000. 
20 N. El Megharbel, "Rules of origin: impact on firms' competitiveness in Egypt" in Nassar & Aziz 
(eds. ), Egyptian Exports and Challenges, pp. 256-299. 
21 Heba Nassar & Ahmed Ghoneim (eds. ), Institutional and policy challenges facing the Egyptian 
economy, (Cairo: CEFRS & USAID, Egypt, 2003); and A. M. Ragab & N. A. Samak (eds. ), Reflections 
of the privatisation programme on Egyptian economy, (Cairo: CEFRS, 2003). 
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privatisation programme. 22 It looked at the constitutional and legal protection offered 
by the securities regulations, laws dealing with secured transactions, and competition 
and intellectual property rights laws. The study concluded that reforms were needed 
in the judicial system, particularly in the area of bankruptcy law, and called for the 
effective implementation of competition law and the protection of property rights, if 
privatisation was to be successful. The impact of economic liberalisation on changes 
in Egyptian private enterprises and joint ventures in terms of ownership relations, 
strategic priorities, contractual relations, and personnel policies was also examined in 
a study conducted at Manchester Business School. 23 This study concluded that the 
institutional environment, state interference in an enterprises' decision making 
process, government control over the banking system and key suppliers of electricity, 
water and oil, limited the extent and effects of changes in these areas; hence this 
highlighted the limited impact of liberalisation at an enterprise level. 
Only three major academic works dealt with FDI in the Egyptian context. The 
first two were edited books by academics, one in 1979 and the second in 1984.4 The 
third was a PhD thesis conducted at Ulster University, Northern Ireland, in 2000.25 
All three works covered FDI in Egypt in a general sense but none of them looked 
into European or EU direct investment into the country. David W. Carr provided a 
historical account of FDI into Egypt, and focused on the Infitah policy of 1974. 
Gillespie's book examined the relationship between foreign investors, local 
22 Bahaa Dessouki, Privatisation in emerging economies: some aspects of the creation of a new legal 
infrastructure, a case study of Egypt, PhD thesis, School of Law, King's College London, 2000. 
23 Tarek Gebba, Enterprise change and economic transformation in Egypt, PhD thesis, Manchester 
Business School, 2000. 
24 D. W. Carr, Foreign Investment and Development in Egypt, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979); 
and K. Gillespie, The Tripartite Relationship: Government, Foreign Investors and Local Investors 
during Egypt's Economic Opening, (New York: Praeger, 1984). 
u Reda Ali, The determinants of foreign direct investment: a comparative study with particular 
reference to Egypt, PhD thesis, University of Ulster, Northern Ireland, April 2000. 
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entrepreneurs and the government during the 1970s, regardless of the origin of FDI. 
She concluded that this tripartite relationship improved with economic liberalisation 
and deteriorated with increased government interference in economic affairs. 
Reda Ali examined the determinants of FDI with reference to Egypt. His thesis 
depended largely on locational factors such as political, economic and institutional 
reforms, most of which are addressed in chapter eight of this study. 26 He concluded 
that host country locational factors were not equally important for the different types 
of investments since this depended on the sector of activity and on the company's 
investment strategy. His comparative analysis of the internal factors found that 
economic, trade, structure reforms and political stability helped FDI, while human 
capital, labour skills, private sector capabilities, local product quality, tax, 
administrative, legal and education systems damaged FDI. This analysis contributed 
to an understanding of the effects of some internal factors on FDI, but the thesis 
neither took into account the impact of global and regional perspectives on the 
development of FDI into Egypt, nor touched upon EU FDI into Egypt, particularly 
after the 1995 Barcelona process. 
26 Locational factors are addressed in detail in John Dunning's eclectic paradigm of international 
production, which assumes that FDI is determined by two main factors: one the locational advantage 
of the host country and the second is the decision-making process of the firm through which it decides 
whether or not to invest in a specific country. For more discussion see John Dunning, "The Eclectic 
Paradigm of International Production: a restatement and some possible extensions", Journal of 
International Business Studies, Spring 1988, pp. 1-25; John Dunning, "The Determinants of 
International Production", Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 25,1973, pp. 289-333; and John Dunning, 
"Reappraising the eclectic Paradigm in the age of alliance capitalism", Journal of International 
Business Studies, Vol. 26, winter 1995, p. 461. 
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The relationship between private investment and the growth process in Egypt was 
examined in a study at the University of Birmingham. 7 This based its analysis on a 
comparison between the impact of local private capital and public capital on the 
process of growth between 1977 and 1997, with FDI receiving very limited 
consideration in only three pages of the whole work 28 The study showed that private 
investment in Egypt was affected by the output of public investment in 
infrastructural and non-infrastructural activities and the availability of domestic 
credits for private investment. There are also two important essays on FDI into Egypt 
during the 1990s. One provided an overview on FDI into Egypt during the 1990s, 29 
while the other discussed American FDI in Egypt between 1995 and 2001 30 
However, overall there was lack of sufficient material on foreign direct investment in 
Egypt, especially that flowing from the EU after 1995. Despite the significant 
importance of EU-Egyptian partnership agreement to Egypt, FDI received minimal 
attention from both officials and academics between 1995 and 2004. It was not until 
June 2004 that FDI began to emerge as an important aspect in economic policy and 
that the Ministry of Investment was established to deal with investment and 
investment-related issues. 
27 Ali Elbagalaty, Private investment and the growth process in Egypt, PhD thesis, Department of 
Economics, University of Birmingham, March 2002. 
28 Ibid, pp. 289-291. 
29 Meryse Louis et al, "Foreign direct investment in Egypt", in S. Estrin & K. Meyer (eds. ), 
Investment strategies in emerging markets, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004). 
30 Lonba Abdellatif, "American direct investment in Egypt", Center for American Studies, Cairo 
University, Vol. 2, January 2003. 
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4. Sources of the Study and Methodology 
As mentioned above, the vast majority of this thesis is based on primary materials 
obtained from the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones the only 
Egyptian governmental body dealing with foreign investors. This primary data used 
in this work has never been used in the way that it has in this thesis. The data, which 
is gathered up to December 2004, covers all foreign investments made by the EU 
member states, the CEECs, European non-EU member states, the Arab countries, the 
US, and other countries from South East Asia and Latin America into Egypt between 
1 January 1970 and 30 November 2004. Each data sheet consists of the country of 
origin of FDI, the economic sector or industry within which foreign companies 
operate, the name of the foreign investor, the name of its local partner, the date of the 
establishment of the project, the total capital invested in the project, the share of 
capital committed by the foreign investor, and the number of jobs created by each 
investment. 
Thus, all data presented in this thesis, particularly in chapters four, six and 
seven, as well as all figures and tables are based on the primary data collected from 
GAFI, unless otherwise stated. This data does not include any foreign investments 
made in the petroleum sector, which accounted for 64 per cent of total FDI in 2004 31 
However, it includes investments in petroleum services. 32 This is because GAFI does 
not include FDI in the petroleum sector, of which all matters related to foreign 
investment are dealt with through the Ministry of Petroleum. This is why some of 
31 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005, p. 42. 
32 Petroleum services are classified as sub-sector within the services sector. 
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the figures set in this study may differ from other figures mentioned by some 
national and international organisations, including the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in its annually published World Investment 
Report. 33 
Table 1: Average exchange rate of the Egyptian pound (in piaster) to US dollar (US$1) 1970-2005. 
Year Rate Year Rate Year Rate 
1970 0.43.5 1982 0.70.0 1994 3.38.0 
1971 0.43.5 1983 0.70.0 1995 3.39.0 
1972 0.43.5 1984 0.70.0 1996 3.39.0 
1973 0.39.1 1985 0.70.0 1997 3.39.0 
1974 0.39.1 1986 0.70.0 1998 3.40.0 
1975 0.39.1 1987 0.70.0 1999 3.41.0 
1976 0.39.1 1988* 2.30.0 2000 3.60.0 
1977 0.39.1 1989* 2.55.0 2001 4.15.0 
1978 0.39.1 1990* 2.63.0 2002 4.60.0 
1979 0.70.0 1991 3.34.0 2003 5.90.0 
1980 0.70.0 1992 3.32.0 2004 6.16.0 
1981 0.70.0 1993 3.35.0 2005 5.78.0 
Source: Central Bank of Egypt, Economic Review, & National Bank of Egypt, various issues. 
* Figures in these years are based on the market rate of the CBE. They were reported differently by the IMF, which only 
considered the principle exchange rate as follows: 1988 (US$1=EGPO. 70), 1989 (US$1=EGPI. 10) and 1990 (US$1=EGP2). 
The data obtained from GAFI was provided in two different currencies. 
Investments made in inland, the whole geographical area of Egypt except free zones, 
were presented in Egyptian Pounds (EGP), and those in the free zones were in US 
dollars (US$). For the purpose of consistency and compatibility, the Egyptian 
currency was converted into US dollar at the average annual current exchange rates 
33 See special notes by UNCTAD on recent changes in the methodology of FDI, which states that FDI 
inflows into Egypt started to include investment in the petroleum sector in the third quarter of 2004. 
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005, (New York: United Nations, 2005), p. 299. Also, all 
figures published by the Egyptian-British Chamber of Commerce in London on FDI inflows into 
Egypt included investment in the petroleum sector. 
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of the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) and the National Bank of Egypt (NBE) between 
1970 and 2005. The conversion of currency in this work is based on the average 
annual rate of exchange of each year (as shown in table 1) rather than the daily 
exchange rate during the period under consideration. 
It is worth noting here that Egypt's exchange rate policy went through several 
phases over the past forty years. During the 1960s and 1970s, Egypt adopted a 
multiple exchange rate, which specified different rates for government transactions, 
for exports and imports, and for national commercial transaction and transfers. 34 On 
27 December 1978, the Minister of Economy issued decree No. 372 authorising the 
use of a unified exchange rate for each of the official and incentive rates, for all 
transactions, with the exception of some thereof, which was effective from 1 January 
1979 35 The rate was then set at US$1 to 0.70 Egyptian piasters. In July 1988, the 
Egyptian government began to use a `floating commercial rate' at US$1 to EGP2.30. 
As for the principle rate, the Central Bank exchange rate was devalued by 55 per cent 
and stood at US$1 to EGP 2, up from EGP 1.10.36 This rate increased gradually to 
record EGP2.71 in July 1990. As from February 1991, the government declared that 
all dealings in foreign exchange were to be conducted through two markets: the 
primary market and the free market. 37 Since then, the exchange rate used in this 
thesis has been based on the free market rate. 
34 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Financial Statistics, Washington D. C., Vol. XLIII, No. 10, 
October 1990, pp. 209-211. 
35 Central Bank of Egypt (1979), Economic Review, Vol. XIX, No. 1,1979, p. 12. 
36 Economic Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Egypt, issue No. 3,1990, p. 10. 
37 Central Bank of Egypt, Economic Review, Vol. XXXI, No. 4,1991, p. 173. 
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As for the EU, the total levels of FDI flows into Egypt by each of its member 
states are calculated on the basis of the date of entry into the Community. For 
example, Greece's FDI is not included in EU direct investment before 1981. 
Similarly, investments from Spain and Portugal are included in the total EU FDI 
flows only after their accession to the Community in 1986. This also applies to the 
ten new member states of the EU, which joined the Community on 1 May 2004. 
Moreover, this thesis also draws on a significant amount of quantitative and 
qualitative data and materials held by Egypt's Ministry of Investment; Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Industry; the Central Bank of Egypt; the European Commission; 
Eurostat; and the official publications of the United Nations such as World 
Investment Reports, published annually by the UNCTAD. Statistical analysis of this 
data has been particularly useful in determining the level of FDI growth in Egypt 
from countries other than the EU member states. 
This study adopts a multidisciplinary approach. A theoretical perspective is 
employed to provide an explanation of the main variables of the subject of FDI, 
while the historical analysis explains briefly the development of European direct 
investment into Egypt from the early nineteenth century until the contemporary 
period. Statistical analysis is also used to determine the value, the pattern, static and 
sectoral distributions of EU FDI in Egypt's main economic sectors. 
The theoretical approach provides an understanding of the definitions of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and the theoretical debates surrounding it. This helps me to 
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differentiate between FDI and other kinds of investments such as portfolio 
investment, while defining some fundamental aspects of FDI such as equity 
ownership and long term commitment of entrepreneurs to invest in an economic 
entity in a foreign country, where they have control over the management and 
operations of the company. While exploring the differing theoretical perspectives, 
namely neo-Marxist and neo-liberal, regarding the effect of FDI on states economic 
development, this study adopts the regional perspective to examine the impact of the 
1995 Barcelona process and the subsequent EU-Egyptian Partnership Agreement of 
2001 on the growth rate of EU FDI into Egypt during the Barcelona era. 
It is also important to highlight the neo-Marxist perspective, which blames the 
structural barriers of the international capitalist system for the backwardness and 
underdevelopment of most developing countries. It attributes the unfriendly attitude 
of these country governments towards MNCs to the exploitation of these 
corporations of their national resources, an attitude prevailed in Egypt between the 
mid-1950s and the early 1970s. The neo-liberal perspective emphasises the 
importance of economic liberalisation and argues that economic liberalism is 
conducive to an improvement in the economic, political and social conditions of the 
states, a view that is currently supported and encouraged by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. 
The historical analysis explains briefly the development of European direct 
investment into Egypt from the early nineteenth century until the contemporary 
period. It shows that European direct investment grew rapidly in Egypt under liberal 
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economic policies and less government interference in the country's economic 
affairs, particularly between 1890 and 1920, when Egypt had an export-oriented 
economy based on one-crop - cotton. The introduction of limited economic and 
political liberalisation of the mid-1970s also produced a record FDI of US$4.6 billion 
in 1975. It also shows how the impact of the 1952 Revolution, which reoriented the 
economic system from a liberal to a centralised socialist system and allowed full 
government control over the country's economic, political and financial institutions, 
led to the decline of FDI in Egypt between 1956 and 1971. 
This study also adopts a comparative approach through which Egypt's FDI 
inflows from the EU under the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) of 1972 is 
compared, in terms of value, static and sectoral distribution, with those under the 
Barcelona process of 1995. This comparison allows me to examine whether the latter 
policy framework has significantly contributed to the growth of EU FDI into Egypt, 
in particular, and the country's economic development in general. 
The study attempts to answer the following questions: 
1. What impact does the development of the Euro-Egyptian economic relations 
have on the growth of EU direct investment in Egypt? 
2. To what extent has the development of Egypt's investment environment 
impacted on the growth of foreign direct investment into the country? 
3. How does the Barcelona process of 1995 impact directly on Egypt's 
economic development, particularly at the domestic level? 
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4. What are the main factors affecting the growth of EU FDI into Egypt during 
the Barcelona era? 
5. Structure of the Study 
This study comprises nine chapters. Chapter one provides a theoretical understanding 
of the concept and the definitions of FDI, its components and development from 
global and regional perspectives, as well as a brief description of the main theoretical 
debates surrounding it. Chapter two provides an historical overview to the 
development of European direct investment into Egypt from Mohamed Ali's era 
(1805-1840) until the GMP of 1972. It looks at the factors that led to the extension of 
European political and economic power into the Mediterranean region, and how this 
led to a progressive engagement of European capital and nationals in the Egyptian 
economy between the mid-nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth century. It ends 
with an examination of the political and economic transformation that began 
following the 1952 revolution, and how this affected European FDI into the country. 
Chapters three and four cover the period between the 1972 GMP and the 
Barcelona process of 1995. Chapter three investigates the impact of Egypt's internal 
legislative, legal, economic and political reforms on the country's investment 
environment during this period. In particular it looks at the impact of the Infitah 
policy of 1974 and Law 43 of the same year, on Egypt's FDI inflows. It also 
examines the institutional development of EU-Egyptian economic relations under the 
1972 GMP, the 1974 Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD), and the Cooperation agreement of 
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1977, which governed Egypt's economic relations with the EU until the ratification 
of the 2001 Association agreement. Chapter four uses the data collected from GAFI 
to provide statistical analysis of EU FDI into Egypt between 1972 and 1995. It 
begins with an overview of the global FDI inflows into Egypt, followed by an 
analysis of the resurgence and development of EU FDI flows into Egypt during that 
period. This is followed by a descriptive analysis of the static and sectoral 
distributions of EU FDI flows into the country and an examination of the impact of 
this investment on employment levels in Egypt between 1972 and 1995. 
Chapters five, six and seven cover the period between 1996 and 2004. Chapter 
five analyses the 1995 Barcelona process and four of its main dynamics, which had 
direct impact on EU-Egyptian economic relations. The creation of the Euro- 
Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010, South-South economic integration, 
financial and technical assistance, and the 2001 partnership agreement are examined 
in detail. Chapter six examines the EU's rising role in global investment, the 
Mediterranean region and Egypt, and provides descriptive and statistical analyses of 
the static and sectoral distribution of EU FDI into Egypt between 1996 and 2004. 
Chapter seven, a case study, examines British FDI into Egypt's manufacturing sector 
between 1996 and 2004, with especial reference to its impact on the Egyptian labour 
market. 
Chapters eight and nine look at some of the main internal and external 
determinants affecting EU FDI into Egypt between 1996 and 2004. Chapter eight 
analyses the impact of internal factors such as political and economic stability, 
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privatisation, institutional development and transparency, the role of the legal 
system, and infrastructure facilities, on the growth of EU FDI into Egypt. Chapter 
nine looks at the external factors affecting EU FDI flows into Egypt. It begins by 
highlighting the limitations of FDI in Egypt's investment strategy, and focuses on the 
impact of such issues as south-south economic cooperation, and the EU enlargement 
eastward on the growth of FDI into the country. The chapter ends by examining the 
impact of multilateral trade and investment regimes on Egypt's attractiveness to FDI. 
The thesis ends by concluding that despite the tremendous development in the 
EU-Egyptian economic relations over the past thirty three years, EU direct 
investment into Egypt has continued to encounter a significant number of obstacles 
that limited its growth until the end of 2004. This is largely because Egypt did not 
have a clear and defined investment strategy and that its economic policies were 
designed to deal with specific issues, regardless of their effects on the country's 
investment environment. If Egypt is to achieve a reasonable growth rate of FDI it 
must liberalise unilaterally its trade and investment regime and develop its 
institutions, legal system and regulatory framework. This may enable the country to 
maximise the benefit of the EU-Egyptian partnership and enhance its attractiveness 
to foreign investors, particularly from the EU. 
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Chapter One 
Foreign Direct Investment and the Economic 
Development of States: A Theoretical Perspective 
Economic growth is the ultimate objective of most economic policies and, as such, 
tops the economic agenda of developed and developing countries alike. The rate of 
growth is often determined by the level of investment in productive resources and by 
the increase, or decrease, in the productivity of these same resources. Until the mid- 
1990s, it was believed that investment in fixed capital was the most important 
determinant of growth, but recent studies have shown that increases in productivity 
through technical innovation are the main determinant of competitiveness and 
growth 38 This means that although fixed capital investment in plants and machinery 
is important, investment in education and training to improve the efficiency of the 
labour competent of the productive process is equally vital. 39 This is why FDI, 
which combines increased resources with innovation and technology transfer, has 
become a determinant factor in the development process. 
FDI may be easy to define in theory but its actual effects on economic growth 
have been widely debated by both the traditional and neo-liberal schools of thoughts. 
38 Brian Morgan, "Regional Issues in Inward Investment and Endogenous Growth" in S. Hill & B. 
Morgan (eds. ), Inward Investment, Business Finance and Regional Development, (London: 
Macmillan Business, 1998), p. 13; Indra de Soysa, Foreign direct investment, democracy and 
development: assessing contours, correlates, and concomitants of globalization, (London: Routledge 
Taylor & Francis Group, 2003), pp. 23-66; Yingpi Wei & Xiaming Liu (eds. ), Foreign direct 
investment in China, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2001), pp. 112-131; and Diprk R. Basu & 
Victoria Miroshnik (eds. ), Japanese Foreign Investments 1970-1998: perspectives and analyses, 
(New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), pp. 108-125. 
39 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Promoting Foreign Direct 
Investment in Developing Countries, (Paris: OECD, 1993), pp. 50-53. 
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Traditionalists consider FDI as a major dynamic of the structural power of 
international capitalism which is exploitive and harmful to developing countries - 
views that have recently been highlighted in the current debate on globalisation. 40 
This outlook originated in the historical experience of most developing countries 
during the colonial period. It argues that the penetration of Multinational 
Corporations (hereafter, MNCs) is likely to have undesirable political, economic and 
social impacts on host developing countries. Meanwhile, neo-liberals argue that FDI 
can bring substantial benefits by creating economic growth through the utilization of 
land, labour and capital in the productive process. This view is currently endorsed by 
most international financial institutions, including the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (hereafter, IMF). 
These varying interpretations raise more concerns and questions than they answer 
in regard to the practices and the objectives of MNCs in investing in developing 
countries. Traditional theories have, as yet, failed to provide an explanation for the 
geographical concentration of global FDI flows into the developing world. If MNCs 
are exploiting developing countries, why do the latter still struggle to attract a 
substantial proportion of global capital flows? If MNCs are driven by profit 
maximization, how can they observe moral and ethical policies in dealing with 
ao For discussion on globalisation and FDI see Uri Dadush, Dipak Dasgupta and Marc Uzan, Private 
Capital Flows in the Age of Globalisation: the Aftermath of the Asian Crisis, (Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar, 2000); John Dunning, Globalisation, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, (Oxford: 
Elsevier Science Ltd, 1998); M. Bordo, B. Eichengreen & D. Irwin, Is globalisation today really 
different than globalisation a hundred years ago? (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 1999); Anthony Bende-Nabende, Globalisation, FDI, Regional Integration and Sustainable 
Development: theory, evidence and policy, (Aldershort, Hants, UK: Ashgate, 2002); Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and development, Globalisation and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), 
OECD Country Studies, Vol. 2, Paris, 1997; and David Saari, Global Corporations and Sovereign 
Nations: Collision or Cooperation?, (London: Quorum Books, 1999); and OECD, Globalisation and 
Linkages to 2020: Challenges and Opportunities for OECD Countries, OECD, Pairs, 1996; and 
Mounir Zahran, "Rethinking globalisation", Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 620,9-15 January 2003. 
http: //weekly. ahram. org. eg/2003/620/ec l . htm. 
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authoritarian regimes in developing (host) countries? To what extent can FDI 
stabilise/destabilise the economic and political systems of host countries? What 
impact does FDI have on industrial and organisational development, employment, 
the environment, democratisation and the socio-political and socioeconomic 
development of the host countries? To what extent can economic and political 
liberalisation, particularly after the opening up economies for MNCs, affect the 
national character, identity and sovereignty of states? Can FDI bring about political, 
cultural and economic harmonisation between home and host countries? 
1.1. Definitions of FDI 
A theoretical understanding of FDI depends, to a large extent, on the way it has been 
defined. This is particularly true as FDI differs greatly from other forms of 
investment such as portfolio investment. 1 FDI is the category of international 
investment that highlights the willingness of investors to commit themselves to long- 
term investment, with management involvement, in enterprises in a foreign country. 
As one EU official has put it, FDI is "the kind of investment that reflects the 
objective by an investor in one country to obtain a lasting interest in an enterprise in 
another country, which implies a long-term relationship between the investor and the 
enterprise and a significant degree of influence by the investor on the management of 
the enterprise". 2 According to the World Investment Report 2003 published by the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (hereafter, UNCTAD), FDI 
41 Portfolio investment represents passive holdings of securities such as foreign stocks, bonds, or other 
financial assets, none of which entails active management or control of the securities' issuer by the 
investor. Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia. http: //en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Portfolio investment 
42 Stephane Quefelec, "European direct investment in the Mediterranean countries", Eurostat, 
Statistics in Focus, Brussels, Theme 2-13/2003, p. 3. 
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is "an investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest 
and control by a resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent 
enterprise) in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the foreign 
direct investor. "43 This definition also implies that the investor exerts a significant 
degree of influence on the management of the enterprise located in the other 
economy. Such investment involves both the initial transaction between the two 
entities and all subsequent transactions between them and among affiliates, both 
incorporated and unincorporated. 
These definitions highlight two fundamental concerns that distinguish FDI from 
other foreign portfolio investment. The first is the intention of the investor to 
maintain a long-term commitment to the foreign enterprise. The decision-making 
process for long-term investment is complicated and involves difficult questions on 
what, how, why, where and when to invest substantial proportions of capital beyond 
the investor's home country borders. The decision to invest does not only depend on 
the area of specialisation and the capacity of the foreign firm to gain market access to 
a particular country, but also on the political and economic environment within 
which foreign companies operate. The second concern is the involvement of the 
entrepreneur in the management of the company. This involvement is based on 
`ownership equities' that give foreign entrepreneurs the power to have their say in 
the management of the company. 
43 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 
2003, (Geneva: United Nations, 2003), p. 231. 
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Thus, ownership is a central factor in the promotion of FDI as it determines the 
relationship between foreign investors and host countries. 
4 In this context, FDI can 
be defined as an investment in which a company acquires a "substantial controlling 
interest in a foreign firm above a 10 per cent share or set up a subsidiary in a foreign 
country. "45 Ownership takes the form of acquisitions of capital and equity in existing 
firms or of greenfield investment in new companies. Foreign equity depends largely 
on the degree of political and economic liberalisation of the host countries. The legal 
systems in most developed countries allow complete foreign ownership, but in many 
developing countries investment laws restrict foreign equity to less than 49 per cent 
of the total equity of the company. Whatever the economic and political nature of the 
host country, nominal shares of foreign equity in joint ventures account for more 
than 10 per cent of shares, a level that gives investors the right to participate in 
management and to have a seat on the company executive's board 46 
FDI comprises equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company loans, and 
takes the form of either flows or stocks. 7 According to the World Investment Report 
2003, FDI flow is the capital provided by foreign investors or received from an FDI 
enterprise by foreign investors, while FDI stock is the value of the share of capital 
and reserves attributable to the parent enterprise, plus the net indebtedness of 
affiliates to the parent enterprise. 8 This means that FDI capital does not necessarily 
44 United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, The Determinants of Foreign Direct 
Investment: A Survey of the Evidence, (New York: United Nations, 1992), pp. 39 & 55-57. See also 
David Conklin and Don Lecraw, Foreign Ownership Restrictions and Liberalisation Reforms, (Hants, 
UK: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997), pp. 1-5 8. 
45 John-ren Chen, "Foreign Direct Investment, International Financial Flows and Geography" in Chen, 
John-ren (ed. ), Foreign Direct Investment, (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 6. 
46 H. Said (ed. ), "International Financial Report of Arab Republic of Egypt", Center for Economic & 
Financial Research & Studies, Faculty of Economics and Political Sciences, Cairo University, Vol. 
No. 2, October 1999, pp. 37-39. 
47 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, pp. 231-232. 
48 Ibid, pp. 231-232. 
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have to come directly from outside the host country. Rather it can be capital 
borrowed from another foreign firm operating under the investment law or it can be 
capital reinvested by the same firm or its affiliates in other economic activities in the 
same host country. 
FDI has also been classified as vertical or horizontal investment, depending on 
the objective of the firm and the nature of the production process. 9 Vertical FDI 
aims at entering a market of non-tradable products and services, utilising the 
resources of host countries and eliminating the high cost of trade, particularly 
transportation, tariffs and customs-50 It is characterised by the geographical 
fragmentation of the production process in several countries, where production 
activities are produced in some areas but distributed and marketed in others. It is 
often conducted through regional or global strategies set by specific companies in 
order to dominate regional markets. 
On the contrary, horizontal FDI is characterised by the similarity of the 
production process in both native and host countries, and it is located where most 
outputs of the production in the host country subsidiary are sold in the same host 
country for domestic needs. Such investment tends to be carried out in industries 
requiring high research and development (hereafter, R&D) or industries associated 
with complex technological and production procedures. 5' This kind of FDI gives 
foreign firms monopoly power over a certain product in a host country, while 
allowing it to enjoy the benefit of cheap labour and production costs. 
49 See for example Lobna Abdellatif, "American Direct Investment in Egypt", Center for American 
Studies, Cairo University, Vol. 2, January 2003. pp. 17-20. 
50 Ibid, p. 3. 
51 John-ren Chen (2000), Foreign Direct Investment, p. 20. 
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1.2. Globalisation and the Growth of FDI 
At the present time, there is still insufficient data to prove conclusively that the 
growth of FDI is associated particularly with the process of globalisation or that their 
linkage is inevitable. But analysing some aspects of the present, and past, phase of 
the internationalisation of production during the nineteenth century indicates a link 
between the acceleration of international production and the spread of capital across 
the world. This has been evident in the growth of international trade; freedom of 
movement of capital; and the increase in the number of international companies 
operating in more than one country. Prior to the twentieth century, this phenomenon 
was achieved through a combination of the opening up of the global economic 
system and the forces of imperialism which encouraged and safeguarded foreign 
capital investment worldwide. Such conditions provided great opportunities for many 
large and medium sized firms, and allowed imperial powers such as Britain, France 
and the Netherlands to spread their activities beyond their national borders and 
operate across the Americas, Asia, Africa and the Middle East. 
The contemporary process of globalisation exhibits a similar pattern as the 
growth of MNCs in size and number highlights the relationship between the growth 
of FDI and the advance of globalisation. 52 This phase is clearly driven by highly 
measurable economic processes such as the growth of trade and the rapid spread of 
52 Joseph Battat, Isaiah Frank & Shen Xiaofang, "Suppliers to Multinationals: Linkage Programs to 
Strengthen Local Companies in Developing Countries", Foreign Investment Advisory Service, 
Occasional Paper, No. 6, (Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 1996), pp. 7-10. 
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FDI flows worldwide. 53 Although it began with intensive economic liberalisation and 
privatisation programmes launched by the British and American governments in the 
early 1980s, 54 the present phase of globalisation was accelerated further by the 
tremendous developments in the economic sphere such as the economic liberalisation 
of developing countries, the spread of regional economic integration, and the 
strengthening of the international trading system through the creation of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995. 
Indeed, the extent of financial globalisation is wider and deeper than ever before. 
Since the early 1990s, statistics have shown that FDI accounts for one-third of global 
output, three-quarters of commercial technological capacity, and about three-quarters 
of all world trade. 55 Global FDI grew by an annual increase of 27 per cent between 
1983 and 1990, which seemed impressive at that time, but the rate of growth 
recorded during the past 15 years was much greater. For example, the global stock of 
FDI, increased from US$2 trillion in 1990 to reach approximately US$9 trillion in 
2004.56 The total global FDI flows increased rapidly from US$315 billion in 1995 to 
reach an estimated US$1.3 trillion in 2000.57 Due to a decline in the global economy 
in the following year, this level was decreased in value by 41 per cent in 2001,13 per 
53 Andra de Soysa, Foreign Direct Investment, Democracy and Development, p. 10; H. Milner & R. 
Keohane "Internationalisation and Domestic Politics: An introduction" in H. Milner & R. Keohane 
(eds. ), Internationalisation and Domestic Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
54 Frank Sader, "Privatisation and Foreign Investment in the Developing World: 1988-1992", The 
World Bank, Policy research, Working Paper No. 1202, October 1993, p. 7; and International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), "Privatisation: Principles and Practice", The World Bank, Washington D. C., 1995, 
pp. 9-11. 
UNCTAD, World Investment Reports 1985-2003; and J. Dunning, "Governments, Markets and 
Multinational Enterprises: some emerging issues", International Trade Journal, Vol. 7, fall 1992, pp. 
111-29. 
sb UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005, p. ixx. rD 
57 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2001, p. 9. '". 
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cent in 2002,12 per cent 2003 and 14 per cent in 2004, when global FDI inflows 
reached US$648 billion. 58 
Despite such statistics, one can hardly assume that FDI has reached the entire 
world economy or is evenly distributed. FDI is still concentrated in developed states, 
which attract almost three-quarters of the world's total FDI flows, with the US and 
the UK both the largest investors and recipients. 59 However, FDI flows have reached 
some developing countries such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, 
China, Mexico and Ireland, some of whom have recently emerged as both host and 
home economies for MNCs. This has led to an increase in the share of developing 
countries in outward flows from 5 per cent in the early 1980s to 36 per cent in 2004, 
and it has also resulted in some of these states not only becoming exporters of FDI 
but also assuming a role in enhancing world production. 60 
Along with developments in economic liberalisation and world trade, there has 
been a growing tendency in the global economy towards the liberalisation of FDI 
regimes and the strengthening of international standards for the treatment of foreign 
investors. This tendency has been reinforced by pressure from major international 
financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF on governments in 
developing countries to promote economic liberalisation. Meanwhile, the recognition 
of the role of FDI in economic development has led some governments to adopt 
58 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005, p. 3. 
59 The uneven distribution of FDI inflow stock was highlighted by the marginal share of Africa, which 
was estimated at around 2 per cent of the total FDI inflow stock in 1990, while only 20 developed 
countries accounted for almost 79 per cent. De Soysa, (2003), Foreign direct investment, Democracy, 
and Development, p. 14. 
60 In 2004, the share of developing countries of global FDI increased by 40 per cent to reach US$233 
billion from the previous year. Almost 60 per cent of this capital was received by the top five 
recipients, which were China, Hong Kong (China), Brazil, Mexico, and Singapore, in that order. 
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unilateral and multilateral measures to improve their business and investment 
environments. For example, between 1991 and 2004, some 2,156 regulatory changes 
were introduced in national FDI regimes, of which 2,006 aimed at creating a more 
favourable environment for FDI. 61 In 2004,235 of the 271 regulatory changes made 
by 102 countries were more favourable to foreign investors. 62 There has also been an 
increase in the number of bilateral investment treaties (BITS) and double taxation 
treaties (DTTs), which totalled 2,392 and 2,559, respectively, between 1991 and 
2004.63 These trends are continuing to grow further as governments are now more 
willing than ever to offer further guarantees and incentives to foreign investors; more 
liberal entry and operational conditions to foreign firms; and increased liberalisation 
and privatisation in economic sectors of interest to foreign entrepreneurs. 64 
Theoretically, the liberalisation of FDI can allow firms greater freedom in 
making international location decisions and in choosing the mode of entry whether 
through trade, joint-ventures or licensing that suits the market and the business 
environment. In conjunction with privatisation, this can open up new areas of 
economic activity and, in turn, increase the size of the national and regional market. 
Moreover, the liberalisation of the FDI regime can help international firms to 
enhance their competitiveness by spreading their activities over different regions in 
61 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005, p. 26. 
62 Almost 87 per cent of these regulatory changes aimed to open up new areas to FDI. They implied 
further liberalisation to investment regimes either through various types of incentives or greater 
investor protection. 
63 BITs accounted for 40 per cent between developed and developing countries, 25 per cent among 
developing countries. China, Egypt, the Republic of Korea and Malaysia have each signed more than 
40 treaties with other developing countries, UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005, pp. 22-30. 
64 Kathy Megyery and Frank Sader, "Facilitating Foreign Participation in Privatisation", Foreign 
Investment Advisory Service Occasional Paper, No. 8, (Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 1996), 
pp. 2-7. 
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order to attain locational advantages. This makes FDI the preferred way for 
companies to remain competitive in the global market. 
The growth of global FDI can be attributed to structural and functional changes 
that have occurred within the global economic system since the early 1990s. On a 
structural level, the collapse of the communist economic system in eastern and 
central Europe and the efforts made by these states to open up their economies and to 
integrate into the global economy increased investment opportunities for MNCs. 
Other countries in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East recognised the positive 
impact of FDI on East Asia's economic growth and they pursued investment policies 
favourable to FDI. Indeed, one could attribute the rapid growth in FDI to the pursuit 
by many countries of national policies attractive to FDI and the introduction of 
regional arrangements intended to create a favourable FDI environment. 
This latter factor is evident in most regional integration arrangements and 
partnership agreements that contain FDI provisions. Notably, such provisions have 
become key components of the recent association agreements between the EU and 
East European, Latin American and southern Mediterranean states, including 
Egypt. 65 This not only stresses the importance of regionalism as a dynamic for FDI 
growth, but also the linkage between regional integration and capital inflows into 
large economic blocks. Evidence of the changes that have taken place in the post- 
Cold War global economic system can be seen in the increase in the number of 
65 In the early 1990s, the EU conducted a series of trade agreements with Central and Eastern 
European countries. In 1995, The EU established the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, known also as 
the Barcelona process, under which the EU conducted bilateral association agreements with its 
southern partner states. For example, Egypt concluded its association agreement with the EU on 25 
June 2001. 
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international companies considered to be MNCs. They increased from about 44,000 
parent companies and 280,000 foreign affiliates in 1997 to almost 70,000 parent 
companies and 690,000 foreign affiliates in 2004.66 Such a rise has been 
accompanied by integrated production structures adopted by MNCs to expand 
geographically the production process in order to benefit from cost and logistical 
advantages. 67 
However, the significance of MNCs is not their growth in number but in their 
financial and technological capacities to transfer capital as well as a whole culture of 
advanced technology, knowledge, management and marketing skills that can have a 
direct impact on host economies. 68 MNCs are the main source of capital required for 
investment. 69 They possess almost three-quarters of the capital used for global FDI, 
which gives them the financial capacity to determine global capital flows. The 
structure of these corporations enables them to launch and coordinate their activities 
globally despite fundamental political, economic and cultural differences from one 
country to another. 70 Thus, MNCs, which have internationalised the production 
process and made the global economy more integrated, have been instruments of 
globalisation. 
66 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1997, (Geneva: United Nations, 1997), pp. 3-7; and 
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2004, p. 13. This is in addition to the variety of non-equity 
arrangements with other firms such as franchising, licensing, subcontracting and management 
contracting, which have not been counted for. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2000, pp. 8-9. 
67 During the 1960 and 70s, MNCs tend to adopt `stand alone' strategies by creating independent 
satellite production facilities, which were hardly linked to other affiliates in different regions. 
68 At a national level, MNCs can have greater role in national economies, where foreign capital 
accounts for a substantial proportion in the capital formation of the states. 
69 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, p. 110. 
70 United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporation, The Determinant of Foreign Direct 
Investment: A Survey of the Evidence, (New York: United Nations, 1992), pp. 66-68. 
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The role of MNCs in the economic development of states is determined by three 
main factors: the degree of economic liberalisation; the mode of entry, including 
large-scale privatisation programmes; and the freedom of foreign ownership. 
Regarding the first factor, the role of MNCs depends on whether or not they are 
allowed to penetrate the market of a given country. Market penetration depends on 
the type of government, its economic philosophy and attitude to MNCs. An analysis 
of the geographical distribution of FDI worldwide shows that the marginal share of 
FDI in developing countries is in part due to suspicions over MNCs intentions to 
invest in their economies. 7' This has been due to restrictions on market access for 
MNCs as well as protectionist policies adopted by governments to avoid exposure to 
international competition. The concentration of capital in specific regions such as the 
US, the EU and Japan reflects not only a degree of harmony between governments 
and MNCs, but also a positive relationship based on the ability of governments to 
liberalise their economies, pursue market-oriented policies and improve their 
economic environment by making them more attractive to FDI. 
Most data presented by UNCTAD has identified a link between the spread of FDI 
and the implementation of large scale privatisation programmes. Foreign investors 
are active purchasers of the sale of state-owned companies that produce strategic 
goods such as minerals and cotton or those operating in vital economic sectors such 
as communications. This was evident during the 1990s, when most global FDI was 
done through cross-border acquisitions rather than mergers. While cross-border 
mergers did not exceed 2.3 per cent of the total number of deals in 1999, sales 
through acquisitions reached as high as 65.3 per cent of total sales of companies, 
'1 During the 1960s and 1970s, most developing country governments associated MNCs with the 
norms and practices of imperialism, and hence their operations were limited to the capitalist world. 
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15.4 per cent of deals where more than 50 per cent of ownership was transferred, and 
16.2 per cent of deals that included a transfer between 10 and 49 per cent of the total 
share of company equity. 72 
This data highlights that the difference in the equity share of foreign companies 
reflects the nature of government regulations as well as corporate strategies. States 
with liberal economic and regulatory systems are more attractive to MNCs, 
particularly those formulating their long-term investment policies. This case is often 
found in developed capitalist states that allow freedom of ownership. However, states 
with poor regulatory systems are less attractive to foreign investors because they tend 
to limit foreign ownership. The more a country moves towards the capitalist 
economic system, the more attractive it becomes to foreign investors. Evidence of 
this can be found in transitional economies such as China, Singapore, Mexico, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, where FDI has contributed significantly to economic 
growth. 
The data also highlights the importance of the right to private and foreign 
ownership. Most MNCs prefer to acquire full or large equity shares of privatised 
companies rather than equal or nominal shares in order to maintain control over their 
assets, operations and management. Foreign companies may consider greater size of 
equity when it comes to operations requiring economies of scale, large expenditures 
for R&D or the expansion of distribution networks. 73 The rationale behind this is 
that large-scale equity can provide the company with protective functions such as a 
stable position in the market, sizeable profits, and strength against competitors. Size 
72 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, p. 101. 
73 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2000, p. 143. 
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also matters for foreign companies that aim to use a particular market as a base or a 
platform for regional expansion in production and marketing. 
1.3. FDI and Economic Growth: The Neo-Marxist Perspective 
Despite the growing tendency towards adopting economic policies attractive to 
MNCs, there is a fundamental theoretical divide over the effect of foreign capital on 
economic growth, particularly between those who perceive it as a vehicle for 
modernisation and those who view it as a tool of structural imperialism. 74 The 
origins of the debate can be found in the fact that capital gains from FDI contributed 
to tremendous growth in the colonial powers, while the impact of these policies 
added to poverty, backwardness and a deterioration in the socioeconomic conditions 
of the colonised countries. 
Neo-Marxist and dependency theorists place much of the responsibility for the 
failure of developing countries to achieve a reasonable rate of economic growth on 
the structural barriers of the international capitalist system against development in 
these countries. 75 They argue that the dominant position enjoyed by the industrial 
74 See Duncan Snidal, "International Cooperation among Relative Gains Maximizers", International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, Issue No. 4, (December 1991, pp. 387-402; Robert Keohane, 
"International Institutions: Tow Approaches", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. No. 32, Issue No. 
4, (December 1988), pp. 379-396; Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation among 
Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses", World Politics, Vol. No. 44, Issue No. 3, (April 1992), pp. 466- 
496; Ernest Haas, Beyond the Nation State, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964); Jeffrey 
Leonard, "Multinational Corporations and Politics in Developing Countries", World Politics, Vol. 32, 
No. 3, (April 1980), pp. 454-483; J. Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism" in G. Modelesi 
(ed. ), Transnational Corporations and World Order, (San Fransisco: W. H. Freeman & Co., 1979), 
vp155-171; and H. Megahed, Imperialism as a Global Phenomenon, (Cairo: World Books, 1985). 
For details on the `world-system theory' see Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System 1: 
Capitalist Agriculture and origins of the European World-System in the Sixteenth Century, (New 
York: Academic Press, 1974); I. Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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states and the subsequent dependency of poor countries on the rich created profound 
inequalities in the North-South relationship. 76 This dominance is central to 
maintaining the present structure in the capitalist world-system. 77 Such views based 
their critiques on the structure of the capitalist world system and imperialism and 
hence did not only call for more economic autonomy and sovereignty for national 
development but also for a new international economic order, which would make the 
world system less biased against developing countries. 78 They argued that the 
capitalist world system was to blame for the core-periphery relationship between 
poor and rich states, and that this structure was responsible for the continued 
peripheralisation of the underdeveloped regions. 79 
The underdevelopment of the peripheral states, neo-Marxists argued, was caused 
by the nature of post-colonial control and exploitation by the western powers, and 
these both directly and indirectly affected the process of development in the 
peripheral regions. 80 Underdevelopment might occur directly through trade, 
University Press, 1979); and I. Wallerstein, The Modern World-System 11: Mercantilism and the 
Consolidation of the European World-Economy 1600-1750, (New York: Academic Press, 1980). 
76 Paul Viotto & M. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, second 
edition, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), pp. 459-461. 
" The structure of the capitalist world-system has been, since the emergence of capitalism in Europe 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, based on a core, a periphery and a semi-periphery. The core 
regions have historically been engaged in the most advanced economic activities such as banking, 
manufacturing, technologically advanced agriculture and ship building. The periphery has provided 
raw materials such as minerals and timber to fuel the core's economic expansion. The semi-periphery 
also involves in a mix of production activities, some associated with the core areas and some with 
peripheral areas. Class structure varies in each region depending on how the dominant class relates to 
the world economy. This division of labour requires as well as increases inequality between regions. 
Within this structure, the basic role of the state is to ensure the continuation of the capitalist mode of 
production. 
78 S. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global Liberalism, (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1985); cited in de Soysa, Foreign Direct Investment Democracy, and 
Development, p. 35. 
79 On the issue of neo-colonialism see, for example, J. Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism" 
in Modelesi, G. (ed. ), Transnational Corporations and World Order, (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman 
& Co., 1979), pp. 155-171; and H. Megahed, Imperialism as a Global Phenomenon, (Cairo: World 
Books, 1985) (in Arabic). 
80 The most detailed studies on this issue were made by Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped 
Africa, (London: Bogle-l'Ouverture, 1973); Stephen Gill & David Law, "Global Hegemony and the 
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economic aid and direct investment. It could also happen indirectly without direct 
western involvement through the cooperation and the role played by some internal 
elites in developing countries, who considered themselves part of the capitalist 
system and hence were willing to participate in the exploitation of their own states by 
the core states and their MNCs. 8' While these theorists acknowledged the capacity 
of MNCs to contribute to economic development, they have argued that the `triple 
alliance' between MNCs, host countries and local elite often acts to distort the 
process of development. This alliance can also diminish the levels of social welfare 
by creating both income inequality in host developing countries and a new 
international division of labour where wealth is being created unevenly. 82 They 
argued that foreign investment was supposed to expand the manufacturing base of 
the economy and mitigate the harmful effect of dependency on primary commodity 
exports, but the fact that MNCs are driven by profitability has forced them to focus 
on, and capture, the exclusive sectors of the economy, distorting the development 
process so that FDI led to a process of uneven development. 83 
Neo-Marxists also link the process of underdevelopment and the democratic 
deficit in developing countries to the disarticulation of the economy and the unequal 
distribution of wealth, where only the elites who were connected to the world system 
Structural Power of Capital" International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4,1989, pp. 475-499; and 
Frank Klink, "Rationalising Core-Periphery Relations: The Analytical Foundations of Structural 
Inequality in World Politics", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 2,1990, pp. 183-209. 
81 The role of domestic forces (often so-called national bourgeoisie or comprador class), who ally 
themselves with foreign capitalists in the exploitation of their own society, is dealt with in several 
studies. See for example Samir Amin, Neo-Colonialism in West Africa, (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1974), S. Amin, Imperialism and Unequal Development, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1977); and F. H. Cardoso & E. Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1979). 
82 De Soysa, Foreign Direct Investment, Democracy, and Development, p. 38. 
83 FDI increases the wealth of the developed countries and hence enhances the process of economic 
development, while exploitation through FDI in developing countries decreases their wealth and 
hence leads to underdevelopment. See for example S. Krasner (1985), Structural Conjlict: The Third 
World against Global Liberalism, p. 81-94. 
58 
benefited from the core-periphery interaction while many others were left worse 
off. 84 This inequality brought with it other harmful manifestations such as class 
tension, political violence, rebellion and crime, factors that affect directly the 
socioeconomic and socio-political development of all states. They have also argued 
that MNCs can influence the politics and the decision-making process in native and 
host countries alike, particularly when it comes to formulating policies regarding 
strategic economic sectors such as communications, oil and energy. 85 The political 
influence of MNCs has raised fears among the governments of some developing 
countries, particularly when these corporations dominant or monopolise production 
and marketing in strategic economic sectors. 
1.4. FDI and Economic Growth: The Neo-Liberal Perspective 
Neo-liberals argue that this inequality in the distribution of wealth between 
developed and developing countries can be reduced through advantages of 
backwardness. 86 They argue that backwardness is advantageous for developing 
countries in the process of economic development because diffusion takes place from 
the core industrialised states to the periphery at faster rates than the core is able to 
adopt epochal innovations in key sectors. 87 This analysis is relatively undermined by 
the fact that such diffusion occurred at a much slower pace over the past 50 years 
84 L. Armijo, "Mixed Blessings: Expectations about Capital Flows and Democracy in Emerging 
Markets", in L. Armijo (ed. ), Financial Globalisation and Democracy in Emerging Markets, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1999), p. 22. 
85 S. S. Zarnouka, Multinational Corporations and Development, the Political Dimensions, Centre for 
the study of Developing Countries, Cairo university, Cairo, Issue 21,2002, pp. 20-21 (in Arabic). 
86 The concept of `backwardness' was first introduced in A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness 
in Historical Perspective, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962). 
97 De Soysa, Foreign direct investment, democracy and development, p. 29. 
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because the legacy of colonialism and the practices of MNCs forced many 
developing countries not only to minimize the level of cooperation with former 
colonial industrial states, but also to limit the access of MNCs into their markets. 
Unlike neo-Marxists who blame the world capitalist system for the backwardness 
of developing countries, neo-liberals argue that the internal conditions of these 
countries are the main cause of their underdevelopment. They draw their analysis 
from the internal political, economic and cultural differences between developed and 
developing countries. They believe that economic liberalism creates the right 
condition for political development, economic growth and social improvement, and 
hence modernisation has become a permanent feature of the development process in 
most capitalist industrial states. In their view, this is not the case in most developing 
countries, where authoritarianism and a centralised economy often determine the 
development process. In developing countries, modernisation is retarded by the 
inability of the state to adapt to changing political, economic and social situations; 
hence underdevelopment is caused by internal political upheaval, inadequate political 
institutions, inefficient economic policies and social incoherence, all conditions that 
make the political, economic and cultural environment highly unattractive to foreign 
capital. 
Thus, the relationship between political and economic liberalisation and the 
process of development has a strong theoretical basis in neo-liberal thought. 
Goverment involvement in economic activities is dangerous to freedom, 
concentrates power in the hands of a small elite, and destroys social pluralism. While 
less government interference in the economy enhances the market, strengthens the 
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private sector as an engine for economic growth, and increases the prospects for 
democracy as it allows alternative forces to develop within society. 
88 The positive 
effect of foreign capital and democracy on economic growth encourages neo-liberals 
through the so-called `Washington Consensus'89 to exert political pressure on 
developing countries to open up their economies; liberalise their trade and 
investment regimes; and launch comprehensive political and economic reforms. 
This trend has led to a growing tendency across the developing world towards 
economic and trade liberalisation. Political liberalisation, however, seems to be much 
slower than economic because of the reluctance of many ruling regimes in 
developing countries to concede, or even share, power. The inability of these regimes 
to utilise effectively their national resources and to achieve an acceptable level of 
economic growth forced them to allow MNCs, with their financial and technological 
capabilities, to participate in the process of economic development. 
Neo-liberals argue that capitalism is synonymous with a free market economy at 
home and free trade abroad; hence economic development can only succeed under 
liberal economic conditions. 9° Such conditions allow for the most effective 
utilisation by the state of its physical, human and capital resources in the productive 
process. This often leads to a higher rate of economic growth, whereas 
underutilisation of these resources is the main cause of underdevelopment in 
developing countries, particularly the lack of capital due to low savings rate. This 
88 De Soysa, Foreign direct investment, democracy and development, pp. 41-42. 
89 The Washington Consensus is an expression used to highlight the identical objectives of the policies 
and strategies promoted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for economic 
liberalisation. During the late 1980s and the early 1990s, these institutions exercised tremendous 
pressure on many developing countries in order to launch and implement economic reforms and 
structural adjustment programmes. 
90 Salah El-Amrousi, Economist at the Centre for Arab and African Research, "Between ideology and 
reality", Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 678,19-24 February 2004. 
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particularly the lack of capital due to low savings rate. This places significant 
importance on the role that foreign capital investment can play in the economic 
growth of developing countries, especially where FDI becomes the main source of 
capital, knowledge and technology. 91 This makes FDI a key aspect in the North- 
South interaction. 
The neo-liberal theoretical perspective also stresses the importance of economic 
and trade liberalisation that is conducive to economic growth in the industrialised 
states; and that such a process, if implemented in developing countries, can benefit 
greatly from open access to the much larger markets in the developed world 92 It 
highlights the necessity to differentiate between the policy of import-substitution 
adopted by the governments of many developing countries and those of export-led 
economic policies practised by the industrialised states. 
The economic miracle of the East Asian economies strengthens the argument that 
trade liberalisation serves as a mechanism for economic revolution in countries 
whose resources were previously underdeveloped. 3 As such foreign trade and 
investment cannot be considered as a zero-sum game, but a process in which every 
country gains. Industrial states gain substantial profit from their foreign trade and 
investment, while developing countries benefit from gaining access to the 
91 On the effect of FDI through knowledge and technology transfer on economic development in 
developing countries see S. Lall & P. Streeten, Foreign Investment, Transnationals and developing 
countries, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977); and S. Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth: Rate, 
Structure and Spread, (New Heaven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966). On the relation between FDI 
and technology transfer see R. Leonhardt, Foreign Direct Investment, Ownership and the Transfer of 
Technology, (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2004). 
92 De Soysa, Foreign direct investment, democracy and development, p. 28. 
93 M. Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World:: An Introduction to Problems and Policies 
in a Global Perspective, (New York: Longman, 1977), p. 33. 
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technological advances and the importation of machinery and scientific knowledge 
which contributes to the creation of their industrial bases 
94 
From an FDI perspective, multinational corporations are major instruments of 
modernisation as they provide advanced corporate management; remove the 
bureaucratic and cultural barriers to productivity; introduce specialisation in 
production; and encourage exposure to the global market. States with limited 
national resources can benefit from the availability of huge capital flows possessed 
by these corporations. If allowed to access a particular market, MNCs can improve 
market structure by developing production processes, strengthening the private 
sector, increasing exports, and generating employment. 
The growing importance of MNCs in economic development is also reflected not 
only in allowing developing countries to improve the internal dynamics of their 
markets through deregulation and competitiveness, but also in the significant rise in 
the number of countries receiving and investing sizeable amounts of FDI. The 
number of countries reporting inward FDI capital of more than US$10 billion 
increased from just 17 countries in 1985 to 51 countries in 2000.95 This rise has been 
matched by serious efforts by MNCs to enhance competitiveness by spreading their 
activities over different regions in order to attain locational advantage. 
94 The impact of FDI on the process of industrialisation in emerging economies in discussed in great 
details in H. Hughes & Y. Seng, Foreign Investment and Industrialisation in Singapore, (Canberra: 
Australian National University Press, 1969); and H. Hill, Foreign Investment and Industrialisation in 
Indonesia, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
95 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2001, p. 49. 
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1.5. FDI and Economic Growth: The Regional Perspective 
The relationship between FDI and economic development has been examined in 
several studies dealing with regional integration. 96 Some of these have found a 
positive interaction between global trends of FDI flows and the process of 
regionalism. These findings are based on empirical evidence from regional 
arrangements such as the EU, NAFTA and ASEAN, which indicates that regionalism 
changes the economic environment in a way that is favourable to MNCs and local 
firms alike. 7 
These studies also highlight a strong relationship between the entry mode of 
MNCs and regional economic developments, most notably free trade areas. 98 
Regional trade agreements both intentionally and unintentionally serve the interests 
of MNCs not only by bypassing trade barriers through FDI but also by creating large 
markets with a wide range of product specialisation. Such factors allowed the three 
largest economic regions (the EU, the US and Japan) to account for the bulk of 
international production, providing and receiving most global FDI. Data shows that 
between 1998 and 2000, these regions accounted for 75 per cent of global FDI 
96 M. Schiff & L. A. Winters, Regional Integration and Development, (Washington D. C.: The World 
Bank, 2003); De Soysa, Foreign Direct Investment, Democracy, and Development: assessing 
contours, correlates, and concomitants of globalisation, (London: Routledge, 2003); and J-r. Chen, 
"Foreign Direct Investment, International Financial Flows and Geography" in Chen J. (ed. ), Foreign 
Direct Investment, (London: Macmillan, 2000). 
97 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Regional Integration in the 
Asia Pacific: Issues and Prospects, (Paris: OECD and the Bob Hawke Prime Ministerial Centre at the 
University of South Australia, 2005), pp. 27-59. 
98 See for example T. Ito & A. Krueger, The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in East Asian 
Economic Development, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2000); J-r. Chen, "Foreign Direct 
Investment, International Financial Flows and Geography" in Chen, J-r (ed. ), Foreign Direct 
Investment, (London: Macmillan, 2000); and M. Schiff & L. A. Winters, Regional Integration and 
Development, (Washington D. C.: The World Bank, 2003). 
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inflows and 85 per cent of outflows, and were home to nearly 50,000 MNCs and host 
to nearly 100,000 foreign affiliates. 9 
These studies also found a positive relationship between the size of the market 
and the growth of FDI. One study on European integration concluded that the EU 
experienced a significant rise in FDI from outside the Community, as well as from 
within its member states, following the signing of the Single European Act 
(hereafter, SEA) in 1986.100 The SEA allowed for mutual recognition of most 
legislative instruments such as national standards and the single licence principle, 
which strongly improved opportunities for market access. It provided the framework 
and the rules that ensured reciprocity and competitiveness, the two most important 
aspects for foreign companies operating in host countries. 
Data also shows that European integration was the main stimulus for the growth 
of FDI into the EU, as well as between the EU and the European Free trade 
Association (hereafter, EFTA). Indeed, the growth of FDI inflows into the EU, which 
reached some US$617 billion in 2000, was due to deepening regional integration 
during the 1990s, political stability, market size, developed infrastructure and the 
unification of fiscal and monetary policies that resulted in the introduction of the 
Euro in 2002. Such measures stimulated foreign investment within the EU, with the 
UK becoming the largest outward investor within the EU in 2000.101 Cross-border 
99 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2001, p. 9. 
10° C. Smekal &R Sausgruber, "Determinants of FDI in Europe" in Chen, J. (ed. ), Foreign Direct 
Investment, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000), pp. 35-36. 
101 This was mainly due to major cross-border M&As such as the acquisition of Mannesmann by 
VodafoneAirTouch (the largest deal ever worldwide until 2000). UNCTAD, World Investment Report 
2001, Promoting Linkages, (New York & Paris: United Nations, 2001), p. 15. 
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Mergers and Acquisitions (hereafter, M&As) 102 were important in areas such as 
telecommunications and the automobile industry and, to a lesser extent, in the 
banking sector, which tends to seek profits by expansion into emerging markets. 103 
EU growth has also been attributed to the tendency toward consolidation and 
concentration in the financial sector, which led to the formation of regional financial 
groups such as Nordea in 2000.104 Almost half of all EU FDI took place within the 
region, with few exceptions, such as Austria, where two-thirds of its outflows were 
directed towards Central and Eastern European countries. 105 Most FDI inflows to the 
EU are from the US, while a substantial level of outflows is increasingly directed 
towards the ten new EU countries, in line with rising privatisation and their accession 
into the Community in May 2004. 
The objectives of regional economic arrangements have gone beyond the 
elimination of trade barriers to focus on the liberalisation of investment, including 
FDI. From the early 1960s, regional agreements have been developed in their 
substance and character from partial regionalism that aimed at protecting member 
states against non-member countries towards total liberalisation, which aimed at 
102 The term Mergers and acquisitions refers to the aspect of corporate finance strategy and 
management dealing with the merging and acquiring of different companies as well as other assets. 
Usually mergers occur in a friendly setting where executives from the respective companies 
participate in a due diligence process to ensure a successful combination of all parts. On other 
occasions, acquisitions can happen through hostile takeover by purchasing the majority of outstanding 
shares of a company in the open stock market. Technically what differentiates a merger from an 
acquisition is how it is financed. A merger is often financed by an all stock deal. An acquisition can 
involve cash and debt combination, or just cash, or a combination of cash as stock of the purchasing 
entity. The motives behind M&A that are considered to add shareholder value are economies of scale, 
increased revenues or market share, cross selling, use of complementary resources and taxes, while 
diversification, overextension and empire building are thought to not add shareholder value. 
http: //en. wikipedia. ore/Mergers and acquisitions 
103 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2001, Promoting Linkages, p. 15. 
104 Nordea was created as a result of mergers between Merita Bank (Finland), Nordbanken (Sweden), 
Unidanmark (Denmark) and Christiania Bank of Kreditkasse. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 
2001, Promoting Linkages, p. 15. 
105 Ibid, p. 18. 
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boosting international trade and investment. The most significant development in 
regional integration was also the move beyond traditional trade agreements to 
advanced North-South trade relations based on equal partnership between developed 
and developing countries. '06 The impact of this development was apparent in 
Mexico's accession into NAFTA in 1994, leading to an increase in FDI from only 
US$4.3 billion in 1993 to US$11 billion in 1994.107 
The political and economic conditions of participant states in regional 
agreements can determine, to a large extent, the impact of regional integration on 
both the rise of FDI and economic growth. Empirical evidence shows that regional 
agreements between South-South states are unlikely to benefit their members unless 
they are accompanied by the liberalisation of trade with the rest of the world. While 
North-South agreements can enhance the credibility of southern states and improve 
their economic performance through FDI inflows from developed partners. 
Regarding the latter, the impact of regional cooperation was positive in the case 
of EU arrangements with Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). Regional 
cooperation, which started in the early 1990s, brought about economic reforms, trade 
liberalisation and privatisation programmes, all ingredients that were vital for the 
attraction of FDI into CEECs. By 2002, the CEECs attracted FDI inflows of US$31 
billion. This decreased to US$21 billion in 2003 due to the end of privatisation in the 
106 The notion of `equal partnership' between developed and developing parties is stated clearly in EU 
regional agreements with its peripheries in Central and Eastern Europe, southern Mediterranean 
region and Latin American countries. See for example the text of the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 at 
http: //europa. eu. int/comm. /external relations/euromed/da. htm 
107 M. Schiff & L. A. Winters, Regional Integration and Development, (Washington D. C.: The World 
Bank, 2003), p. 17. 
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Czech Republic and Slovakia. 108 Data also shows that privatisation-related FDI 
transactions were a key determinant of FDI inflows, with the exception of Hungary, 
where the privatisation process has been completed and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, where large-scale privatisations involving foreign investors have 
not yet started. 109 
Moreover, the impact of regional integration is greater on these developing 
countries that possess well-developed mechanisms for deepening economic 
integration. This is particularly true when the developing states adopt unilateral 
liberalisation and export-oriented economic policies to improve their business 
environment. Such measures assisted Asian economies in achieving considerable 
growth in FDI, which reached US$148 billion in 2004, a figure almost 23 per cent 
higher than 2003 due to the FDI boom in China and Hong Kong. The South-East 
Asian economies (ASEAN-10) have also done well in terms of attracting FDI 
inflows, but are still far behind those of the northern region. The most significant 
development in this region was the emergence of Asian MNCs operating in the 
region. This increased economic activity and the amount of capital invested from, 
and within, this region. 
Regarding south-south economic cooperation, there has been some concern about 
the viability of this trend as a means for promoting investment and attracting FDI. 
This explains the poor economic performance of such regional arrangements as the 
Common Market for East and South African countries (COMESA) and the Greater 
inter-Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), where most member states in these regions 
108 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2004, p. 69. 
109 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2001, pp. 34-37. 
68 
still pursue import-substitution economic policies, which aim to restrict entry, protect 
national industries through tariff barriers and regionalise trade. These regions also 
failed to set up effective mechanisms to harmonise their political and economic 
policies, hence regional problems severely undermine the process of regional 
integration. The case of the Arab states and their failure to develop a coherent 
regional economic order over the past half a century raises the question of whether 
such prerequisites as the political and economic stability of the participant states are 
essential for the creation of a sustainable regional economic integration. ' 10 
Despite its rich natural resources, large size and huge number of countries and 
population, Africa's failure to stabilise its political and economic conditions affected 
its share of global FDI inflows, which remained around 3 per cent (US$18 billion) of 
global FDI inflows in 2004.111 The improvement in FDI shares by some countries, 
most notably Angola, Egypt and South Africa, has not changed the overall weak 
outlook for FDI. Latin America and the Caribbean, which accounted for US$68 
billion during the same year, with Brazil the largest recipient of FDI (US$18 billion) 
followed by Mexico (US$17 billion), also attracted far less than the Asian region 
mainly due to political and economic instability. 
"0 For discussion on the causes of the failure of inter-Arab integration see for example Abdel Motaleb 
Abdel Hamid, Arab Common Market: Reality and Prospect in the Third Millennium, (Cairo: Arab 
Nile group, 2003); Alfonse Aziz, "The Arab Nation and Encountering the Economic Challenges of 
Globalisation", in Salah Salem Zarnouka (ed. ), The Globalisation and the Arab Nation, Development 
Issues, No. 23, (Cairo University: Center for the Study of Developing Countries, 2002), pp 204-171 
(in Arabic); and Allan Findlay, The Arab World, (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 1-70. Some of the 
causes affecting inter-Arab economic integration are also discussed in detail in chapter 9. 
111 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2001, p. 19. 
69 
On a functional level, most bilateral investment treaties (hereafter, BITS) and 
international investment agreements (hereafter, IIAs), 112 have shifted the focus from 
traditional issues such as protection, treatment, and dispute settlement to more 
moderate goals relating to the right to establishment, performance requirements and 
the employment of key foreign personnel! 13 While rising in number from 385 in 
1989 to 2,181 by 2002,114 most recent bilateral trade agreements are now covering 
investment issues such as pre-establishment and post-establishment national 
treatment; the prohibition of performance requirements; promotion and protection 
including expropriation and compensation; dispute settlement both at state-to-state 
and investor-to-state level; and transfer clauses guaranteeing the free transfer of 
capital, income, profits and royalties. Other comprehensive agreements, implying 
trade-related and investment-related provisions, cover different issues such as trade 
and investment in services, intellectual property rights and competition, issues that 
are implicitly and explicitly stated in the NAFTA and the MERCOUSUR 
agreements. "15 
These agreements aim to create a more favourable trade and investment 
framework through liberalisation, not only of regional trade but also of restrictions to 
FDI, including operational restrictions. These measures lead to the general 
harmonisation of investment frameworks of member states by reducing obstacles and 
increasing investment flows. However, one can argue that these bilateral measures 
112 Most bilateral trade agreements conducted between the EU and its peripherals contained sections 
covering FDI. For example, Article 46 of the EU-Egyptian Association Agreement of 2001 covered 
some aspects on investment and called for the promotion of FDI. Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Trade, 
Texts of the Euro-Egyptian Partnership Agreement, Vol. 1, Cairo, July 2002, p. 33 (in Arabic). 
113 The best example of these moderate provisions of BITs is the Japan-Republic of Korea agreement 
for Liberalisation, Promotion and protection of Investment, signed on 22 March 2002. UNCTAD, 
World Investment Report 2003, p. 89. 
114 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1998, p. 59; and UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, 
89. P; 
58 15 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, p. 91. 
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to improve the investment climate are complementary to the guidelines of the World 
Bank and the rules set up by the WTO, which aim to facilitate the further expansion 
of FDI regimes. 116 These legally binding objectives can improve the investment 
environment by contributing to greater transparency, stability, predictability, and 
security for investment in sectors not yet covered by bilateral and multilateral 
agreements. Also, many national governments have recently adopted FDI-specific 
regulatory frameworks to support their investment objectives and develop their 
investment regimes to meet the needs of MNCs and foreign investors. They have 
also begun creating investment promotion agencies and have established specialised 
schemes such as export processing zones and free-trade and investment zones. 117 
Empirical evidence of these investment measures can be found to varying 
degrees in several bilateral trade agreements, mostly conducted within regional 
arrangements. The most noticeable agreements are those conducted by the EU with 
its southern neighbouring states from the mid-1990s onwards, which are more 
comprehensive than those conducted during the 1970s, as they include various 
political, economic, social, educational and cultural dimensions. l 18 The agreements 
have already guaranteed market access to the EU countries and their MNCs to bypass 
trade barriers. In principle, they are expected to provide the mechanism through 
which southern neighbouring states can develop their political, legal, financial and 
administrative systems, while simultaneously improving their economic conditions 
and business environment. This theory remains unproven and whether these new 
116 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1998, Trends and Determinants, pp. 57-58. 
117 Jacques Morisset and Kelly Andrews-Johnson, "The Effectiveness of Promotion Agencies at 
Attracting Foreign Direct Investment", Foreign Investment Advisory Service Occasional Paper, No. 
16, (Washington D. C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World 
Bank, 2004), pp. 1-17. 
118 More details on the Euro-Mediterranean partnerships are provided in chapter five. 
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agreements can make developing countries attractive locations for labour-intensive 
FDI activities is still a matter of debate. This study examines how, and to what 
extent, all of the above factors have influenced EU FDI into Egypt in the period since 
the Global Mediterranean Policy of the 1970s. 
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Chapter Two 
Egypt and European Direct Investment, 
1805-1972: A Historical Overview 
Since the nineteenth century, European FDI has entered Egypt at varying levels 
depending on the domestic political situation and Europe's position in the global 
economic system. During the first half of the nineteenth century, European 
involvement in Egypt was limited to the supply of knowledge, technology and 
manufacturing expertise, but the degree of engagement intensified with the free 
movement of capital and labour following the expansion of European political and 
economic power between the mid-nineteenth century and the end of World War II in 
1945. The declining position of the European powers following the onset of the Cold 
War, together with the impact of the 1952 Egyptian revolution, affected considerably 
European direct investment in Egypt until 1972, the year that the GMP began. 
2.1. Extension of European Political and Economic Power into the 
Mediterranean. 
The roots of European investment in Egypt can be found in the progressive 
development of capitalism and the emergence of European political and economic 
power during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These developments, 
particularly in the areas of industry and technology, were brought about by the 
industrial revolution. The most important development was the internationalisation 
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of the global economy and its subsequent impact on the growth of trade and FDI. 
This resulted in a strong interrelationship between the spread of trade and the growth 
of FDI because the growing importance of the latter was often linked with the role of 
large firms in international production. Such a relationship became apparent after the 
transition of the world economy from an agrarian to an industrial economy in the late 
eighteenth century, when increased specialisation in production and the accumulation 
of capital outgrew the limits of domestic markets. 119 The emergence of new 
technologies and innovations in machinery and communications systems enhanced 
this relationship by enabling large firms to invest overseas. The internationalisation 
of economic activities contributed to the sustainability of the global system during 
that time, but its stability was only maintained by the unchallenged political and 
economic control of Britain over large parts of the globe until it was challenged by 
the emergence of the superpowers - the US and the Soviet Union - after 1945. 
During this early period, the internationalisation of production was facilitated by 
an open regulatory framework; 120 unsupervised short and long-term capital 
movement; the unrestricted transfer of profits; and a superior gold standard which 
encompassed almost all major industrial and agrarian economies. 121 It was also 
driven by the internationalisation of the labour market, which reached unprecedented 
levels, assisted by large waves of inter-continental migration from Europe, 
particularly to the North and South American economies. Between 1870 and 1915, it 
was estimated that 36 million people left Europe, two-thirds of whom went to the 
1 19 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1994, p. 119. 
120 Oskar Morgenstern, The Question of National Defence, (New York: Random House, 1959), p. 17. 121 R. Mckinnon, The Order of Economic Liberalization: Financial Control in the Transition to a 
Market Economy, Second Edition, (New York: John Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 3. 
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US. 122 Egypt had a substantial share of this wave of European immigration as the 
total number of foreigners rose from about 3,000 in 1836 to over 68,000 in 1878 and 
to 221,000 in 1907.123 
These migration waves were encouraged by relaxed legislation allowing 
citizenship to be freely granted to immigrants. Statistics also show a significant 
growth in capital flows, which was estimated in 1914 at US$44 billion, of which the 
UK accounted for the largest share, followed by France and Germany. 124 FDI stocks 
accounted for almost one-third (US$14 billion) of total global investment, with the 
UK accounting for 45 per cent of the total global FDI outward flows and the US, as 
the largest recipient, accounting for 20 per cent of FDI inflows. 125 This growth, 
aided by the lack of formal restrictions on the flow of capital, led to a considerable 
harmony and integration in the financial markets and a remarkably high level of 
cross-national ownership of securities, including government and private bonds and 
stocks. 126 
This process was also accelerated by a significant growth in international 
production through FDI and the shift of resources from agriculture into industry, 
within which traditional sectors such as textiles and clothing were challenged by 
entirely new industries that were characterised by more capital-intensive production 
techniques such as engineering, steel and chemicals. 127 These structural changes 
were enhanced by the emergence of new means of organising production such as 
122 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1994, p. 120. 
123 C. Issawi, Egypt in Revolution: An Economic Analysis, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1963), p. 29. 
124 Ibid, p. 120. 
12$ UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1994, p. 121. 
126 Oskar Morgenstern, The Question of National Defence, pp. 512-528. 
127 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1994, p. 121. 
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assembly lines and new corporate structures suitable for large-scale production, 128 as 
well as the introduction of new modes of transportation and communications such as 
steamships, railways, telegraph and cables, which simultaneously altered the scale 
and organisation of modern production activities and facilitated the opening of new 
markets. By 1913, transportation was the primary sector for investment, accounting 
for 55 per cent of total global FDI stocks, followed by trade and distribution at 30 per 
cent with 10 per cent in manufacturing. 129 
These structural changes coincided with Europe's political and economic 
evolutions. The political process developed with the introduction and reform of laws 
in the areas of public health, education, social justice, transport and navigation. The 
birth of the modem political party system and the participation of trade unions in 
industrial and political affairs also had an impact. 130 European economic 
development, which was well advanced by the mid-nineteenth century, not only 
improved the European standard of living but also created a huge financial surplus 
that needed to be reinvested. Major financial institutions such as banks, insurance 
companies and large Charter companies emerged to play a key role in this process. 
Foreign capital investment became a leading economic sector to the extent that the 
export of capital became as important and popular as the export of goods and 
commodities. 131 This significant growth in foreign investment was attributed to the 
huge surplus of wealth; the advanced financial apparatus; and the rising experience 
and confidence of European financial institutions. These institutions believed that 
there was more profit to be made abroad than at home, a belief that was strengthened 
128 Ibid, p. 121. 
129 Ibid, p. 121. 
"o P Hayes, The Nineteenth Century 1814-80, (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1975), introduction. 
131 H. Croome & R. Hammond, An Economic History of Britain, (London: Christophers, 1937), p. 244. 
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further by political and legal privileges secured by British administrations in 
colonised countries. 
During the nineteenth century, Europe's capital markets flourished and London 
became the financial capital of the world. The influx of capital, made possible by 
European economic development, allowed investors to expand their economic 
activities beyond their own borders. By the mid nineteenth century, France's position 
in the global capital market, due to rapid economic development and growth in 
industry and finance, came close to that of Britain, while the savings of Germany, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and the US grew enormously so that Britain no longer 
enjoyed her unassailable position in wholesale world market of capital. 132 British 
capitalists, however, remained pioneers in discovering and opening up new fields for 
development because of their willingness to assume risk; their intensive trade 
relations; and their experience and advantages gained from their political and 
economic ties with the rest of the world. 
French capitalists also played a significant role in investment overseas, 
particularly in the construction of railways in Austria, Spain and Algeria. The most 
notable achievement was their success in 1854 in securing permission from Said 
Pasha to construct the Suez Canal in Egypt. 133 The drive to gain control of such a 
strategic project as the Suez Canal encouraged the French to purchase 52 per cent of 
shares (to the value of 200 million francs for 400,000 shares at 500 francs each). 
132 C. K. Hobson (1914), The Export of capital, p. 121. 
133 Ibid, p. 129. 
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While Britain took advantage of Egypt's financial crisis and bought Khedive Ismail's 
shares in the Suez Canal for just under £4 million in 1875.134 
During the 1860s, the Netherlands emerged once again as a foreign investor, with 
almost £60 million of capital invested abroad. 135 Germany followed suit and became 
a major investor in the global economy as its investors became more willing to 
accept risk in return for a high yield. German especially tended to invest in more 
risky government bonds than the French, and their holdings of these bonds amounted 
to about £15 million in 1883.136 By the late nineteenth century, most European 
foreign investment went to the US, where capital was most secure and the prospect 
for development was higher than any other part of the world, with an estimated 
capital of US$3.1 billion (£620 million) invested mainly in railway bonds and 
stocks. 137 
2.2. The Beginnings of European Direct Investment in Egypt 
Despite these developments, European investment in Egypt was highly insignificant 
during the first half of the nineteenth century. This was evident in the lack of capital 
investment by Europeans in Mohamed Ali's Modernisation Programme between 
1805 and 1849, which attempted to turn Egypt into a modern industrial state. This 
134 K. Gillespie, The Tripartite Relationship: Government, Foreign Investors and Local Investors 
during Egypt's Economic Opening, (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 35. 
135 Amsterdam was the financial capital of the world from the beginning of the seventeenth century 
until the defeat of the Netherlands in the Napoleonic Wars, which crippled the Dutch economy. Since 
then, this position was overtaken by London. 
136 Hobson, The Export of Capital, p. 146. 
137 In 1899, European holdings in the US economy were made by Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Switzerland, France, which invested US$2.5 billion, US$240 million, US$200 million, US$75 million 
and US$50 million, respectively, while only US$35 million was invested by the rest of Europe. 
Hobson, The Export of Capital, (London: Constable & Company ltd., 1914), p. 154. 
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programme produced some notable achievements in the country's economic, 
administrative and legal system, of which the replacement of the prevailing system of 
communal ownership of land by individual private ownership was the most 
significant development. 138 Private ownership created a new group of small 
businesses and local investors and entrepreneurs whose role remained secondary to 
the government in economic development. 
In the economic sphere, major developments were achieved in the irrigation 
system which expanded the cultivated area from 3.1 million acres in 1813 to 4.2 
million acres by 1852 and the planting of long-staple cotton which started on a 
commercial scale in 1821. While a communications network - particularly sea ports 
such as Alexandria - was built to facilitate foreign trade. 139 Achievements in the 
industrial sector were also impressive, particularly in the weaving of cotton textiles 
and armaments, with some new industries introduced such as cotton-ginning, rice 
milling, sugar and rum, edible oil, dairy products, woollen fabrics, silk, ropes, 
leather, glass, books, paper, saltpeter and sulphuric acid. The total investment in 
these areas of industry amounted to almost £12 million, with some 70,000 workers 
employed. 140 European participation in this development process was limited to the 
hiring of managers, engineers and technicians, but their role in factories, arsenals and 
foundries was significant. 141 
138 Although it has been argued that the distribution of most land went to Mohamed Ali's relatives and 
followers, one should not underestimate the importance of the freedom of private ownership in the 
attraction of FDI. D. W. Carr, Foreign Investment and Development in Egypt, (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1979), p. 12. 
139 Carr, Foreign Investment and Development in Egypt, p. 12. 
140 Ibid, p. 12. 
141 The role of European engineers and technicians was significant as they provided training 
programmes for local employees, assisted in the installation of new machinery, developed parts of 
imported goods for local production and up-graded Egyptian manufacturing techniques. It is also 
argued that Mohamed Ali depended largely on French experts for developing the navy and the army, 
79 
However, European capital investment was not attracted by this impressive level 
of development, probably because of the authoritarian nature of Mohamed Ali' s rule 
and the strong governmental control over the country's political and economic 
system and institutions, in particular over the import and export of goods and 
commodities. 142 There was opposition by many European countries to the nature of 
Egypt's system of state's monopoly and the protective measures regulating Egyptian 
industry. In 1820, tremendous European pressure resulted in a3 per cent duty on all 
Egyptian imports. This was increased to 12 per cent in the 1838 Anglo-Ottoman 
Treaty provided that Egypt abandoned its monopoly system. After Egypt's military 
defeat, 143 the 1841 treaty officially cut back Egypt's military forces, reduced the 
general import duty to 5 per cent, and abolished the monopoly system, while 
securing the entry of foreign traders and investors into the Egyptian market. 144 
In the post-Mohamed Ali's era (1850-1920), European interest in Egypt steadily 
increased with the growing strategic importance of the country following the opening 
of the Suez Canal in 1869, and the parallel re-orientation of the economy towards 
free market and export-led economic policies. '45 There was also limited government 
interference in economic affairs during this period. '46 The emergence of European 
capital flows took two different forms. The first model was state-driven investment 
and in establishing new schools of medicine, engineering, chemistry and military science. Gillespie, 
The Tripartite Relationship, p. 33. 
142 The government directly imported almost two-fifths of goods brought into Egypt. 
143 Despite their imperial rivalry, French and British navels united in 1840 and launched a major 
operation in which they destroyed the Egyptian naval in Rio in the Mediterranean Sea. This naval war 
affected badly Egypt's military and naval capabilities and put an end to Mohamed Ali's ambitions to 
create an Egyptian Empire. 
144 Carr, Foreign Investment and Development in Egypt, p. 13. 
145 C. Issawi, "Egypt Since 1800: A Study in lop-sided Development", Journal of Economic History, 
vol. 21 (March 1961), pp. 7-8. 146 Carr, Foreign Investment and Development in Egypt, pp 15-17. 
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to secure strategic interests in major projects such as the Suez Canal. Such strategic 
engagement was evident in the large scale investment made by France and Britain in 
the Suez Canal Company. 147 The second form was private investment by banks, 
financial institutions and entrepreneurs, who were mainly driven by commercial 
gains. During this period, European banks were not only considered the principle 
agents of the new economic imperialism, 148 but also the main source of funds for 
economic development until at least the establishment of Bank Misr in 1920. This 
was due to the easy entry and exit of capital; the limited restrictions on operations; 
the existence of appropriate standards of treatment and dispute settlement; and a 
stable and transparent regulatory framework. 
The economic climate, which was based on export-oriented economy, was a 
major determinant in the increase in European investment in Egypt. Until 1920, 
Egypt had a one-crop agriculture economy where almost all activities were centred 
on the cultivation and export of cotton, which increased from £17 million in 1845 to 
£250 million in 1920.149 The intensive cultivation of cotton, as the principle 
commercial crop of the Egyptian economy, enhanced Egypt's comparative advantage 
as an agrarian country and brought her national economy into the global economy to 
the greatest extent up to that time. The increase in the production and the quality of 
Egyptian cotton, particularly long-staple cotton, encouraged European companies to 
invest in agriculture-related projects, particularly irrigation systems, including the 
147 H. Croome &R Hammond, An Economic History of Britain, (London: Christophers, 1937), pp. 
253-4. 
148 A. Bonne, State and Economics in the Middle East, A society in Transition, (London: Kegan Paul, 
Trench Trubner & Co. Ltd, 1948), p. 249. 
lag C. Issawi, "Egypt Since 1800: A Study in lop-sided Development", Journal of Economic History, 
Vol. 21 (March 1961), pp. 7-8. 
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building of canals, barges and dams, all of which were financed and maintained by 
European funds. '5° 
The impact of foreign investment accelerated further the cotton boom, which saw 
the value of cotton exports more than double by 1906,151 and reach its highest value 
during the Korean War in 1952.152 It has been argued that the large-scale 
immigration of foreigners and the US$400 million invested in Egypt by 1914 were 
largely connected to cotton production or related activities such as financing, 
transportation and trading activities. 153 Also, other external factors affecting the 
global market elsewhere contributed to the intensity of European investment in 
Egyptian agriculture. For example, the American Civil War, which affected 
considerably the British cotton and textiles industry, turned Egypt into a viable 
alternative cotton source for British textile companies. '54 The British Administration 
in Egypt had no interest in subsidising or protecting local industry and prevented the 
development of a local Egyptian textile industry. Rather, this administration 
encouraged the country to keep its economy exclusively devoted to the cultivation of 
cotton. Raw cotton was sent to British factories in Manchester and Leicester for 
manufacturing and then exported to Egypt at high cost. The cotton export surplus 
was absorbed by the repayment of huge foreign debts and servicing projects for 
imperial purposes, hence minimizing the positive impact of the influx of European 
capital and personnel on economic development. 
150 S. Radwan, Capital formation in Egyptian industry and agriculture 1882-1967, (London: Ithaca 
Press, 1974), pp. 17-65. 
51 Ibid, p. 169. 
152 K. Owen & S. Pamuk, A History of the Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century, (London: 
I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1998), p. 31. 
153 Carr, Foreign Investment and Development in Egypt, p. 14. 
154 American Civil War cut off the supply of cotton, an act which almost paralyzed British cotton and 
textiles industry. For more details see H. Croome & R. Hammond, An Economic History of Britain, p. 
243. 
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Moreover, the capacity of the Egyptian market for economic expansion was a 
major determinant in attracting foreign investment into Egypt. The Egyptian market 
was characterised by an "exceptional increase in the imports of industrial goods from 
Europe, and the growing number of the large-scale companies with foreign capital, 
operating in such important fields as transport, communications and production". ' 55 
European companies were encouraged to meet this absorptive capacity for industrial 
products and a high level of consumption due to the rapid growth of the population. 
Indeed, the rise in European capital flows into Egypt was a direct response to the 
increased demands of the Egyptian market, of which the multiplication of imports 
per capita of the population increased from just £0.1 in 1801 to almost £2.3 in 1907, 
a level of growth that was highly attractive to European investors. 156 This capacity 
for expansion was a tangible asset for European investors, who spared no time in 
building new factories for cotton ginning and pressing, textiles, beer, cement, 
cigarettes, tobacco, and manure. Most European companies specialised in very 
precise areas of economic activities in order to sustain the monopoly in these sectors. 
For instance, the concentration of FDI flows in transport and communications, 
including railways, ports, roads, buses and shipping facilities gave European 
investors the power to control the most important and vital sectors of the Egyptian 
economy. 157 Such monopolies not only secured economic influence for foreign 
investors but also made their companies an integral part of the country's socio- 
economic structure. 
155 A. Bonne, State and Economics in the Middle East: A Society in Transition, (London: Kegan Paul, 
Trench, Trubner & Co. LTD, 1948), p. 274. 
'56 Bonne, State and Economics in the Middle East, p. 253. 
157 Ibid, pp. 248-9. 
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The growth of European FDI in Egypt was further enhanced by the country's 
physical and human infrastructural facilities. The development of physical 
infrastructure was encouraged by the government through tax incentives for 
investment in vital areas of communications, road and port facilities and cultivable 
land and irrigation schemes. These incentives also promoted investment in areas such 
as consumer goods, which were necessary for meeting the increasing demands of a 
growing population. Moreover, Egypt was viewed as an exceptionally cheap source 
of the skilled labour vital for modem industrial production, particularly in labour 
intensive-heavy industries. In 1907, it was estimated that most European investment, 
which concentrated in industries such as textiles, clothing, food and metal work, 
absorbed an average of 34 per cent, 19 per cent, 17 per cent and 12 per cent, 
respectively, of the total labour engaged in manufacturing. 158 These figures highlight 
the extent to which labour forces added significantly to Egypt's locational 
advantages. 
Egypt's political climate was another major determinant for the growth of 
European investment in the country between 1850 and 1950. The imperial foreign 
policy adopted by most European powers provided protection to their national 
interests, safeguarded their capital and secured special status and legal privileges for 
their nationals. This policy aimed at weakening the position of the local political 
establishment - headed by the King and the national government. 159 Such weakness 
was evident in limited government intervention in economic affairs; the inability of 
us Government of Egypt, Department of Statistics, Population Census of 1907, Cairo, 1909, pp. 192- 
359; and S. Radwan, Capital formation in Egyptian Industry & Agriculture 1882-1967, (London: 
Ithaca Press, 1974), p. 173. 
159 Samy Abu Anour, "Cabinets by the Palace and the British" in Raouf Abass (ed. ), British-Egyptian 
Relations 1954-1951, (Cairo: Al-Ahram Centre for political and Strategic Studies, 1995), pp. 39-57. 
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the state to generate sufficient domestic capital formation; and the marginal 
participation of Egyptian entrepreneurs in the country's economic development. 
160 
Unlike Mohamed Ali, his successors were weak rulers and they provided the 
opportunity for European dominance of the country's political and economic 
affairs. 161 Nor did local rulers show concern about the country's economic 
conditions or any interest in securing Egypt's financial status in the global system. 
This was apparent in the efforts of Khedive Ismail, which failed to re-activate state 
participation in economic activities. His policies were too extensive to be financed by 
public funds, and hence he relied heavily on foreign borrowings, thus increasing 
dramatically Egypt's foreign debts. The impact of Egypt's financial crisis resulted in 
Ismail selling shares in the Suez Canal to the British Government in 1875.162 The 
weakness of Khedive Tewfik led to the 1882 British military occupation, while the 
weakness of other rulers allowed the British administration to dominate all Egypt's 
economic, financial and political affairs until almost the middle of the twentieth 
century. 
Such political weakness resulted in a lack of any governmental attempts to take 
the lead in the promotion of economic development during the period under 
consideration in this chapter. 163 Statistically, the government's share in the economy 
160 It was argued that Egyptian industrial, financial, commercial and business bourgeoisie did not 
emerge in a coherent form until the 1930s, and therefore its participation in economic activities 
remained marginal to foreign entrepreneurs until this role disappeared after the 1952 revolution. M. 
Zaalouk, Power, Class and Foreign Capital in Egypt, the rise of new bourgeoisie, (London: Zed 
Books Ltd., 1989), pp. 17-23. 
161 The successors of Mohamed Ali were: Abbas ruled from 1849 to 1854; Said ruled from 1854 to 
1963; Ismail ruled from 1963 to 1879; Mohamed Tewfik ruled from 1879 to 1892, Abbas Hilmi ruled 
from 1892 to 1914; Fuad I ruled from 1917 to 1936; and Farouk I ruled from 1936 to 1952. 
162 See footnote 134, p. 71. 
163 Patrick O'Brien, The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System: from Free Enterprise to Socialism, 
1952-65, (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 66. 
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was as little as one-eighth of government consumption and capital expenditure in the 
national outlay; 16 per cent of state contributions to the gross domestic product 
(GDP); 2 per cent of state enterprises in production; and 8 per cent of employment in 
public services. 164 Also, the government had neither the capacity nor the power to 
influence the volume, or the direction, of lending by local financial institutions, and 
hence had no significant financial role in the process of development. This was left to 
foreign banks to perform. 
One can also argue that the substantial rise in European capital and nationals in 
Egypt was due to the success of European powers to maintain the privileges and 
concessions provided by the Capitulation system. 165 Between 1841 and 1937, most 
Europeans enjoyed fiscal and judicial immunity under this system, and hence Egypt 
was an attractive location for FDI as the system granted foreign investors preferential 
treatment over a wide range of investment opportunities. The benefits of such 
treatment were further enhanced by the financial and commercial links of European 
investors with their home markets, which gave them advantages over their Egyptian 
competitors. Although Egypt remained a predominantly agricultural economy, the 
industrial sector, which began to emerge during the 1890s, was almost exclusively 
financed and owned by European companies and nationals. '66 
164 K. Gillespie (1984), The Tripartite Relationship, p. 40. 
165 Capitularies or capitulations were commercial concessions dated back as far as Crusader and 
Mamluk times, which included freedom from customs duties, other forms of taxation and civil form of 
diplomatic immunity so that foreign nationals were effectively under the jurisdiction of their consuls. 
As far as modem Egypt was concerned, these were humiliating discriminatory privileges and 
concessions granted to certain foreign powers in Egypt, the end of which was finally negotiated in the 
Montreux Convention of 1973. Chamber Dictionary of World History, (Edinburgh: Larousse plc., 
1994), pp. 160-161. 
166 Gillespie, The Tripartite Relationship, p. 36. 
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Table 2.1 shows that between 1833 and 1933, the paid-up company capital 
owned by foreigners increased from EGP6.4 million in 1833 to around EGP43 
million in 1902, and reached EGP102.3 million in 1933. Data also shows that almost 
160 new European companies with a combined capital of EGP43.3 million were 
established in Egypt between 1900 and 1907.167 It was also estimated that 91 per 
cent of the total capital controlled by foreign entrepreneurs, who dominated almost 
the entire communication system, industry and trade, was invested in joint-stock 
companies in 1914.168 These figures illustrate the depth of European involvement in 
the Egyptian economy. This involvement was made possible by the large size of the 
expatriate community, which by 1945 totalled almost a quarter of a million, the 
majority of whom were British, French, Italian and Greek. They not only enjoyed a 
legally privileged position under the nineteenth century capitulatory treaties but also 
dominated most of the more profitable parts of the economy. '69 
Table2.1: European direct investment in Egypt (paid-up capital and debentures in EGP), 1833-1933 
Firm activity 1833 1902 1933 
Mortgage companies 3,826,000 10,525,000 44,310,000 
Banks & finance 1,843,000 2,174,000 5,085,000 
Agricultural & urban 
land firms 
- 2,395,000 6,745,000 
Transport & canals 62,000 3,645,000 4,445,000 
Industrial mining & 
commercial 
669,000 5,903,000 20,780,000 
Suez Canal 18,350,000 20,930,000 
Total 6,400,000 42,992,000 102,295,000 
Source: A. Bonne, State and Economics in the Middle East, 1948, p. 251. 
167 S. Radwan, Capital formation in Egyptian Industry & Agriculture 1882-1967, (London: Ithaca 
Press, 1974) p. 172. 
168 Bonne, State and Economics in the Middle East, p. 250. 
169 R. Owen & S. Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century, (London: 
I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1998), p. 33. 
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However, European FDI flows into Egypt were affected by some major obstacles 
between 1917 and 1952. Chief amongst these was the impact of World War I 
between 1914 and 1917 and the global economic instability that followed. This led to 
structural and functional changes in Egypt's economic system. The most notable 
change was the absorption of Egypt's export-oriented economy, as described above, 
by a new economic system based on import-substitution industrialisation. 170 The 
impact of this was evident in the decline of the agricultural sector, whose share of 
GDP decreased due to the general fall in cotton export prices in 1920,1921 and 
1926. This decline in cotton prices continued throughout the Depression years 
between 1929 and 1932, and hence negatively impacted on the Egyptian economy 
which relied heavily for many decades on one-crop-cotton. Egypt was thus forced to 
diversify its economic resources, develop its industrial sector, and encourage 
investment outside agriculture. 
The inter-war period was also marked by the Egyptianisation of the economic 
system. 171 The move towards this process began in 1919, when Saad Zaghloul's 
revolution highlighted the danger of the colonial economic system and demanded 
economic independence and diversification. 172 The establishment of Misr Bank in 
1920 illustrated the increasing tendency towards greater participation of national 
capital and labour in economic development. This bank succeeded in mobilising 
Egyptian capital and creating Egyptian-run industries in various economic sectors in 
170 Gillespie, The Tripartite Relationship, p. 37. 
171 Robert Vitalis, When Capitalists Collide: Business Conflict and the End of Empire in Egypt, 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 10-27. 172 This perception of economic diversification was later adopted by the Wafd political party, which 
was founded in 1923. 
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order to give Egyptians some influence over their own economy. 
173 The Federation 
of Industries was founded in 1922 and worked towards setting up regulatory 
frameworks and policies favourable to the development of Egyptian industries. By 
1939, Egyptians made up 52 per cent of its members, an increase of 40 per cent from 
1925. 








Source: Issaww i. C. (1963 ), pp. 87-88: and Carr. D. W. (1979), p. 19. 
The post-1920 era also witnessed greater involvement by Egyptian professionals 
in economic activities at various levels. Figure 2.1 shows that by 1947 the number of 
teachers, engineers, physicians, lawyers and pharmacists reached 52,000,16,000, 
5,700,5.000 and 1,600, respectively. Legislation was introduced to increase 
Egyptian participation in business. For example. the 1947 joint stock companies' 
laws defined the minimum percentages of an Egyptian shareholding as follows: at 
least 51 per cent of a company's capital, 40 per cent of its Board of Directors, while 
75 per cent of employees had to have 65 per cent of the total salaries, and 90 per cent 
of the workers had to receive 80 per cent of the wages paid. 17-1 "These measures may 
By 1930 the Bank formed 9 companies in the areas of paper, cotton ginning, silk weaving, fish and 
flax. The biggest company was Misr Cotton Spinning & Weaving Company with capital worth 
EGP300.000. Carr. Foreign Investment and Development in Egypt, pp. 17-18. 
"' F. Harbison, Human Resources for Egyptian Enterprise, (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 
1958). pp. 56-57. 
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Teachers Engineers Physicians Law yers Pharmcists 
well have been a reaction to the policy of some foreign companies employing 
workers from their own ethnic minority groups. 
The impact of Egyptian participation in the economy was noticeable in the 
gradual decline in the number of foreigners from 240,000 in 1937 to 204,000 in 1947 
and to 143,000 in 1960.175 Similar patterns of rising Egyptian participation and 
declining foreign participation in the Egyptian economy were exhibited in company 
ownership. The percentage of Egyptian capital in joint stock companies rose 
gradually from only 9 per cent in 1933 to almost 50 per cent in 1956. These figures 
indicate the dramatic impact of these measures on foreign investment activities, 
which dropped sharply from £81 million (apart from the £83 million foreign shares 
in the Suez Canal) in 1933 to an average of around EGP9 million (of which EGP5.2 
million went into petroleum) between 1952 and 1961.176 
Did the high level of concentration in European capital flows contribute in any 
significant way to the development of Egypt's economic growth during the period 
between 1850 and 1952? An analysis of European involvement in Egypt's economic 
activities shows that European capital was concentrated in specific economic sectors, 
and a general improvement was exhibited in the performance of these sectors. The 
overall impact of European investment during this period was, however, minimal in 
terms of Egypt's economic growth as most foreign investment was directed towards 
projects serving imperial needs. 
175 R. L. Tignor, "The Egyptian Revolution of 1919: New Directions in the Egyptian Economy", 
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 12,1976, p. 48. 
176 Carr, Foreign Investment and Development in Egypt, p. 21. 
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In the economic sphere, where agriculture alone accounted for almost half of the 
EGP100 million of European capital flows in Egypt's joint stock companies in 1933, 
there was no significant improvement in the overall performance of the agricultural 
sector. Although funding projects, such as the construction of dams and canals, did 
benefit over 2.4 million local agricultural workers, '77 agricultural strategy was 
designed for imperial needs as it devoted Egypt's resources to the cultivation of one 
high-value crop, cotton, which was of significant importance to the European textiles 
industry. The increase in cotton production by almost 150 per cent from under 3 
million cantar (Icantar = 99lbs) in the early 1880s to some 7.5 million just before the 
WWI did not contribute significantly to the wealth of the country, as cotton 
production was exported to Europe, mainly Britain, at low cost for manufacturing 
and returned to Egypt in the form of textiles and clothing at high prices. 178 
The export of cotton also failed to reduce Egypt's foreign debts because much of 
the trade balance surplus was wiped out by the payment of interest on debts. 179 Even 
the textile industry, which was largely associated with cotton production, did not 
contribute proportionally to Egypt's exporting capacity. Thus, Egypt's largest 
industry did not enjoy a comparative advantage. Despite using high value long staple 
cotton, Egypt's textile industry produced low quality cloth at great cost in 
comparison with its counterparts in countries such as India, which used less valued 
cotton and produced high quality cloth cheaply. This made it difficult for the 
Egyptian textile industry to compete in the global market. 
177 R Owen & S. Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century, (London: 
I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1998), pp. 30-3 1. 
X79 Ibid, opt., p. 31. 
179 R. Mabro & S. Radwan, The Industrialisation in Egypt 1939-73: Policy and Performance, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), p. 20; Carr, Foreign Investment and Development in Egypt, p. 14; 
and Gillespie, The Tripartite Relationship, p. 36. 
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In industry, European capital flows into Egypt were directed towards 
manufacturing in consumer production, and aimed only to serve the local market as 
Egypt was not manufacturing goods or industrial products. This meant that the high 
profits made by these foreign companies came from the domestic financial sector and 
the national economy. 
Table 2.2: Employment in Manufacturing, 1907-1937. 











Textiles 83.2 34 72.8 20.3 40.5 29 
Clothing 45.8 19 89.9 25.1 9.6 6.9 








Building materials 10.3 4.2 10.2 2.8 - - 
Wood & products 12.8 5 56 15.6 4.2 3 
Leather 1.2 0.5 2.5 0.7 1.4 1 
Chemical products 0.8 0.3 2 0.6 6.4 4.6 
Petroleum 0.2 0.1 
Construction of 
vehicles 
3.9 2 4.3 1.2 - - 
Printing & paper 
(paper) 




Others 4.4 2 18.9 5.3 5.9 4.2 
Total 242.6 100 358.7 100 139.6 100 
Source: S. Radwan, Capital formation in Egyptian Industry & Agriculture 1882-1967,1974, pp. 173-191. 
There was also a failure to achieve balanced development in the industrial sector 
because foreign firms merely sought areas of high profit and thus never attempted to 
launch an industrialisation programme or to improve Egypt's wider industrial base. 
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Data shows that there was a tiny proportion of the manufacturing labour force 
employed in a small number of large modem factory type enterprises. 
180 
This is not, however, to underestimate the role of FDI in generating employment. 
Table 2.2 illustrates that the employment rate depended largely on the level of 
foreign capital flows in economic activities. It shows that the total number of people 
employed in 1907 and 1917, when foreign investments reached its peak, was 24,600 
and 358,700, respectively. By 1937, the employment rate had fallen with the decline 
in FDI flows because of the Great Depression of 1929-1932, and the outbreak of the 
World War II. On a sectoral level, the rate of employment fell in textiles, clothing, 
metal work and wood working to 29 per cent, 6.9 per cent, 8.2 per cent and 3 per 
cent of total employment in manufacturing in 1937, from 34 per cent, 19 per cent, 12 
per cent and 5 per cent, respectively, in 1907. There was, however, a noticeable 
increase in the number of jobs created in other sectors such as food and the chemical 
industry, which grew from 17 per cent and 0.3 per cent in 1907 to 23.3 per cent and 
4.6 per cent, respectively, in 1937, thus highlighting the diversion of FDI flows from 
traditional sectors during this period. 
From a socio-political perspective, the association of European investors with the 
political elite, in the form of the monarch and his inner circle in the government, 
secured their interests through privileges and legal status. But this had a negative 
impact on the development of the political process. This was apparent when Egypt's 
180 The largest three European enterprises were the French-owned sugar company, the Societe 
Generale des Sucreries et de la Raffinerie d'Egypte, south of Cairo, employed some 17,000 workers in 
1916, the British-owned cotton spinning and weaving mill, Fabrique nationale d'Egypte at 
Alexandria, employed some 800 workers, and Belgian factory Societe Anonyme des Ciments 
d'Egypte near Helwan, employed some 260 workers. The rest of companies employed a much lesser 
number, which could not contribute significantly to human resources development in Egypt. 
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political system rapidly deteriorated in the post-war period, and the power centre 
shifted from the old conservative monarch and the traditional political elite towards 
new political, religious and nationalist forces, who engaged simultaneously in an 
anti-colonial struggle. 181 The negative impact of this coalition between foreign 
capitalists and a corrupt political elite was strongly reflected in the attitude of the 
revolutionary regime towards foreign investments182 - an attitude which brought an 
end to European investment in Egypt by the early 1960s. 
It must also be stressed that the departure of some European capital flows from 
Egypt back to native countries in the post-war period created huge unemployment 
due to the closure of factories and workshops that had been at full capacity during the 
war. It was estimated that almost 300,000 workers were dismissed, of whom only a 
very small number managed to find alternative employment in the private sector. '83 
Such socio-political conditions led to the spread of social unrest throughout the 
country and internal political instability, as well as the spread of political 
radicalism, 184 all of which challenged the fundamental principles of the attraction of 
FDI. 
181 R. Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Middle East, (London: Routledge, 1992) 
18. 
182 p. O'Brian, Revolution in Egypt's Economic System: from Private Enterprise to Socialism 1952- 
65, (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 66. 
183 Middle East Economic Service, vol. 1, no. 1, January 1947, p. 6. 
184 J. Bill & R. Springborg, Politics in the Middle East, (New York: HarperCollinsCollege Publishers, 
1994)), fourth edition, pp. 8-29. 
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2.3. The 1952 Revolution and European Direct Investment into Egypt 
By 1952, Egypt's political and socio-economic conditions badly deteriorated and 
there was widespread dissatisfaction among the population, particularly army 
officers, who revolted against the conservative establishment on 23 July 1952.185 
This revolution changed dramatically the political and economic landscape of Egypt 
from a liberal system to a centrally-planned socialist economic system controlled by 
a revolutionary government and led by President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Between 
1952 and 1971, this government failed to convince foreign and private investors that 
the revolution intended merely to eliminate the corrupt political establishment and to 
put right the political damage caused by the poor performance of the Egyptian army 
and its defeat in the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948.186 This failure was evident in the 
reluctance of foreign and private investors to engage in economic activities, many of 
whom preferred to wait and see because of their concern over Nasser's intention. 
This marked the beginning of a withdrawal of foreign and private capital from the 
economy, which reached its peak in the late 1950s. 187 
185 For discussion on the 1952 revolution see for example: Khalid Muhyi al-Din, Memories of a 
revolution: Egypt, 1952, (Cairo: American University Press, 1995); Wlter Laqueur, Nasser's Egypt, 
(London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1957); Peter Manfield, Nasser's Egypt, second edition, 
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969); Robert St John, The Story of Gamal Abdel Nasser, ( New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1960); Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt's Liberation: the Philosophy of the 
Revolution, (Washington D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955); Robert Stephens, Nasser: A Political 
Biography, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974); Tom Little, Egypt, (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1958); Anthony McDermott, Egypt from Nasser to Mubarak: a Flawed Revolution, (London: 
Croom Helm, 1988); John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: the political economy of two 
regimes, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); and Raymond Baker, Egypt's uncertain 
revolution under Nasser and Sadat, (Cambridge: Harverd University Press, 1978). 
186 B. Reich & D. Long, The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa, Boulder, 
(Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), p. 314. 
187 Michael Twomey, A Century of Foreign Investment in the Third World, (London: Routledge, 
2000), pp. 65-67. 
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From the government's perspective, foreign and private companies failed to 
honour their commitment to economic development. They did not respond 
enthusiastically to the government efforts and incentives to promote industrialisation 
and encourage the role of the private sector. 188 For example, the modification of the 
foreign investment Law 138 of 1947, by reducing the mandatory proportion of 
Egyptian capital in foreign firms from 51 per cent to 49 per cent, did not influence 
the attitude of foreign investors. 189 Their failure to cooperate enthusiastically with 
the new government affected negatively Egypt's economic performance, which in 
turn led to a decrease in the gross national production (GNP) from EGP44 million on 
average between 1945 and 1952 to only EGP27 million during the years 1953-57.190 
This allowed the government to step in, while reducing the role of foreign capital in 
the national economy, on the grounds that "foreign capital is regarded with dark 
doubts in underdeveloped countries particularly those which were colonised. s191 
The British and American refusal, in 1955, to finance the long-desired High Dam 
in Aswan forced the Egyptian government to take radical action in order to gain the 
financial resources to implement its ambitious development programme. This refusal 
to fund the dam was presented in Egypt as a signal that the West was unwilling to 
provide the financial assistance required for economic development. 192 This turned 
Egypt toward the socialist world for assistance, a move that was pragmatic and free 
188 O'Brien, The Revolution in Egypt's economic System p. 217. 
189 E. Hosseinzadeh, Soviet Non-Capitalist Development: The Case of Nasser's Egypt, (London: 
Praeger1989), pp. 106-8. 
190 O'Brien, The Revolution in Egypt's economic System, p. 219-20. 
191 Information Department, U. A. R., The Charter, presented by President Nasser at the Inaugural 
Session of the National Congress of Popular Powers on the evening of 215` May 1962, cited in El 
Baghdadi, A., The Five Year Plan for the Economic and Social Development of U. A. R. 1960-65, p. 61. 192 Information Department United Arab Republic, The Arab Socialist Union, Cairo, 1963, pp. 3-12. 
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of ideological implications. 193 The impact of this refusal strained Cairo's political 
relations with major western capitals and resulted in the nationalisation of the Suez 
Canal Company in 1956. This latter act was an attempt to seek alternative national 
resources to finance national projects, particularly when the Suez Canal was the 
primary generator of income in Egyptian economy at that time. In an attempt to 
regain control over the canal, Britain and France, together with Israel, launched the 
tripartite war on 29 October 1956. The failure to recapture the Suez Canal severely 
damaged Franco-British prestige and marked the end of their imperial glory. It also 
marked the beginning of a new tense and hostile era in Euro-Egyptian relations that 
would last until the early 1970s. 
Foreign private investment was deeply affected by the drastic changes in Egypt's 
economic climate, especially the transformation of the economic system away from a 
capitalist model towards a more centrally-planned socialist system. This re- 
orientation had no economic objective but was an attempt to break away from 
western control of Egyptian affairs. 194 Indeed, the origin of the Free Officers' 
dissatisfaction was not due to a lack of understanding or appreciation of the benefit 
of capitalism but due to their desire to seek an alternative socio-political and socio- 
economic order distinct from that associated with a corrupt monarchy, bourgeoisie 
193 It was also reported that the move towards the East was to ease the impact of Egyptian rejection to 
the US demand to enter the Baghdad Pact. Egyptian government believed that the condition attached 
to the offer meant that Egypt had to abandon its objectives for political independence and economic 
development as Egypt would have to accept foreign troops on its territories when it was necessary for 
the purpose of the security of the Middle East. Hosseinzadeh, Soviet Non-Capitalist Development, p. 
113; and Y. Rizk, "American Role the Determining the framework of Negotiation", in Abass, R. (ed. ), 
British-Egyptian Relations 1951-54, (Cairo: Al-Abram Centre for Political and strategic Studies, 
1995), pp. 96-117 (in Arabic). 
194 Abdellatif El-Baghdadi, Egypt's Vice President and Minister of Planning, "The Five Year Plan for 
the Economic and Social Development of U. A. R. 1960-65", General Congress of the National Union, 
Cairo, July 4 1960, p. 4. 
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and landlord class. 195 The nationalisation of the Suez Canal marked the beginning of 
an intensive programme aimed at limiting foreign and private ownership in strategic 
economic sectors. This programme was driven by the belief that foreign domination 
was the cause of Egypt's political, economic and social backwardness. This view 
was expressed by Ali Sabry, the Egyptian Premier (1962-1965), who argued that: 
foreign domination was exercised through the economic machinery they set up on our 
soil. Most of the banks operating in Egypt were foreign banks, accumulating our 
national savings and exploiting them for the benefits of the imperialist countries, 
regardless of the consequent standstill in the growth of the Egyptian society. The same 
was the case with insurance companies and import and export agencies. '96 
This attitude led to economic nationalisation, the main objective of which was to 
rid Egypt of foreign control over its financial institutions. This objective was 
achieved through an intensive programme of Egyptianisation of several foreign and 
private banks and insurance companies, including Misr Bank, which was 
nationalised in February 1960. The whole cotton trade shortly thereafter passed into 
government hands. The programme resulted in the final breakdown in cooperation 
between the government and foreign banks and companies, which existed and 
operated in Egypt for many years. By 1962, the economy had changed considerably 
and ownership of the main economic sectors was now into the hands of the 
government. The role of foreigners had substantially been reduced, and in some 
economic sectors badly eroded. 
195 C. Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century: an Economic Survey, (London: Oxford University press, 1954), 
pp. 261-62. 
96 Information Department, Statement on Government Policy, by All Sabry, Egypt's Premier and 
Minister of Planning in the National Assembly on 6`h April 1964. 
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The nationalisation programme also attempted to divert projects intended to 
attract foreign capital away from greenfields and unexploited raw materials, which 
were the focus of foreign capital in the previous period. 197 Despite the government's 
success in driving away foreign capital from greenfield projects, the economic 
impact of this action was highly damaging, as Egypt lost approximately 92 per cent 
of her total foreign capital investment, which totalled only EGP8.7 million (EGP5.2 
million went into the petroleum industry) in 1961 compared with EGP 100 million in 
1948.198 To compensate for such a loss, the government relied heavily on loans and 
credit facilities from the Soviet Union, the US and West Germany, which reached 
EGP186 million, EGP68.1 million and EGP53.1 million, respectively, in 1961.199 
This was a significant burden for the government and interest charges and the 
repayment of principal, in particular, placed a great strain on the Egyptian economy 
in subsequent years. 
These economic reforms deeply affected the very existence of most foreign 
companies operating in Egypt. The comprehensive programme of land reforms, the 
nationalisation of foreign banks and companies and the consolidation of the state-run 
public sector marked the end of the pre-1952 free market economic era. Structural 
control over economic activities was conducted through long-term plans for social 
and economic development by the National Planning Committee, set up in 
accordance with the Presidential decree 78 of January 1957. As the economy became 
197 These projects were defined in indispensable operations which require new experience and skills 
that were not available in the national domain. Ali Sabry, Egypt's Premier and Minister of Planning, 
"Statement on Government Policy", Information Department, statement in the National Assembly on 
6`s April 1964., p. 61. 
198 Al-Ahram newspaper, Cairo, 26`s November 1961; and C. Issawi, Egypt in Revolution: an 
Economic Analysis, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 237. 
`99 Issawi, Egypt in Revolution: an Economic Analysis, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 
p. 240. 
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increasingly dominated by the government, many privately-owned foreign and local 
companies were placed under the management of the Economic Development 
Organisation (EDO), which was created in 1957 and controlled some 64 companies 
with a total capital value of EGP80 million by 1958. 
The government's control and management of the main channels of finance 
reached a very high level by early 1960, when almost 74 per cent of gross capital 
formation was carried out by the government in comparison to 28 per cent prior to 
1952 200 Government control of financial resources was also accompanied by direct 
government intervention in almost all economic activities, ranging from the 
imposition of controls on the flow of international trade and transactions in hard 
currencies to the licensing of imports and the discrimination against commodities 
purchased with hard currencies. 01 Government intervention was greater in areas of 
importance to foreign investors such as insurance, which was restricted by Law No. 
153 of 1957. This Law prohibited the "founding of any insurance company without 
government authorisation and decreed that a certain percentage of all reinsurance had 
to be done with Egyptian reinsurance companies". 02 
The legal and regulatory system was firmly set to control and re-organise every 
area of the economy starting from the weekly working hours in industrial units, fixed 
at 42 hours by Law 133 of 1961, to the Arabisation of the language (making Arabic 
language compulsory) in business establishments, which used either French or 
200 Patrick O'Brien, The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System: from free Enterprise to Socialism 
1952-1965, (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 85. 
201 Ibid, p. 81. 
202 C. Issawi, Egypt in Revolution: An Economic Analysis, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) 
p. 57. 
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English, by Law 115 of the same year. 203 This control limited the role of private 
capital in economic development during the 1960s. 
The first five-year plan of 1960-65 confirmed that the government had full 
control of the planning and financing of national projects and most economic 
activities, leaving no room for foreign and private capital for investment. Thus, the 
role played almost exclusively by European capital in Egypt's economic 
development in the pre-revolutionary period was overtaken by significant Soviet 
involvement in the Egyptian economy, particularly in the wake of financing its High 
Dam project, so that its economy was increasingly run by Russian technology, 
machinery, and money. Even the large European expatriate community, which 
reached almost a quarter a million people in the inter-war period, was replaced by a 
large Russian community made up mainly of technicians. 204 Moscow replaced 
London as the primary purchaser of Egypt's cotton and, together with some other 
East European capitals, became Egypt's new source of financial, economic and 
military assistance on relatively favourable terms. 205 Unlike European capital, most 
Soviet capital investment was in the form of long-term loans administered by the 
state, and directed towards specific projects that had been agreed on with the 
Egyptian government. This pattern of foreign direct investment, which peaked during 
the Nasserite era (1954-1970), differed entirely from the pattern of entrepreneurship 
exhibited previously by European investors. 
203 Ibid, p. 57. 
204 There is a huge different between the Russian community during the 1960s and the European 
community in the pre-WWII in economic terms because the Europeans were largely businessmen and 
entrepreneurs who possessed capital and capitalist thought, while the Russians were merely 
technicians and professionals with communist ideology. 
205 M. Zaalouk, Power, Class and Foreign Capital in Egypt: the rise of new bourgeoisie, (London: 
Zed Books Ltd., 1989), p . 32. 
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Moreover, an overall assessment of the causes that led to the decline of European 
direct investment in Egypt during the 1950s and 1960s reveals that European 
companies were greatly affected by the foreign policy of their native governments 
towards Egypt. This was apparent in the failure of the European governments to 
understand the profound shift in thinking in ex-colonial states and their failure to 
realise that the 1952 revolution was part of a "worldwide movement against 
imperialism as a political system and all the values and cultural practices that 
empowered and sustained it". 206 The impact of this policy led to the emergence of 
nationalism across the Arab world. 207 Furthermore, Nasser's attempt to create a 
viable economic structure, free of European capital and influence, was seen in 
Egypt's Russia-sponsored industrialisation programme, as well as his efforts to join 
with Syria (1958-1961) within the United Arab Republic and to create an Arab 
Common Market in 1964, similar to the model established by the EEC in 1958208 
These efforts, however, failed to develop this inter-Arab regional economic 
arrangement due to a lack of economic dynamism and political will, and it was not 
until the early 1970s that Arab capital flows began to be effective in the economic 
sphere. 209 
It is also true that while Egypt's political and economic climate was becoming 
increasingly unattractive to foreign investors, Europe took serious steps towards 
206 P. Darby, At the Edge of International Relations: Post-colonialism, Gender and Dependency, 
(London: Pinter, 1997), p. 18. 
207 D. Hopwood, Egypt Politics and Society 1945-90, (London: Routledge, 1993), third edition, pp. 
59-83. 
209 It is also argued that the initiatives of 1964 were a reactionary response to the close EEC-Israel 
relations after signing their first trade agreement in June 1964. European Community, "Signing of 
Trade Agreement between EEC and Israel", Official Publication, No. 1857, Brussels, Thursday 4 June 
1964. 
209 The contribution of Arab capital investment in Egypt was later noticed in the establishment of the 
Arab Organisation for Industrialisation in August 1975 with a capital of US$1.04 billion put up by 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates to meet Egypt's needs from military and 
civilian goods. D. W. Carr, Foreign Investment and Development in Egypt, pp. 21 and 109. 
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economic integration starting with the creation of the Organisation for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948, the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) in 1952, the European Economic Community (EEC) after the signing of the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957,210 and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 
1960211 These measures, initiated by the newly established EEC, developed 
Europe's organisational structures and improved its internal markets. This 
development made it clear to investors that emerging European economic 
cooperation firmly rooted in their market principles, provided better investment 
opportunities for their business than those available in Egypt. 212 Nevertheless, it was 
this process of European integration and the development of its external ties with the 
neighbouring states that reinforced Euro-Egyptian economic relations, particularly 
through the Community's Global Mediterranean Policy that began in 1972. 
210 The six founding states of the EEC were France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxemburg. 
211 J. Harrop, The Political Economy of Integration in the European Community, (Hants, UK: Edward 
Elgar, 1989), pp. 10-15. 
212 From an FDI perspective, Egypt and Europe were simultaneously experiencing two contradicting 
strategies for their economic organisational structures. Europe opened up its markets and improved 
their economic policies that were conducive to FDI through regional integration. While Egypt's 
organisational structure was developed to tighten government control over the flow of Egypt's 
national income and to secure funds for development programmes from public resources. 
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Chapter Three 
Development of Egypt's Investment 
Environment, 1972-1995 
During the 1970s, Egypt experienced a radical re-orientation at its political and 
economic system. This era saw an end to the belligerent status quo with Israel that 
existed prior to the 1973 war; an end in the deterioration of the country's 
socioeconomic conditions; and the integration of Egypt into the global system. It also 
witnessed the evolution of Egypt's legal and administrative systems and the 
liberalisation of its economic system. Political stability was achieved through 
Egypt's rapprochement with the west, particularly the US, and its peace treaty with 
Israel in 1979. Euro-Egyptian relations improved from the early 1970s through 
bilateral and multilateral initiatives such as the 1974 Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) and 
the Cooperation Agreement of 1977. The country's economic performance and 
investment climate also improved tremendously, in turn encouraging the resurgence 
of foreign investment into the country, which reached its peak in 1975. However, the 
growth in FDI was not sustained throughout the period under consideration due to 
lack of continued political, economic, administrative and legal reforms. 
3.1. The Evolution of Egypt's Legal System 
The resurgence of Arab and European FDI flows into Egypt in 1972 highlighted the 
significant role of the legal system in attracting foreign investment. 213 From an FDI 
213 In 1972, Saudi Arabia and Italy were the first and the only two countries to invest in Egypt after 
the amendment of the Constitution, which offered guarantees in case of nationalisation and 
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perspective, it was the evolution of the legal framework that allowed foreign 
investors to engage in the country's economic activities. The promulgation of 
investment laws was first directed at Arab capital flows through Law 65 of 1971, 
which concerned the investment of Arab funds and the free zones, and the 
Presidential Decree 109 of 1972, which approved Egypt's adherence to the 
`Agreement for the Establishment of the Arab Organisation for the Safeguarding of 
Investment'. Ratification of these opened the way for Egypt to join the Agreement on 
Investment and Movement of Arab Capital among Arab countries. 214 Despite 
specifically dealing with Arab investment, European investors from Italy, Germany 
and Switzerland took advantage of Article 18 of Law 65 of 1971, which allowed 
other foreign investors to benefit, after cabinet or Presidential approval, from the 
incentives and guarantees provided by the law. This was evident in the US$2.3 
million invested by Italy in the chemical industry in 1972, while Germany and 
Switzerland invested around US$51.4 million (EGP20 million) and US$79.2 million 
(EGP31 million), respectively, in pharmaceuticals in the following year. 215 
Having considered the political conditions of the country at the time, the foreign 
response to this preliminary piece of legislation was encouraging and highlighted the 
importance of incentives and guarantees in the promotion of FDI. Although Law 65 
offered such incentives and guarantees as capital repatriation after five years in the 
original currency and at the prevailing exchange rate; remittance of profits at the 
prevailing exchange rate; tax exemption for five years; and fair compensation in the 
sequestration of properties. This information is based on the data collected from General Authority 
for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI), Egypt. 
214 D. W. Carr, Foreign Investment and Development in Egypt, 1979, p . 41. 2 is Data collected by the author from GAFI, Egypt, in December 2004. 
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event of nationalisation or expropriation, this law was criticised for not exempting 
imports of capital equipment for approved projects from customs duties. 216 
The poor response of Arab investors to these preliminary laws encouraged the 
Egyptian Government to target FDI flows from other destinations, particularly 
Europe and the US. The promulgation of Law 43 of 1974 was designed for this 
purpose by allowing foreign participation, up to 49 per cent of total equity, with 
public or private capital in Egyptian companies. The percentage was set at this level 
to prevent foreign dominance of the country's financial institutions, and hence 
eliminated fears of a return to the colonial situation in one of the country's main 
economic sectors. 217 Apart from the banking sector, the law did not specify a 
maximum percentage of foreign equity. A degree of flexibility was also extended to 
GAFI's Board of Directors, by a two-thirds majority vote according to clause C of 
Article 4, to approve the investment of Arab or foreign capital without local 
participation in other fields, with the exception of banking. 218 
Such progress resulted in a sudden and sharp rise in Egypt's FDI inflows from 
US$522 million (EGP204.1 million) in 1974 to US$4.6 billion (EGP1.8 billion) in 
1975219 This rise in FDI was due to the wider range of incentives extended in the 
law, which included tax exemptions on commercial and industrial profits for five 
years that could be extended to eight years depending on the nature of the project; its 
geographical location; and its importance to economic development. Exemptions 
216 This omission was remedied in the area of tourism by Law No. I of 1973, concerning hotel and 
tourist establishments. D. W. Carr, Foreign Investment and Development in Egypt, p. 42. 
211 National Bank of Egypt, Economic Bulletin, Special Studies, Cairo, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3,1975, 
pp. 251-252. 
18 D. W. Carr, Foreign Investment and Development in Egypt, 1979, p. 44. 
2t9 Figures were calculated and converted from local currency to US dollar (at current exchange rate) 
by the author from the data collected from GAR, Egypt, in January 2005. 
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were also extended for the same period to reinvested profits, as long as these profits 
were not subject to taxation in the investor's home country or elsewhere. Foreign 
firms operating in the Free Zones enjoyed a total freedom from customs duties and 
almost total relief from corporate taxes on profits for an unlimited time. This law also 
offered guarantees in case of nationalisation, sequestration or confiscation except by 
judicial procedures. 













Hov ever, the impact of Law 43 of 1974 on FOl inflows into Egypt was limited 
and FDI growth became unsustainable after 1975. Figure 3. l shows a sharp decline 
in FDI flows by more than USS2.7 billion, from US$4.6 billion in 1975 to around 
US$1.8 billion in 1976. It shows that the impact of the Law 32 of 1977, which 
attempted to address this decline in FDI, was also limited. ' 20 The rise of Egypt's 
FDI inflows from US$2 billion in 1977 to over US$2.5 billion in the following year 
was followed by a dramatic decline in 1979, when FDI inflows reached US$768 
million. Since then, this only twice reached just above US$1 billion. but fluctuated 
and fell far below this level until the mid-1990s. hence highlighting serious problems 
220 Details of Law No. 43 of 1974 concerning the investment of Arab and foreign funds and the free 
zones as amended by Law 32 of 1977 (5 June 1977) is citied in National Bank of Egypt, Economic 
Bulletin, Vol. XXX, No. 2,1977, pp. 162-190. 
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far below this level until the mid-1990s, hence highlighting serious problems in the 
Egyptian legal and bureaucratic system. 
Although Law 43 of 1974 provided a sufficient basis for attracting foreign 
investment, it was criticised by foreign investors for the many ill-defined regulations 
it included. Foreign investors were also dissatisfied with the determination of the 
applicable exchange rate, as their capital entered at the official rate but the 
repatriation of capital was to be made at the prevailing rate. 2' Even the 1977 
amendment of this law did not properly address most issues of concern to foreign 
investors and hence failed to attract a substantial number of new foreign companies. 
It was apparent that this law was biased against import substitution projects, which 
represented the largest amount of FDI, in terms of profit repatriation rights and 
foreign exchange availability. 
The Companies Law 159 of 1981, which set out the rules and procedures for the 
incorporation of foreign businesses, regulated taxes, fees and employment rules, had 
little impact on the FDI growth rate during the following fifteen years. Other 
measures intended to stop a further deterioration in FDI growth, such as the 
investment law of July 1989, also failed to address issues of prime concern to foreign 
companies such as trademarks, patents, taxation and labour. 222 This failure, together 
with Egypt's financial crisis of the late 1980s and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 
August 1990, discouraged foreign firms from investing in the country and brought 
FDI flows to their lowest level - US$75.2 million - in 1990. 
221 D. W. Carr, Foreign Investment and Development in Egypt, 1979, p. 47. 
222 United Nations, Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, (New York: United 
Nations, 1993), pp. 11-15. 
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Indeed, the cumbersome nature of Egypt's legal system was a hindrance to the 
local business community and foreign companies alike. Most companies considered 
this system incapable of protecting them from fraud, forgery and the duplication of 
products or even protecting the local market against very cheap imports from China 
and South East Asia. This vulnerability created a dilemma, in which the government 
was neither able to adopt a more liberal policy nor willing to sacrifice the 
importation of cheap goods from the Far East without risking the loss of foreign 
investments. 223 
3.2. Administrative and Bureaucratic Development 
The bureaucratic system also failed to provide adequate support to foreign investors, 
who suffered from the length of time required for incorporating their businesses. This 
was mainly due to the multiplicity of agencies involved and the many different steps 
required between the application for project approval and incorporation of the 
company. For example, a French joint venture with an Egyptian partner had to wait 
for almost 18 months to get the necessary licences and approvals from government 
agencies, while other firms stated that it took them almost three years to complete the 
required procedures. 224 
In part, this problem was caused by lack of fixed criteria for use by officials in 
reaching decisions or determining the extent of various incentives for foreign 
223 Susan Strange et at., "European Direct Investments in North Africa: the Investors' perspective", in 
N. Ayubi (ed. ), Distant Neighbours, 1995,237. 
224 Ibid, p. 237. 
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investors, and often ended in diverse and conflicting interpretations of the law. 225 
The bureaucratic system remained typical of those in the developing world. Foreign 
investors complained about the numerous procedural requirements, including 
registration, securing investment incentives, getting a tax number, gaining access to 
land, obtaining building permits and municipal licenses, getting utilities and services 
connected, getting work permits for their employees, importing equipment and inputs 
and complying with employment formalities. 226 
These complaints highlighted the inefficiency of carrying out administrative 
procedures and hence undermined the relatively modest improvement in FDI entry 
requirements (on average the number of procedures required was 9 and the time until 
entry 52 days, compared to an average of 11 procedures and 68 days in most 
developing countries). 227 The monetary cost of FDI entry was also much higher in 
Egypt at US$943, compared to the average cost of US$504 in other developing 
countries. These factors led, in many cases, to long delays and a huge increase in 
establishment and production costs that, due to rising inflation and customs duties, 
accumulated during the interval between applying to set up and actual establishment. 
Opposition to economic reforms favouring FDI also came from some high 
ranking officials and ministers, who were ideologically opposed to the private sector 
and hence undermined the efforts of the political leadership to liberalise the 
economic system. Such challenges, which were common throughout the whole 
225 D. W. Carr, Foreign Investment and Development in Egypt, 1979, p. 94. 
226 James Emery, Melvin Spence Jr., Louis Wells, Jr., and Timothy Buhrer, "Administrative Barriers 
to Foreign Investment: Reducing Red Tape in Africa", The World Bank's Foreign Investment 
Advisory Service Occasional Paper, No. 14, Washington D. C., 2000, p. 16. 
227 Jacques Morisset and Olivier Lumenga Neso, "Administrative Barriers to Foreign Investment in 
Developing Countries", The World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper, No. 2848, Washington 
D. C., May 2002, p. 11. 
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period, emerged at the early stage of the economic liberalisation period, when 
President Sadat dismissed his Prime Minister Abdel Aziz Hegazy, who in 1975 
warned about the danger of foreign investment. Indeed, Sadat went so far as to 
explain that his economic liberalisation was victimised by "bureaucratic red-tape and 
erroneous ideological resistance". 28 
Table 3.1: Number of projects approved in Inland and Free Zones by date 1972-79. 
Year Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 Total 
1972 0 0 0 7 (5in+2fz)* 7 
1973 4 in 9(5in+4fz) 3 in 9 (8in+lfz) 25 
1974 1 13 (11in+2fz) 18 (16in+2fz) 31 (28in+3fz) 63 
1975 21 (16in+5fz) 24 (22in+2fz) 43(22in+21fz) 62(35in+27fz) 150 
1976 54 (21in+33) 34(19in+15fz) 27(11in+16fz) 24(11in+14fz) 140 
1977 70(57in+13fz) 47(38in+9fz) 52(35in+17fz) 39(30in+9fz) 208 
1978 81(61in+20fz) 53(37in+16fz) 32(23in+9fz) 50(40in+10fz) 216 
1979 63(51in+12fz) 63(46in+17fz) 69(53in+16fz) 60(53in+7fz) 255 
Total 294 243 244 282 1064 
Source: K. Gillespie, 1984, pp. 193-194. 
* in = inland and fz = free zones 
The immediate impact of the removal of Hegazy from the premiership was 
apparent in the rise in the number of projects approved for investment in late 1975 
and early 1976, as seen in table 3.1. This table also shows how political events such 
as the food riots of January 1977 influenced the authorities to approve some 70 
project applications in the first three months of the same year in an effort to underline 
its ongoing commitment to economic liberalisation. Of the 70 foreign projects 
approved during the first quarter of 1977,65 projects with an estimated US$1 billion 
(EGP404 million), were approved on 27 March 1977, while only 5 projects were 
228 J. Waterbury, Egypt: Burdens of the Past Options for the Future, (London: Indiana University 
Press, 1978), p. 232. 
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approved from 1 January 1977 until this date. 229 The large number of approved 
projects could not be attributed to the investment Law 32 of 1977 because this law 
did not come into effect until June 1977. 
The government failed to combine its economic liberalisation programmes with 
reforms of the bureaucratic system. No serious efforts were made to inform or train 
civil servants, who carried out the implementation of legislation and policies, of the 
objectives of the liberalisation programmes. Such failure was apparent in the conflict 
in policy orientation between the political leadership and the lower levels of 
government, who since the 1950s had been giving priority to public, over private, 
sector applications. 30 
Between 1972 and 1995, foreign companies suffered from strict government 
control over such vital areas as employment policy, as well as bureaucratic 
restrictions concerning price controls on a number of strategic commodities, 
including cloth, bread, sugar, edible oil, soap and utilities. The government also 
maintained direct control over the exchange rate and the devaluation of the Egyptian 
Pound, as well as the country's main financial resources until the early 1990s. This 
affected considerably the value of the profits of foreign companies in many respects, 
not least the earnings of their native managers and employees. The overvalued 
official exchange rate of the Egyptian Pound, which was used for government 
transactions, made it very difficult for foreign companies to submit competitive 
tenders for public contracts when they had to import goods or buy materials on the 
black market. Such factors not only limited the production and marketing activities 
229 K. Gillespie, The Tripartite Relationship, 1984, p. 74. 
230 D. W. Carr, Foreign Investment and Development in Egypt, 1979, p. 95. 
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of many foreign companies in the country but also made it difficult for them to 
compete in the market or secure substantial profits. Hence, most economic activities 
were conducted by the uncompetitive public sector or the underdeveloped private 
sector. 
Further obstacles were also highlighted in a study by the National Bank of Egypt, 
which argued that many foreign companies found it difficult to obtain land on which 
to set up projects because of lack of integrated industrial zones, the high price of 
land, and because formalities for the allocation of government-owned land to 
projects were excessively time-consuming. 231 It also argued that many foreign 
companies in the new industrial areas suffered from a lack of infrastructural 
facilities, particularly telecommunications. 232 Inadequate and inaccurate data 
regarding domestic and regional markets also greatly affected studies and forecasts in 
respect of investment projects, particularly in the area of marketing and consumer 
demand. This in turn also affected the decisions of some firms as to whether or not to 
undertake projects, while it discouraged others from expanding their activities into 
other areas. 
3.3. Economic Liberalisation Programmes 
Between, 1972 and 1995, Egypt launched two large-scale economic liberalisation 
programmes. The first was the 1974 Infitah policy, which aimed at transforming the 
231 National Bank of Egypt, Economic Bulletin, Vol. XXX, No. 2,1977, pp. 156-157. 
232 Most foreign investors in the new industrial cities complained about such vital services as 
telephone and telex services, which were deficient, and transport was not extended to the areas where 
their projects were set up. 
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economic system from a centrally-planned socialist to a semi-capitalist system. It 
also allowed a greater role for foreign capital and the private sector in economic 
development. This transformation was inevitable because the public sector was 
unable to lead the process of economic development, while the government could not 
afford the absence of foreign and private capital, if the country was to be 
modernised. 33 This policy succeeded to a large extent in forging economic ties 
between Egypt and the West, particularly the US and Europe, while strengthening 
the position of the government vis-ä-vis the local business community which desired 
increased private enterprise. 
234 
This success was evident during the mid-1970s, especially following Law 43 of 
1974 which contributed to a huge rise in FDI in Egypt. Shortly after the introduction 
of the Infitah policy, Arab, American and European companies began to establish 
joint ventures and branches in Egypt. In 1975, Arab FDI flows increased to around 
US$1 billion from only US$341.2 million in the previous year. This was also the 
case with the US FDI flows, which increased from US$157.8 million in 1974 to over 
US$1 billion in 1975. The greatest response was that of EC companies whose capital 
investments increased from US$15.9 million in 1974 to approximately US$1.6 
billion the following year. 235 Foreign participation was permitted in almost all 
economic sectors, with industry the most attractive sector and almost 55 foreign 
banks operating in the financial sector by 1981,236 
233 Due to limited national resources, the Government of Egypt relied heavily on foreign aid and loans 
to finance large national projects and implement its economic development programme. 
234 D. Hopwood, Egypt Politics and Society 1945-90, Third Edition, (London: Routledge, 1991), 
131. 
235 Figures are calculated and converted by the author from local currency into US dollar at current 
exchange rate from the data collected from the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones 
(GAFI), Egypt, in January 2005. 
236 According to GAFI, the financial sector received the highest value of FDI flows between 1972 and 
1995, but industry had the largest number of companies and investments were much more consistent 
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From an FDI perspective, several external measures were taken by the Egyptian 
government to consolidate the Infitah policy. US-Egyptian relations were 
consolidated in order to benefit from US investment and technological expertise 
through an economic agreement for the avoidance of double taxation. This 
encouraged the US to participate in reconstruction projects in the Suez Canal, and 
safeguarded US investment in Egypt. 237 Financial and technical agreements were 
concluded with Germany, France, the UK and Spain to provide Egypt with loans and 
facilities for development purposes. The government also secured substantial 
financial support from major international institutions such as the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 238 the World Bank, the IMF and Arab 
Fund for Economic and Social Development. 
Such measures added significantly to those taken earlier and aimed at securing 
investments from the Arab and oil-exporting countries in 1972, when the government 
approved the Resolution of the Arab League's Economic Council. This resolution 
attempted to promote Arab investment, prohibited the nationalisation and 
expropriation of Arab capital, and provided for Arab countries to set down the 
conditions and the fields in which investment would be focused. An Arbitration 
Board was also set up within the Arab League to consider investment disputes. 239 
than that in finance, which fluctuated sharply between the years, and were almost absent after 1983 
from the banking sector. UNCTAD put the financial sector second to tourism, which was indeed far 
behind the industrial sector, as will be explained in chapter four. UNCTAD, "Investment Policy 
Review: Egypt", United Nations Publications, Geneva, 1999, p. 132. 
237 National Bank of Egypt, Economic Bulletin, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3,1975, p. 252. 
238 The IBRD provided US$50m loan for the clearance of the Suez Canal in 1974-75 and US$70 
million for its enlargement. 
239 National Bank of Egypt, Economic Bulletin, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3,1975, p. 252 
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At a national level, the Infitah policy increased the role of the private sector in 
developing the country's infrastructure and modernisation programmes. It allowed 
greater participation of private and foreign capital, particularly in the areas of textile, 
food and beverages, chemicals, metals, machinery and electronics. 240 There were 
also some notable successes in foreign-national cooperation in the industrial sphere, 
particularly in the automobile industry with Fiat, for example, producing the Ramses 
with a German engine and a locally built frame. 241 
In the financial sector, the Infitah policy introduced a number of policy measures 
that eliminated market entry restrictions to foreign investors. The government 
introduced vital reforms to the financial market through a set of laws aimed at 
liberalising capital markets. Capital Market Law No. 95 of 1992 was designed for 
that specific purpose and under the direction of the Capital Market Authority (CMA), 
which had the responsibility of protecting investors against unlawful and unfair 
practices, guaranteeing the availability of relevant information through a prudential 
regulatory scheme, and monitoring the operations and performances of the Cairo and 
Alexandria stock exchanges. 
However, the impact of the Infitah policy on investment was short-lived. The 
benefits of FDI were eroded by the high annual rate of population growth of 2.3 per 
cent which reduced per capita income; the heavy debt-servicing burden which 
increased with the expansion of borrowing for development purposes; large defence 
expenditure; the high rate of inflation; and high government expenditures. The 
limited impact of FDI on economic development was also caused by the failure of 
240 UNCTAD, "Investment Policy Review: Egypt", United Nations Publications, Geneva, 1999, 
132. 
41 Ibid, p. 132. 
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the government to engage foreign capital in major national projects such as the 
reconstruction of the Suez Canal zone in the mid-1970s; 
242 the building of new 
industrial cities such as the Sixth October and Tenth Ramadan in 1980s; and 
agricultural and land reclamation projects such as Toshka in upper Egypt. 243 
The privatisation of Egypt's public sector under the Infitah policy, which was 
intended solely to revive the private sector, was narrowly implemented. 244 This 
programme failed to achieve its objective due to strong socialist sentiment across 
different layers of the government bureaucracy, and some controversy surrounding 
how, and to whom, public companies should be sold. The process, which allowed 
public sector companies to sell some of their equity shares to private investors or to 
enter into joint ventures with foreign companies under Law 43, had little effect on 
FDI. 
This was due to several factors. Firstly, most sales did not go to foreign or private 
companies but to the employees of the concerned companies due to the belief that 
involving employees in ownership could stimulate productivity. 245 Secondly, 
privatisation was challenged by the controversial legal framework, Law 111 of 1975, 
which prevented any decrease in the percentage participation of the state in the 
equity of public sector companies. As such any sale required a Presidential decree in 
242 The significance of these mega projects such as the reconstruction of the Suez Canal zone and the 
clearance and opening of the canal was in the result which led to repatriation of some 235,000 refuges 
to Port Said and 20,000 to Suez by 1975. National Bank of Egypt (1975), Economic Bulletin, No. 3, 
254. 
243 Ministry of Economy, Investing in Egypt, (Cairo: Government Publications, 2002), Vol. 2, p. 29; 
and Ali EL-Samman, "Toshka is TOPs", AI-Ahram Weekly, Issue 620,9-15 January 2003. 
htty: //weekly. ahram. org. eg/2003/620/ec2. htm 
244 Frank Sader, "Privatising Public Sector Enterprises and Foreign Investment in Developing 
Countries 1988-1993", Foreign Investment Advisory Service Occasional Paper, No. 5, (Washington, 
D. C.: The International Finance Corporation and the World Bank, 1995), pp. 7-8. 
245 Middle East Economic Digest, London, Vol. 22, (10 February 1978), p. 24; and K. Gillespie, The 
Tripartite Relationship, 1984, p. 123. 
117 
order to bypass this law, unless the company entered into a joint venture under Law 
43246 Thirdly, privatisation was mainly carried out by Egyptian nationals, who by 
1978 accounted for almost 55 per cent of all capital authorised under Law 43, the 
bulk of which had been supplied by the public sector and a few individual 
investors. 47 The public sector invested in some 70 new non-financial projects with 
capital totalling EGP232 million. 248 This means that most new investments came 
from the sector that most urgently required restructuring and development, and hence 
neither technology nor new foreign capital was available to contribute to economic 
development. 
The poor quality of Egypt's public sector and its policy of over-employment 
discouraged foreign companies from seeking joint ventures with public sector 
companies. This was apparent in the lack of foreign participation in the two phases of 
privatisation during the mid-1970s and early 1990s. Even those companies which 
had already been operating in the country, complained to their Egyptian partners 
about the many indirect employees that had to be kept on the payroll. Indeed, indirect 
workers, including guards and drivers, absorbed a substantial proportion of profit, 
and hence deprived Egypt of one of its main comparative advantages - cheap labour. 
Besides the financial losses, long term employment in the public sector damaged the 
competitive edge of Egyptian managers and workers, leading one French company 
manufacturing electrical goods to complain that commercial considerations came 
246 Egyptian Ministry of Economy, "Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Study on Law 43 
Investment Policies ", Economic Studies Unit, Cairo, 1979, p. 23. 
Z4' K. Gillespie, The Tripartite Relationship, 1984, pp. 122-125. 
248 Egyptian Ministry of Economy, Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, 1979, pp. 7-23. 
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second with their local partners, whose inattention to costs and pricing reduced the 
profitability of the enterprise. 
249 
Egyptian private funds were also very limited as most of the assets of public 
companies were purchased by very few individuals, who did not commit themselves 
to long term investment but rather focused only on projects with short term returns 
and huge profit margins for their invested capital. The limited financial ability of 
employees to buy shares in public companies also allowed a few individuals with 
good political contacts such as Osman Ahamed Osman to become major 
shareholders. 50 Such entrepreneurs, who often declared themselves proponents of 
free market enterprise and competition, were more of a hindrance than a help to 
economic liberalisation. For instance, while he was a Cabinet Minster between 1973 
and 1977, Osman prevented market competition by limiting the approval of projects 
in the construction domain in order to protect Arab Contractors, the company he 
owned and chaired. During his four years in office, he approved only 8 projects in 
construction, but after his removal from the cabinet the same number was approved 
in a three-month period, and some 69 projects were approved in the following two 
years. 251 Such factors hindered this phase of privatisation and thus Egypt remained a 
public-sector-led and inward-looking economy, promoting import-substituting 
industries until the early 1990s. 
The Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme (ERSAP) 
introduced in 1991 was the second major step towards economic liberalisation during 
249 Susan Strange et al (1995), "European Direct Investments in North Africa: the Investors' 
perspective", in N. Ayubi (ed. ), Distant Neighbours, 1995, p. 239. 
250 K. Gillespie, The Tripartite Relationship, 1984, p. 124. 
251 Fiani and Partners (1980), Egypt Investment Directory, Cairo, Egypt; cited in Gillespie, The 
Tripartite Relationship, p. 126. 
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the period under consideration. This programme, which was guided by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, attempted to minimise the 
impact of Egypt's economic crisis of the late 1980s, particularly after the sharp 
decline in oil prices and a surprising rise in interest rates, which led to fiscal and 
balance of payments deficits, a high rate of inflation and rising unemployment. 
52 By 
1991, Egypt's inflation rate had reached 20.4 per cent and its GDP declined 
dramatically to 1.2 per cent from 8.7 per cent in 1987,253 adding significantly to a 
further increase in the trade deficit, which amounted to US$11.7 billion in 1990 254 
By the early 1990s foreign debt amounted to US$50 billion, with an annual debt 
servicing of some US$5 billion. 255 
The 1991 ERSAP was far more comprehensive than the Infitah policy. It 
included deregulation, fiscal adjustments, tax reforms, the curtailment of subsidies, 
and financial and trade liberalisation. In particular privatisation aimed at achieving 
sustainable economic growth, creating new employment opportunities, and shifting 
the economy from a centrally-planned to a decentralised market-based and outward- 
oriented economy. 256 The programme also attempted to raise Egypt's GDP to an 
average of 6 per cent per annum and the ratio of investment to GDP to 25 per cent 
from 18 per cent, mainly through increased private investment. 257 Moves toward 
252 Ahmed El-Najjar, Egyptian Economy: from July experience to the future model, (Cairo: Al-Ahram 
Centre for Strategic and Political Studies, 2002), p. 145. (in Arabic) 
253 International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook 1994, pp. 116 and 124. 
254 IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1994, p. 183. 
255 These deteriorated economic conditions not only affected considerably Egypt's relations with the 
IMF and the World Bank between 1987 and 1991, but also raised doubts among foreign companies 
about the country's financial credibility in the global financial system. Susan Strange et al, "European 
Direct Investments in North Africa: the Investors' perspective", in Ayubi (ed. ), Distant Neighbours, 
1995, pp. 235-236. 
256 The World Bank, Trends in Developing Countries, Washington D. C., 1996, p. 152; and United 
Nations (1998), Foreign Direct Investment Legislation Reflecting Environmental Concerns in the 
ESCWA Region: The Cases of Egypt and Jordan, New York, 1998, p. 22. 
257 World Bank, Trends in Developing Countries, 1996, pp. 155-56. 
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economic liberalisation regulated further in Law 203 of 1991, which attempted to 
reform public enterprises and eliminate the differences in treatment between the 
public and private sectors. This law paved the way towards privatisation by 
separating some public companies from their ministries, re-organising them into 17 
diversified and financially autonomous holding and affiliated companies, and making 
them dependent on their economic viability, as a preliminary step for privatisation, 
restructuring or liquidation. 258 
Although the 1990s privatisation programme achieved some success through the 
stock market in areas such as port services, telecommunications, electricity, and 
insurance companies, it encountered various difficulties such as the re-grouping of 
the companies to be privatised into specialised holdings according to their financial 
restructuring, and other factors such as unemployment concerns and lack of foreign 
participation. 259 Contrary to the declaration that only unprofitable public sector 
companies would be sold, most sales have been of profitable companies, adding 
subsequently to a further deterioration in the public sector, which then was the main 
engine of the country's economic growth. 260 
The most distressing part of the process was the sale of strategically important 
companies such as Alzojaj Almosatah, which was not only very profitable but one of 
the most reputable and successful specialist companies in glass production in Egypt 
258 UNCTAD, "Investment Policy Review: Egypt", United Nations publications, Geneva, 1999, p. 21. 
259 Failure to attract large number of foreign investors meant that the privatisation programme missed 
one of its main objectives, which is attracting strong investors to the domestic market and receiving 
maximum prices for the enterprises in the selling process. Kathy Megyery and Frank Sader, 
"Facilitating Foreign Participation in Privatisation", The World Bank, Washington, D. C., 1996, p. 4. 
260 Ahmed El-Najjar (2002), Egyptian Economy: from July experience to the future model, p. 147. 
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and the wider Middle East. 261 The sale of Assuit Cement was another example of the 
government selling very successful companies of strategic importance at much lower 
prices than their actual market value. The sale of such a company represented a 
setback to the economy whose construction and housing sectors depended largely on 
cement imported from abroad. The sales process was both corrupt and mismanaged 
by the ministry responsible for privatisation. For example, Al-Abram Beverages, El- 
Nasr Steamers and Meridian Hotels were valued below their market worth and sold 
to pre-selected buyers at much lower prices than those offered by competitors. 262 
The case of Pepsi Cola Egypt, which was sold in August 1994 for EGP157.6 million, 
was another example of the lack of transparency and corruption as the company 
which comprised 8 factories and 18 production lines was sold for the value of only 
two factories. 263 
The distribution of the total revenues from the sale of public sector companies, 
which was estimated in 1999 at around EGP10 billion, highlighted the limited impact 
of privatisation on economic growth during the 1990s. Statistics show that almost 
EGP3.6 billion (36.1 per cent of total revenues) was used in debt repayments; 
EGP1.9 billion (19.3 per cent) used in compensating the early retirement of workers; 
EGP331 million (3.3 per cent) was used to pay the salaries of employees in 
unprofitable companies; while only EGP4.1 billion (41.3 per cent) went to the 
treasury. 264 These figures indicate that the remaining revenues were too insignificant 
to add to investment in the economy, especially when the balance of trade deficit 
261 Ibid, pp. 159-160. 
262 Ibid, pp. 150-161. 
263 This claim was made by the former chairman of the Pepsi Cola Egypt before it was privatised. Ibid, 
153-154. 
Ministry of Public Sector Administration, Researchers file, cited in A. El-Najjar, Egyptian 
Economy: from July experience to the future model, pp. 161-162. 
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grew during the second half of the 1990s to US$12.5 billion and US$11.5 billion in 
1998-99 and 1999-2000, respectively. 265 Data also indicates that the sales process 
was used to cover up the failure of the government in restructuring public sector 
companies and the huge debts of the economy, which absorbed almost one third of 
revenues. The contribution of some 19.3 per cent of total revenues by the 
government to early retirement shows that privatisation did not generate employment 
as it was supposed to do, but rather added significantly to the level of unemployment 
which was already high. 
Between 1974 and 1995, the nature of Egypt's economic liberalisation highlights 
the failure of the government to either promote an export-oriented policy or to 
balance a mixture of policies based on export-orientation and import-substitution. 
The government's focus on import-substitution industrialisation, which led to a huge 
growth in the country's balance-of-payments and balance-of-trade deficits, explains 
not only this failure but also the insignificant progress made in developing export- 
focused projects. The Egyptian Government adopted highly protectionist measures 
and policies against foreign competition. Such an approach, which prevailed for most 
of the 1980s and early 1990s, caused stagnation in the internal market and badly 
affected the activities of many foreign companies in Egypt. The impact of this was 
reflected in the reaction of two French mineral water companies and another 
producing pressed concrete, which argued that protection from competition led to 
overpriced products inappropriate to a low income mass market such as Egypt and 
265 The Egyptian-British Chamber of Commerce. http: //www. theebcc. com/balance payment. shtml. 
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that reducing the price would lower profits to the point where companies would leave 
the market. 
266 
The inability of the government to develop the mechanisms of the internal market 
made it impossible for foreign companies, often operating in import-substituting 
sectors, to acquire some sort of monopoly status and hence reduced the country's 
investment potential for these companies. The undeveloped nature of Egypt's 
internal market meant that there was insufficient and inadequate operational and 
technical local support for foreign companies operating in the market. From an 
operational perspective, the standard of local support, the quality of procedures and 
services and the delivery time were low and uncertain. This forced some firms to 
switch from using local fabrics and materials to importing most of their requirements 
from abroad, thus adding significantly to the cost of their products. 
On the technical side, most incentives for investment were offered to companies 
operating in free zones and new industrial cities such as Sixth October and Tenth 
Ramadan, which were set up by the government to accommodate workers and 
factories. Most of these new cities lacked basic facilities such as water, electricity, 
hospitals, schools and transport. Such conditions made it difficult for foreign and 
local firms to operate. One French confectionary manufacturer even complained that 
it did not have electricity for two years after it had started work. 67 The failure of the 
government to overcome these obstacles to foreign investment added significantly to 
the challenge of attracting foreign capital flows into the country. 
266 Susan Strange et at, "European Direct Investments in North Africa: the Investors' perspective", in 
Ayubi (ed. ), Distant Neighbours, 1995, p. 236. 
267 Susan Strange et at, "European Direct Investments in North Africa: the Investors' perspective", in 
Ayubi (ed. ), Distant Neighbours, 1995,238. 
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3.4. The Political Climate 
Developments in Egypt's political system during the 1970s not only impacted 
positively on the country's investment climate but also added to the FDI growth rate. 
The development of the internal political system began as early as May 1971, when 
the Corrective Revolution restored the sequestrated properties and dismantled large 
parts of Nasser's apparatus, including the elite Arab Socialist Union (ASU), top army 
officers, the intelligence service and the police force. This process was consolidated 
by the emergence of the multi-party system in 1976, with the Arab Socialist Party in 
the centre, the National Progressive Union Party on the left and the Free Socialist 
Party on the right. The resurgence of the Wafd Party and the formation of the Umma 
Party strengthened the political process during the 1980s, all of which added towards 
the country's gradual political transition. 
Political reforms were very much driven by personal vision and economic 
motives, particularly by President Sadat who believed that his foreign and economic 
policies required a more flexible, liberal and democratic political system. This 
limited the role of institutions in the development of the political process, which was 
balanced somewhere between the desire to adopt the basic norms of the democracy, 
such as political pluralism, and the desire to introduce measures strengthening the 
power of the president. 268 
268 Derek Hopwood, Egypt Politics and Society 1945-90, Third Edition, (London: Routledge, 1991), 
p. 112. 
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The manipulation of the process of democratisation was apparent in Sadat's 
effort to form his own party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), to consolidate his 
power. Democratisation was also undermined by the president's control over 
political parties and the media. This was evident in the introduction of emergency 
measures which severely curtailed political activity, controlled the press and made 
demonstrations and strikes illegal, as well as measures allowing the president an 
unlimited number of terms in office. 269 Political reform was also constrained by such 
measures as those giving the president the power to crack down on political 
opposition and Islamic movements or to rely on the army to defend and protect his 
legitimacy. 270 
These measures slowed down the process of economic liberalisation and 
development. This was apparent during the 1980s and 1990s, when Egypt 
experienced not only political but also economic stagnation. The FDI growth rate 
dramatically decreased from US$1,379.8 million in 1980 to US$258.2 million, 
US$75.2 million and US$324.2 million in 1985,1990 and 1995, respectively. 271 EU 
FDI flows into the country fell from US$923.5 million in 1980 to US$26.9 million in 
1990, while US capital flows decreased from US$28.6 million to US$0.9 million 
during the same period. 272 Arab investment also fell from US$317 million in 1980 to 
US$41.1 million in 1990, despite the improvement in Arab-Egyptian diplomatic 
relations. 273 Although this decline occurred due to multiple factors as explained 
269 Ibid, pp. 114-120 
270 The most obvious example of this was in 1986, when President Mubarak ordered the army to crack 
down the riots broke among the Central Security Forces, which were often used as the arm of the state 
in dealing with demonstrations and strikes. Hopwood, Egypt Politics and Society 1945-90, p. 189. 
Z" Figures are calculated and converted from local currency into US dollar by the author from GAFI's 
data base. 
272 These figures do not include investment in the petroleum sector. 
273 In 1989, Egypt's diplomatic relations were formally restored with Arab states, and the country was 
allowed back into the Arab League, whose headquarter was moved from Tunisia city back to Cairo. 
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above, foreign investors considered Egypt high political risk for investment, 
particularly after the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991. For example, concerns over this led 
French investors to concentrate their investments in economic sectors from which it 
was easy to withdraw, thereby indicating a certain lack of confidence in Egypt's 
investment climate. 274 They believed that political risk in Egypt and the wider Arab 
world was higher than that of Asia and Latin America and was only lower than that 
of sub-Saharan Africa. 275 
It was the Egyptian-Israeli peace process, above all, that contributed significantly 
to an improvement in Egypt's political environment and the country's economic 
growth. It minimised the political and economic costs associated with the mutual 
hostility prior to the 1973 war, particularly when it was apparent that Arab territories 
could not be liberated by military means. 276 It has also been argued that the peace 
process eased the economic and monetary challenges faced by Egypt during the 
1970s and 1980s. 77 Moreover, Egypt's rapprochement with the West, particularly 
the US, during the mid-1970s improved the image of the country in the developed 
world and re-positioned it as a major pro-western ally in the Middle East. This 
political transformation consolidated the country's place in the global economic 
system, enhancing the credibility of the Egyptian Government with major 
international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF in relation to 
credits, loans and grants for social and economic development. 
274 Louis Blin, (1995) "French Investments in the Arab World", in Ayubi, N. (ed. ), Distant 
Neighbours, op., p. 270. 
275 Ibid, p. 270. 
276 Abdel Aleem Mohamed, "Egyptian Policy towards the Palestinian Issue and the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict", in Mostafa Elwy (ed. ), Egyptian School in Foreign Policy, Vol. 1, (Cairo: Centre for 
Political Research and Studies, Cairo University, 2002), pp. 446-7 (in Arabic). 
277 On domestic challenges faced by Egypt during the 1970s and 1980s see for example Y. Meital, 
"Domestic Challenges and Egypt's US policy", MERIA, Vol. 2, No. 4, November 1998. 
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This political re-orientation also allowed Egypt to build up political and 
economic ties with the US and the EC through bilateral and multilateral frameworks 
for cooperation such as the 1974 Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD). During the period 
under consideration, US economic and military assistance amounted annually to 
around US$2 billion. 278 Other measures by foreign agencies to revive the Egyptian 
economy and increase the role of the private sector in the economy were apparent in 
the effort of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
which provided some US$25 million to Egyptian banks in 1978 for use by the 
private sector in importing American goods. 279 Whatever the motives of this 
contribution, Egypt's major trading partners, since the mid-1970s, have been the two 
main western economic powers, the US and the EU. The former was Egypt's largest 
single trading partner, accounting for 40 per cent of all Egypt's imports until the 
early the 1990s, but since that time its position has been overtaken by the EU. 
Together, these two economic powers accounted for an average of 62.1 per cent of 
Egypt's total imports and 63.3 per cent of its exports over the period from 1991 to 
2001.80 
However, the impact of these political developments had not been hugely 
effective in either stimulating sustainable economic growth or promoting foreign 
investment into Egypt. The political and economic support received by Egypt from 
the West was very much undermined by the country's isolation in the Arab world 
278 Ahmed Galal & Robert Lawrence (eds. ), Building Bridges: An Egypt-US Free Trade Agreement, 
(Cairo: The Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies, Cairo & John F. Kennedy School of Government, 
US, 1998), p. 8. 
279 Middle East Economic Digest, London, Vol. 22 (November 1978), p. 27; and in Vol. 23 (May 
1979), p. 26. 
280 Sherine Abdel-Razek, "FTA inches forward", AI-Ahram Weekly, Issue 641,5-11 June 2003. 
http: //weekly. ahram. org. eeV2003/641/ec3. htm 
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after the signing of its peace treaty with Israel in 1979.281 This agreement cost Egypt 
almost all the economic and financial support that it previously received from major 
Arab donors such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya and Iraq. 282 Also, Egypt's 
isolation in the Arab world deprived the country of one of its main comparative 
advantages, its geographical proximity to other Arab and Middle East countries. 
Major multinational companies such as British Leyland, Ford, Coca Cola, Colgate 
Palmolive, Motorola, Xerox, and Revlon, which hoped that their investments in 
Egypt would provide them with a regional platform for export to other Arab markets, 
suffered from Egypt's regional isolation until the mid-1980s2ß3 The desire of many 
of these companies to avoid being placed on the Arab Boycott List may also have 
impacted negatively on FDI inflows into the country. 
Egypt's attempt to achieve political stability was also undermined by tensions 
and regional conflicts including the Lebanese Civil War, the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in 1982, the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 
1990, the 1991 Gulf War, the Palestinian Intifada of 1988, and repeated deadlocks in 
the Middle East peace process. As political events often influence economic 
cooperation and development, this volatile region was highly unattractive to foreign 
capital flows, and hence the impact of high political risk on the growth of FDI was 
evident in the lack of private investment during most of the period between 1972 and 
1995. 
281 Egypt's membership in the Arab League was suspended between March 1979 and May 1989, and 
headquarter of the League was moved from Cairo to Tunisia during this period. 
282 K. Gillespie, The Tripartite Relationship, 1984, pp 79-80. 
283 In 1975 and in its effort to attract foreign investors, Egypt announced that companies on its boycott 
list could do business in Egypt if their investment was at least twice that of their investments in Israel. 
K. Gillespie, The Tripartite Relationship, 1984, p. 80. 
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3.5. Euro-Egyptian Economic Relations under the Global Mediterranean 
Policy 
Since the EEC's establishment in 1957, Euro-Egyptian relations steadily developed 
through a serious of bilateral and multilateral frameworks for cooperation, though 
real economic cooperation did not materialise until the mid-1970s. 
284 The EC's 
Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) of 1972, which attempted to develop the 
Community's external relations with southern Mediterranean countries, produced the 
first preferential trade agreement signed between the Community and Egypt in 
December of that year. 285 This policy had no effective mechanisms to contribute to 
Egypt's economic growth and the significance of the agreement only lay in the 
institutionalisation of the EC-Egypt trade relationship. This limited progress was 
probably due to the tension that marked their political relationship, which emanated 
from the legacy of colonialism and Europe's support for Israel in its conflict with 
Arab states prior to 1967286 
284 Improvement in Euro-Arab relation occurred after some major European powers such as France, 
and UK changed their attitudes towards the Arab-Israeli conflict following the 1967 war. This change 
of attitude was clear in France's policy towards the Arab cause after 1967. Britain changed its policy 
and called for an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of mutual compromise, the right of self- 
determination for the Palestinian people, and the reopening of the Suez Canal in order to minimize the 
cost of oil transportation around the Cape of Good Hope. See A. Mishrif, "The Impact of Global 
Forces on the Euro-Arab Economic Relations", unpublished paper, April 2003; A. Ramazani, The 
Middle East and the European Common Market, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1964), 
88. P, 
58 s For discussion on the Global Mediterranean Policy of 1972 see H. Jawad, Euro-Arab Relations, 
(Reading: Ithaca Press, 1992); I. Greilsammer & J. Weiler, Europe's Middle East Dilemma: The 
Quest for a Unified Stance, (London: Westview Press, 1987); N. Ayubi, Distance Neighbours, The 
political Economy of Relations between Europe and the Middle East/North Africa, (Reading: Ithaca 
Press, 1995); and S. Al-Sheikh & S. Al-Aani', The Euro-Arab Dialogue, A study in Associative 
Di lomacy, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983). 
286 S. Mansour, Euro-Arab Dialogue: The Search for a New Start, (Cairo: Al-Ahram Centre for 
Strategic and Political Studies, 1984), pp. 153-154 (in Arabic). 
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The economic relationship was also affected by the unwillingness of the EC to 
provide sufficient economic and financial assistance to its former colonies, hence 
raising doubts among its southern partners about the objectives of the GMP. 
287 This 
first EC-Egypt preferential trade agreement failed to achieve its basic objectives. No 
trade barriers in industrial goods between Egypt and the EC were eliminated until the 
second agreement was signed in 1977288 
From the outset, the EC deprived Egypt of its main comparative advantage in 
agricultural commodities by failing to compromise in offering suitable concessions 
in agricultural exports on the grounds that such a compromise could endanger the 
legitimate interests of member states or the EC Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP)289 Export of manufactured goods into the EC market was also minimal 
because of Egypt's inadequate industrial capacity to produce goods capable of 
competing in the EC market. Thus, neither the GMP nor the preferential trade 
agreement had a significant impact on the Euro-Egyptian economic relationship until 
1974, when the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) was set up as a new multilateral 
framework for cooperation. 
The EAD, which was established in the aftermath of the oil crisis of 1973, 
attempted to foster the EC's political, economic and cultural relationship with the 
287 The situation of Morocco and Tunisia was different because of their special relationships with 
France. This was apparent in French influence on the EC's external ties to improve relations with 
North African countries, an effort that was concluded in trade agreements with Tunisia and Morocco 
in March 1969. For more details see Nadia Mustafa, Europe and the Arab World, (Beirut: Centre for 
Arab Unity Studies, 1986), p. 210 (in Arabic). 
288 This is despite the fact that the preferential trade agreement allowed for more than 90 per cent of 
Egyptian industrial exports to the EC to enjoy tariff concessions. Middle East and Africa Economist, 
"Egypt-EC sign Accord", New York, Vol. XXVII, No. 3, March 1973, p. 33. 
289 European Community Executive Commission, "Relations with the Mediterranean Countries", 
Bulletin of the European Communities, 10/1,1977, pp. 119-120. 
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Arab countries. 290 Although much of the activities in these domains took place in 
Egypt, where the Arab League's headquarters were based, the impact of the dialogue 
on Egypt's social and economic development was limited. From the outset, the 
dialogue was undermined by political considerations such as the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and the participation of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in the 
framework's deliberations. 91 Such issues not only overshadowed economic 
cooperation but also led to the postponement of the meetings until June 1975, and a 
complete suspension of the dialogue after the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David Accords 
and the exclusion of Egypt from the Arab League in 1979.292 
From an FDI perspective, the EAD did not include mechanisms to improve the 
business environment of its participants nor did it encourage European companies to 
extend their activities to the Egyptian, and the wider Arab, market. 293 No similar 
legal privileges or diplomatic impetus as those enjoyed by European firms in Egypt 
during the nineteenth century were secured by the EAD, 294 and though Egypt saw an 
unprecedented rise in FDI inflows in the years following the initiation of the EAD, 
the role of the Dialogue in this rise can be questioned. 
Table 3.2 shows that the number of European firms approved for projects rose 
from 19 in 1974 to 51 in 1975. This was matched by a similar rise in the number of 
290 Rory Miller, Ireland and the Palestinian Question 1948-2004, (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 
2005), pp. 81-92. 
291 Rory Miller & Ashraf Mishrif, "The Barcelona Process and Euro-Arab Economic Relations: A 
Decade On", MERIA, Vol. 9, No. 2, June 2005, pp. 94-108. 
http: //meria. idc. il/journal/2005/issue2/Miller%2ORoly%2Opdf. pddf 
292 Ahmed Sidqi Al-Dajani, `The PLO and the Euro-Arab Dialogue', Journal of Palestinian Studies, 
Vol. IX, No. 3 (Spring 1980), pp81-108; and Jawad, Euro-Arab Relations: A study in Collective 
Diplomacy, (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1992), p. 159. 
293 H. Jawad, Euro-Arab Relations: A study in Collective Diplomacy, (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1992), 
P. 160. 
294 S. Al-Mani & S. Al-Shaikhly, The Euro-Arab Dialogue: A Study in Associative Diplomacy, (New 
York: St Martin's Press, 1983), p. 134. 
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projects approved involving companies of non-European origin. For example, the 
number of Arab projects approved doubled from 35 in 1974 to 70 in 1975, while 
projects of joint foreign, Arab and Egyptian capital also increased remarkably from 
only 2 projects to 14 during the same period. 
Table 3.2: Number of approved projects with EC, US, Arab & joint participation, 1972-1979. 
Year EC Projects US Projects Arab Projects Joint Projects Total 
1972 2 0 4 1 7 
1973 5 3 12 0 20 
1974 19 10 35 2 66 
1975 51 11 70 14 146 
1976 57 14 59 11 141 
1977 68 21 70 15 174 
1978 70 14 64 15 163 
1979 84 21 60 11 176 
Total 356 94 374 69 893 
Source: K. Gillespie, 1984, pp. 198-201. 
GAFI data also confirms that the rise in EC's FDI flows into Egypt to US$1.6 
billion in 1975 from only US$15.9 million in the previous year, was parallel to the 
rise recorded by the US and Arab states, which amounted to US$1,023.3 million and 
US$1,074.2 million in 1975 from US$157.8 million and US$341.2 million, 
respectively, in 1974.295 Indeed, other domestic factors such as Law 43 of 1974 
played a significant role in the rise. This indicates that the rise in the number of 
projects approved and the value of FDI inflows were not primarily due to the EAD 
but to other factors involved in the attraction of FDI in Egypt. 
The 1977 EC-Egypt Cooperation Agreement attempted to promote overall 
cooperation between the two parties by way of "contributing to the economic and 
295 Data collected by the author from GAFI, Egypt. 
133 
social development of Egypt and helping to strengthen relations between the parties 
through economic, technical, financial and trade cooperation, ' . 
296 The success of the 
agreement lay in its capacity to provide a base for EC-Egyptian trade relations in the 
years prior to the ratification of the new association agreement signed under the 
umbrella of the Barcelona process in 2001. Indeed the 1977 agreement 
institutionalised EC-Egyptian trade relations, particularly as this relationship was 
governed in accordance with the rules and principles of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and supervised by the Cooperation Council, which was 
established in order to ensure compliance by the contracting parties with the spirit 
and terms of the agreement. 
However, the economic impact of the agreement was not of any great 
significance. The agreement dealt solely with trade, paying minimal attention to 
financial and technical cooperation, apart from US$204 million of economic aid 
provided after the signing the agreement. 297 Nor was any effort made to encourage 
European firms to invest in the Egyptian economy. Moreover, cooperation in the 
science and technology spheres never materialised because the agreement failed to 
determine the type of technology that was required for Egypt's development or how 
it should be transferred. 
As for trade, the preferential agreement failed to help Egypt improve its 
exporting capabilities into the EC market or to narrow the trade deficit in favour of 
296 Text of Article 1 of the Cooperation Agreement of 1977. European Union, Official Journal L266, 
27/09/1978, P. 0002-0103; and 
http: /europa. eu. int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc? smartap i! celexapi! prod! CELEXnumdoc&lg=ENnumdoc=21 
977A0118(01) 
297 K. Gillespie, The Tripartite Relationship, p. 78. EU financial assistance to Egypt between 1977 and 
1955 is discussed in detail in chapter five, pp. 177-179. 
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the EC, as explained above. Nor did the agreement increase the rate of growth in 
Egypt's trade or improve the conditions of access for Egyptian products into the EC 
market. As the balance of trade with the Community was soaring, Egypt lost many of 
the protective and fiscal customs duties and tariff charges previously associated with 
imports by EC countries of industrial products originating in Egypt. 298 Even the 
abolition of quantitative restrictions on imports from Egypt into the Community was 
subject to the exemption of many goods and commodities listed in Annex II to the 
Treaty establishing the EEC. 
299 
In the area of agriculture, the agreement deprived Egypt, an agrarian country, of 
its comparative advantage in agricultural products. The agreement did not offer 
Egyptian agricultural products any significant advantage in terms of market access 
into the EC. Customs duties on imports originating in Egypt remained applicable to 
almost all agricultural products. While there was a small reduction in customs duties 
for products of less significant value to the Egyptian economy such as lemons, 
customs duties and import charges remained high in regard to fruit and vegetables 300 
The Egyptian quota of rice was limited to only 32,000 tonnes, provided that Egypt 
levied a special charge on exports of the product. A similar requirement was also 
applied to imports into the EC of bran and other residues derived from the sifting, 
milling or other working of cereals. The agreement conditioned the quantity and 
price of Egyptian agricultural products on the regulations of the EC Common 
Customs Tariff (CCT) and Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), which made it 
298 The abolishment of many of these protective and customs duties tariffs were done in accordance 
with the rules set in Articles 10 and 11 of the 1977 Cooperation Agreement. 
299 Article 12 of the 1977 Cooperation Agreement. 
300 See text of the 1977 Cooperation Agreement, Article 17- paragraph 2. 
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impossible for many agricultural commodities and products to meet the standards 
required under EC regulations. 301 
In the area of industrial goods, the concessions made by this agreement to 
Egyptian industrial exports were minimal and insufficient as the elimination of 
customs duties and charges on industrial products originating in Egypt had already 
been in effect with regard to Denmark, Ireland and the UK since 1 January 1972 and 
with regard to the rest of the Community since 1 January 1975 302 Concessions in 
advanced industrial production such as motor vehicles and the motor vehicle 
assembly industry were also of no advantage because Egypt did not possess the 
industrial capacity that allowed her to export spare parts or vehicles into the EC 
market. The agreement also failed to specify measures that would contribute to 
Egypt's industrialisation or that would encourage European companies to invest in 
the industrial sector, which is often the driving force of a country's economic 
development. 
301 Hassan Khadr, "Analytical Study of Egyptian Exports of Fruits and Vegetables during the period 
1986-1990", in Wadouda Badran (ed. ), The Development of Egypt's Relation with the EEC 1989-90, 
(Cairo: Centre for Political Studies and Research, 1992), p. 375. (in Arabic) 
302 See Article 10 of the 1977 Cooperation Agreement. 
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Chapter Four 
A Statistical Analysis of European 
Direct Investment into Egypt: 1972-1995 
What impact did the tremendous improvement in Egypt's investment climate, 
particularly during the 1970s, have on the growth of EU direct investment into the 
country from the beginning of the Global Mediterranean Policy of 1972 until the 
beginning of the Barcelona process of 1995? This chapter attempts to address this 
question, by using primary data collected from the General Authority of Investment 
and Free Zones (GAFI), the main governmental body responsible for foreign direct 
investment in Egypt. The aim is to explain how the development of Egypt's internal 
political and economic process and the progress that occurred in the EU-Egyptian 
economic relationship affected the growth rate of EU FDI into the country. The first 
section examines the growth in Egypt's overall FDI inflows originating in the EU, 
the Arab world and the US. This is followed by an analysis and assessment of the 
growth of EU FDI inflows into Egypt during the period under examination. Section 
three analyses the static distribution of EU FDI, while section four looks at the 
sectoral distribution of these investments. 
4.1. Global FDI Inflows into Egypt 1972-1995 
Data shows that global FDI flows responded positively to Egypt's transition towards 
political and economic liberalisation in the mid-1970s. This was due to the 
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constitutional and legal amendments of the early 1970s, in particular the efforts to 
reduce the risk of nationalisation and the sequestration of foreign and privately 
owned properties 303 This response was apparent in the gradual rise in FDI flows into 
the country from just US$11.5 million in 1972, to an unprecedented record of 
US$4.6 billion in 1975. Table 4.1 shows that this sharp rate of growth was due to an 
increase in diversified FDI flows originating not only from the EC but also from 
other European non-EC member states such as Switzerland, the Arab world, the US 
and, to a lesser extent, East and South East Asia. By 1975, optimism among foreign 
investors regarding Egypt's investment potential was very high. Indeed, EU, US and 
Arab FDI flows increased by a remarkable 10,206 per cent, 648 per cent and 315 per 
cent, respectively, between 1974 and 1975. FDI flows from other regions such as 
Central America and the Far East also began to rise in order to benefit from Egypt's 
comparative advantages, thus making Egypt an attractive destination for global FDI 
flows by the end of the 1970s. 304 
Although this table shows that the record of US$4.6 billion of FDI had not been 
repeated during the period under examination in the chapter, Egypt continued to 
attract substantial amounts of global FDI inflows, mainly from Arab and European 
firms, at an annual average of US$1.4 billion between 1976 and 1982. The 1975 peak 
in FDI should not be considered as evidence of liberalisation but only a reflection of 
the optimism and recognition of foreign companies of Egypt's investment potential. 
303 These guarantees were re-enforced in the constitutional amendment of 1971 and the investment 
Law 43 of 1974 and its amendment Law 32 of 1977. For more details see Chapter Three. 
304 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), "Explaining and Forecasting 
Regional Flows of Foreign Direct Investment", Programme on Transnational Corporations, (New 
York: United Nations, 1993), p. 26. 
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Table 4.1: FDI inflows into Egypt by origin, 1972-1995 (US$ million) 
Year EU* Non EU 
Europe 
USA Arab States East & 
S. E. Asia 
Others Total 
1972 2.3 0 0 9.2 0 0 11.5 
1973 51.4 79.5 60.6 5.1 0 0 196.6 
1974 15.9 3.6 157.8 341.2 0 3.6 522.1 
1975 1,612.6 5.9 1,023.3 1,074.2 37.8 846.3 4,600.1 
1976 496.1 225.3 462.9 635 2.8 56.5 1,878.6 
1977 881.3 282.1 4.8 309.7 0 503.3 1,981.2 
1978 877.8 26.8 135.8 1,383.4 104.6 23.3 2,551.7 
1979 478.7 1.4 3.4 114.6 0.7 169.8 768.6 
1980 923.5 67.3 28.6 317 5.8 37.6 1,379.8 
1981 132 10.4 55.6 386.6 0.7 58.3 643.6 
1982 536.7 0.1 105.1 167 172.4 95.4 1,076.7 
1983 129.8 15.8 141 268.5 52.4 144.3 751.8 
1984 75.3 15.8 2.7 395.7 0 13.6 503.1 
1985 31.4 3.3 12.1 206.7 4.3 0.4 258.2 
1986 21.8 563.3 15.1 245.6 0 0 845.8 
1987 19.5 2.3 0.8 83.6 0.5 0 106.7 
1988 62.9 46 2.9 162.5 0.08 5.7 280.1 
1989 163.6 19.9 0.5 72.5 4.4 0 260.9 
1990 26.9 2.6 0.9 41.1 0 3.7 75.2 
1991 38.2 0.1 48.7 548.5 0 12 647.5 
1992 172.3 46.7 13.5 163.8 21.4 337.6 755.3 
1993 66.9 11.6 30.7 246.9 1.9 4.6 362.6 
1994 179.4 1.5 2.2 75.1 0.7 9 267.9 
1995 114.7 1.5 16.6 151.7 1.4 38.3 324.2 
Total 7,111 1,432.8 2,325.6 7,405.2 411.88 2,363.1 21,049.6 
Source: GAFI, Egypt, 2004. 
* The figures are calculated on the basis of states' accession year into the Community. For example, 
capital flows from Greece are not calculated as EU capital flows until it became a member in 1981. 
Spanish and Portuguese capital flows were considered as non-EU capital before 1986 and are 
calculated as EU capital after that date. This applies to all new member states into the EU. 
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Although the 1974 Infitah policy achieved limited economic liberalisation, the 
Egyptian economy was among the fastest growing transitional economies and by the 
mid-1980s Egypt was among the top ten developing countries receiving FDI. 305 This 
position was lost during the second half of the 1980s due to deterioration in Egypt's 
economic situation. Data shows that Egypt's FDI inflows decreased dramatically 
from US$845.8 million in 1986 to US$75.2 million in 1990, confirming that Egypt 
was no longer a favoured destination for foreign investors. This was evident in the 
dramatic decline in FDI flows into Egypt between 1986 and 1995, compared with the 
previous ten years, 1976-1985. For instance, FDI flows from the EU into Egypt 
decreased from US$4.2 billion, between 1976 and 1985, to US$809.5 million during 
the following ten years. American investment also fell from US$952 million during 
1976-1985, to just US$131.9 million during the 1986-1995 period. Arab investment 
was also reduced, but to a lesser extent, from US$4.2 billion during the first ten years 
(1976-1985) to US$1.8 billion during the following ten years. 
However, data shows that Egypt had accumulated FDI stocks of US$21 billion 
by the end of the 24-year period under examination. Between 1972 and 1995, Arab 
states were the largest foreign investors in Egypt, with FDI accounting for US$7.4 
billion, with Saudi Arabia was the leading Arab investor in the country. 306 Despite 
Egypt's isolation and its exclusion from the Arab League between 1979 and 1989, 
Arab FDI flows into the country continued to be more consistent than those from the 
305 During the 1970s, Egypt was ranked ninth among the top ten developing countries receiving FDI, 
and by the mid- 1980s the country was moved to the fifth place, only behind Mexico, Brazil, China 
and Malaysia. International Finance Corporation and Foreign Investment Advisory Service, "Foreign 
Direct Investment, The Role of FDI in Developing Countries", IFC and FIAS, Washington D. C., 
1997, p. 17. 
306 Data collected by the author from GAFI, Egypt, in 2004. 
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US and Europe. Even when the country faced its worst economic and financial crisis 
in 1987,307 Arab FDI flows contributed US$83.6 million, accounting for 77.6 per 
cent of total global FDI inflows into Egypt. 








Figure 4.1 shows that the EU was just behind the Arab world, with investment in 
Egypt accounting for US$7.1 billion between 1972 and 1995. US direct investment 
lagged behind that of the EU and stood at US$2.3 billion, of which US$1 billion was 
invested in 1975. The lack of substantial US investments after 1977 reflected the fact 
that American private investors were unconvinced that Egypt. despite its political 
and economic development, was an attractive area for investment. Though the US 
Government was the main sponsor of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, US private 
companies continued to perceive Egypt, and the Middle East in general, as an area of 
307 According to the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), the debt crisis 
precipitates an erosion of confidence in the country's creditworthiness and attractiveness and that 
recession and continued macroeconomic instability further undermined the confidence in the 
economy. Egypt's FDI inflows were oriented toward producing for local market, and hence a 
recession and economic stagnation provide further disincentives to new investment. United Nations 
Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), Foreign Direct Investment Flows to Developing 
Countries: Recent Trends, Major Determinants and Polier lm/plications, PPD. 167,10 July 1990, p. 
33. 
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high political risk 308 They preferred to invest their capital in Latin America, Europe 
and the Far East. US officials even acknowledged the failure of the government in 
convincing US private investors of the political stability of the Middle East. 309 
Thus, some in the American business community remained doubtful of the 
durability of peace in the region, while others considered the economic and financial 
support of their governments for Egypt as merely a reward for its peace with 
Israel. 310 Moreover, the small share of US investment in Egypt was due not only to 
the limited size of the Egyptian market compared with the size and capacity of US 
corporations which prefer to invest in economies of scale, but also to the 
fragmentation of the regional market that was caused by the absence of Arab-Israeli 
cooperation and the lack of economic integration among Arab states, whose inter- 
trade relations did not exceed 4 per cent of their total foreign trade in the early 
1990s 311 
Egypt also received similar investment to that of the US from other countries 
most of whom were located in Central America and Caribbean. Data shows that 
around US$2.3 billion was invested by companies and banks located in Panama and 
the Cayman Islands 312 Asian investors were the least attracted by the Egyptian 
market, which received only US$411 million during the 24-year period, of which 
308 According to a survey by the United Nations the political stability by a foreign country was ranked 
either first or second amongst influences on the US overseas investors. This was followed by the 
effect of nationalism and foreign restrictions. United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporation, 
The Determinant of Foreign Direct Investment: A Survey of the Evidence, (New York: United 
Nations, 1992), p. 44. The total American direct investment in Egypt during 1972 and 1995 was highly 
marginal in comparison to the annual US economic and military assistance to Egypt during this 
period, which was estimated at US$2 billion. 
'09A. McKay, "US Investment in Egypt May Grow", Journal of Commerce, March 29,1978. 
310 D. W. Carr, Foreign Investment and Development in Egypt, 1979, p. 93 
311 Susan Strange et al., "European Direct Investments in North Africa: the Investors' perspective", in 
AAubi (cd. ), Distant Neighbours, 1995, p. 250. 
31 GAFI, Egypt, 2004. 
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US$120 million was invested by Japan in 1982 313 Despite emerging as a global 
economic power during the period under consideration, there was no substantial 
Japanese investment into the country between 1982 and 1995. Also, non-EC 
European countries, mainly Switzerland, invested around US$1.4 billion. 
4.2. EU FDI Flows into Egypt, 1972-1995 
During the period between 1972 and 1995, the EU was the largest non-Arab foreign 
investor in Egypt, far ahead of that of the US or the Asian tiger economies. The 
pattern of growth of EU investment was similar to that set out above. Between 1972 
and 1974, EU FDI flows into the country were limited due to fear of nationalisation 
and sequestration of foreign owned companies, as was the case during the 1960s. The 
Egyptian market was first tested by Italians in 1972. In the following year, German 
firms invested US$51.4 million in the pharmaceutical industry. They were followed 
by Britain, Luxemburg and the Netherlands in 1974. By 1995, Egypt received FDI 
flows from most European countries; including 14 of the EU member states. 314 
Portugal was the only EC member state that did not have investments in Egypt 
before 1995. 
Figure 4.2 shows that EU FDI flows into Egypt peaked in 1975, with US$1.6 
billion, but fell dramatically to US$496.1 million in the following year. This fall was 
313 GAFI, Egypt, 2004. 
314 GAFI, Egypt, 2004. 
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due to the serious concerns raised by European investors about Egypt's investment 
climate, which were addressed in Law 32 of 1977.31' 











This figure also shows that EU FDI flows were relatively high between 1976 and 
1983, with an annual average of US$560 million during these eight years. While the 
rate of FDI flows was relatively close between 1977 and 1978 at around US$880 
million, this eight-year period experienced fluctuation, which varied between 
US$923.5 million in 1980 and US$129.8 million in 1983. The next sharpest fall 
occurred in 1981 with a drop of 662 per cent from the previous year. This was 
probably due to Egypt's internal instability after the assassination of' President Sadat 
in 1981. 
Between 1984 and 1995, the EU's total FIN flows into Egypt amounted to 
around US$1 billion. The lowest rate of EC FDI flows was US$19.5 million in 1987, 
when Egypt's economic and financial situations were at their worst condition. The 
highest rate of EU FDI flows during this period was 1992 and 1994, with an average 
of US$175 million in each of these years. This rise was probably due to the 
315 Details of the concerns of foreign investors and Law 32 of 1977 were discussed in Chapter Three, 








implementation of the 1991 ERSAP, sponsored by the IMF and the World Bank, as 
well as the introduction of privatisation. 
Table 4.2: FDI by EU member states (including FDI before enlargement)* into Egypt, 1972-1995 (US$ million). 
Country" Aus Bel UK Den Fin Fra Ger Gre Ire Ita Lux Neth Spa Swe Total 
1972 2.3 2.3 
1973 51.4 51.4 
1974 4.6 5.9 5.4 15.9 
1975 1101.5 2.3 67.8 3.3 148.3 115 176.7 1614.9 
1976 45.5 46.3 319.7 1.3 29.4 53.9 496.1 
1977 3.6 24.5 700.8 30.5 4.6 121.2 0.7 1 886.9 
1978 0.5 43.7 9.2 802.3 30.4 0.7 0.2 887 
1979 0.1 438 3 36 0.6 1 478.7 
1980 50.7 800.7 56 12.6 0.6 3.4 0.1 924.1 
1981 0.4 2 63.8 43.6 2.7 14.8 5.1 7.1 139.5 
1982 18.7 0.3 38.4 479.3 536.7 
1983 2.1 6.7 1.6 12.8 37.1 71.1 0.8 132.2 
1984 1.1 11.7 1.8 14.3 46.4 75.3 
1985 2.3 0.7 14.1 8.6 0.1 3.6 2 31.4 
1986 8.1 3.4 5.7 4.3 0.3 34 55.8 
1987 14.3 4.8 0.4 19.5 
1988 1.7 3.5 40.4 17.3 62.9 
1989 3.4 0.3 1.5 154.9 2 1.5 163.6 
1990 2.8 0.8 0.2 23.1 0.07 26.9 
1991 30.1 4.6 0.1 0.2 1.8 1.4 38.2 
1992 42.3 2.3 12.7 40.4 1.9 10.9 61.8 7 179.3 
1993 22.5 11 30 2 1.4 66.9 
1994 0.6 14.8 0.2 2.3 0.06 0.3 4.5 122.3 34.4 179.5 
1995 1.3 36.2 0.5 0.1 15.5 2.1 0.3 57.6 1.1 0.02 114.7 
Total 1.7 55.5 2659.8 56.3 11.5 2067.5 361.6 6.6 0.3 422.3 467.6 1016.5 10.6 41.8 7179.7 
Source: (JAFI, Egypt, 2UU4. 
*The UK, Ireland and Denmark joined the EC in 1973, while Austria, Finland and Sweden accessed in 1995. 
** For full name of these countries see abbreviations. 
Egypt's FDI inflows from the EU into the free zones were insignificant between 
1972 and 1995. Total investments accounted for around US$48.1 million. Britain 
contributed US$20.8 million. Luxemburg accounted for US$8.4 million, all of which 
was invested in 1981. The Netherlands invested US$7.4 million, of which US$6.5 
million was invested in 1994. German investments stood at US$5.6 million of which 
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US$3 million was invested in 1992. French investments in the Free Zones were just 
below US$3 million during the whole period. Also, the free zones received some 
investment from European countries outside the EU such as Norway, which invested 
US$2 million in 1989 and Cyprus, which invested US$5.3 million in 1994-1995.316 
These figures suggest that European investors had limited involvement in 
Egypt's economic activities prior to the Barcelona process of 1995. Only 6 of the 15 
EU member states exhibited relatively constant interest in the Egyptian market over 
the 24-year period under examination, and the involvement of the 6 countries 
fluctuated over the years. 17 For instance, table 4.2 shows that British FDI flows 
only exceeded US$100 million three times between 1972 and 1995, and this occurred 
only two years in row in 1979 and 1980. French FDI flows exhibited a similar 
pattern of fluctuation with only three successive years of investments over US$100 
million (1976-1978). Even more extreme were German FDI flows into Egypt. They 
increased sharply from US$200,000 in 1991 to US$40.4 million in 1992 but 
disappeared entirely in 1993. Similarly, Luxemburg's FDI flows exhibited the same 
pattern during the first half of the 1990s. 
EU member states accumulated FDI stocks valued at US$7.1 billion between 
1972 and 1995. Figure 4.3 shows that the UK had the largest share of EU FDI stocks 
316 Figures are calculated by the author from data collected from GAFI in 2004. Cyprus joined the EU 
on I May 2004. 
317 The six countries are Britain, France, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Italy and Germany. They are 
listed in order according to the size of their share of FDI flows, with Britain having the largest share 
and Germany contributing the smallest share among the six countries. 
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in the country. with US$2.6 billion, followed by France with US$2 billion, while the 
Netherlands accumulated US$1 billion during this period. 318 








Luxemburg and Italy had relatively similar amounts of FDI stocks, with 
US$467.6 million and US$422.3 million, respectively. German FDI stocks accounted 
for US$361.6 million. making up only 0.04 per cent of total EU FDI stocks during 
that period. Denmark and Belgium each had around US$56 million worth of' stocks, 
and Sweden had US$41.8 million. Finland and Spain had around US$11.5 million 
and US$10.6 million, respectively. Portugal was the only EU country that did not 
have any FDI stock in Egypt before 1995, while the remaining EC member states had 
minor shares. 
319 
318 Before converting the currency from Egyptian pound (EGP) into US dollar US$), the Netherlands 
occupied the second place, after the UK, with a total FDI stocks valued at FGPI billion, while France 
was in the third place with FDI stocks around EGP830 million. This ranking changed after currency 
conversion due to the fact that the majority of French investments were made between 1975 and 1978, 
when the exchange rate was 0.39 piaster to I US dollar (100 piaster =1 Egyptian pound). Meanwhile, 
the majority of Dutch investments were made during the 1980s and 1990s, when the value of the 
Egyptian pound with much less than in the 1970s. For example, the EGP3l3.7 million invested by 
France in 1978 were worth as much as US$802.3 million, while the EGP335.5 million invested by the 
Netherlands in 1982 were worth only US$479.3 million, similarly the value of the EGP205.1 million 
made by Dutch investors in 1992, which valued as little as US$61.8 million. 
'19 Ireland had FDI stock of US$250,000, all of it was made in a textile factory making socks in 
Alexandria Free Zone in 1994. This was the first and the only Irish investment in Egypt before 1995. 
Data collected by the author from GAFI, Egypt. 2004. 
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4.3. Static Distribution of EU FDI into Egypt, 1972-1995 
Between 1972 and 1995, data shows that the EU's total FDI flows into Egypt were 
unevenly distributed by its member states. The UK, France and the Netherlands 
were the top three EU investors in Egypt, followed by Luxemburg, Italy and 
Germany, as middle ranking investors. The investments made by Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland. Greece, Spain and Sweden were of little consequence. 320 
However, the significance of EU investment, despite being second to that of the Arab 
states, was great. This was particularly true as Europe was the main source of' 
technology transfer and management skills associated with FD1, especially when 
American companies showed little interest in the Egyptian market. 
Among the EU's three main investors in Egypt, Britain was the largest European 
investor with a total FDI of US$2.6 billion between 1972 and 1995. Figure 4.4 
confirms this and shows that Britain led France and the Netherlands by an estimated 
US$600 million and US$1.6 billion, respectively. It also shows that these three 
countries invested the majority of their FDI flows between 1974 and 1983. During 
this 10-year period, each of these three countries invested significant capital flows at 
different times. Britain was the main investor in 1975 and 1980, and France invested 
most of its capital in 1977 and 1978, while the Netherlands was the main investor in 
1982. 
"Ö See table 4 . 
2, p. 141. 
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Most British capital flows were centred on the financial and industrial sectors, 
though a noticeable shift from the former sector to the latter occurred in the 1990s 
and 1990s. Egypt's industrial sector absorbed the largest share of British capital 
flows. with investments worth nearly US$l. 4 billion between 1972 and 1995, of 
which 94.9 per cent was invested in the pharmaceutical (58.3 per cent) and food 
(36.6 per cent) industries. 32' The Iinancial sector received just under l1S$1.2 billion, 
of which 88.8 per cent was invested in the banking sector in 1975, while the 
remaining share was made in the investment sector. "Tourism, services, agriculture 
and infrastructure received US$38.8 million, US$11.6 million, US$10.4 million and 
USS6.1 million, respectively, between 1972 and 1995. 
French investment in Egypt amounted to US$2 billion and almost 82.3 per cent 
of this was concentrated in the financial sector. As available data shows, French 
investors were not enthusiastic about investing in manufacturing and services sectors. 
They focused. instead, on economic sectors that they were able to easily withdraw 
from. This was apparent in the share of the French investment in the industrial sector 
321 Detailed analysis of investments in these sectors will be provided in the next section - sectoral 
distribution of EC FDI in Egypt. 
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which received as little as US$146 million, of which 35.4 per cent, 22.8 per cent, II 
per cent, 9.2 per cent, and 9 per cent went to food, building materials, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals and the metals industry, respectively. 
The majority of this investment went to the banking sector, which received 
US$1,278.3 million, while the investment sector took US$368 million. Investments 
in tourism and agriculture amounted to US$23 million and US$4.6 million, 
respectively, while those in services and construction were highly insignificant. Such 
analysis does not only highlight the concern of French investors about Egypt's 
political and economic stability, but also a lack of commitment to long term 
investment in the country. '"` The modest French involvement in industry suggests 
also that the French interest in Egypt was driven by a desire to create market 
penetration rather than financial gains. 323 
Dutch FDI flows into Egypt exhibited a similar pattern to that of Britain. Most 
investments were made in the industrial and financial sectors. The latter received 
US$566.3 million, of which 83.8 per cent was made in the banking sector and 16.2 
per cent in the investment sector. It was followed by the industrial sector, which took 
US$427.5 million, of which building materials, pharmaceuticals and engineering 
received 47.4 per cent, 34.8 per cent and 15.2 per cent, respectively, making up to 
97.4 per cent of the total Dutch investment in industry between 1972 and 1995. Some 
US$5.7 million went to the food industry and US$4.2 million to chemicals, while 
322 French companies were very much concerned about the political risk that was perceived higher in 
Egypt, and the Arab world, that in Latin America and Asia, but was only lower than that of Sub- 
Saharan Africa. For further details on this issue see Louis Blin. "French Investments in the Arab 
World", in Ayubi, N. (ed. ), Distant Neighbours, pp. 270-271. 
'" Moroccan industry was the only sector in the Arab world to received considerable attention from 
French investors who look upon Morocco as a base for re-exports. Ibid, p. 271. 
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textiles received only US$1.2 million. Unlike the other two leading EU investors, the 
Netherlands invested as much as US$10.2 million in agriculture, while its investment 
in tourism was much less than Britain and France, and stood at only US$2.6 million 
during the period under examination. 
Figure 4.5 illustrates the distribution of FIN flows by a middle ranking group of 
countries, whose FDI flows were much less than that of the top three EU investors, 
but their pattern of investment was also far more complex than that explained above. 
Although their investment was smaller than that of the UK or France, for example, 
Luxembu(g. Italy and German), showed a constant interest in the Egyptian market. 
even at the time of Egypt's economic turndown. 
Figure 4.5: Middle rank EU investors in Egypt with FDI flows between US$468 











Unlike Germany, Luxemburg and Italy made large investments, which classified 
them in certain years as the major EU investors. For instance, Luxemburg was only 
second to France, which invested US$700.8 million in 1977, as its FDI flows 
accounted for US$121? million. In 1994, it invested US$122.3 million, making the 
largest EU investment in Egypt by any EU country, accounting for 68.1 per cent of 
total EU investment during that year. Italy's investment of US$I54.9 million in 1989 
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accounted for 94.7 per cent of the EU's total FDI flows into the country. German 
investment was less than US$50 million in any given year between 1972 and 1995, 
but its flows continued to be relatively constant in value, compared to these other 
countries. 
In terms of its size and population, Luxemburg's investment was significant. 
Between 1972 and 1995, it invested US$467.6 million, of which US$277.9 million 
went to the financial sector. The investment sector received 51.2 per cent of total FDI 
in the financial sector, while the remaining 48.8 per cent went to the banking sector. 
The industrial sector received US$144.5 million. The food industry and chemicals 
took US$121.5 million and US$20.3 million, respectively, accounting together for 98 
per cent of total investment in the entire industrial sector. Agriculture and the 
construction sector received relatively similar sums, with each taking around US$6.9 
million. Tourism was of little attraction to Luxemburg investors, and benefited from 
only US$2.1 million between 1972 and 1995. 
Unlike Luxemburg, Italy invested more capital in the industrial sector than in the 
financial one. Italian companies invested US$216.4 million in industry, of which 
engineering took 89.8 per cent of total industrial investment, and 6 per cent went to 
building materials. The chemical industry and food accounted for US$5.6 million 
and US$2.2 million. Investment in the financial sector amounted to US$150.8 
million between 1972 and 1995. The banking sector received 98.4 per cent of this 
investment, all of which was made in 1975, and the remainder 1.6 per cent (US$2.5 
million) was made in the investment sector. Tourism attracted some US$6 million, 
while US$1.5 million was invested in infrastructure. 
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German investors were far more attracted to Egypt's industrial sector than their 
Italian counterparts. Almost 67.5 per cent of total German investment, which 
amounted to US$361.6 million, went into the industrial sector. The metals industry, 
pharmaceuticals, engineering, and chemicals received US$68.6 million, US$61.2 
million, US$58 million, and US$52.7 million, accounting together for 98.3 per cent 
of total German FDI in the industrial sector. Textiles and building materials each 
received US$1.5 million, while US$700,000 was invested in the food industry. 
Germany invested more capital in the construction sector and tourism than in the 
financial sector. While some US$36.8 million and US$29.8 million were invested in 
the former, the latter received only US$24.8 million, of which 61.7 per cent was 
invested in the banking sector and 38.3 per cent went into investment. Agriculture 
and services benefited from US$7.5 million and US$3.7 million, respectively, 
between 1972 and 1995. 
Figure 4.6, below, shows the EU member states with FDI flows totalling less 
than US$57 million between 1972 and 1995. Apart from Portugal which did not 
invest in Egypt during the period under examination, the remaining eight EU 
member states invested in the country to varying degrees. Belgium, Denmark and 
Sweden invested US$55.5 million, US$56.3 million and US$41.8 million, 
respectively. The majority of these investments were made in specific years rather 
than evenly distributed over the whole period. For example, Belgium invested 91.3 
per cent of its FDI in 1980, while Denmark and Sweden made 82.2 per cent and 81.3 
per cent of their investments in 1976 and 1986, respectively. This pattern also applies 
to Finland, Spain, Greece and Austria, which invested almost 80 per cent, 67 per 
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cent, 69.7 per cent and 76.5 per cent of their total investments in 1978,1981,1977 
and 1995, respectively. Ireland made a single investment of US$250,000 in the free 








Figure 4.6: EU investors in Egypt with total FDI flows under US$57 million, 1972-1995 
--0 Belgium --ý--- Denmark Greece Spain 
-- Ireland -+- Sweden -- 4--- Finland Austria 
4.4. Sectoral Distribution of EU FDI Flows into Egypt 1972-1995 
Data shows that EU FDI flows were unevenly distributed across Egypt's main 
economic sectors. Figure 4.7 highlights clearly that finance and industry attracted 
most capital flows with shares of around US$ 3.8 billion and US$2.6 billion, 
respectively. accounting both for 95 per cent of total investment between 1972 and 
1995.324 Tourism, services, infrastructure. 32 and agriculture received US$161.9 
million, US$82.5 million, US$62.6 million and US$40.8 million, respectively, 
during the period under consideration. 
324 The ranking of the financial sector as the most attractive sector, ahead of industry, is base on the 
value of capital invested in this sector, which became higher than that of industry only after 
converting the currency from Egyptian pound into US dollar. This was due to the fact that most 
investments made in finance were made during the second half of the 1970s, when Egyptian pound 
was strong and the exchange rate was at an average of EGP 0.39 to one US dollar. In local currency 
(EGP), the financial sector received EGP2.4 billion and industry took EGP2.5 billion between 1972 
and 1995. 
's GAFI data classifies construction and infrastructure as one sector. Hence, I calculated figures for 
construction and infrastructure together as called them 'Infrastructure'. 
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The financial sector attracted 56 per cent of total EU investment in Egypt 
between 1972 and 1995. Almost all investments in this sector were made between 
1975 and 1983. At the beginning of the era of economic liberalisation, the banking 
sector was highly attractive and drew in around US$3.1 billion. This was due to the 
investment Law 43 of 1974 that authorised the establishment of joint 
Egyptian/foreign banking ventures to undertake business in local currency, provided 
that Egyptian participation was not less than 51 per cent. The law allowed foreign 
banks to establish both 'on-shore' and 'off-shore' branches to deal solely in foreign 
currency. Accordingly, several joint banking ventures were created including those 
between Chase Manhattan Bank and the National Bank of Egypt and Barclays Bank 
International and the Banque du Caire. 36 Other international banks such as Lloyds 
Bank International, the Bank of America, American Express International, First 
National City Bank. Manufacturers Hanover Trust and the National Bank of Abu 
Dhabi opened branches to deal in foreign currency. 
326 National Bank of Egypt, Economic Bulletin, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3,1975, p. 258. 
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The number of banks registered with the Central Bank of Egypt increased from 
31 in 1975 to 43 by the end of 1976, of which foreign and joint venture banks 
established under Law 43 of 1974 increased from 8 to 19 banks. 327 Data shows 
intensive European involvement in the banking sector. In 1975, two British banks, 
Lloyds Bank and Barclay's Bank, invested 33.7 per cent of all EU investment in 
banking, while French banks invested almost 41.2 per cent in 1977 and 1978. Dutch, 
Italian and Luxemburg banks also invested around US$474.7 million, US$148: 3 
million and US$135.7 million, respectively. German and Greek investments were 
minor and accounted for as little as US$15.3 million and US$4.6 million during the 
period under consideration. 
However, the failure of the Egyptian government to restructure and develop the 
banking sector deprived it of any further investment after 1983. This failure also 
forced some well-established international banks such as Britain's Lloyds Bank to 
withdraw from the country, highlighting the weakness, underdeveloped code of 
practice and inefficiency of the Egyptian banking system. One can argue that the 
concentration of most EU FDI in the country's financial institutions might have 
alarmed the government to possible foreign domination of its financial system, and 
hence the liberalisation of the banking sector could have been stalled to prevent such 
a development. 28 Slowdown of capital investment in the banking sector added 
327 Of the 19 foreign banks 2 were joint ventures and 9 were branches of foreign banks. National Bank 
of Egypt, Economic Bulletin, Vol. XXX, No. 2,1977, pp. 137-138. 
328 There is no evidence that restrictions were imposed on FDI in the financial sector, but this 
argument is entirely based on the perception of some Egyptian officials, whose views and policies 
were influenced by anti-colonial ideologies, particularly those who believed that British and French 
dominance over Egyptian financial institutions during the nineteenth century and first half of the 
twenty century allowed their governments to heavily intervene in Egypt's internal political and 
economic affairs before the 1952 revolution. Such an attitude was common among some senior 
politicians and statesmen during the 1970s and 1980s. For example, in 1975, President Sadat 
dismissed hid Prime Minister, Abdel Aziz Hegazy, arguing that his policies were a hindrance rather 
than being conducive to economic liberalisation. 
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further to Egypt's financial crisis of the late 1980s, and also deprived the country of 
the benefit of huge international financial and technological resources that could 
have been used in the country's economic development. 
Figure 4.8 shows that the investment sector received much less FDI than banking 
did. Some 51 EU companies invested US$763 2 million. accounting for the 
remaining 19.5 per cent of total EU investment in the financial sector between 1972 
and 1995. Unlike the banking sector, much of the capital invested in this sector came 
from 25 companies between 1991 and 1995. France was the major investor with 
almost 48.7 per cent of total investment, followed by Luxemburg. the UK and the 
Netherlands, with 18.8 per cent. 17.5 per cent and 12.1 per cent. Germany, Sweden, 
Italy, Denmark and Belgium each invested US$9.5 million, US$7 million, US$2.5 
million, US$1.2 million and US$0.6 million, respectively, accounting for the 
remaining 2.7 per cent of total EU FDI in this sector. While such a distribution 
highlights small improvement in the Egyptian financial sector during the 1990s, this 
did not impact at all on the banking sector. 
Figure 4.8: EU FDI flows into Egypt's financial sector 1972-1995 
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Egypt's manufacturing sector attracted over US$2.6 billion, of which 
pharmaceuticals and the food industry received 38 per cent and 26 per cent, 
respectively, between 1972 and 1995. Each of these industries was marked by a 
single large investment made by British companies. The British share in 
pharmaceuticals accounted for 78.2 per cent of total EU investment, of which some 
US$790.7 million was invested in 1980. The same applies to the food industry, in 
which the British share reached 73.5 per cent with US$433.3 million invested in 
1979. These large investments reflected the favourable conditions of the Egyptian 
market for FDI between 1975 and 1984. 










Some 23 companies from 6 EU member states invested US$1 billion in the 
pharmaceutical industry. 329 highlighting the growing importance of this industry to 
European investors during the period under examination. The availability of natural 
and human resources allowed German companies to invest in this area as early as 
1973, when Events Pharma and Holding GMBH, invested jointly US$51.4 million in 
329 The 6 countries were Germany, UK, the Netherlands, France, Belgium and Italy. Germany was the 
first EU member to invest in pharmaceuticals in 1973. The UK had the highest value of FDI with 
US$805.4 million, while Italy made the smallest investment with only US$0.2 million in 1988. 
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the Egyptian Events Pharma (Hoxet West). 330 In 1980, Glaxo Group Limited 
invested US$790.7 million in GlaxoSmithKline Egypt. This was the largest single 
investment and was followed by two significant, but smaller, investments made by 
Dutch companies, of which Exonobel Pharma International invested US$71 million 
in Upper Egypt Pharmaceutical Industries (Siduco) in 1983. The other investment of 
US$45 million was made by three Dutch companies in a new pharmaceutical 
company DSM Anti-Infects Egypt in 1984 331 In 1995, Ely Lily Holland invested 
US$32.7 million in its affiliate company Ely Lily Egypt. 332 French companies were 
less attracted to this industry investing only US$13.1 million, of which 95.4 per cent 
was invested in 1993. Apart from these few large investments, there was little 
European interest in this industry, which was capital-intensive and required 
significant investment in research and development (R&D). Despite the fact that 
pharmaceuticals were the first industry to attract large capital flows, the majority of 
investments were small and hence their contribution to R&D was insignificant. 
EU investment was directed into labour-intensive areas, such as the food 
industry, 333 as a way of benefiting from the cheap cost of labour and production 
materials. This sort of investment generated employment but almost all products 
were consumed locally. The food industry benefited from US$687.4 million of 
investment made by 54 companies from the EU, the majority of which originated in 
the UK, Luxemburg and France. This industry was almost totally dominated by the 
330 The US$51.5 million was equivalent to EGP20 million in 1973. Moreover, there were several 
small investments made by German companies in pharmaceuticals, the most important of them was 
made by Shiatea Brothers with US$5.7 million in Atos Pharma (an Egyptian medical herbal company) 
in 1986. 
331 The share of the three Dutch companies, Interfirm By, Just Procads Beheer VIBV and Just Procads 
III BY, accounted for 77 per cent of the equity of the Egyptian company. 
332 This sum was equivalent to EGP110.9 million at that time. 
333 The food industry includes six sub-sectors: sugar and confectionery, tobacco and cigarettes, food 
preservation, oils and oils products, fermentation, distillation, and alcoholic beverages, and milk and 
dairy products. 
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33 British companies operating in the market with US$505.1 million, while 
Luxemburg and France had 7 and 2 companies with investments of US$121.5 
million and US$51.7 million, respectively. 
The concentration of FDI in this industry reflected its comparative advantage in 
terms of labour intensiveness and the availability of production materials locally. 
This dependence on local materials for production eased the financial burdens that 
companies in other sectors had to face when having to import production materials in 
hard currency. This was particularly true given the limitations on foreign firms 
obtaining foreign currency under government regulations and a fixed exchange rate. 
This reduced profit margins where imported materials had to be purchased with hard 
currency at a higher rate from the black market. 
It was also apparent that some industries were dominated by one single EU 
member state, which either had the largest number of companies operating in the 
country or invested the highest amount of FDI flows in a specific industry. For 
instance, the engineering industry attracted investments from 55 companies with FDI 
of US$367.6 million, of which US$194.3 million were invested by 9 Italian 
companies between 1981 and 1991. Almost 72.5 per cent of the total EU investment 
of US$279.3 million in construction materials was made by Dutch companies. 
German companies were a dominant force in metals and the chemical industry with 
almost 30 per cent and 35 per cent of the US$144.2 million and US$154.6 million, 
respectively. 
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Spain and the Netherlands invested equally a total of US$14.6 million of the 
US$20.1 million invested by the EU in textiles. The Spanish investment of US$7.3 
million in textiles accounted for almost 70.1 per cent of the total EU investment in 
this industry inland, which amounted to US$10.4 million. The remaining US$9.7 
million was made in the free zones by Dutch, French, Italian, British and Irish 
companies, which invested USS7.3 million, US$1.3 million, US$500,000, 
US$375,000 and US$250,000, respectively. The Dutch invested US$813,000 in 
textiles in 1979 and US$6.5 million in 1995. 
Although the manufacturing sector attracted investment from 248 Ia) companies, 
these investments did not contribute to a significant improvement in Egypt's 
industrial capacity, nor did they help the country to build an industrial base and 
become a regional platform for exporting manufactured goods. Indeed, most 
investments in the industrial sector aimed at import-substitution industrialisation and 
hence were intended to serve the needs of the internal market. No sufficient capital 
flows were allocated to textiles, Egypt's major industry. The lack of capital and 
technology in this important sector hindered the process of development and hence 
deprived Egypt, famous for exporting high quality long staple cotton, from 
developing into a major exporter of textiles and clothing. 










General Petroleum Hospitals Consultancy Financial 
Services Services Services 
Data shows that the Egypt's services sector was one of the least attractive, only 
ahead of infrastructure and agriculture, to foreign investors. It gained investment 
from some 33 EU companies with total capital flows of US$82.5 million, of which 
US$63 million was invested inland and US$19.5 million in the free zones. This 
investment spread over 5 sub-sectors, namely financial services, hospitals, 
consultancy, petroleum services, and general services. Figure 4.10 shows that 
general services received US$60.1 million, accounting for 73 per cent of the total 
investment in this sector. Petroleum services took US$19.5 million, of which 
US$16.8 million was invested by Britain's Off Shore Oil Service in the Public Port 
Said Free Zone in 1978. Hospitals received around US$1.7 million, while financial 
services and consultancy each attracted as little as US$500,000 between 1972 and 
1995. 
This highlights clearly the undeveloped nature of the services sector during this 
period due to a number of reasons. Most business activities had not developed to a 
level that required supporting services. Most companies operating in Egypt did not 
rely on consultancy or business and legal advice in their decision making, 
particularly in regard to investment; and the majority of companies did not pay 
sufficient attention to training and human development, hence the services of 
consultancy companies were almost totally unwanted during the period under 
consideration. These factors could explain why investments in financial services, 
consultancy and hospitals did not occur until the early 1990s. 334 
"" Apart from one investment in hospital, all other investments in these sub-sectors were made 
between 1990 and 1995. 
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EU investment in infrastructure facilities and the construction sector was 
insignificant, though Egypt gave a high priority to these areas during the 1970s. 33 
Despite the growing demand for housing due to a dramatic increase in the 
population, the construction sector was among the least attractive to f_? U investors, 
absorbing only USS62.6 million during the whole period. '`' This lack of investment 
by EU companies was due to a local monopoly over the construction sector by large 
Egyptian companies such as Arab Contractors. 't'his factor affected further the entry 
of EU companies into construction when the chairman of Arab Contractors became a 
minister (1974-1977) responsible for this sector. Data shows that between 1972 and 
1977, only 4 European companies operated in this sector with total capital oft JS 8.4 
million (EGP3.3 million). This was the case, despite the urgent need to rebuild the 
area next to the Suez Canal in order to repatriate around half a million people. 337 As 
noted above, it was not until his removal from office in 1977 that EU FIN into this 
sector commenced. 
"' According to the Federation of Egyptian Industries, infrastructure projects in transport, 
communications. ports, electricity, housing and utilities as components of the infrastructure necessary 
for economic development received as high as 38.4 per cent of the total investments made in 1978. 
Federation of Egyptian Industries, "Distribution of investments among national and foreign. public 
and private sectors". Year Book 19 -8, pp. 17-19. 
"6 This sum was equivalent to EGP33.1million in local currency at the time of investment. 
3" Middle East and African Economist, "Egypt: Economic prospects continue to improve", New 
York, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, December 1974, p. 156. 
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Between 1978 and 1983, some 21 companies invested almost US$42.7 million 
(EGP29.9 million), after which there was no further EU F1)1 flows into construction 
until 1995. It was apparent that this sector once again favoured national over foreign 
investment. Infrastructure facilities such as communications and transport attracted 
US$1 1.7 million from 6 EU companies, most of which was invested between 1984 
and 1989. British companies contributed almost 52.1 per cent (US$6.1 million) of 
this investment between 1987 and 1989. In this latter year, Dutch, German and 
Italian companies invested each around US$1.5 million. From that time until 1995, 
infrastructure did not receive FDI from the EU. In 1995, US$1 2 million was 
invested by Spain. The pattern of investment in infrastructure highlights that there 
was some concern within the government about foreign involvement in the strategic 
areas of water. power stations and communications. 








It was not until the early 1990s that tourism received some attention from 
European investors. The total investment in this sector over the entire period 
amounted to USS161.9 million (EGP302 million), of which US$50.7 million was 
invested by Belgium in 1980. Figure 4.12 shows that British, German and French 
investments in tourism accounted for US$38.8 million (23.9 per cent). US$29.8 
million (18.4 per cent) and USS23 million (14.2 per cent), respectively. Italy and 
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Denmark each invested around US$6 million, Sweden invested half of this figure 
(US$3 million), while the Netherlands and Luxemburg invested US$2.6 million and 
US$2.1 million, respectively, between 1972 and 1995. This small level of investment 
highlighted the insignificant contribution of EU investors in tourism, despite the 
country's tremendous potential and its rich history, sea resorts and tradition. 
Agriculture also suffered from a lack of investment from the EU. Despite being 
an agrarian country, Egypt attracted as little as US$40.6 million, of which 50 per cent 
was invested by both the UK and the Netherlands. 338 Germany, Luxemburg and 
France invested the remaining 50 per cent, with each accounting for US$7.5 million, 
US$6.9 million and US$4.6 million, respectively, between 1972 and 1995. This 
insignificant contribution in agriculture greatly undermined Egypt's comparative 
advantage in agricultural products, particularly in strategic commodities such as 
cotton and wheat. 
4.5. The Impact of EU Investment on Employment Levels in Egypt, 
1972-1995 
The most significant impact of EU investment into Egypt was the creation of 275 
companies, which generated 66,135 jobs between 1972 and 1995.339 Almost 67.7 per 
cent of these jobs were created by 165 companies established in the manufacturing 
sector. It was followed by tourism, where 31 companies created 6,753 jobs, while 
338 Dutch investment in agriculture was made by one company in a single project with EGP23.3 
million (equivalent to US$10.2 million at the time of investment) in 1988. 
339 The employment figures are totally based on the data collected from GAFI, where foreign 
companies register their projects, the capital invested and the jobs created. 
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accounted for 10.2 per cent of the total jobs created by EU companies. Investment in 
services generated 4,090 jobs, while construction and agriculture received 
investments in 11 and 10 companies, creating 3,122 jobs and 2,095 jobs, 
respectively. The financial sector, which received the largest amount of EU FDI 
flows, did not record any notable employment during the period under examination. 
Some 86 British companies contributed to the creation of 34.8 per cent of these 
jobs. German and French companies accounted together for 33.6 per cent of the total 
jobs, of which 14,482 jobs (21.9 per cent) were created by 56 German companies and 
7,745 jobs (11.7 per cent) by 33 French firms. These three countries created almost 
68.4 per cent of the total jobs. Investments made by companies from the Netherlands, 
Italy and Luxemburg generated 5,883 (8.9 per cent), 5,234 (7.9 per cent) and 3,729 
(5.6 per cent) jobs, respectively, accounting together for 22.4 per cent of jobs. The 
remaining 9.2 per cent of jobs were created by firms from 9 EU member states. 340 
Table 4.3 highlights that the financial sector, which accounted for 56 per cent of 
the total EU investment, did not contribute to job creation and its impact on socio- 
economic development was insignificant. This was due to the fact that most of these 
investments were made in existing banks and companies during the second half of 
the 1970s, but this stopped in the 1980s and 1990s. It also shows that manufacturing, 
which received 39 per cent of total EU FDI, was the leading sector for employment. 
340 With the exception of Portugal which did not have FDI in Egypt during the period under 
consideration, the number of jobs created by the 9 EU member states were as follows: Sweden 1,402 
jobs (2.1 per cent), Denmark 1129 (1.7 per cent), Finland 1,092 (1.6 per cent), Spain 890 (1.3 per 
cent), Greece 245 (0.4 per cent), Belgium 207 (0.3 per cent), Austria 163 (0.246 per cent), and Ireland 
125 (0.189 per cent). 
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Table 4.3: Number of EU companies, jobs created and percentage of total jobs in Egypt 1972-1995 
Sector No. of Companies No. of Jobs % of total jobs 
Agriculture 10 2,095 3.2 
Industry 165 44,814 67.7 
Construction & 
Infrastructure 
11 3,122 4.7 
Finance 0 0 
Services 21 4,090 6.2 
Tourism 31 6,753 10.2 
Free Zones 37 5,261 8 
Total 275 66,135 100 
Source: (iAr I. 
- Figures are not available. 
Apart from the chemicals industry which generated 28.9 per cent of the total jobs 
in manufacturing, there was a relatively similar distribution of employment among 
other industries at an average of 5,000 jobs. Investment in construction materials, 
processed food and engineering generated 5,895,5,583 and 5,546 jobs, accounting 
for 13.2 per cent, 12.5 per cent and 12.4 per cent of jobs, respectively, during the 24- 
year period under consideration. Metals and the pharmaceuticals industry generated 
10.4 per cent and 9.2 per cent of the total jobs, while textiles and wood working 
created 7.6 per cent and 5.9 per cent, respectively, as figure 4.13 shows. 
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Although there is no data available on the quality of' the jobs created by FU 
companies, the concentration of investments in such industries as chemicals, 
engineering and pharmaceuticals indicates that a relatively high degree of 
specialisation and training would have been provided to employees. "I'his sort of 
industry is mainly based on research and technology, and hence technological and 
human development represents a vital element of their competitiveness. Moreover, 
increasing demand in the labour market in these industries can lead to an increase in 
the number of professionals. engineers and scientists, which could add significantly 
to the quality of the labour force. The impact of investment in sectors such as 
services and tourism was significant in terms of job creation but had a lesser impact 
on the quality of the jobs created. 34' These sectors do not often rely on technology, 
but rather on public relations skills such as customer services etc. The overall Etl 
contribution to employment, however, was modest when compared to the objectives 
set out by the government of Egypt in its first 10 year plan of 1973, of creating 11.4 
3'' Robert E. Baldwin, The Effects of Trade and Foreign Direct Investment on Employment and 
Relative Wages ", OECD Jobs Stuck, Working Paper. No. 4, Paris, 1995, p. 6-25. 
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million jobs by 1982.342 This objective further increased with the fast growth rate of 
the population from 35 million in 1973 to 67.8 million in 1995. 
As the data presented above highlights, EU FDI flows into Egypt fluctuated 
sharply and were unevenly distributed among the country's economic sectors 
between 1972 and 1995. It surged in 1972 in response to internal political and 
legislative developments, and sharply increased following the multilateral initiatives 
of the GMP of 1972, the EAD of 1974 and the Infitah policy of the latter year. But 
the limited scope of internal development by the early 1980s undermined greatly 
European capital flows into Egypt in the following fifteen years. It was also apparent 
that the 1977 Cooperation Agreement, which governed EU-Egyptian economic 
relations for over a quarter a century, failed either to narrow the trade deficit in 
favour of the EU or contribute to the country's overall economic growth. 
Thus, the search for a new framework to govern EU-Egyptian economic relations 
became a necessity in the post-Cold War era, particularly given the growing 
importance of regionalism and the acceleration of globalisation. The subsequent 
development of these dynamics, which increased the role of MNCs, improved the 
dynamics of internal markets, and highlighted the importance of FDI in economic 
growth. As such it is now necessary to examine the most recent political and 
economic framework governing EU-Egyptian relations - the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership that began in November 1995. 
342 Middle East and African Economist, "Sadat's outline of Egypt's ten-year National Action 
Programme 1973-82", Vol. XXVII, No. 5,1973, p. 61. 
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Chapter Five 
The Barcelona Process: 
A New Dynamism in EU-Egyptian Economic Relations 
This chapter examines the factors that impacted on EU-Egyptian economic relations 
in the period following the beginning of the Barcelona era in 1995. It argues that the 
impact of the Barcelona process and the EU-Egyptian association agreement that 
followed have been much greater than that of previous arrangements, which all failed 
to contribute to the sustainable development of the Euro-Egyptian economic 
relationship. This chapter examines how, and to what extent, the Barcelona process 
can continue to contribute to sustainable long-term development in the bilateral EU- 
Egyptian economic relationship, in particular in regard to European direct investment 
into Egypt. 
The Barcelona process was established after signing the Barcelona Declaration 
between the 15-EU member states and their 12 Mediterranean partners in Barcelona, 
Spain, on 28 November 1995, with the aim to create a shared area of peace, stability 
and prosperity around the Mediterranean basin. 343 This process linked Egypt to the 
EU, one of the most powerful economic entities in the post-Cold War era. This not 
only enhanced the credibility of the Egyptian Government and its subsequent 
economic policies with regard to major international financial institutions but also 
increased the confidence of foreign investors entering the Egyptian market. At the 
343 The 12 southern Mediterranean states are Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Palestinian 
Authorities, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Turkey, Malta and Cyprus. Text of the Barcelona Declaration, 
Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Barcelona, Spain, November 27-28,1995. 
http: //europa. eu. int/comm/external relations/euromed/dg. htm 
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heart of this relationship are a number of policy measures aimed at creating a Euro- 
Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010; encouraging horizontal integration across 
the southern Mediterranean region; the implementation of the comprehensive 2001 
EU-Egyptian association agreement; and the provisional financial and technical 
assistance provided to Egypt under the umbrella of the MEDA programmes. 344 The 
successful implementation of these measures will eventually stimulate internal 
political, legal and economic reforms that are conducive to a general improvement in 
Egypt's business environment. However, the growth of European capital flows into 
Egypt also depends on the ability of the host government to develop its political and 
economic systems and eliminate barriers to FDI. 
Unlike the GMP and the EAD of the 1970s, the Barcelona process provided 
Egypt and the EU with the most comprehensive political and economic framework 
for cooperation to date. Under the political and security umbrella, the process set out 
a framework for political dialogue; peaceful resolution of disputes; a Middle East 
free of weapons of mass destruction; a commitment to pluralistic society, democracy 
and human rights; and the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean stability pact 
which would embody a crisis prevention and crisis diffusion mechanism 345 These 
mechanisms reflected the desire of Egypt and the EU to adopt a new approach to 
bilateral ties in the face of evolving post-Cold War security challenges in the Middle 
East. Such challenges were key issues of discussion at both the June 1994 EU 
Council meeting in Corfu and the summit of EU leaders in Essen, Germany, the 
following December. The mechanisms to deal with such challenges were formally 
344 MEDA is the name of all the economic and financial programmes around which the Euro- 
Mediterranean project is constructed. Samir Amin & Ali El Kenz, Europe and the Arab World, 
(London: Zed Books, 2005), p. 93. 
345 Text of the Barcelona Declaration. http: //europa. eu. int/comm/external relations/euromed/dg: htm 
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expressed in the political and security protocol of the Barcelona Declaration, which 
laid the foundation for the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. 
The Declaration's economic and financial protocol was the most dynamic aspect 
of the partnership. It represented the most comprehensive economic and social 
agreement that the EU has entered into with Egypt since its creation in 1958. It 
embodied a commitment by the participants to sustainable and balanced economic 
and social development with a view to achieving their objective of creating an area 
of shared prosperity. 346 It also opened the way for a comprehensive and coherent 
attempt to implement large-scale political and economic reforms in southern 
Mediterranean countries through economic cooperation, financial assistance and the 
establishment of a free trade area by 2010. 
5.1. The Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area 
The creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010 provides Egypt with 
the opportunity to belong to one of the world's largest free trade areas. It offers 
Egypt access to a large market across Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. 347 
The free trade area objective has been central to the attempt to increase the pace of 
sustainable economic and social development in the southern Mediterranean states. 
Initial steps towards this end were taken through the initiation and ratification of a 
series of bilateral association agreements. For example, the EU has entered into 
bilateral trade agreements with Tunisia and Israel in 1995, Morocco and Cyprus in 
346 The Barcelona Declaration, the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Barcelona, Spain, 27-28 
November 1995; http: //europa. eu. int/comm/external relations/euromed/dg. htm. 
347 The 37 member states are the 15 member states during the signing of the Barcelona Declaration 
plus the 10 new member states after the enlargement of May 2004 and the 12 southern Mediterranean 
states participant in the Barcelona process. 
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1996, Turkey, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority in 1997, Egypt in 2001, Lebanon 
in 2002, Algeria in 2002, and Syria in 2004. These agreements operated under the 
conditions of free trade and in observance of the rules and regulations of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO). This meant that the Barcelona process played a key role 
in introducing the economies of the underdeveloped Mediterranean states to the 
profound structural economic changes in the global economy that have occurred 
since the end of the Cold War. For Egypt this opportunity opened up the country's 
economic system and enabled it to embark upon an economic transformation that 
will help it to integrate into the global economic system. 
One can argue that Egypt has benefited from being a member of the Euro-Med 
Free Trade Area because the post-Cold War international order has been defined by 
geo-economic politics, which have not only given rise to globalisation but have also 
enhanced the process of regionalisation, a process that has become a major feature of 
the global economic system. 48 Indeed the creation of the Euro-Med Free Trade 
Area was a natural consequence of the gradual spread of regionalism, and it offered 
the Egyptian economy the opportunity to become a partner of the EU, as one of the 
three major economic blocs - the others are the North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA) and East Asia. 
The increased competitiveness among these blocs has forced each to seek ways 
strengthening its economic structure. The means have varied between mechanisms to 
enhance the capacity of the internal markets and to widen their spheres of influence 
to their peripheries through trade agreements and economic partnerships. This was 
sas Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Political economy of EU-Middle East relations" in Manochehr Dorraj 
(ed. ), Middle East at the Crossroads, (Oxford: University Press of America, 1999), p. 240. 
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apparent in 1994 when the 1988 Canada-US Free Trade Area was expanded to 
include Mexico to create the NAFTA. In 1992, members of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) transformed their political organisation into a 
free trade area. In Africa, several initiatives were launched such as the Common 
Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which expanded as far north as 
Egypt with a membership of 21 nations 349 During the mid-1990s, the EU negotiated 
free trade agreements with East and Central European countries, and launched the 
Barcelona process with Mediterranean states. Although the degree of integration 
varied from one region to another, the common goal in all cases was the elimination 
of trade barriers among participants and the dismantling of discriminatory policies 
directed at external trade partners. 
Such global developments stimulated further moves towards trade liberalisation. 
By the end of the 1990s, the Egyptian Government was negotiating five free trade 
areas 350 The first, and most important, was negotiated with the EU. Negotiations 
began in 1994 and concluded with the signing of the Egypt-EU association 
agreement on 25 June 2001. In 1997, Egypt and the US entered into negotiations 
intended to create a free trade area, but these negotiations have not yet materialised 
due to the strict conditions imposed by the US Government in areas such as 
intellectual property rights. By January 1998, Egypt, in the company of some other 
Arab states, succeeded in creating the Greater Inter-Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), 
the most viable economic arrangement established by the Arab League to date. This 
349 M. Abu EI-Einein, "Political Relationships between Egypt and COMESA member states", African 
Perspective: COMESA, (Cairo: State Information System), volume 1, issue 1, spring 2000, pp. 55-59 
(in Arabic). 
350 Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, "Egyptian-European Partnership and the 
General Debate around It", Arab Strategic Report 2000, Cairo, 2001, P. 317. 
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was followed by membership in the COMESA in June 1998,351 and negotiations with 
Turkey leading to the creation of an Egyptian-Turkish free trade area. Although the 
Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area was the most important for Egyptian regional 
integration, the other four arrangements also added to this. 
On a functional level, the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade 
Area enabled Egypt to familiarise its economic system with the functional changes 
that were occurring in the global economic system, particularly after the 1994 
Uruguay Round of GATT talks and the subsequent creation of the World Trade 
Organisation in January 1995. While these institutions aimed at promoting 
liberalisation, competitiveness and non-discrimination in international trade on the 
assumption that such policies are conducive to the national welfare of their member 
states, the EU-Mediterranean Free Trade Area ensured the smooth economic 
transition of the Egyptian economy through a scheduled timetable for the elimination 
of trade-related barriers, including tariffs and customs duties on industrial goods and 
commodities up until 2010 352 
This transition period for economic and trade liberalisation is vital to the social 
and economic stability of the country, particularly when it experiences periods of low 
gross domestic product (GDP) and high unemployment, as table 5.1, below, shows. 
The transition period also helped Egypt to transform its economic policies so that 
they move towards compatibility with those of international institutions that 
administer the growing volume of international trade, which has doubled over the 
351 COMESA includes 21 African countries - Zambia, Uganda, Malawi, Angola, Burundi, Moon 
Islands, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Namibia, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Zimbabwe, Cecil, Moriches, Democratic Congo, Djibouti and Egypt. 
352 Scheduled timetables of the elimination of tariff and customs duties were spelled out in great 
details in the EU-Egypt Association Agreement of 25`x' June 2001. 
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past twenty years; and the cross-border flow of FDI, which has risen ten times faster 
than world production 353 This transition period was a pre-requisite if Egypt was to 
integrate successfully into the global economic system, because its trade and 
investment strategies had to fall into line with more liberal trade policies and the 
acceleration of deregulation and market-oriented reforms. 
Table 5.1: Selected Economic Indicators in Egypt 1995-2004. 
Year Real GDP 
Growth Rate 




1995/96 5.0 7.3 9.2 0.0 45.9 
1996/97 5.3 6.2 8.8 0.9 36.7 
1997/98 4.1 3.8 8.8 1.0 33.2 
1998/99 5.4 3.8 8.1 2.9 31.2 
1999/00 5.9 2.8 9.0 3.9 28.2 
2000/01 3.4 2.4 9.2 5.5 28.5 
2001/02 3.2 2.4 9.0 5.9 32.6 
2002/03 3.1 3.2 9.9 6.1 35.6 
2003/04 3.8 8.4 9.87 5.9 39.2 
Source: Egyptian Ministry of Foreign i rade & Industry, Quarterly Economic Digest, Vol. X, No. 3, p. 17. 
The Barcelona process provided the framework for Egypt's economic 
liberalisation, especially as the Barcelona Declaration of November 1995 implied 
that "signatories must pay due observance to the rule of the international trade and 
WTO obligations" 354 This framework led Egypt to embark upon large-scale 
liberalisation and privatisation programmes, while putting in place effective 
353 Bernard Hoekman & Michael Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System: the 
WTO and Beyond, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 2"d edition, p. 2. 
354 The text of the Barcelona Declaration implied that signatories must pay due observance to the rule 
of the international trade and WTO obligations. 
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measures to minimise the political and socio-economic consequences of such 
policies. Economic reforms were compatible with such global rules and principles as 
reciprocity, market access and the transparency of trade-related and investment 
policies. Further measures for economic and political liberalisation focused on a 
wide range of key economic sectors and issues - from industry, agriculture, foreign 
trade, and technical and financial assistance, to the environment, transport and 
communication, scientific cooperation, crime and money laundering. These measures 
offered Egypt the opportunity to deal simultaneously with domestic issues such as 
legislative and regulatory rules, and with regional and global matters such as south- 
south economic integration and the attraction of foreign direct investment. 
5.2. South-South Economic Integration 
The Barcelona process promoted horizontal integration by encouraging economic 
cooperation among the EU's Mediterranean partners. This inter-regional cooperation 
became a necessary precondition for the accumulation of rules of origin to be 
effective, hence allowing them greater access to the EU market. This condition not 
only forced the southern partners to strengthen their relationship with the EU through 
the successful implementation of bilateral agreements but also to maximise their 
efforts to formulate policies conducive to inter-regional economic cooperation 
among themselves. A notable success in this respect related to the revival and 
reinforcement of the idea of inter-Arab economic cooperation, leading to the creation 
of the GAFTA in 1998. 
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This process also motivated Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco to establish the 
Mediterranean Arab Free Trade Association (MAFTA) in 2001, with the aim of 
achieving regional free trade prior to the 2010 deadline for the establishment of free 
trade with the EU. 355 The Agadir Declaration of 8 May 2001 underlined the 
commitment of these four governments to regional trade liberalisation. This included 
the most advanced Maghreb and Mashreq countries in the Barcelona process, and 
was also open to other Euro-Mediterranean partners once full free trade among the 
four signatories had been achieved in 2006. The MAFTA attempted to achieve 
enhanced economic and industrial integration, encourage investment, enhance 
competitiveness and increase intra-regional trade in all four partner countries. In 
2003, the EU supported this process with financial and technical assistance worth E4 
million. 356 This support was provided through the DG Europe Aid Cooperation 
Office and the Regional Indicative Programme 2002-2004, which encouraged South- 
South trade and integration on a sub-regional basis and introduced pan-Euro- 
Mediterranean cumulation of rules of origin and the liberalisation of trade in 
services. 
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Egypt also entered into negotiations with the non-Arab partners of the Barcelona 
process, such as Turkey, to liberalise trade ties, foster economic cooperation and 
enhance access to the EU market. 58 But progress on the Egyptian-Turkish front was 
stalled by political considerations, particularly Turkey's military cooperation with 
355 Eberhard Rhein, `Euro-Med Free Trade Area for 2010: Whom will benefit? ' in George Joffe (ed. ), 
Perspective on Development: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 
13. 156 
European Commission, "Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and MEDA Regional Activities", 
Euromed Information Notes, Brussels, June 2002, p. 6. 
357 Ibid, p. 6. 
358 Al-Abram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, "Egyptian-European Partnership and the 
General Debate around It", Arab Strategic Report 2000, Cairo, 2001, p. 317. 
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Israel, which was viewed as a national security threat by some Arab states, 
particularly Syria 359 These issues were considered by Egypt as negative aspects of 
the Egyptian-Turkish relationship and certainly were an obstacle to further economic 
cooperation. 
Apart from political obstacles related to breakdown in the Israel-Palestinian 
peace process, the GAFTA was also impeded by several legal and practical obstacles 
that threatened the development of an inter-Arab free trade area. One the one hand, 
the treaty lacked precise definitions and failed to specify exactly what products were 
excluded from evolving trade liberalisation. This was highlighted in its first year of 
existence when 10 member states listed almost 600 commodities and goods to be 
exempted from free trade regulations. 360 The treaty also lacked effective 
enforcement mechanisms. They allowed some member states to delay, or postpone, 
their trade liberalisation programmes beyond agreed deadlines. The GAFTA suffered 
from the contrasting visions adopted by the Arab League's Economic Council and its 
Social and Economic Council on how to revive the fragmented Arab economic 
system. While the latter promoted economic cooperation through trade liberalisation 
and the gradual establishment of a new Arab free trade area, the former insisted on 
the need to revive and ratify the Arab Common Market, which was introduced by 
President Nasser of Egypt in 1964. This effort proved unworkable in the face of 
numerous political difficulties including the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Lebanese 
civil war of the 1970s and the splits inside the Arab League following the Egyptian- 
Israeli peace treaty of 1979 and the 1990-91 Gulf crisis. 
359 Ahmed F. Raslan, The Turkish-Israeli Rapprochement, Al-Siassa Al-Dawlya (international 
Politics), Political quarterly Journal, (Cairo: Al-Ahram Foundation), vol. 130, October 1997, pp. 115- 
118; and Arab Strategic Report 2001, Arab-Turkish and Regional Relations, (Cairo: Al-Ahram Centre 
for Political and Strategic Studies, 2001), pp. 193-202. 
360 Al-Abram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Arab Strategic Report 1998, Cairo, p. 169. 
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Moreover, inter-regional cooperation has been hampered by the fact that most 
Arab and Mediterranean states produce similar commodities in terms of composition, 
quality standards and technological and manufacturing techniques. They have a 
limited industrial base, which make their share of manufacturing goods as a 
percentage of foreign trade very small. In 1997, the average percentage of industrial 
sector share of GDP varied between 6.7 percent and 11.2 percent in the Arab region. 
Since then only Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco, of the 22 Arab countries, have 
managed to improve their industrial performance with their industrial sectors 
accounting for 19.5 percent, 18.2 percent and 18 percent of GDP, respectively, in 
2005.361 These two factors - the production of similar commodities and a limited 
industrial base - have to be overcome if inter-Arab economic integration is to be 
successfully implemented in accordance with the rules of free trade. 
A further challenge to inter-regional cooperation, particularly after the September 
11 2001 terror attacks on the US, has been the preoccupation of Arab and Middle 
Eastern governments with regime protection and consolidating their domestic 
position at a time of external and local demands for moves towards greater 
democracy and political freedom. 362 The preoccupation of these governments with 
their political survival has definitely slowed down the implementation of structural 
adjustments and liberalisation programmes. Political instability in the region forced 
various governments to formulate their national economic policies to deal mainly 
361 Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Profile: Egypt, London, 2005, pp. 28-29; EIU, Country 
Profile: Tunisia, London, 2005, p. 39; and EIU, Country Profile: Morocco, London, 2005, p. 42. 
362 Rory Miller & Ashraf Mishrif, "The Barcelona Process and Euro-Arab Economic Relations: A 
Decade On", Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), vol. 9, No. 2, June 2005. 
http//meria. idc. ac. il/i ournal/2005/issue2/Mil ler%2ORory%pdf. pdf 
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with short term challenges rather than long term strategic goals and there is little 
serious focus on the modernisation of legal, regulatory and administrative systems. 
Such a limited approach to economic liberalisation across the Mediterranean 
countries made the prospect of regional integration less likely to match the 
expectations of their peoples or their European partners, who have provided, through 
MEDA programmes, substantial financial and economic assistance to support 
reforms, which are vital if horizontal integration is to occur. 
5.3. EU Financial and Technological Assistance to Egypt 
Prior to the Barcelona process, EU financial and technical assistance to Egypt was 
channelled through four bilateral protocols, each for a four-year period, and 
concluded on the basis of the 1977 EEC-Egypt Cooperation Agreement. 363 After 
1996 all new projects in Egypt were funded by the MEDA programme. 
5.3.1. Financial Protocols 
Table 5.2 shows that EU funds allocated to Egypt increased progressively from 
protocol to protocol and tripled between 1977 and 1996. During this period, most of 
the funding was essentially diverted to agriculture and the environment, although 
funds for economic cooperation, energy, industry, scientific cooperation, and health 
363 The four Financial Protocols covered the period from 1977 until 1996, and were concluded as 
follows: first protocol from 1997 until 1981, second protocol from 1983 until 1986, third protocol 
from 1988 until 1991, and the last protocol from 1992 until 1996. 
181 
were also included in the protocols 364 The total funds made available to Egypt in 
the form of grants amounted to 0661 million. European Investment Bank (EIB) 
lending provided ¬802 million during the same period, making a total of ¬1.463 
million. 365 
Table 5.2: EC Financial Protocols to Egypt 1977-1996 (E million) 
Financial Protocols EU Grants EIB Loans Total 
Protocol I (1977-81) 77 93 170 
Protocol 1I(1983-86) 126 150 276 
Protocol III (1988-91) 200 249 449 
Protocol VI (1992-96) 258 310 568 
Total 661 802 1.463 
Source: Delegation of the EU Commission in Egypt, Annual Report 2001, p. 9. 
Despite the concentration of funds in agriculture and the environment, progress 
in these sectors was very limited. Agriculture was hampered by poor access to 
irrigation and water across large areas; the insufficiency of financial resources to 
update and upgrade agricultural production; the lack of a systematic approach to the 
increased exports of agricultural products; the slow development in the agricultural 
processing industry; and continued migration and unbalanced development between 
urban and rural areas 366 Further progress in the environment was challenged by the 
lack of balance between preserving natural and historical sites and promoting 
364 Agriculture was considered a key sector in Egypt's economy, which accounted for almost 17 per 
cent of its GDP, 17 per cent of its total export and 23 per cent of the employment of the country's 
workforce. Environmental protection was also vital for Egypt particularly in South Sinai, after its 
liberation from Israel in 1983, where the marine environment of the Gulf of Aqaba, along a coastal of 
about 900 km, offered a unique spectrum of Marine Flora and Fauna. Success in this area with the EU 
fund can be seen in the development of Ras Mohamed National Park, which expanded from 97 km to 
its current size of 480 km, the St Katherine Protectorate in 1994 and the Taba National Park, which 
have been judged as particularly rich and worthy of protection. 
365 Delegation of the EU Commission in Egypt, Annual Report 2001, Cairo, p. 9. 
366 Ibid, p. 10. 
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tourism. This imbalance affected the environment at the expense of tourist 
development, particularly the construction of tourist resorts, holiday developments 
and hotels. 
5.3.2. The MEDA Programme 
Under the umbrella of the Barcelona process, EU financial and technical assistance 
to Egypt has been provided through a new financial policy framework called MEDA. 
MEDA funds support policy-led national programmes of structural reform and 
liberalisation through integrated sector-wide programming. The bilateral 
implementation of EU financial and technical assistance to Egypt under MEDA was 
covered in a Framework Convention signed in February 1998. While funds were 
essential for the implementation of projects, considerable technical assistance proved 
to be valuable in assisting small and medium-sized Egyptian enterprises in 
complying with new environmental legislation. 
According to the annual report of the delegation of the EU Commission in Egypt 
in 2001, the MEDA programme was the principle financial tool of the EU for the 
implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, with some 86 per cent of the 
resources allocated to MEDA channelled bilaterally to partner countries, while 14 
per cent were devoted to regional or horizontal activities, from which all parties are 
eligible to benefit. These financial resources attempted to support the implementation 
of the association agreement through: 
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" Support for economic transition through increasing competitiveness and the 
development of the private sector in order to increase competition in the 
domestic and international markets. 
" Strengthening the socio-economic balance by alleviating the short term costs 
of economic transition through appropriate measures in social policy. 
" Regional cooperation by complementing bilateral activities through measures 
to strengthen cooperation at the regional level. 367 
One of the most significant dynamics of the MEDA programme was the fact that 
its funding was designed to mobilise its own resources so as to achieve structural 
changes in a sustainable manner. Despite the progress made in projects intended to 
foster economic transition and socio-economic balance, this dynamism has not yet 
helped Egypt to achieve targeted sustained economic growth above 6 per cent per 
annum. Progress, however, has been made through a significant increase in financial 
cooperation, via the MEDA programme signed in February 1998, compared with the 
financial resources made available under previous financial protocols. 
5.3.2.1. MEDA I Funding 
MEDA 1 (1996-2000) attempted to prepare Egypt for the new Association 
Agreement. Financial and technical support was provided to projects dealing with 
economic transition and increasing competitiveness in Egyptian industries, as well as 
those alleviating the negative effects of employment and social reform. Under 
MEDA I, the EU provided the 12 non-EU participants in the Barcelona process with 
367 Delegation of the European Commission in Egypt, Annual Report 2001, Cairo, 2002, p. 8. 
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some ¬3,435 million, of which Egypt received E615 million - 17 per cent of the total 
funds. MEDA I also provided around 638.7 million to Egypt towards EIB interest 
rate subsidies. As table 5.3, below, shows Egypt's funding was divided between four 
large MEDA programmes - education enhancement, health reform, social 
development and industrial modernisation. In regard to Egypt's economic transition, 
the EU financed three key programmes amounting to around ¬100 million during the 
second half of the 1990s. The Private Sector Development Programme, the Public 
Enterprise Reform and Privatisation Programme and the Banking Sector Reform 
Programme absorbed around 645 million, £43 million and £11.7 million, 
respectively. 
Table 5.3: EU Fund to Egypt: MEDA I, 1996-2000 (E million) 
Project Number Programme Title Amount allocated 
EGB-7-4100/IB/97/0011 Education Enhancement Programme 100 
EGB-7-4100/IB/1050/98 Health Sector Reform Programme 110 
EG/13-74 100/113/97/0361 Social Fund for Development - Phase lI 155 
EGB-7-4100/97/0733 Industrial Modernisation Program 250 
Total fund for projects 615 
EIB Interest Rate Subsidies 38.7 
EIB Risk Capital 30 
Total Fund granted 683.3 
Source: European Union, Annual Cooperation Report Egypt 2003, p. 23. 
The fourth programme was the Industrial Modernisation Programme, which 
started in 2001 with total grant funding of £250 million. The previous Private Sector 
Development Programme and the current Industrial Modernisation Programme not 
only represented a commitment by Egypt and the EU to modernise Egypt's industrial 
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base but also provided a good model for the continuity of policy-led cooperation 
368 
These two programmes helped Egypt to prepare for increased competition following 
the dismantling of import tariffs under the new association agreement. 
Under MEDA I, government-led policies that dealt with social inequality, 
creating employment and the restructuring of service delivery to increase efficiency 
and enhance quality received substantial funding from the EU. Funds were 
distributed as follows: 
" The Education Enhancement programme received 6100 million to improve 
the basic education system at primary and preparatory levels. 
" The Health Sector Reform Programme received £110 million, with £10 
million for the Support to the Population Programme in Upper Egypt -a 
family planning initiative. 
9 The Social Fund for Development which received £155 million. 
5.3.2.2. MEDA II Funding 
The MEDA II programme (2001-2005) allocated @5.35 billion to Mediterranean 
states participating in the Barcelona process in order to support their industrial 
development and ease balance of payments pressures during their economic 
transition. Meanwhile, the contribution of the EIB was ¬6.4 billion, in addition to E1 
million for transnational projects 369 As for Egypt, its Country Strategy Paper (CSP), 
which includes the National Indicative Programme (NIP) adopted in December 2001, 
369 Ian Boag, the European Commission's ambassador to Egypt, Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue 588,30 May 
-5 June 2002. http: //weekly. ahram. org. eg12002/588/ec5. htm 369 European Commission, External Relations, Financial Cooperation/MEDA Programme 
http: //europa. eu. int/comm/extemal relations/euromed/meda. htm 
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defined key priorities such as the private sector, improving the socioeconomic 
balance, strengthening civil society, the environment, energy, transport and structural 
adjustments. According to its NIP, the indicative value of grants received by Egypt 
during 2002-2004 was 16332 million, including up to E41 million in interest rate 
subsidies to loans made to Egypt by the EIB. 37° 
Much attention has been given to promoting the implementation of the 
Association Agreement, supporting the process of economic transition, stability and 
balanced socioeconomic development. As for the effective implementation of the 
Association Agreement, the Trade Enhancement Programme (TEP) was launched in 
2003. It covers three different phases. TEP-A provided £20 million in technical 
assistance for upgrading the capacity of Egypt's Ministry of Foreign Trade in critical 
areas such as commercial representation, export promotion, and trade facilitation. 
TEP-B provided E40 million for encouraging and accelerating the implementation of 
policies and reforms with the aim of reducing the cost and duration of foreign trade 
operations, particularly export, import and the transit of goods. TEP-C provided E6 
million to support Egypt's effort to reform customs, in particular the streamlining of 
customs procedures and the reduction of non-tariff barriers in order to enhance 
foreign trade. 371 
In addition to this, ¬80 million was provided through the Spinning and Weaving 
Restructuring Programme (SWRP) in 2003 to assist Egypt in restructuring its 
critically vulnerable and socially-sensitive spinning and weaving sector. A project 
worth £2 million was also launched to provide limited technical assistance and 
370 European Commission, Annual Cooperation Report Egypt 2003, p. 26. 
371 European Commission, Annual Cooperation Report Egypt 2003, p. 27. 
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equipment to reinforce the Egyptian administration's capacity to prepare the 
implementation process and raise awareness of the challenges and opportunities 
posed by the agreement. 
Table 5.4: MEDA 11 funding for Egypt, 2002-2004 (E million) 
Programmes Projects Starting Date Funds 
Effective Implementation of the Trade Enhancement August 2002 (5 years) 66 (20 + 40 + 6) 
Association Agreement Programme (A-B-C stages) 
Spinning & Weaving 2004 80 
Restructuring Programme 
Promotion of the Association 2004 2 
Agreement 
Support for Economic Technical & Vocational 2004 (6 years) 33 
Transition Training 
TEMPUS 2003 11 
Financial & Investment Sector 2004 15* 
Reform 
Balanced Socio-economic Integrated Local Development 2004 64 
Development Programme for South Sinai 
Support for Social 2004 20 
Development and the 
Development of Civil Society 
Total (3 programmes) 8 projects 291" 
source: Leiegauon ui curupcan t, ommission in rgypt, cu-rgypt i, ooperanon, [uu3. 
º This figure was set at E52 million in the EU Annual Report Egypt 2003, p. 27. 
** Figure does not include ¬41 million towards EIB interest rate subsidies. 
MEDA II also provided support for the process of economic transition through 
three main programmes. 372 The most important was the Financial and Investment 
Sector Reform Programme, which provided 615 million for improving financial 
sector supervision and its responsiveness to the needs of savers and borrowers in a 
372 EU Delegation in Egypt, EU-Egypt Cooperation: Status of Projects funded under MEDA 11,2005. 
htlp: //www. eu-delegation. org. ez/en/eu-funded programmes/program 3. doc 
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modernising economy. This programme was divided into three separate projects: 
FISC-Rural, FISC-Social (agreed to in 2003 and signed in 2004), and FISC-Financial 
which was agreed to in 2004.373 The Technical and Vocational Educational Training 
Programme provided ¬33 million to support reform in Egypt's training and 
vocational system and to ensure that Egyptian enterprises have access to better 
trained work forces, and the competitive skills required to meet the challenges of a 
modem economy. 
The Trans-European Mobility Scheme for University Studies (TEMPUS) 
programme was extended to the Mediterranean countries in June 2002, and E11 
million was earmarked for Egypt over a two year period in order to enhance its 
higher education system by developing inter-university cooperation between 
universities in Egypt and the EU. Some 12 joint European partnership projects were 
selected in 2002 and established in October 2003, while some 61 applications were 
received for the academic year 2004-2005.374 As for supporting stability and 
sustainable and balanced socio-economic development, the Integrated Local 
Development Programme for South Sinai received E64 million to promote 
sustainable, diversified and environmentally sensitive economic activities in the area, 
and Support for Social Development and the Development of Civil Society 
programmes received E20 million to reduce poverty and enable the Ministry of 
Insurance and Social Affairs to facilitate the social re-integration of five categories of 
children at risk such as girls with no access to education, street children, working 
children and disabled children. 375 
373 European Commission, Annual Cooperation Report Egypt, 2003, p. 27. 
374 European Commission, Annual Cooperation Report Egypt 2003, p. 28. 
375 Ibid, p. 28. 
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5.3.2.3. MEDA Regional Programmes (MRPs) 
Table 5.5: MEDA Regional Programmes for Southern Mediterranean states 1996-2005 (E Million) 
Programmes Projects Fund 
1 Making EMFTA a Reality FEMISE 6.3 
MEDATAT 50 
UNIMED Business Network 2.5 
Industrial Cooperation 30 
EU-Med SMEs Cooperation 2.8 
Risk capital Resources 250 
2 Promoting Regional Infrastructure Initiatives Transport Programme II 20 
Cooperation in Energy 13.8 
Water Management 40 
Water Information 3.3 
Information Society (EUMEDIS) 65 
Environment II 36 
Private participation in Infrastructure 2.6 
3 Enhancing the Rule of Law & Good 
Governance 
Good Governance & Rule of Law 6 
Network of Foreign Policy Institutes 2.5 
Malta Diplomatic Training Seminars - 
Human Rights & Democracy 36 
4 Bringing Partnership closer to the People Euromed Heritage 57 
Euromed Audiovisual 20 
Euromed Youth Action 16 
Euromed Dialogue: Information and 
Communication 
10 
Total 4 21 669.8 
Source: Data calculated by the author from EU Annual Report Egypt 2003, pp. 30.32. 
Egypt has undoubtedly benefited financially from MEDA regional programmes that 
have attempted to deal with problems common among many Mediterranean partners 
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and to reinforce bilateral cooperation, rising North-South cooperation and the 
tackling of issues of a transnational dimension. In 2002, MEDA regional payments 
accounted for £61 million. This almost doubled in 2003 to reach 6112 million. 
376 
According to the Regional Strategy Paper 2002-2006, the objectives of the regional 
programmes were to make the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area a reality, to 
promote regional infrastructure initiatives, enhance the Rule of Law and Good 
Governance, and bring the partnership closer to the people. As table 5.5 indicates the 
MRPs committed around £669.8 million for these priority projects, in which 
Egyptian institutions were active participants. 377 
5.3.3. The Industrial Modernisation Programme (IMP) 
Egypt's Industrial Modernisation Programme attempted to revitalise national 
industry through technical and financial support provided by the Government of 
Egypt and the EU. 78 It was the largest programme to be implemented and financed 
outside the EU, with a budget of £250 million from MEDA I funding and £106 
million from the Egyptian government. 379 The programme attempted to promote 
GDP growth and the competitiveness of the private enterprise sector, with special 
emphasis on small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the context of economic 
liberalisation and internationalism. 
376 European Commission, Annual Cooperation Report Egypt 2003, p. 28. 
"' This figure is committed for regional projects that benefit all Euromed participants, but figures of 
Egypt's shares of these projects are not available. 
37 Ambassador Gamal Bayoumi - Assistant Foreign Minister and Headed Egypt's team during the 
negotiations of the partnership with the EU, "Revitalising National Industry", Al-Ahram Weekly, 28 
December 2000-3 January 2001, issue No. 514. 
379 The IMP also benefited from an equal amount of E250 million from MEDA II funding (2000- 
2005). 
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It also attempted to create a competitive and sustainable policy framework within 
which "the private sector can grow, generate more FDI to increase investment and 
technology transfer, develop innovation and technology which is a key for future 
growth and development, and to help modernise the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
to better serve the changing needs of the private sector". 80 In other words, the 
objective of the IMP was to prepare the industrial sector for the challenge that would 
follow the introduction of free trade conditions and the exposure to global markets 
through the modernisation of its production methods, management and employment 
skills, and quality standards needed to meet European specifications 381 
To achieve this objective, the Industrial Modernisation Centre (IMC) was 
established under Presidential Decree 477 in 2000 to act as the focal point for 
ensuring that Egypt became a strong player in the global market place and also to 
deliver support to various enterprises. 82 Though the role of the IMC is largely 
advisory, its cooperation with partners such as Technology Centres, Business 
Representative Organisations, and R&D institutions can have deep implications for 
the structure and functioning of enterprises, particularly when their access to funds 
has been linked to an improvement in their competitiveness. Over the past four years, 
both the Integrated Technical Assistance (ITA) and Business Resource Centres 
(BRCs), the strategic delivery arms of the IMP, provided significant technical and 
380 Industrial Modernisation Centre, Industrial Modernisation Programme: Overall Work Plan April 
2003- May 2006 (unpublished document), Cairo, 2004, p. 3. 
381 See Export from Egypt, Industrial Modernisation Centre at 
http"//www. exportfromegypt. com/en/imc/index. asp 
382 The eligibility criteria for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises to receive support from the IMP or 
the IMC is that the company must operate in the industry or service sectors related to industry, has at 
least 10 full-time employees, fully or privately owned with a majority private share, legally 
established in Egypt, and shows potential for growth and profit-making. Industrial Modernisation 
Centre, Industrial Modernisation Programme: Overall Work Plan April 2003- May 2006 
(unpublished document), Cairo, 2004, pp. 2-4. 
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practical support services to a large number of SMEs particularly in the food 
industry, but the effectiveness of their services is as yet difficult to assess. 
The Egyptian Government founded Carroll Growth Investment through the IMC 
to attract foreign investment in industrial projects. It invested 66 million in this 
vehicle and managed to attract US$20 million during early 2005.83 Some leading 
private sector companies have also assumed an active role in the development of 
Egyptian industry. Concord International Investments invested US$35 million in 
industrial projects, which included the purchase of a 56 per cent equity in Bisco Misr 
in early 2005.384 
The success of the IMP, however, depends largely on its capacity to redefine its 
general objectives and increase its financial resources to cope with the demand for 
modernizing a wide range of private sector enterprises in various industrial areas. 385 
It depends also on the willingness, and capacity, of large private sector companies to 
play an active role in the industrialisation programme by investing more in industrial 
projects than in services. The exclusion of public or state-owned majority 
shareholders from the IMP sheds some light on the limited scope and capacity of the 
programme to modernise the public sector economy, which is of extreme importance 
to the national economy. 
383 Al-Ahram Al-Eqtisadi, Cairo, June 19,2005, p. 13. 
384 Interview with Mohamed Younis, Chairman of Concord International Investments, Al-Ahram Al- 
Egtisadi, June 19,2005, p. 13. 
38 Interview with Rashid Mohamed Rashid, Egypt's Minister of Foreign Trade and Industry, in 
Industrial Modernisation Centre News, Issue No. 4, January 2005, p. 8. 
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5.3.4. European Investment Bank (EIB) Lending to Egypt 
Prior to the Barcelona process, the EIB provided Egypt with loans worth E802 
million to finance projects relating to rebuilding the infrastructure of the country, 
while placing particular emphasis on assisting Egypt's private sector, in particular 
dynamic small and medium sized companies. It also allocated special additional 
loans in the form of risk capital contributions of £30 million and extra loans of £325 
million, which brought the total EIB lending committed under Protocols and its own 
resources to around ¬1,157 million. 386 
During Protocol 1 (1977-1981), the EIB provided some 693 million. The Suez 
Canal Authority received £25 million, Shoubra El Kheima (£25 million), DIB I 
Global Loan (¬15 million) and Abu Qir Gas Development (E28 million). During 
Protocol I1(1983-1986), the bank provided around E150 million of its own resources 
to finance projects in the energy and cement sectors, and E3 million on risk capital 
resources from the EC budget. These loans were extended during Protocol III (1988- 
1991) to E248.9 million of the EIB's own resources and they cover projects in the 
agri-business, manufacturing, water and sanitation, gas and energy, and the tourism 
sector. The bank also provided around £11 million on risk capital resources from the 
EC budget, of which ¬3 million each went to the Alexandria Tyre Factory and Misr 
Compressor Factory, E2 million to the Winter Palace Hotel, and E1.5 million to 
Jardins du Nil. 
386 Delegation of European Commission in Egypt, Annual Report 2001, Cairo, p. 18. 
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During protocol IV (1992-1996), EIB loans to Egypt amounted to around E651 
million, including E310 million of the bank's own resources, ¬16 million loans on 
risk capital resources and 6325 million (loans off-protocol) from the Horizontal 
Facility for Mediterranean regional and environmental projects. 387 These loans 
financed investments in sanitation, air transport, steel and aluminium production, 
highways and energy, pollution abatement, cement, ceramic production, tyres, 
compressor and industrial gases, gas pipelines, oil refining, printing, irrigation and 
small and medium sized enterprises, and were provided via public and private 
commercial banks that managed resources on behalf of the EIB. 
Under the Euro-Med framework signed in July 1997, in which the EIB 
committed £1.3 billion to non-EU Mediterranean partners, Egypt received £411 
million of soft loans provided under favourable condition, of which ¬382 million 
were in the form of long-term loans from the bank's own resources. Almost £100 
million of this was invested in the Suez Oil Refinery; ¬150 million divided equally 
between EgyptAir and ANDSK II Flat Steel Plant; £45 million was invested in two 
projects in ECC Grey Cement; £46 million in two projects in GASCO Gas Pipeline; 
E25 million in Red Sea hotels; and E16 million in Lecico Ceramic. 388 The EIB also 
provided E29 million in the form of risk capital contributions from EU budgetary 
resources (MEDA I), of which E25 million was invested in a competitive upgrading 
of Egyptian enterprises and the remaining E4 million invested in Lecico Ceramics. 
387 Delegation of the European Commission in Egypt, Annual Report 2001, Annex V, pp. 68-69; and 
Euro-Afed Partnership, Egpt: Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 & National Indicative Programme 
2002-2004, p. ' 8. 
388 Delegation of European Commission in Egypt, Annual Report 2001, p. 70. 
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Between 2000 and 2001 (under MEDA II), the EIB allocated E330 million in 
loans to support infrastructural projects in water, energy and transport. The Cairo 
North Power Plan I benefited from loans worth E150 million. E30 million was 
invested in the Industrial Development Bank of Egypt Global Loan II (IDBE GL II), 
while £150 million was divided equally between the National Drainage Programme, 
the Industrial Development Bank of Egypt Global Loan III (IDEB GL III) and the 
Cairo Metro Line 2 Extension. 89 Under the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean 
Investment and Partnership (FEMIP), which was established in May 2003, Egypt has 
also benefited from financial and technical assistance provided by the EIB. The bank 
allocated @105 million for technical assistance to FEMIP partners between 2003 and 
2006, of which ¬54.7 million was spent during 2003-2004 - Turkey obtained E12.6 
million, the Maghreb countries E22.8 million and the Mashreq countries ¬19.3 
million. 390 As table 5.6, below, shows the majority of assistance was allocated to 
traditional areas of concern to the bank such as the envirorunent, water and 
infrastructure. 
Table 5.6: FEMIP TA Support to MENA countries in 2003-2004 (E million) 
Sector Maghreb Mashreq Turkey Total 
Environment/Water 9.8 7.7 4.4 21.9 
Infrastructure 8.0 6.5 2.7 17.2 
Industry/Finance 3.8 4.5 5.5 13.8 
Human Capital 1.2 0.6 - 1.8 
Total 22.8 19.3 12.6 54.7 
Source: EIB, Report on FEMIP TA Support Fund, 2005. 
389 Ibid, pp. 19 and 70. 
390 European Investment Bank (2005), Report on FEMIP Technical Assistance (TA) Support Fund: 
Objectives, Strategy and Scope of Activities, FEMIP Ministerial Meeting, Alexandria, Egypt, June 7, 
2004, p. 3. 
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The EIB also planned to invest between £8 billion to £10 billion in MENA 
countries by 2006 via existing Mediterranean lending mandates, risk capital 
resources from the EU budget, and investment aid funds provided by the EU. 
391 Such 
assistance proved vital to Egypt's economic transition as the EIB has given special 
priority to the development of private sector economic activities and to projects 
contributing to the creation of a favourable climate for private investment 
392 In line 
with this objective, a FEMIP Trust Fund (FTF) was established at the end of 2004, 
with a budget of £30 million. It focused on small business lending, the provision of 
privatisation services and mainstream technical assistance activities. The EIB office 
in Cairo was active in coordinating the first FTF project on `How to Improve the 
Efficiency of Worker's Remittances', which was approved by the FTF Assembly of 
393 Donors in January 2005 
5.4. The EU-Egypt Association Agreement of 25 June 2001 
The conclusion and signing of the Egypt-EU Association Agreement on 25 June 
2001 has been the most important and dynamic development in Euro-Egyptian 
relations since the Barcelona Declaration was agreed in 1995. The agreement was 
ratified in 2004, and is expected to govern the economic relationship between Egypt 
391 European Investment Bank (2005), Financing in Mediterranean Partner Countries, What is 
FEMIP? And Technical Assistance FEMIP Support Fund. 
hqp: //eib. or% sit/dynamic. asp? desianation=med&sCountChildern=4&childHeaderTd=260 
392 Philippe de Fontaine Vive, European Investment Bank Vice President, confirmed that 37 per cent 
of total EIB fund was granted to private sector projects. Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 694,10-16 June 
2004. http: //weekly. ahram. or.. eg/2004/694/ec2. htm 
393 European Investment Bank (2005), Report on FEMIP Technical Assistance (TA) Support Fund: 
Objectives, Strategy and Scope of Activities, FEMIP Ministerial Meeting, Alexandria, Egypt, June 7, 
2004, p. 2. 
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and the EU until the two parties reach a total liberalisation of their trade in goods, 
services and capital by 2020. The dynamism of this agreement lay not only in its 
predominant concern with trade liberalisation, including the free movement of 
industrial, agricultural, fisheries and processed agricultural products, 394 but also in 
the wide scope of issues of prime importance to the interests of both participants. The 
agreement covered political dialogue, foreign policy coordination, security 
cooperation, economic and financial cooperation, social and cultural cooperation, the 
environment, transport and telecommunications, technology transfer, the exchange of 
information, human rights, the fight against drug trafficking, terrorism, organised 
crime and money laundering. 
395 
Table 5.7: Egypt's trade balance with the EU, 1996-2004 (US$ million) 
Year Exports Imports Total Trade Balance of Trade 
1996 1614 4714 6328 -3100 
1997 1555 5050 6605 -3495 
1998 1192 5960 7151 -4768 
1999 1236 5668 6904 -4432 
2000 1900 4803 6703 -2903 
2001 1311 3773 5084 -2461 
2002 1304 3339 4643 -2035 
2003 2026 2801 4827 -775 
2004 (Jan-Aug) 1623 1959 3581 -336 
Total 13761 38067 51826 -24305 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry, International Trade Unit, Cairo, Egypt, 2004. 
... See text of the Egypt-EU Association Agreement, Title II, Chapters 1-2, Articles 7-16. As for 
agricultural products, there have been some qualitative and quantitative restrictions due to limitation 
imposed by the EU Common Agricultural Policy. 
395 Egypt's Ministry of Foreign Trade, Text of the Egypt-EU Association Agreement, Vol. 1, July 2002 
(in Arabic). 
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In economic terms, this agreement attempted to strengthen Egypt's trade relations 
with the EU, the country's main trading partner, whose total exports to Egypt are 
around 40 per cent and imports around 34.6 per cent of total trade. 396 The creation of 
the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area is expected to foster the trade relationship 
and narrow trade deficit that currently favours the EU, as seen in table 5.7. 
Optimism springs from the gradual increase in Egypt's export quotas in 
agricultural commodities and products. 397 For instance, while the agreement 
eliminated all tariffs on industrial goods exported to the EU immediately after its 
ratification, it waived tariffs on such commodities as new potatoes (exports allowed 
between 1 January and 31 March each year) from 130,000 tones in the first year, to 
190,000 tonnes in the second year to 250,000 tonne in the third year and thereafter. 
This also applied to frozen vegetables, whose quota increased by a thousand tonnes 
annually in the first three years after the agreement came into force. 398 This reduces 
the cost of Egypt's imports from the EU markets, particularly after the introduction 
of the Euro as a unified currency across the EU member states (except Britain, 
Sweden, Denmark, and the ten new member states) which led to stability in financial 
dealings and transactions. 399 Egypt can also take advantage of the increased size of 
396 Data collected by the author from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry, Cairo, 2004. 
397 Ministry of Foreign Trade, Ten Advantages of the Egypt-EU Association Agreement, vol. 4, Cairo, 
July 2002, pp. 6-10. 
398 Egypt is allowed to export 1,000 tones of frozen and preserved vegetables (tariff-free) in the first 
year after the agreement comes into force; this increases in the second year to 2,000 tones, and to 
3,000 tones in the third year and thereafter. For the details of the elimination of tariffs on quotas in 
agricultural commodities see Text of the Association agreement (in Arabic), Ministry of Foreign 
Trade, vol. 2, July, 2002, pp. 37-47. 
39 The use of Euro as currency avoided Egyptian importers to worry about the differences in cost 
from exchange rates of each individual currency of EU countries and the lack of foreign currency in 
the Egyptian market. The introduction of the Euro in January 2002 eliminated such difficulties for 
importers and businessmen dealing with most European partners. Jean-Pierre Chauffour and Loukas 
Semitsiotis, The impact of the euro on Mediterranean partner countries, European Commission, 
Directorate General II - Economic and Financial Affairs, Euro Papers, No. 24, June 1998, pp. 20-22. 
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the EU market following the enlargement of 2004, which increased its consumption 
capacity and its population to around 450 million people. 
Notably the agreement guaranteed constant EU financial assistance to Egypt. It 
also provided the most effective legal and institutional mechanism for consultation 
and settlement of trade disputes between Egypt and the EU. For example, in the 
event of serious difficulties in relation to a given issue or product, the issue may be 
reviewed within 30 days by the Association Committee and/or the Association 
Council, whose decisions are binding on both parties. 400 Trade issues that are not 
thoroughly explained by the agreement can be resolved in accordance with the 
provisions of the WTO and the GAAT of 1994.401 In disputes concerning balance of 
payments, the agreement demands that Egypt and the EU take restrictive measures in 
conformity with the conditions laid down within the framework of the GATT and 
Articles VIII and XIV of the Statues of the International Monetary Fund. 402 This 
institutional mechanism has been consolidated through regular meetings and 
consultations by officials and experts to facilitate the movement of capital between 
the EU and Egypt and to achieve its complete liberalisation as soon as conditions are 
met. 
The impact of the recent agreement on European direct investment into Egypt 
depends largely on the capacity of the agreement to assist Egypt in improving its 
economic performance and bringing about fundamental structural changes in the 
country's economic system. As for FDI, the most important dynamic of this 
400 See Title VIII "Institutional, General and Final Provisions", Articles 74-86 of the Egypt-EU 
Association Agreement of 2001. 
401 See Articles 22-24 of the 2001 Egypt-EU Association agreement. 
402 See Article 33 of the 2001 Association Agreement. 
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agreement was its affirmation of the "free circulation of capital for direct investment 
made in companies formed in accordance with the laws of the host country, and the 
liquidation or repatriation of these investments and of any profit stemming 
thereafter" 403 This affirmation was followed by the call for increasing the flow of 
capital, expertise and technology to Egypt through: 
" appropriate means of identifying investment opportunities and information 
channels on investment regulations; 
" providing information on European investment regimes (such as technical 
assistance, direct financial support, fiscal incentives and investment 
insurance) related to outward investments and enhancing the possibility for 
Egypt to benefit from them; 
"a legal environment conducive to investment between the two parties where 
appropriate, through the conclusion by the member states and Egypt of 
investment protection agreements, and agreements to prevent double taxation; 
" examining the creation of joint ventures, especially for SMEs and, when 
appropriate, the conclusion of agreements between Member states and Egypt; 
9 establishing mechanisms for encouraging and protecting investment 404 
The Association Agreement also encouraged cooperation between the EU and 
Egypt in planning and implementing projects demonstrating the effective acquisition 
and use of basic technology (Article 43), the use of standards (Article 47), the 
development of human resources and job creation - especially educational and 
vocational training that improve the skills and quality of the Egyptian labour market 
(Article 42). This encouragement was apparent in joint governmental projects or 
403 Article 32, Chapter 1, Title IV of the Egypt-EU Association Agreement of 25`h June 2001. 404 See Article 46, Egypt-EUAssociation Agreement of 2001. 
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policy-led programmes designed by the Egyptian Government and financed by the 
EU in areas such as the environment and infrastructure, but such an approach has not 
yet involved the participation of small and medium-sized private enterprises. By 
addressing issues so fundamental to the attraction of FDI as a developed 
infrastructure, the agreement focused primarily on cooperation leading to sustainable 
development in economic sectors such as the environment (Article 44), transport 
(Article 51), information and telecommunications (Article 52), and energy (Article 
53), especially renewable energy. 
Moreover, the agreement addressed basic principles of concern to foreign 
investors in Egypt such as the rule of law; adequate and effective protection of 
intellectual property rights (Article 37); 405 standardisation (Article 47); cooperation 
to harmonise methodological procedures in order to create reliable statistics and data 
(Article 56); scientific and technological cooperation particularly in innovation and 
Research and Development (Article 43); simplifying the procedures of the customs 
systems (Article 55); and the quality of financial services, particularly the 
improvement of accounting, supervisory and regulatory systems of banking, 
insurance and other parts of the financial sector in Egypt (Article 49). 
405 Annex VI of the Egypt-EU Association Agreement concerning intellectual property rights specified 
that by the end of the fourth year after the agreement of comes into force Egypt shall accede six 
multilateral conventions on intellectual property rights: the Convention for the Protection of 
Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations (Rome, 1961); Budapest 
Treaty on the Intellectual Recognition of the Deposit of Micro-organisms for the Purposes of Patent 
Procedures (1979, amended 1980); the Patent Cooperation Treaty (Washington 1970, amended in 
1979 and modified in 1984); the International Convention for Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(Geneva, Act 1991); Nice Agreement concerning the international Classification of Goods and 
Services for the Purpose of the Registration of Marks (Geneva Act 1977, and amended in 1979); and 
Protocol relating to the Madrid Agreement concerning the international registration of Marks (Madrid 
1989). Egypt and the EU shall also reaffirm their obligation to the WTO agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Marrakech, April 1994) taking into consideration the 
transitional period for developing countries in Article 65 of that agreement; the Paris Convention for 
the protection of industrial property (Stockholm Act 1967 and amended in 1979); Berne Convention 
for the protection of literary and artistic works (Paris Act 1971); and Madrid Agreement concerning 
the International Registration of Marks (Stockholm Act 1967 amended in 1979). 
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The agreement also paid significant attention to social matters concerning the 
rights and well-being of Egyptian and European nationals legally residing and 
employed in the territory of the other party. 
406 In this respect, Article 62 of the 
agreement stressed the importance of the free movement of labour, while urging 
Egypt and the EU to seek measures to ensure fair treatment of their nationals legally 
residing in one another's territory, improving working conditions, and protecting the 
social security rights of their workers. Such measures have not only addressed the 
concerns of European managers and employees in Egypt but have also put in place 
effective ways to deal with the issue of illegal immigration, which is of great concern 
to EU member states. 07 Some of these measures were set out in Article 65, which 
called for: 
- improving living conditions, creating jobs and income generating activities, 
and developing training in areas from which emigrants come. 
- promoting the role of women in economic and social development. 
- improving the social protection and healthcare systems. 
- implementing and financing exchange programmes for groups of Egyptian 
and European young people, with the view of promoting mutual knowledge 
of their respective cultures and fostering tolerance, an objective that once was 
an ultimate aim of the 1970s EAD. 
As explained above, the Barcelona process provided an opportunity for Egypt 
and the EU to further economic cooperation. Indeed, this process has contributed to 
406 See Title VI, Chapter 1 "Dialogue and Cooperation on Social Matters, the 2001 Egypt-EU 
Association Agreement. 
407 This has been discussed in several parts of the book edited by George Joffe in 1999. George Joffe, 
Perspective on Development: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, (London: Frank Cass, 1999). 
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the significant development of Egypt's economic environment not only on a national 
level but also on a regional level through the promotion of horizontal integration. 
The agreement is expected to encourage more foreign investors to set up export- 
oriented industries in Egypt targeting the EU and other markets with which Egypt 
has free trade agreements such as the Arab market and the Common Market of 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). By streamlining the rules of origin of the 
EU partner countries, diagonal cumulation with these partners will be possible, thus 
boosting intra-Arab trade and investment. 08 How, and to what extent, this process 
impacted upon the growth of European direct investment into Egypt is the main 
focus of the following chapter. 
408 Ambassador Gamal Bayoumi, Former Assistant Foreign Minister and headed the Egyptian team 
during the negotiations of the Association Agreement with the EU between 1995 and 2001, Al-Ahram 
Weekly, Issue No. 693,3-9 June 2004. http: //weekly. ahram. org. eg/2004/693/ecl. htm 
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Chapter Six 
A Statistical Analysis of EU 
Direct Investment into Egypt, 1996-2004 
The post 1995 EU-Egyptian partnership contributed primarily to an improvement in 
foreign trade, financial and technical cooperation. The same level of improvement 
was expected in relation to FDI. The aim of this chapter is to examine whether or not 
this was the case over the past ten years. Primary data covering the period between 1 
January 1996 and 30 November 2004 was collected from GAFI, Egypt, for this 
purpose. This data is analysed statistically to determine the extent to which each 
member state of the EU contributed to the overall growth of FDI inflows into Egypt. 
It is also used to analyse the sectoral distribution of EU capital flows into the 
economy, and whether the pattern of distribution exhibited during this period led to a 
significant degree of growth or specialisation in specific industries or economic 
activities. To conduct such analysis, this chapter looks first at the role of the EU in 
global investment in the past ten years. This is followed by an assessment of EU FDI 
into the Community's other Mediterranean partners in the Barcelona process. 
6.1. The EU's Rising Role in Global Investment 
During the past ten years, the EU has managed to overtake the US as the world's 
largest global investor. This was first achieved in 2000, when Britain overtook the 
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US as the world's leading individual investor. 
409 This role was reaffirmed in 2002 as 
Luxemburg became the world's top investor and recipient of FDI flows. 
410 Figure 
6.1 shows that prior to this achievement EU direct investment had increased 
tremendously in terms of inward and outward flows between 1996 and 2000. This 
declined sharply in 2001 due to the general decline in the global economy, and it 
gradually decreased in the following three years to reach, in 2004, a point close to 
that achieved in late 1997. 












Source UNCTAD, World Investment Reports 2001,2003 & 2005. 
Data shows that global FDI flows into the EU increased by 595 per cent during 
the first five years of the Barcelona era, from US$1 13.3 billion in 1996 to US$674.5 
billion in 2000. This was due to an improvement in the EU's economic performance 
and the strengthening of its macroeconomic indicators, as well as the introduction of 
the Euro in 1999,41' which highlighted the significance of the reduction of 
transaction costs, and the fact that greater price transparency facilitates and 
409 The US continued to be the single largest host country for FDI, while its role as the largest outward 
investor was over taken by the UK in 1999 and 2000. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2001, p. 
12. 
410 In 2002, Luxemburg was the world's largest outward investor and largest FDI recipient, accounting 
for about 19 per cent (US$126 billion) of world inflows and 24 per cent (US$154 billion) of outflows. 
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, p. 69. 
"' UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1998, p. 13. 
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1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
accelerates capital flows and cross-border M&As. 
412 This growth was also due to 
European political stability, market size, and a well-established infrastructure. Such 
advantages allowed the Community to attract almost half of US FDI outflows by the 
late 1990s 413 Japanese companies were also attracted to the EU zone due to the 
stabilisation of its exchange rates. 
Table 6.1: FDI inflows of the 15-EU member states, 1996-2004 (US$ million). 
State 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Austria 4426 2654 4533 2974 8840 5919 356 7352 4865 
Belgium & 
Luxemburg* 






Denmark 768 2798 7724 16750 33818 11525 6630 2595 -10722 
Finland 1109 2114 12143 4610 8834 3732 7919 3296 4648 
France 21960 23173 30984 46545 43250 50476 49035 42498 24318 
Germany 6573 12244 24593 56077 198276 26414 50516 27265 -38557 
Greece 1058 984 71 562 1108 1589 50 661 1351 
Ireland 2617 2712 8865 18211 25779 9651 28981 26888 9120 
Italy 3535 4961 4280 6911 13375 14871 14545 16415 16815 
Netherlands 16662 11134 36939 41205 63854 51927 25038 19331 -4605 
Portugal 1344 2360 3005 1157 6635 6298 1767 6558 1112 
Spain 9308 8625 14848 17674 39969 27913 43696 29013 18361 
Sweden 5437 10968 19836 60926 23242 11910 11738 1288 -371 
UK 24435 33227 74321 87979 118764 52623 24029 20298 78399 
EU 113296 129952 264833 481274 674483 363051 397144 326611 196100 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Reports 2UU3 & 2UU5. 
(*) Belgium and Luxembourg had been counted as one country until 2001. Figures in 2002 are for each country respectively. 
Table 6.1 shows that almost all EU member states recorded a sharp increase in 
their FDI inflows between 1996 and 2000. Germany was the largest recipient of FDI 
inflows into the EU during the peak period. This increased from US$6.5 billion in 
1996 by 188 per cent, 378 per cent, 862 per cent and 3,051 per cent in 1997,1998, 
1999 and 2000, respectively. It was followed by the UK, whose share also increased 
412 Financial Times Survey, "Birth of the Euro", April 30,1998. 
413 European Commissions, "Economic Accounts of the EU", Eurostat, Luxemburg, 1997, p. 64. 
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sharply from US$24.4 billion in 1996 by 136 per cent, 305 per cent, 361 per cent and 
487 per cent in 1997,1998,1999 and 2000, respectively. 
14 Belgium and 
Luxemburg were jointly the largest recipient of FDI inflows in 1999, with a record 
US$119.7 billion. The Netherlands and France's share of FDI inflows increased from 
US$16.6 billion and US$22 billion in 1996 to US$63.8 billion and US$43.2 billion 
in 2000, respectively. Ireland did particularly well during this period as its inward 
flows increased from US$2.6 billion in 1996 to US$25.8 billion in 2000. Between 
2001 and 2004, there was a decline in FDI inflows into the EU, with Denmark, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden experiencing disinvestment in 2004. 
Table 6.2: FDI outflows of the 15-EU member states, 1996-2004 (US$ million). 
State 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Austria 1934 1987 2745 3301 5740 3137 5807 6776 7164 
Belgium & 
Luxemburg* 






Denmark 1984 4209 4477 16943 25052 12964 5686 1126 -10363 
Finland 3595 5278 18647 6605 22572 8367 7622 -2590 -1028 
France 30420 35584 48611 126856 177449 92974 50441 53147 47802 
Germany 50804 41797 88823 109648 56846 42079 15171 -3570 -7267 
Greece -18a 156 262 539 2102 607 655 47 607 
Ireland 727 1016 3906 6109 4629 5864 10332 3543 -7400 
Italy 8697 10414 12407 6722 12316 21472 17123 9071 19262 
Netherlands 32115 24494 36669 57627 73540 48514 33901 37778 1458 
Portugal 784 1903 3847 3168 7512 7564 155 7326 6178 
Spain 5397 12626 18936 42084 54675 33093 36454 30807 54246 
Sweden 4677 12648 24371 21928 40592 6594 10633 21238 15147 
UK 34047 61590 122820 207235 249783 68037 50300 66457 65391 
EU 183180 220953 415367 731068 819169 451911 383071 369100 276330 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Reports, 2001 & 2UU3 & 2005. 
(*) Belgium and Luxembourg had been counted as one country until 2001. Figures in 2002 are for each country respectively. 
(a) Estimated figures. 
414 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2001, p. 15. 
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As for FDI outward flows, the EU has been the main source of capital flows 
during the period under examination. Its share of global investment increased from 
US$183.2 billion in 1996 by 121 per cent, 227 per cent, 399 per cent and 447 per 
cent in 1997,1998,1999 and 2000, respectively. In 2001, FDI outflows decreased 
by almost 55 per cent from the previous year. Table 6.2 shows that a gradual decline 
continued during this period until 2004, when it recorded flows of US$276.3 billion. 
In 1996, Germany was the largest EU investor overseas with US$50.8 billion. It 
was followed by the UK, the Netherlands and France, who invested around US$34 
billion, US$32.1 billion and US$30.4 billion, respectively. By 2000, the UK was the 
largest EU investor, accounting globally for 30.4 per cent (US$249.8 billion) of total 
EU outflows, followed by France, the Netherlands and Germany investing US$177.5 
billion, US$73.5 billion and US$56.8 billion, respectively. Belgium and Luxemburg 
increased their share from US$8 billion in 1996 to US$86.4 billion in 2000, as table 
6.2 shows. Some countries such as Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece emerged as 
exporters of capital flows, with Spain increasing its FDI outflows from US$5.4 
billion in 1996 to US$54.7 billion in 2000. 
In 2002, Irish FDI outflows increased by almost 1,421 per cent to reach US$10.3 
billion, from US$727 million in 1996. In the same year, Luxemburg, the smallest of 
the then 15 EU member states, recorded the highest share of FDI outflows, with a 
total of US$126.1 billion - over one-third of the total EU outward flows. This made 
Luxemburg the world's largest investor and recipient, accounting for about 19 per 
cent of world inflows and 24 per cent of outflows. 15 This was due to investment 
415 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, p. 69. 
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links with the US economy and the progressive development of European 
integration. 416 It was also due to the favourable conditions, including tax exemptions 
offered by Luxemburg for holding companies and corporate headquarters. Such 
conditions produced large cross-border M&As. The 2000 Vodafone-Mannesmann 
deal, with its significant FDI inflows and outflows, made Luxemburg one of the most 
important investors and FDI recipients worldwide. This position was further 
enhanced in late 2001 when Arbed (Luxemburg), Aceralia (Spain) and Usinor 
(France) formed the steel group Arcelor with its headquarters in Luxemburg. 417 
However, Luxemburg's outward flows were not of significant importance to 
investment in developing or transitional economies. Luxemburg certainly could not 
be compared to the UK in terms of its commitment to long term investment in 
specific developing markets or in terms of the distribution of its capital flows across 
a number of economic areas. British investors showed a more permanent and 
constant presence in global markets due to their willingness to take risks and their 
experience and knowledge, dating back to the colonial era, of many parts of the 
global market. Unlike Luxemburg, which concentrated its investment in 
manufacturing and services in the US and the EU, British capital flows tended to 
focus on resource-seeking investment in developing countries and thus its capital 
flows were disbursed across various economic sectors such as agriculture, raw 
materials and mining. 
Also, despite its impressive record of FDI in 2002 Luxemburg's share of EU 
GDP was only 0.2 per cent and its domestic investment stood at only US$4.4 billion. 
416 European Commission, `Economic Accounts of the European Union' (Eurostat, Statistics 
Collection, 1998), p. 61. 
417 UNICTAD, World Investment Report 2003, p. 69. 
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This confirmed the fact that Luxemburg's position as a leading world investor did 
not benefit developing economies because the increase and decrease in its inflows 
and outflows merely reflected a transfer of funds between affiliates within the same 
group located in developed countries. This argument was confirmed by Luxemburg's 
Central Bank, which admitted that capital invested in the country for further transfer 
as FDI elsewhere was estimated at about 80 per cent of the inflows and outflows of 
FDI from Luxemburg in 2002 418 This was particularly true in the case of Egypt, 
whose FDI inflows from Luxemburg were at the lowest level in 2002, while Britain 
remained the main European investor in the country between 1996 and 2005, as 
explained below in detail. 
The data presented above also shows that the EU's contribution to global 
investment was largely affected by the general trend and development in the global 
economic system during the period under consideration. This was particularly true 
during the 2001 global economic downturn, when global FDI outflows decreased by 
40.1 per cent from the previous year. According to the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), global FDI flows decreased from US$1,393 
billion in 2000 to US$833.8 billion in 2001, and were reduced by a further 21.9 per 
cent in 2002 to reach US$651.2 billion, the lowest level since 1997 419 This decline 
occurred at the same time as a decline in the global economy by almost half from 4.8 
per cent in 2000 to 2.4 per cent. This was due, in 2001, to slow down in the US 
economy, particularly after the September 11 terror attacks, which affected 
dramatically economic activity worldwide, particularly in the areas of tourism and 
418 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, p. 69. 
419 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, pp. 249-252. 
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foreign direct investment. 20 The decline in EU FDI flows was also caused by a lack 
of large scale M&As by MNCs from developed countries, particularly the US. This 
reduced the number of M&As - the main entry mode of FDI worldwide - and limited 
the movement of capital among developed countries, hence decreasing the overall 
sum of global FDI outflows. 
Data also shows that the decline in EU FDI flows was caused in part by the 
general decline in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 421 in the developed countries from 
3.9 per cent in 2000 to one per cent in 2001 and 1.8 per cent in 2002 and 2003. 
Although US GDP, which was worst hit by the September 11 event, recovered from 
0.3 per cent in 2001 to 2.4 per cent in 2002 and 2.6 per cent in 2003, the impact of 
global economic decline was much greater in the EU, which recorded a steady 
decline in GDP from 3.5 per cent in 2000 to 1.5 per cent in 2001,0.9 per cent in 
2002, and 0.5 per cent in 2003. As one of the most important destinations of EU's 
FDI outflows, Latin America was similarly affected by a sharp decrease in its GDP 
from 4 per cent in 2000 to 0.7 per cent in 2001, (minus) -0.1 per cent in 2002, and 
1.1 per cent in 2003 422 However, the relationship between a state's GDP and global 
economic decline was less clear in developing countries. For instance, East European 
and Middle Eastern countries were the least affected by the 2001-2003 global 
420 International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook, September 2003, pp. 173-181. 
421 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is defined as the total value of goods and services produced within 
a territory during a specified period, often annually, regardless of ownership. GDP defers from Gross 
National Product (GNP) in excluding inter-country income transfers, in effect attributing to a territory 
the product generated within it rather than the incomes received in it. Whereas nominal GDP refers to 
the total amount of money spent on GDP, real GDP adjusts this value for the effects of inflation in 
order to estimate the actual quantity of goods and services making up GDP. GDP measures only final 
products and services, that are consumed by their final user, and not used as input into other goods 
because measuring intermediate goods and services would lead to double counting of economic 
activity within a country. The most common approach to measuring GDP is the expenditure method, 
in which GDP = consumption + investment + net export (export - import = net export). Wikipedia, 
the free encyclopaedia. http: //en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Gross domestic product 
422 International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook, September 2003, p. 181. 
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economic slowdown due to an increase in oil prices and the introduction of large 
scale economic reforms and liberalisation programmes 423 
Moreover, the drop in EU FDI flows can also be attributed to the widespread 
insecurity and instability caused by the September 11 attacks on the US and the 
subsequent US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which created an environment not 
conducive to FDI. These developments were highly damaging for US and European 
companies operating in the Middle East and North African region, as well as the 
wider Muslim world. 24 However, most European companies found themselves in a 
better position than their US counterparts operating in the Middle East. Many 
managed to sustain their investment in the region, and some even took over 
investments left behind by American companies that quickly departed the region 
after September 11. Data also shows that the EU was a beneficiary of this event by 
receiving large sums of capital flows from the Arab and Muslim countries when anti- 
Americanism increased after September 11,2001. This can be seen in the record of 
FDI inflows into the EU, which increased from 46.7 per cent of the total global FDI 
423 Al-Abram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, Strategic Economic Trends Report 2003- 
2004, Cairo, January 2004, p. 24. 
424 Many foreign companies, particularly from the US, feared that they could be victims of revenge 
due to the rising anti-western sentiment among Arab and Muslim people after the US-led policy of 
`war on terror' and the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Most foreign companies feared that their 
employees could be taken hostages or their offices could have some physical damage. Some US firms 
withdrew from the Saudi market, while some others reduced their staff and operations to a minimum 
level. Ibid, pp. 27-28. In Egypt the negative impact of the war was much greater on the flow of new 
FDI into the country and lesser on those operating in the market. Yasser Sobhi, "Casualties of 
conflict"Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 630,20-26 March 2003. 
httD: Hweekly. ahram. orp-. eR/2003/630/ecl. htm ; Mona El-Fiqi, "Waiting for war", Al-Ahram Weekly, 
Issue No. 630,20-26 March 2003. http: //weekly. ahram. org. eg/2003/630/ecl. htm; Yasmine El- 
Rashidi, "Stocking up for war", Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 631,27 march -2 April 2003. 
http: //weekly. ahram. org. eg, /2003/631/ecl. htm; Sherine Nasr, "Just say no", Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue 
No. 633,10 16 April 2003. http: //weekly. ahram. ora. eg/2003/633/ecl. htm; and Wael Gamal, "Paying 
the war price", Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 627,27 February -5 March 2003. 
http: //weekly. ahram. org. ee/2003/627/ecl. htm. 
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inflows in 2001 to 57.5 per cent in 2002 due to diversion of huge capital investment 
from the oil-rich Arab Gulf states from the US to the EU 
425 
The completion of privatisation programmes was a key way of attracting foreign 
investment into developing countries. By the early twenty-first century, this factor 
affected directly the trends of FDI outflows from the EU. This mode of entry which 
was common during the 1990s proved less risky and cost efficient as the time and the 
amount of funds required to generate profits was much less than that required when 
investing in greenfield projects. Some European companies, therefore, adopted a 
`wait and see' strategy, hoping that new opportunities might emerge, while others 
diverted their investments to other potential markets such as those in East Asia and 
Eastern Europe. 
Despite this decline in investment, one can argue that EU global investment 
remained strong as the Community was the home to half of the world's 100 largest 
non-financial MNCs. This highlighted the extent to which the Community can 
influence the trends of FDI flows worldwide. In 2004, the EU was the home of 
36,003 parent MNCs and 199,303 foreign affiliates. 26 Denmark possessed the 
largest number of parent MNCs with 9,356 companies, followed by Germany, 
Sweden and the UK, which had 8,522,4,260 and 3,132 parent companies, 
respectively. France, the Netherlands and Italy had 1,922,1,608 and 1,017 parent 
companies, respectively, while Austria, Belgium and Luxemburg, Finland and Spain 
each had over 900 parent companies. 
27 There is no doubt that these corporations, 
425 Al-Abram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, Strategic Economic Trends Report 2003- 
2004, Cairo, January 2004, p. 29. 
426 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005, p. 264. 
427 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, p. 222. 
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and their affiliates operating abroad, can affect the level of economic development of 
states, if their FDI flows are to be reallocated or diverted to other economies. 
The geographical distribution of the EU's FDI flows worldwide also provides a 
better understanding of the position, and the role, of the EU in global economic 
development. According to the European Commission, EU capital flows were linked 
to the world's three major economic regions between 1995 and 2005. NAFTA was 
428 the first destination of EU FDI, followed by EFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN 
Surprisingly, the geographical proximity and historical ties of the Mediterranean 
region did not allow for a substantial proportion of European capital flows as this 
region lacked political and economic development. 
6.2. EU FDI in Partner Mediterranean Countries, 1996-2004 
The EU's Mediterranean partners received an average of 1.2 per cent of total EU 
outward flows between 1996 and 2004. This figure placed these partners far behind 
the Mercosur and East European countries, which took around 8 per cent and 7 per 
cent, respectively, of the EU's total FDI outflows during the same period. 29 While 
the total share of FDI flows from the EU into these regions fluctuated between 5 per 
cent and 12 per cent, the total share of the Mediterranean partners never exceeded 2 
per cent of EU outward flows and remained constantly low between 0.5 per cent and 
428 This order was defined according to the net assets invested by the EU in these economies. NAFTA 
comprises the US, Canada and Mexico. EFTA comprises of Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Iceland, and 
Norway. Mercosur comprises of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. ASEAN includes 
Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei and Vietnam. 
429 S. Quefelec, "European direct investment in the Mediterranean countries", European Communities, 
Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, Theme 2- 13/2003, p. 2. 
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1.8 per cent during the period under examination. 430 This highlights the absence of a 
radical transformation in the economic structure of the Mediterranean region and 
hence the inability of this region to absorb large levels of FDI inflows. Latin 
American countries, in contrast, increased their share of FDI inflows from 3.4 per 
cent in 1995 to 8.5 per cent, 10 per cent and 8 per cent in 1996,1998 and 2001, 
respectively. Similarly, East European countries demonstrated the capacity to absorb 
as much as 12 per cent of FDI in 1995, and even their declining share of FDI inflows 
from the EU of 8.5 per cent and 8 per cent in 1997 and 2001, respectively, was still 
far more than that of the Mediterranean countries. 
A comparison between the rise and fall of EU FDI flows into these 3 regions 
during the period under examination also shows that the rise of the Latin American 
share of EU outflows was matched by a relatively similar percentage decline in the 
East European share. However, no such match was recorded on the Mediterranean 
side. This analysis indicates that the EU diverted its capital flows between regions 
that achieved satisfactory records of political and economic development. This 
contrasted with the trade record of the EU because trade tends to be less sensitive 
than FDI to political and economic instability. For example, the MERCOSUR 
countries, which received the largest share of FDI inflows from the EU, after the US, 
conducted only 2 per cent of their trade with the EU, 431 while the Mediterranean 
partners who received the lowest share of FDI conducted 8 per cent of their total 
430 S. Quefelec, "European direct investment in the Mediterranean", Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, 
Theme 2- 13/2003, p. 2. 
43" For details on EU-Mercosur investment relations see Commission of European Communities, 
"European Union-Mercosur Relations", in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
Investment Policies in Latin America and Multilateral Rules on Investment, (Paris: OECD, 1997), pp. 
123-125. 
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trade with the EU in 2000 432 In terms of FDI, the relatively limited importance of 
the Mediterranean region to European investors reduced its total FDI stocks from the 
EU to as little as 1.5 per cent, compared with 7.5 per cent for the MERCOSUR and 5 
per cent for East Europe. 
Despite being one of the least attractive regions for the EU's FDI outflows, the 
Mediterranean partners of the Barcelona process experienced a substantial increase 
in their FDI inflows from the EU from E737 million in 1995 to E3.6 billion in 2003, 
with an intermediate peak of ¬5.2 billion in 2000. This rise was largely due to a 
general improvement in the global economy and renewed economic cooperation with 
the EU through the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean partnership. 
Table 6.3 shows that the distribution of FDI flows from the EU to the Maghreb 
and Mashreq countries changed from year to year, but that their shares grew broadly 
over the years, accounting for around E1.4 billion and ¬1.2 billion, respectively, in 
2003. It also shows that Morocco and Egypt received the largest share of EU 
outflows to the Maghreb and Mashreq countries. In the case of the Maghreb, 
Morocco's share increased from as little as 4.1 per cent in 2000 to as much as 45.3 
per cent of the total EU flows to region in 2003. Egypt's share also varied from as 
little as 5.6 per cent of the total EU FDI into the Mashreq in 1997 to as much as 76 
per cent in 2002. This table also shows that Turkey was the favoured destination of 
EU's flows amongst the 12 Mediterranean countries, taking an average of 40 per cent 
during that period and 82.5 per cent of the total EU's outflows to these countries in 
1999. Turkey was also the largest recipient of EU capital flows during the downturn 
432 S. Quefelec, "European direct investment in the Mediterranean countries", European Communities, 
Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, Theme 2- 13/2003, p. 2. 
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period (2001-2002) as its shares accounted for 71.6 per cent and 55.2 per cent of the 
total FDI inflows from the EU to the Mediterranean partners in 2001 and 2002, 
respectively. This level of concentration is due mainly to Turkey's 1996 Customs 
Union with the EU, as well as fiscal and microeconomic reforms, and the huge 
economic and political strides that the Turkish government made in preparation for 
full membership of the EU 433 Israel's FDI inflows from the EU were relatively small 
during this period due to the second Intifada in the Palestinian Territories. 
Table 6.3: EU-15 outward FDI flows and their percentage to 12-Mediterranean partner states (E million) 1995-2003. 
Region/state 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Maghreb 100 201 659 520 -15 872 778 706 1393 
Countries (13.6%) (22.7%) (46.4%) (22.6%) (-1.3%) (16.6%) (18.6%) (39.7%) (38.6%) 
Morocco 33 154 470 113 91 215 235 420 1635 
(4.5%) (17.4%) (33.1%) (4.9%) (8%) (4.1%) (5.6%) (23.6%) (45.3%) 
Mashreq 169 80 236 546 442 2312 600 1742 1252 
Countries (22.9%) (9%) (16.6%) (23.7%) (38.6%) (43.9%) (14.3%) (97.9%) (34.7%) 
Egypt 97 61 79 346 406 1387 566 1352 968 
(13.2%) (6.9%) (5.6%) (15%) (35.5%) (26.4%) (13.5%) (76%) (26.8%) 
Israel 118 199 100 225 -227 653 -329 63 74 
(16%) (22.5%) (7%) (9.8%) (-19.8%) (12.4%) (7.8%) (3.5%) (2.1%) 
Turkey 350 405 425 1013 944 1424 3013 983 917 
(47.5%) (45.6%) (29.9%) (44%) (82.5%) (27.1%) (71.6%) (55.2%) (25.4%) 
Cyprus' - - - - - - 170 504 -462 
(4.1%) (28.3%) (-12.8%) 
Malta* - - - - - - -38 -2218 (- 432 
(-0.9%) 124.6%) (12%) 
12-Med. 737 885 1420 2304 1144 5261 4194 1780 3606 
countries (100%) (100%) (1000/u) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
Source: Amo nacKer, turopean commission, tsrusseis, Apra 2UU). 
* Data for Cyprus and Malta are not available before 2001. 
433 Turkey's application for full membership in the EU was submitted as early as 1961 and was turned 
down several time on political, religious and cultural ground, The latest disappointed for Turkey was 
in May 2004 when the enlargement of the Union included ten new states but excluded Turkey, 
Romania and Bulgaria, with a promise for re-consideration of their applications in 2007. 
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Figures for the EU's FDI flows into Cyprus and Malta were not available prior to 
2001 and were largely influenced after that by preparation for EU membership. Data 
shows that these two countries saw large FDI withdrawals, most of them due to the 
re-organisation of companies based there. 434 The decline in EU investment after 
2001 resulted in large withdrawals of FDI mainly by the Netherlands and the UK 
from the Mashreq countries; most noticeable was Portugal's FDI withdrawal from 
Egypt in 2002,435 a year during which EU FDI stocks in the Mediterranean fell to the 
lowest level since the launch of the Barcelona process in 1995.436 The UK, the 
Netherlands and France remained the main European investors, and together owned 
almost half of the EU FDI stocks in the region. 
EU FDI stocks in Mediterranean partner countries increased almost continuously 
in the Barcelona era. In 2002, EU FDI stocks in the Maghreb, Mashreq and Turkey 
amounted to between ¬7.1 billion and E8 billion. 437 The Maghreb was the only area 
where the EU's FDI stocks showed uninterrupted growth, from E2 billion in 1995 to 
C2.5 billion, £3 billion, £4 billion, £4.5 billion, £5 billion, £6 billion, and £7.5 billion 
in 1996,1997,1998,1999,2000,2001 and 2002, respectively. The Mashreq also 
recorded steady growth until 1999, when its EU FDI stocks increased sharply from 
just over £3 billion to approximately £8 billion in 2000. This increase was due to the 
sudden rise in Egypt's FDI stocks from E2 billion in 1999 to ¬5.4 billion in 2000, but 
434 Arno Backer, "The impact of the Barcelona process on Trade and Foreign Direct Investment", 
paper presented at the Conference of Middle East and North African Economies: Past Perspectives 
and Future Challenges, Brussels, 2-4 June 2005, p. 25. 
ass Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, theme 2-12/2004, p. 3. 
436 Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, theme 2-12/2004, p. 2. 
437 Arno Backer, "The impact of the Barcelona process on trade and foreign direct investment", paper 
presented at the Conference of Middle East and North African Economies: Past Perspectives and 
Future Challenges, Brussels, 2-4 June 2005, p. 27. 
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this decreased to E4 billion in 2001, as indicated in table 6.4. This table also shows 
that most British and Dutch investments were made in Turkey and Egypt, while 
French firms tended to invest more in the Maghreb countries. German FDI stocks in 
the region were distributed almost evenly between the Maghreb and Mashreq 
countries, as both regions recorded ¬446 million and ¬426 million, respectively, in 
2001. Turkey was also the main market for German and Italian investors. 
Table 6.4: EU FDI stocks in Mediterranean partner countries by member states in 2001 (8 million) 
Country Extra-EU 12-MPC Maghreb Mashreq Morocco Egypt Israel Turkey 
UK 466998 5257 247 2426 100 2046 375 2076 
France 273242 4448 2102 1061 1488 614 224 996 
Netherlands 184907 3204 168 1308 35 925 
Germany 329698 2881 446 426 189 354 245 1404 
Italy 70228 2410 810 307 253 232 64 1065 
Denmark 39330 1122 - - 7 66 25 169 
Portugal 12423 1088 581 492 173 492 0 0 
Austria 19991 541 - 7 - - - 5 
Finland 18513 36 - - - - - -12 
Greece 6256 - 1 54 0 9 0 16 
Ireland 17718 - - - - - - 0 
EU-15 1777591 26495 5974 6343 2611 4025 1631 7062 
Source: hurostat, statistics in Locus, tneme z, 1212UU4. 
Despite the small decrease in 2001, the Mashreq's share of the EU's FDI stocks 
remained above 67 billion in 2002. This was due to the general surge of extra-EU 
FDI, and not necessarily due to the increased attractiveness of the Mediterranean to 
foreign investors. 38 In 2002, Egypt accounted for nearly half of the EU FDI stocks 
in the Mashreq region, indicating that FDI flows and stocks in the Mediterranean 
438 Ibid, p. 27. 
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region depended on political stability and a willingness to embark on economic 
reforms. 
6.3. EU FDI Flows into Egypt, 1996-2004 
During the Barcelona era, Egypt has witnessed some major developments that have 
led to an increase in global FDI inflows into the country. Chief amongst these has 
been the promulgation of Law 8 of 1997, which offers tremendous incentives and 
guarantees for investment and allows foreign investors 100 per cent ownership of 
firms. This law has added significantly to the enhanced credibility of Egypt after its 
successful implementation of the 1991 Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (ERSAP) and the initiation of the Euro-Egyptian Partnership under the 
umbrella of the Barcelona process of 1995. The impact of these developments led to 
a parallel increase in the country's GDP, which steadily increased from 2.9 per cent 
in 1993 to 6 per cent in 1999, and in global FDI inflows into the country, at least 
until the general decline in the global economy of 2001, as table 6.5 shows. 
Egypt has been a major destination for EU outward flows into the Mediterranean 
region. This was largely reflected in Egypt's record of FDI inflows and stocks 
between 1996 and 2004, during which the 15 EU member states invested around 
US$2.5 billion. The growth of EU direct investment into Egypt has been closely 
linked to the country's economic growth, the macroeconomic stability, and extensive 
economic liberalisation, particularly privatisation that was the main entry mode of 
FDI into the country. It is also linked to the rise and fall in total EU outward flows. 
This was apparent in the overall growth of FDI inflows from the EU between 1996 
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and 2000, and the sharp decrease in these flows after that time in line with the 
general slowdown in global FDI flows into the Mediterranean region. 
Table 6.5: Total FDI inflows in Mediterranean countries 1996-2004 (US$ million). 
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Algeria 270 260 501 507 438 1196 1065 634 882 
Egypt 636 887 1076 1065 1235 510 647 237 1253 
Jordan 16 361 310 158 787 100 64 424 620 
Lebanon 80 150 200 250 298 249 257 358 288 
Morocco 357 1188 417 850 215 2825 481 2314 853 
Palestine 4 7 218 189 62 20 -5 - - 
Syria 89 80 82 263 270 110 1030 1084 1206 
Tunisia 351 365 668 368 779 486 821 584 639 
Cyprus 54 491 264 685 804 652 1057 1011 1146 
Israel 1357 1950 1887 3111 5011 3549 1770 3880 1619 
Malta 277 81 267 822 622 281 -426 294 421 
Turkey 722 805 940 783 982 3266 1063 1753 2733 
Total 4213 6625 6830 9051 11503 13244 7824 12573 11660 
source: uivt, irw, woria investment xepons huud, Luus, /UV4 6L . M. ). 
Table 6.5 also shows that Egypt attracted the largest share of the US$83.5 billion 
global FDI inflows into the Mediterranean region between 1996 and 2004. Until 
2000, Egypt was only second to Israel, most of whose FDI inflows came from the 
US. However, Egypt's share of the EU's outward flows to this region was behind 
Turkey, Morocco and Israel during the second half of the 1990s. In 1999, Egypt 
received about 17 per cent of European FDI outflows to the region. By 2000 it 
managed to top the list as the main recipient of EU FDI flows with ¬1157 million, a 
position that was overtaken by Turkey in 2001.439 Figure 6.2 not only confirms this 
but also shows a sudden decline in European direct investment, which decreased by 
over 90 per cent in that year. This dramatic decline affected considerably the overall 
growth of global FDI inflows into the country. 
439 S. Quefelec, "The Egyptian Economy and Relations with EU-15", Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, 
General Statistics, Theme 1-9/2002, p. 2. 
222 










Q Eg\ pt   Morocco Q Israel QI urke} 
Source: Quetclec, S., European Communities, 2003. 
This decrease was apparently the outcome of the re-allocation of European 
investment from Egypt and Israel to Turkey and Morocco. ý° I' l)l Ilows tiom the IU 
to Turkey increased sharply from ¬751 million in 2000 to ¬1271 million in 2001. 
Morocco's share also increased from as little as ¬8 million in 1999 to ¬196 million in 
2000 and ¬212 million in 2001. Although this fall in Egypt's total FDI inflows 
occurred at the time of the 2001 recession in the global economy, which affected 
both the EU and Egypt, European investors showed a lack of' commitment to long 
term investment. This is evident when one measures the percentage of movement of 
FDI flows among the major recipients of EU FDI flows into the Mediterranean. The 
percentage of decline in EU FDI flows into Egypt and other Mediterranean partners 
was closely matched by an increase in EU FDI flows into other parts of the world. 
particularly the former Soviet sphere, which began its economic reforms and 
privatisation programmes at the same time. 441 It was also reported that the economic 
development achieved by East and Central European countries attracted as much as 
18 per cent of the total EU outward flows in 2002, up from only 7 per cent the 
440 S. Quefelec, "European Direct Investment in The Mediterranean Countries", Eurasia!, Statistics in 
Focus, Economy and Finance, Theme 2-13/2003, p. 1. 
441 S. Quefelec, Statistics in Focus, theme 2-12/2004, pp. 2-3. 
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1996 1997 1998 1 ')9') 2000 2001 
previous year. 442 This diversion of FDI flows affected considerably the position of 
European FDI stocks in Egypt and impacted on the country's general economic 
growth, despite the fact that FDI represented a small share of the country's overall 
GDP. 
6.4. Static Distribution of EU FDI Flows into Egypt, 1996-2004 
Data shows that the 15-EU member states invested over US$2.5 billion in Egypt, of 
which US$1.6 billion was invested in the inland443 and US$909 million in the free 
zones between 1996 and 2004 444 The contribution of each member state to this 
varied considerably, with countries such as the UK contributing as much as 33.5 per 
cent of the total EU FDI flows into the country while other members such as Finland 
contributing as little as 0.003 per cent. This unevenness created a hierarchical order 
of the 15 member states, of which the UK occupied the top position with the highest 
percentage of FDI flows, followed by a group of countries such as the Netherlands, 
France, Germany and Italy, whose contributions were relatively similar. The majority 
of the member states had FDI flows well below US$100 million over the nine-year 
period under examination. The most visible changes in Egypt's FDI inflows during 
the Barcelona era were the emergence of the Republic of Ireland as a new investor 
and the dramatic decline in Luxemburg's position, whose investment was of 
considerable importance to the country prior to the 1995 Barcelona process. 
442 Ibid, p. 2. 
443 Inland means the whole country, accept public and private free zones. 
444 These figures for the 15 EU member states and do not include any FDI flows from the ten new 
member states accessed the Community in May 2004. 
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Table 6.6 shows that the UK was the only EU country that recorded FDI flows 
into Egypt above US$840 million between 1996 and 2004. The Netherlands ranked 
second with FDI flows just over US$505 million, followed by Spain with over 
US$329 million in FDI inflows. The investments of traditional European investors 
such as France, Germany, Italy and Belgium ranged from US$100 million to US$200 
million, while those of Luxemburg and Denmark occupied a middle place between 
US$50 million and US$100 million. Ireland and Sweden invested between US$20 
million and US$50 million. Greece was the only country to invest between US$10 
million and US$20 million, with an investment worth US$14 million. FDI flows 
from Austria, Portugal and Finland were below US$10 million. 
Table 6.6: EU FDI into Egypt by member states 1996-2004 (US$ thousand) 
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004' Total 
Austria 1445 177 118 147 1056 5108 0 644 16 8711 
Belgium 104661 1268 2588 0 4861 0 348 1475 276 115477 
Denmark 0 31998 5000 25924 439 300 0 217 6011 69889 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 87 0 0 87 
France 295 41309 49535 60264 21933 1759 457 3286 2240 181078 
Germany 14540 46741 16176 11026 13939 4747 2457 5186 3710 118522 
Greece 2301 3687 0 1950 2878 1618 1739 34 32 14239 
Ireland 59 15975 118 25572 0 964 0 1068 0 43756 
Italy 1298 8226 110141 15599 10156 7566 4396 14639 6810 178831 
Luxemburg 17699 0 48800 0 10139 0 0 0 0 76638 
Netherlands 10767 16937 272988 5357 42889 458 142543 7644 5747 505330 
Portugal 206 0 0 0 28 0 1630 136 0 2000 
Spain 236 1681 918 88 1667 306193 17674 34 1038 329529 
Sweden 0 147 7500 400 5239 0 10809 0 227 24322 
UK 153864 89598 160006 88628 132778 60159 135848 13285 6699 840865 
Total 307371 257744 673888 234955 248002 388872 317988 47648 32806 2509274 
Source: GAFI, Egypt, December 2004. 
* Figures calculated until 30/11/2004 
With the exception of Finland, most EU member states showed a degree of 
consistency in their FDI outflows into Egypt. The pattern of these FDI flows, 
however, was characterized more by fluctuation than by steady growth. This was 
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probably due to the availability of potential opportunities for investment in joint 
ventures at particular times rather than an interest in the economy as a whole. The 
concentration of FDI flows in some economic sectors more than others was due to 
the period of restructuring and modernising in some sectors, in a way that created 
more room for foreign companies to participate in their activities. The sharp degree 
of fluctuation was most noticeable in FDI flows from Belgium, which recorded as 
high as US$104.6 million in 1996, followed by a sharp reduction as indicated in the 
table above. 
In the case of Luxemburg, all its FDI flows were made in three separate years 
(1996,1998 and 2000) with no investments recorded in any of the remaining six 
years. Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain exhibited a different pattern, in which 
FDI flows were made in one-off investments between 1996 and 2004. Of the 
US$115.5 million worth of investment by Belgium, US$105 million was made in 
1996, while the remaining US$10 million was invested over a period of eight years. 
Almost half of the Netherlands FDI flows into Egypt were made in a single 
investment in 1998, while 92 per cent of Spain's FDI flows were invested in 2001. 
This illustrates the ill-defined pattern of investment exhibited by most EU member 
states in Egypt during the Barcelona era. 
British FDI flows into Egypt constituted almost one third of total flows made by 
EU member states between 1996 and 2004. Funds were concentrated in projects 
located in the inland with a total of US$568.5 million, while US$272.3 million was 
invested in the free zones. Data shows that investments in the inland declined over 
the nine-year period under examination, from US$153.8 million in 1996 to US$6.7 
226 
million in 2004. Figure 6.3 shows that this decline was also accompanied by 
fluctuations. but these were much smaller than in the case of the Netherlands and 
Spain. Rather. the UK remained the primary European investor in Egypt during this 
entire period. 











6- UK ----- The Netherlands Spain 
The Netherlands was the second largest ELI investor into Egypt, with total 
investments worth US$505.3 million between 1996 and 2004. Almost 53 per cent of' 
this was invested in 1998, when US$239.8 million was invested in Vodafonc Egypt. 
This dropped sharply in the following eight years, with an intermediate peak of' 
US$142.5 million in 2002. Dutch companies made two large investments in the free 
zones worth US$159 million. The first was made by the Dutch Middle Fast Gas Pipe 
with US$25 million in the Egyptian company East Mediterranean Sea Gas in 2000, 
creating 500 jobs for Egyptian workers. The second investment was made by the ENI 
International BV in the UGDC (the Egyptian Gas Company in the Port Said free 
zone) with US$134 million. creating a further 220 jobs in 2002.44` 
`'``s Data collected by the author from GAFI, Egypt, 2005. 
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Spain occupied third place among EU investors, behind the UK and the 
Netherlands, with a single investment in 2001, when the UNION FINOSA GAS 
company invested US$300 million in Segas Spanish Egyptian Gas, located in 
Damietta. 446 This was the largest single investment by any European company and 
generated employment for 3,000 Egyptian workers. 47 Apart from this investment, 
total Spanish FDI flows into Egypt were around US$29 million, of which US$17.3 
million was invested in the chemical industry in 2002 and US$6.6 million in 
financial services in 2001. Only 5 of the 15 Egyptian companies that received 
Spanish capital got over US$0.5 million. For instance, the second largest investment 
in the free zones made by the Hermomar 2000 Limited in the Union for Laser 
Company in 2004 was nearly US$300,000, highlighting the limited value of most of 
the Spanish investments. 
Between 1996 and 2004, French FDI flows accounted for US$181 million, of 
which US$157.5 million was invested in the inland and the remainder in the free 
zones. These flows grew steadily between 1996 and 1999, but decreased dramatically 
over the following five years. They increased from US$300,000 in 1996 to US$41.3 
million, US$49.5 million and US$60.3 million in 1997,1998 and 1999, respectively. 
French FDI flows were of significant importance during that period as US$94 
million was invested in Egypt's infrastructure between 1998 and 1999. This 
contributed to a general improvement in the country's main infrastructural facilities, 
hence attracting more FDI. Between 1997 and 2000, French firms invested US$13 
million in metals in 1997, US$11.3 million in the food industry in 1998, and 
US$14.3 million in chemicals in 2000. Only two US$1 million investments were 
446 Union Finosa Gas works in the energy sector and specialises in natural gas, particularly the 
licquidisation of gas. 
'4 1GAFI, Egypt, 2005. 
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made in financial services and tourism, while the majority of FDI flows, which 
extended across several economic sectors, were minor investments and hence had 
little impact in terms of employment and economic development. 









--4 - France -+ - Germany Belgium -x Italy 
Italy exhibited a different pattern from France, Germany and Belgium. Its FDI 
flows accounted for US$178 million, of which US$121.6 million was invested in the 
inland and the remainder in the free zones. Figure 6.4 shows that US$110.1 million 
was invested in 1998, while investments in infrastructure, engineering and the 
chemicals industry over subsequent years put Italian investment ahead of France, 
Germany and the Netherlands between 2001 and 2004, and the UK between 2002 
and 2004.448 With the exception of US$46.8 million invested in infrastructure in 
1998, Italian capital flows grew at an annual average of US$8.2 million between 
1996 and 2004. 
Germany invested US$118.5 million in Egypt, of which US$5.5 million was 
invested in the free zones and the remainder in the inland between 1996 and 2004. 
448 In 2004, Italian companies in the area of engineering showed some interest in the Egyptian market. 
In particular IT companies aim also to serve foreign companies working the market and the wider 
Middle East. Eman Youssef, "Italian IT looks south", 41-Ahrain Week/_v, Issue 687,22-28 April 2004. 
httý, 'weekly. ahram. org. ep%2004! 687! ec3. htm. 
229 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
As will be explained below, 68 per cent of total German FDI flows were invested in 
tourism. The majority of investments were made in 1997. In 1997, Germany invested 
US$28.4 million in agriculture, while two other investments were made in chemicals 
and tourism with US$5 million and US$4 million, respectively. Between 1998 and 
2000, German FDI flows grew on average by US$12.2 million per annum, but 
declined dramatically to between US$2 million and US$5 million over the following 
four years. During this period, only one investment was made with a value over 
US$2 million, and six investments were worth over US$1 million. While German 
investment in BMW's new production facility, established by Bavaria Auto Trading 
(a joint venture between investors from the Gulf, Egypt and Germany) included 
factory investment of around US$60 million 449 According to the president of the 
Egyptian-German Business Council, this small FDI contribution was due to a lack of 
trust on the German side, and the failure of institutions such as the Egyptian 
Businessman's Association and the German-Arab Chamber of Industry and 
Commerce to develop ties 450 
During the same period, Belgium invested US$115.4 million. Although this 
investment was eleven times higher than that of Austria, Belgium was a small player 
in terms of constant growth as 90.6 per cent of its total FDI took place in the 
construction materials industries in 1996. Denmark invested US$69.9 million during 
the nine years under examination. Figure 6.5 shows that Denmark invested US$32 
million in the free zones in 1997, which, together with a further US$5 million in 
449 Wolfgang Clement, German Federal Minister of Economic and Labour, Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue 
691,20-26 May 2004, http: //weekly. ahram. org. eg/2004/691/ec6. htm 
450 This lack of trust was apparent in the boycott of all major German companies operating in Egypt to 
an Egyptian-German Business Council meeting in November 2004 to discuss means of developing 
more economic cooperation between German and Egyptian businessmen. Salem Mashhour, President 
of the Egyptian-German Business Council, in Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 719,2-8 December 2004. 
http: //weekly. ahram. org. ew2004/719/ec3. htm 
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1998. accounted for 52.9 per cent of the total Danish FDI flows into the country. 
Although investment in the inland was less than that in the free zones, Danish 
companies invested US$23 million in construction materials and around US$3 








Figure 6.5: Danish. Luxemburg and Irish FDI flows into Fgy pt 1996-2004 
Luxemburg. which was the world's largest investor (US$126 billion) and FD1 
recipient (US$154 billion) in 2002, did not make any investment in Egypt in that 
year. 45' Figure 6.5 shows that of US$76.6 million invested by Luxemburg between 
1996 and 2004, US$48.8 million was invested in the free zones in 1998, US$17.7 
million was invested in the investment sector in 1996 and US$10.2 million was 
invested in the food industry in 2000. `ß'Z This insignificant contribution was due to 
the nature of Luxemburg's economy, which was closely linked to the US economy, 
and depended on large cross-border M&As. Moreover, most of Luxemburg's l' UI 
flows were concentrated in manufacturing and services, and these sectors were far 
less developed in Egypt than in industrial countries. 
451 UNCTAD. World Investment Report 2003, p. 69. 
452 GAFI, Egypt, 2005. 
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The emergence of Ireland as an investor was a major development in EU FDI 
flows into Egypt during the Barcelona era. Ireland, which made its first investment 
with US$250.000 in 1994, invested US$43.7 million between 1996 and 2004, 
placing it ahead of Austria, Greece. Portugal, Sweden and Finland. Ireland exhibited 
similar investment pattern to most EU member states, by investing 92.7 per cent of 
its total FDI flows in two large investments, amounting to US$15 million and 
US$25.5 million in 1997 and 1999. respectively. Such large investments disappeared 
in the following years as total Irish FDI flows accounted for just over US$2 million 
between 2000 and 2004. 
FDI flows from the EU's Scandinavian countries varied considerably in terms of 
value and importance. Data shows that Sweden, with its US$24.3 million, was tar 
head of Finland which invested only US$87,000 between 1996 and 2004. Almost all 
Swedish FDI flows were made in 3 large investments, of which US$10.8 million was 
invested in the free zones in 2002. Two large investments were made in the inland 
with US$13.3 million. of which US$7.5 million and US$5.4 million invested in 1998 
and 2000, respectively. 
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Sweden -ý-- Greece Austria Fbrtugal -*-- Finland 
Between 1996 and 2004, Greek investment in Egypt was around US$14.2 
million, of which US$2 million was invested in the free zones and US$11.6 million 
in the inland. Almost half of this latter amount was invested in the food industry and 
in engineering between 1996 and 1997. Apart from one investment in the metals 
sector worth nearly US$3 million in 2000, Greek FDI flows were small. However, 
these flows were higher than those made by Portugal, which contributed less than 
US$2 million over the nine years in question. Some US$1.6 million of this sum was 
invested in the construction materials industries in 2002. During this period, Austria 
invested US$9 million, of which US$5.4 million was invested in chemicals in 2001. 
6.5. Sectoral Distribution of EU FDI Flows into Egypt, 1996-2004 
The distribution of European FDI flows across Egypt's main economic sectors was 
generally tied to the conditions of these sectors, their strategic importance to the 
national economy, and their attractiveness to foreign companies. This distribution, 
which is illustrated in figure 6.7, also highlighted the relative degree of development 
undertaken in particular industries, the potential for higher growth and profitability, 
and the comparative advantage that some Egyptian industries enjoyed compared to 
their counterparts in the Mediterranean region. These factors determine, to a large 
extent, the degree of concentration of capital and hence explain the level of the 
unevenness in the distribution of European capital flows into Egypt's economic 
sectors between 1996 and 2004. 
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The above figures show a great disparity between the share of' the industrial 
sector. which received as much as 64 per cent of E1I FDI flows. and the shares of' 
agriculture and finance. which together attracted as little as 4 per cent between 1996 
and 2004. Industry-'s large share is due to huge investments in the area of gas, which 
attracted around US$568 million from Spain, the UK and the Netherlands between 
2001 and 2004. Most investments are related to natural gas projects such as pipelines 
and gas liquid located in the free zones. The industrial sector, which received around 
USSI. 5 billion of EU FDI flows, has been the most favoured sector for investment 
between 1996 and 2004, while infrastructure attracted US$530.4 million, 22 per cent 
of FDI flows from the EU. Most of this investment was made in the areas of 
telecommunication, communications, power stations and water. Tourism received 
around USS 133.4 million, accounting for 6 per cent of EU FIN flows into the 
country between 1996 and 2004, while the services sector took 4 per cent (US$103.2 
million) during the same period. 
This data indicates that agriculture (which took only US$57 million), despite 
being one of Egypt*s main economic sectors in terms of employment and 
contributions to the country's Gross National Product (GNP), is no longer viewed as 
Tourism Agriculture 
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an attractive sector by European investors. This is also true of the financial sector, 
often regarded as the engine for investment, which attracted as little as US$44 
million, accounting for 2 per cent between 1996 and 2004. The modest share of 
tourism highlights both the potential for growth and the fact that this sector is 
considerably affected by the security and political stability of the country. It also 
shows that the services sector is still underdeveloped. and thus remained less 
attractive to European investors due to the lack of supporting services to main 
industries and the poor quality of services offered by local companies in terms of' 
time delivery and quality. 










Figure 6.8 shows that of the US$1.5 billion invested in the manufacturing sector, 
US$280.4 million. US$366 million and US$304.5 million were invested in 1996, 
2001 and 2002, respectively. This 1996 investment was due to the introduction of a 
large number of state-owned companies for privatisation. Though this decreased 
sharply to US$71.7 million in the following year, the level of investments which 
reached US$157 million and US$168.3 million in 1998 and 2000, respectively, was 
due to an acceleration in privatisation. The record investment in 2001 and 2002 was 
due to huge investments in natural gas related projects. In 2001, Spain invested 
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US$300 million in a chemical plant for gas liquidisation, while two British and 
Dutch firms invested equally US$268 million in an engineering project in natural 
gas. With the exception of these three large investments, EU FDI flows into industry 
stood at US$66 million in 2001 and grew on average by US$35 million per year 
between 2003 and 2004. 










The engineering industry took US$481 million, 32 per cent of FU F DI into 
manufacturing between 1996 and 2004. Almost three quarters of this investment was 
made by two British firms and a Dutch company in the area of natural gas. In 2000, 
East Mediterranean Gas Pipeline of Britain invested US$94 million in Fast 
Mediterranean Gas, which is located in the Private Port Said Free Zone. Two years 
later, BP Global Investment of Britain and ENI International BV of the Netherlands 
each invested US$134 million in UGDC, which is also located in the Private Port 
Said Free Zone. Firms from other EU member states invested US$16.2 million in the 
free zones. The engineering sector had some 19 joint ventures established in the 
inland with US$102.6 million from the EU, 50 per cent of which was made by 
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British companies. The majority of these investments were made in the automobile 
industry, communications, gas energy, air-conditioning and computer programming. 
This industry received US$24.7 million in 1996 and US$40.2 million in 2000. 
Italian, German and Dutch companies were the largest EU investors in engineering, 
and invested US$15.4 million, US$11.7 million and US$10.3 million, respectively, 
between 1996 and 2004. 
The chemical industry received US$448.3 million, 29 per cent of total EU FDI in 
manufacturing between 1996 and 2004. Two thirds of this investment was made in a 
chemical plant for gas liquidisation, in which Spain's Union Finosa Gas invested 
US$300 million in Segas Spanish Egyptian Gas in 2001. Of the remaining US$148.3 
million of EU FDI in this industry, around US$123.9 million was invested inland, 
and US$24.4 million in the free zones. Most of these funds came from British, 
Dutch, Italian, French, Spanish and German companies, which invested US$42.9 
million, US$23.7 million, US$20.3 million, US$18.4 million, US$17.5 million and 
US$12.8 million, respectively, between 1996 and 2004. Most of these investments 
were made in companies specialising in environmental services, fertilizers, glass 
manufacturing, coating, fibres, glue, plastics, leather, industrial cleaning, liquid gas, 
paper and packaging materials. 
Data shows that the chemical industry flourished after 1996 due to a rising 
interest in the availability of natural and raw materials, highlighting the fact that 
Egypt was still viewed as a resource-seeking market. For instance, 30 of the 34 
Italian-Egyptian companies operating in this industry were established between 1996 
and 2004. Of the 13 Dutch joint ventures 10 were created after 1996, with almost 50 
per cent of their investments made by the Future Pipes International, which invested 
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US$11.8 million in 1997. Also, 10 of the 12 French joint ventures were established 
after 1996, including one large investment by the CFN Investment of US$11.7 
million in the IPM (International Paper Manufacturing company), which created 600 
jobs. German FDI into the chemical industry took place earlier than that of Italy and 
France, as only 16 of the 25 joint ventures were established between 1997 and 2004. 
But these investments tended to be of small value. The largest German investment in 
this industry of US$2.9 million was made by the Finer Plastics in the NAT Pack 
(packaging company) in 1997. Further EU investments in chemicals are unlikely to 
increase substantially as the government is still trying to deal with the major 
obstacles of liberalisation in pricing, distribution and exports 453 Structural 
developments are also slow due to technical problems at factories and because new 
chemical plants take up to 30 months to begin production. The share of foreign 
investment in this industry will remain small as long as market mechanisms and the 
private sector remain of secondary importance. 
Construction materials absorbed US$320.3 million, accounting for 20 per cent of 
the total EU FDI flows to industry between 1996 and 2004. This relatively high share 
was due to the boom in Egypt's construction sector during the 1990s. As most actual 
building work was carried out by local companies, European investors concentrated 
their investments in construction materials, a sector that flourished between 1996 and 
2001. But the 2001 economic slowdown affected considerably FDI in this industry, 
leading to a sharp decline in the following three years 454 Britain, Belgium and 
Denmark were the main investors, investing US$186.3 million, US$104.6 million, 
US$23 million, respectively, between 1996 and 2004. 
ass Mahmoud Mohieldin, Egypt's Investment Minister, Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 716,11-17 
November 2004. http: //weekly. ahram. org. eg/2004/716/ec3. htm 
454 S. Quefelec, "The Egyptian economy and relations with EU-15", Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, 
Theme 1- 9/2002, p. 2. 
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Meanwhile, the metals industry received US$117.6 million, accounting for 7 per 
cent of total EU FDI in manufacturing. Almost 81 per cent of this investment was 
made by 2 companies from Luxemburg and Italy, which invested US$48.7 million 
and US$46.1 million in Elaz Heavy Industries, which is located in Private Suez Free 
Zone, in 1998. The remaining US$22.8 million was invested in inland projects. The 
food processing industry attracted US$85.8 million, 5 per cent of EU FDI in 
manufacturing. This investment grew at a steadily increasing rate from US$2.9 
million in 1996 to US$40 million in 1999. In 1999 and 2001, there were no 
investments in this industry other than those made by Britain. France and Luxemburg 
were the main investors, with FDI accounting for over US$10 million, while Dutch 
and Italian investment stood at US$7.7 million and US$5.5 million, respectively. 
German investors were among the least interested in the food industry as their total 
investments accounted for less than US$0.5 million over the period under 
examination. This level of investment was incompatible with the comparative 
advantage that the food processing industry holds, especially the high quality and 
low-price agricultural output of the country. It was also nominal in comparison with 
the expansion of land reclamation which added around 1,000 hectares of vegetable 
and fruit cultivation over the past decade, hence increasing the supply of cost- 
competitive agriculture inputs to this industry. 455 
The wood working, pharmaceutical, textiles and mining industry received around 
US$51.5 million, US$42 million, US$23.5 million and US$5.9 million, respectively, 
between 1996 and 2004. The lack of investment in these industries was due to 
ass Azza El-Shinnawy & Heba Handousa. "Egyptian Case Studies" in Saul Estrin & Klaus Meyer 
(eds. ) Investment Strategies in Emerging Markets, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004), p. 113. 
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concerns about fundamental issues challenging their development, not least the 
weakness of the legal system and intellectual property rights, particularly in relation 
to pharmaceuticals. Total EU investment in the pharmaceutical industry over this 
nine-year period was less than the single investment made by Germany in 1973. The 
textiles industry also underperformed because of the poor condition of state-owned 
companies and their distorted financial records and debts, which obstructed their sale 
to European investors. This lack of investment in textiles was reflected in the 
nominal share of German imports of textiles from Egypt, which was estimated at E72 
million, accounting for only 0.25 per cent of the ¬29 billion of total German imports 
of textiles in 2002.4'6 Though Egypt produces 30 per cent of Africa's high-quality 
cotton, its small share of the European market indicates both the lack of investment 
and the underdeveloped condition of the textiles industry. The Italians were the most 
active in this industry, though their total investments did not exceed U S$1.5 million 
between 1996 and 2004, a fact that highlights the insignificant contribution of FU 
FDI to this sector. 












456 Sherine Nasr. "See You on the Autobahn", Al-Ahram Week/i", Issue No. 719,2-8 December 2004. 
http:. ''ý, w'eekly. ahram. orý_,. ee'2004/7191ec3. htm 
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Infrastructure was the second largest recipient of F1)I flows from the EU, with a 
total of US$530.4 million, of which US$515.8 million was invested in the inland and 
UD$14.5 million in the free zones between 1996 and 2004. Almost 84 per cent of 
total investment in this sector was made in 1998 by Dutch, British, Italian, French, 
Irish and German companies, which invested US$250 million, US$99 million, 
US$46.8 million. US$35 million, US$14.5 million and US$3.5 million, respectively. 
The Dutch investment of US$239 million in Vodafone Fgypt highlighted the appeal 
of large investments targeted at strategic sectors such as telecommunications that 
guaranteed a monopoly position in the market and hence control over price and 
profit. This substantial investment contributed to an improvement in some 
infrastructural facilities, particularly telecommunications. I lowever, the level of 
investment made in 1998 was not repeated in the following years. Apart from a 
minor investment in 2001, figure 6.9 shows that no investment was made in 
infrastructure between 2000 and 2004. 










The potential for expansion allowed tourism to occupy the third place amongst 
Egypt's main economic sectors, with US$133.4 million of FDl flows from the EU 
between 1996 and 2004. Figure 6.10 shows that FDI inflows from the EU reached 
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their height in 1997 with US$42.6 million, but this decreased by almost half in the 
following year as a result of the Luxor massacre on 17 November 1997, in which 58 
foreign tourists were killed by Islamist extremists. The impact of this incident was 
clearly reflected in the level of growth in foreign investment in an industry that is 
highly sensitive to security and political stability. Despite its steady decline between 
1999 and 2001. FDI flows from the EU continued to average US$15 million per 
annum. European investment in tourism reached its lowest rate in 2003 with only 
US$300.000 but the potential for growth and profitability allowed 1ör a last recovery 
in 2004, when FDI flows increased to US$13 million. The Sharm FI-Sheikh bombing 
of July 2005, which resulted in the death of 88 people and the destruction of the 
Ghazala Hotel. marked another setback for this industry, and future investment in 
tourism will remain subject to the country's internal security, as well as the political 
stability of Egypt and the Middle East region as a whole .47 Figure 6.10a shows that 
the UK was the major investor in tourism, followed by Germany, Italy and France. 








*Full names of the countries are listed in abbreviations. 
'" Sarah El Deeb, Associated Press, "Egypt hunts for attackers who killed 88" 24/7/2005. See 
http: '/news. yahoo. cominews? tmpl=storv&u=! ap120050724/ap_on re mi ea/c, -, pt re 
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The distribution of EU FDI flows into the economy also highlights that the 
services sector was underdeveloped as it attracted only US$103.2 million, accounting 
for 4 per cent the total FDI flows made by the EU. Almost US$95.8 million of this 
investment was made inland, while US$7.5 million was invested in the Free /. ones. 
Figure 6.11 shows that most of that investment was made in petroleum and linancial 
services. It also highlights that public services, such as hospitals, suflered from a lack 
of investment and that the business community had no intention in investing in 
support services such as consultancy. 








The agricultural and the financial sectors were the least attractive to European 
investors between 1996 and 2004. The agricultural sector received a total of US$57 
million, of which US$14.7 million was invested in the free zones. Almost US$42.7 
million investment from eight EU countries was made in the inland, of which 76.6 
per cent was invested by Germany. Agriculture actually received no investment from 
any EU member states in 1996, but the following year saw the largest investment in 
this sector, when Germany invested US$28.6 million. This was followed by US$4 
million in 1998 and 2000, and around USSI. 5 million in 1999 and 2004. Although 
the level of investment was very poor between 2001 and 2003, this period saw a 
steady increase from US$300,000 and US$400,000 to US$600,000 in 2003. 
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Compared to the size and strategic importance of agriculture to the national 
economy, this sector received no significant investment from the major I? U countries, 
with France, Britain. Italy, Spain and the Netherlands accounting Im 6.5 per cent 
(US$2.8 million); 5.6 per cent (US$2.4 million); 4.4 per cent (US$1.8 million); and 3 
per cent (US$1.3 million), respectively, of total FDl flows to agriculture between 
1997 and 2004. 









Figure 6.12 also shows the limited appeal ofthe financial sector, which received 
a total of US$43.9 million, of which US$18.7 million and US$25.1 million were 
invested by Britain, Luxemburg and Sweden (in the investment sector) in 1996 and 
1997, respectively. GAFI data indicates that the banking sector did not receive any 
investment at all from the EU member states during this nine-year period because, as 
one financial expert explained, most Egyptian banks are every small and 
undercapitalised compared to regional and international . 
458 The Governor 
of the Central Bank of Egypt also confirmed that the inefficient, artificially protected 
and peculiar conditions characterised more than 60 financial institutions, of which 
's. Nabil Hashaad, a financial expert, AJ-. Ihram Weekly, Issue 709,23-29 September 2004. 
http: '/weekly. ahrain. org. ee'2004/709, 'ec2. htm 
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state-owned banks accounted for 56 per cent of total assets in the banking system, 
while joint ventures accounted for 38 per cent and foreign banks for 6 per cent 
459 
Even the impact of Banking Law 88 of 2003, which required all banks to increase 
their paid-in capital to EGP500 million by 14 July 2005 in an attempt to consolidate 
the sector into 25 stable financial institutions, did not materialise until August 2005, 
when France's second biggest bank, the Societe Generale, acquired 69.7 per cent of 
the total equity of the Misr International Bank (MlBank), giving it overall control of 
one of Egypt's big banks 460 This US$298.8 million deal was not only the first to 
occur over the past twenty five years, but also marked the beginning of a new wave 
of foreign involvement in the banking sector which is expected to increase with the 
acceleration of privatisation during the second half of this decade. 
Analysis of the nature, and main characteristics, of the EU's FDI outflows into 
Egypt over the past ten years highlights an unhealthy pattern, based on single large 
investments and an inconsistency in the flow of capital. Thus, the next chapter 
attempts to examine, in detail in the form of a case study, the role of British direct 
investment into Egypt's industrial sector. The UK has been chosen as it constitutes 
the main EU investor in the country, with almost 33.5 per cent of total EU FDI flows 
into Egypt. The industrial sector is the largest and most dynamic sector in the 
economy, and has been made a priority by both the Egyptian Government and the 
EU under the jointly sponsored Industrial Modernisation Programme of 2000. 
459 Comments made by Farouk EI-Oqda, Governor of the Central Bank of Egypt, on the objective of 
the Banking Law 88 of 2003. http: //www. businesstodayegypt. com/articlelD=5364. 
460 The Sale of 69.7 per cent of the equity of the MlBank to the National Societe Generale Bank 
(NSGB) was fmalised on 19 August 2005, of the total value of the bank which was estimated at 
US$420 million, at US$7.48 a share. http: //news. bbc. co. uk/go/pr/fr/-/l/hi/business/4165758. stm 
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Chapter Seven 
British Direct Investment into Egypt's 
Industrial Sector 1996-2004: A Case Study 
This chapter examines the extent to which British direct investment impacted upon 
Egypt's industrial sector between 1996 and 2004. For Egypt, industry is currently 
the largest economic sector as a percentage of GNP, and hence its modernisation has 
become a necessity if the country is to achieve sustainable economic growth. The 
examination also highlights the growing importance of industry as the country's 
economic strategy is increasingly based on export-oriented economic policies; hence 
the even greater need for capital, technology transfer and knowledge through FDI. 
The importance of this can be seen in the considerable attention given to the 
Industrialisation Programme, implemented by the Egyptian Government and 
supported technically and financially by the EU since 2000. 
The previous chapters highlighted that the UK has been the largest European 
investor in Egypt since the late nineteenth century. Despite its decline between the 
late 1950s and early 1970s, British FDI flows into Egypt grew again once the legal 
framework allowed for foreign ownership and participation in the country's 
economic activities. The flow of capital has continued to increase to the extent that 
British investment in Egypt now constitutes 33.5 per cent of total EU investment in 
the country. The extent to which these huge capital flows have impacted on Egypt's 
economic growth between 1996 and 2004 is examined below, with specific reference 
to the manufacturing sector and employment. 
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7.1. Britain: the Leading EU Investor in Egypt, 1996-2004 
British FDI flows accounted for a one third of total EU FDI inflows into I? gypt 
between 1996 and 2004. The Netherlands, which was the second largest F. U 
investor, accounted for only 20.1 per cent during the same period. Data also shows 
that the percentage of British FDI flows was almost equal to the combined total of 
Spain, France, Italy. Germany, Belgium and Ireland, which accounted 13.1 per cent, 
7.2 per cent, 7.1 per cent, 4.7 per cent. 4.6 per cent and 1.7 per cent, respectively. 
The share of Luxemburg, the world's largest investor in 2002, did not exceed 3 per 
cent, while Portugal accounted for less than 0.08 per cent ol'the I; lI's total FDI flows 
during the nine years in question. 










Analysis of the available data also indicates that British FDI flows were more 
constant on an annual basis than that of any other EU member state. This is apparent 
in the comparison set out in figure 7.2, which shows that the UK accounted {or half 
of the EU FDI outflows to Egypt in 1996,34.7 per cent in 1997,37.7 per cent in 
1999.53.5 per cent in 2000, and 42.7 per cent in 2002. The lower percentages of FDI 
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in 1998 (23.7 per cent). 2001 (15 per cent), 2003 (27.7 per cent) and 2004 (20.4 per 
cent) were not due to a reduction of FDI flows from the UK but due to an increase in 
investments made by other EU countries, increasing the overall total flows from the 
EU. For instance, although the UK recorded the highest level of FD! flows with 
US$160 million in 1998. it was the single Dutch investment (US$239 million) in 
Vodafone Egypt and investments by Italy (US$110 million), France (US$49.5 
million) and Luxemburg (US$48.8 million) that increased the total Ft 1 FUI flows 
into Egypt by 261 per cent over the previous year. This was also the case in 2001, 
when Spain's investment of US$300 million in the free zones, reduced the 
percentage of British FDI flows in that year to its lowest level (15 per cent), despite 
the UK investing US$60 million. 










British FDI flows were geographically distributed across Egypt, with the inland 
accounting for 66.9 per cent (US$568.5 million) while the free zones received almost 
one third (US$272.3 million) of the total investment. 
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Figure 7.3 shows that most investments inland were made between 1996 and 
1999. In 1996, almost all British capital flows were invested in inland companies. In 
the following three years, investment projects and companies based inland received 
as much as 84 per cent, 93.2 per cent and 90.2 per cent, respectively, of total British 
FDI flows into the country. This situation was almost reversed between 2000 and 
2003, as the majority of investment went into the free zones. In 2000, British 
investment in the free zones accounted for 73.4 per cent of its total capital flows into 
the country, and 99 per cent of total flows in 2002. This unprecedented concentration 
of FDI in the free zones fell to 47 per cent in 2003 and decreased further in 2004. 
7.2. British FDI into the Egyptian Industrial Sector, 1996-2004 
Egyptian industry received US$602.2 million from the UK, accounting t '()r 44 per 
cent of total EU FDI flows into manufacturing between I January 1996 and 30 
November 2004. During this time. British firms invested US$335 2 million in 
industrial projects inland and US$267 million in manulacturing in the free zones. 
Figure 7.4 shows that this contribution grew annually by an average 53 per cent of 
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total investment in industry between 1996 and 2001, during which time it decreased 
to 20 per cent in 1997. before rising again to 84.5 per cent in 2001. It also shows that 
this contribution reached its lowest level of 0.7 per cent in 2002 and increased 
slightly to 1.5 per cent and 6.3 per cent in 2003 and 2004, respectively. Such an 
inconsistent level of growth raises some serious concerns not only for the patterns of 
British FDI flows into Egyptian industry but also in regard to the state of this sector 
and its capacity to attract further FDI from the UK. 








Between 1996 and 2001, British capital flows into the Egyptian industrial sector 
were attracted by the growing diversification in Egyptian manufäcturing goods, the 
expanding domestic market and improvements in product competitiveness and 
quality. "' By this time, manufacturing output stood at 18.1 per cent of total output, 
of which some 62 per cent was contributed by private and foreign companies. 
According to the Ministry of Economy. almost 35 per cent of total private investment 
in Egypt went into the manufacturing sector, which was then one of the most 
attractive sectors for investors. 462 This was due to the introduction of a privatisation 
programme, which started effectively in 1994 and allowed foreign and private 
461 Egyptian Ministry of Economy, "Egypt: A Land of Opportunity", Investing ýI in E, ripi, Volume II, G 
Cairo, 2001, p. 12. 
462 Ibid, p. 12. 
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companies to buy shares in most public sector manufacturing enterprises. The 
response of foreign investors to the privatisation programme was highly positive in 
1996, but a slowdown in this process led to a decline in overall FDI flows from the 
UK and the rest of the EU to the industrial sector. 
However, the modernisation of the industrial sector as a whole did not influence 
all British investors, many of whom became more selective in their investments. For 
instance, the growth of the textiles and agro-industry sectors by 48.8 per cent and 
85.5 per cent, respectively, between 1993 and 1998 did not influence the distribution 
of British FDI flows. 463 Instead, these investments concentrated intensively in 
engineering and construction materials which accounted for 48 per cent and 31 per 
cent, respectively, between 1996 and 2004. Figure 7.5 also shows that chemicals and 
food each attracted 7 per cent of British FDI in manufacturing, while 
pharmaceuticals and textiles each received 3 per cent. This figure for the textiles 
industry is insignificant, particularly where Egypt has had a comparative advantage 
and when the value of manufactured textiles grew by 85 per cent during the same 
period. As explained below in detail most of the US$16.1 million was invested in 
clothing rather than textiles. The wood working sector only received 1 per cent 
(US$4.6 million), while total investment in metals accounted for only US$1 million 
of the total British FDI flows into industry between 1996 and 2004. 
463 Egyptian Ministry of Economy, Investing in Egypt, Volume II, Egypt: A Land of Opportunity, 
Cairo, 2001, p. 12 
251 
Figure 7.5: Distribution of British FDI flows into Egypt's Manufacturing 
sector, 1996-2004 
Pharmaceuticals 








Surprisingly, the mining industry did not attract any British investment, and was 
totally dominated by German. Italian and French companies, which invested jointly 
over US$5.9 million during these nine years. The main beneficiary in this industry 
was the Aswan Development and Mining (ADMCO). which received US$2.9 million 
from the German company Mansman Demage. US$1.4 million from the French 
company Segleke and a similar investment from the Italian company TAKNET SBA 
Bomine. creating together 2,520 jobs in 1997. In 2004, an Italian investment of 
US$32.000 in Italian-Egyptian Marble and Granite created 21 jobs, highlighting that 
despite being the main EU investor in Egypt, the UK was overtaken in some 
industries by its European competitors. 
7.3. Sectoral Distribution of British Direct Investment Inland 
British direct investment inland accounted for US$335.2 million, of which 56 per 
cent was invested in construction materials. Investments in engineering, food, 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals amounted to US$51.1 million, US$44.5 million. 
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US$25.4 million and US$20.8 million, respectively, between 1996 and 2004. While 
wood working, textiles and metals received US$4.6 million, US$1.4 million and 
US$1 million, respectively, during the same period. Data shows that all British 
investment in construction materials, food, pharmaceuticals, wood working and 
metals were located inland, but the majority of investments in engineering and 
textiles were made in the free zones. 
7.3.1. British FDI in the Construction Materials Manufacturing 
The construction materials industry received US$186.3 million of total British FDI 
flows into inland manufacturing between 1996 and 2004. This was due to the boom 
in Egypt's construction sector during the 1990s. As almost all construction projects 
were carried out by local companies, British companies concentrated their 
investments in related building material industries particularly iron, cement and 
ceramics. This sort of investment flourished between 1996 and 2001, but the 
slowdown in Egypt's economic growth after 2001 affected considerably this 
industry, leading to a sharp decline in British investment over the following three 
years 
464 
Figure 7.6 shows the relatively close connection between the rise and fall of FDI 
flows from the UK and the total contribution of EU member states in the 
construction materials sector. The large share of FDI of British companies led to a 
huge increase in the total contribution of the EU, though notable investments from 
464 S. Quefelec, "The Egyptian economy and relations with EU-15", Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, 
Theme 1- 9/2002, p. 2. 
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Belgium and Denmark respectively. contributed US$104.6 million and US$23 
million over the same period. Apart from the two Danish investments of US$18.5 
million and US$4.5 million by the Borg Portland and the Industrial Fund for 
Developing Countries in the Egyptian company Sinai for White Portland Cement, 
data shows direct ties between the rise and fall in British and EU investments into 
this sector between 1997 and 2004, including 2001, when British FUI [lows 
accounted for 99 per cent of total FDI flows from the EU. 
Figure 7.6: British investment compared to total EU FDI into the construction 









Britain's dominance of this sector was due to the limited involvement of other 
major EU investors such as Germany, Italy, France and the Netherlands, whose 
investments were as little as US$2.2 million, US$600,000, US$200,000 and 
US$36.000, respectively, over the nine-year period. Data also confirms that the two 
large investments made by Belgium in 1996 and Denmark in 1999 were the only 
investments made by both countries, and hence British FDI flows faced no 
competition in this industry from any of its main European competitors. 
The Lecico Misr (Egyptian-Lebanese Ceramics Company) which was established 
in 1975 was the only company of the seven British-Egyptian joint ventures that 
operated in the construction materials sector to benefit from British FDI flows in the 
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pre-Barcelona era. The British share in this company was owned by Intage Holdings 
Limited with two other minor investments by individuals, not exceeding US$1 
million. The largest British investment in this sector was made in 1996. With the 
exception of the US$104.6 million invested by the Belgian company HOLSEPLE in 
1996, Almasria Llasmant (Egyptian company for Cement) received US$128.5 
million from the UK-based Egyptian Company for Cement Limited, the largest 
single investment made in this industry. 
The significance of these investments was apparent in terms of employment, as 
they generated 900 jobs between them. This contribution was enhanced by the 
creation of a further 2,500 jobs by two British firms, Lady Well and Blue Nile, which 
invested US$0.9 million and US$5.2 million, respectively, in the Egyptian company 
South Valley for Cement in 1997. In 2001, the second largest British investment was 
made in Blue Circle Egypt for Cement Industry, which received US$51 million from 
the British company Blue Circle Europe Limited. A further US$500,000 and 
US$300,000 was invested by the Associated International Limited Cement and Blue 
Circle Home Products International Limited. 
In the following three years, the decline in European FDI in this sector was 
marked by the absence of any large investments. There were only two minor British 
investments in 2004, one in Alseramic Alouropy (European Ceramics) of US$811 
and the second made by a British investor of Egyptian origin, who invested 
US$32,000 in the Mega Art Works (Abdallah Ali Ragab Mohamed & Partner). This 
latter investment highlights the contribution and role played by migrant investors in 
the economic development of their native countries. 
255 
Compared to the British investment, the majority of EU investments in the 
building materials sector were minor, though their contribution to job creation was 
not insignificant. For example, the US$247,000 invested by the French company Le 
Farge Pelater Internationale in the Egyptian company Le Farge Gypsum Egypt led to 
the creation of 100 jobs in 2001. While German investments did not exceed US$2.2 
million, this still created 1,530 jobs in 1996. In the following year, Deter Christian 
Franklyn (a German company) invested a further US$300,000 in the German- 
Egyptian for Industrial Marble, creating another 65 jobs, while Hanash George 
Winter invested US$200,000, creating 80 jobs in 1999. 
7.3.2. British FDI in the Engineering Industry Inland 
Between 1996 and 2004, British firms invested around US$51.1 million in 
engineering projects in the inland. This accounted for only 18 per cent of total British 
FDI in the engineering sector as the majority of investment was made in the free 
zones during this period. Most British investments were made in petroleum, 
electronics, cinema production, air-conditioning and computer programming. Figure 
7.8 shows that the largest investment was in 2000, when Arab Film Limited invested 
US$31.5 million in the Egyptian company Alarabia Llintag wa Altawzea Alsinimaei 
(Cinema Production and Distribution Co. ). This investment, which created 50 jobs, 
was followed by another during the same year, when the Hatef Telecom BVI 
invested US$2.7 million in the Egyptian Electronics Technology Co., creating a 
further 50 jobs. These figures indicate the limited capacity of this industry to 
generate employment because it depends more on technology and knowledge than on 
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manpower. This was noticeable in the two investments made by Multimedia East and 
the Preda Investment Corporation of US$5.9 million and US$1.7 million, 
respectively, in the Egyptian company Nology International Group in 1998. Together 
they only created 11 jobs. However, the US$6.3 million invested in 1996 by BICC 
DUCAB Investment Limited in BICC Egypt created 150 jobs, the largest number of 
jobs generated by a British investment in this industry. 
The number of lesser investments made by individual investors and small 
companies should not be underestimated in terms of capital and employment. The 
investment of US$600,000 by a British investor in Egyptian-British Air- 
Conditioning (Mizoshi) in 1997 led to 26 jobs. While a minor investment in the Nile 
Petroleum Industries (Incub), which received US$7,374 and US$14,749 from the Try 
Core and the Edico Petroleum, created 44 jobs. In 2001, four British companies 
invested US$2.4 million in Deba Misr Lltasmim wa Eltaghiz. Almost US$1 million 
of this capital was invested by British Deba Holdings Limited and the other three 
companies who each contributed US$260,000, creating another 60 jobs. 
The engineering industry was not completely dominated by British companies. 
German, Italian and French firms also made a significant contribution in the 
electricity, gas, communications, information systems and, in particular automobile 
industries, during the 1990s. In 1996, Germany's Mercedes Benz invested US$4.6 
million (57 per cent of total German FDI in engineering) in Egyptian German 
Automobile (AGA), creating 400 jobs. In 1999, Italy's Fiat Auto SPA invested 
US$11.8 million in Fiat Auto Egypt Manufacturing, creating 500 jobs. 
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Figure 7.7: British FDI flows compared to that of major Eli investors into 











*This figure does not include British investment into engineering in the free zones. which is discussed 
in section 7.4. 
In 1993, the French company Peugeot Automobile invested over t1S$10 million 
in Peugeot Egypt. but the majority of French investments in this industry were 
smaller, averaging US$50,000. Dutch companies made some contributions in the gas 
and technology sector, with US$8.8 million invested by the Uni International ßV in 
the Egyptian company Egyptian International Gas Technology Company (GASTIC) 
in 1996, creating 167 jobs. Meanwhile, Belgian companies specialized in electrical 
equipment and services. The single Belgian investment made by the Vina Nsirdy 
Iplikson d' Electricity of US$4 million, together with two individual investors who 
each contributed US$1,600 in the Shredder Egypt Lightening and Cities Supplies in 
2000, created 51 jobs. 
7.3.3. British FDI in the Food Industry 
By 2004. there were 28 British firms and joint ventures operating in the iüod 
industry, half of them established after 1995. This shows a constant British interest in 
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this industry, which goes back to 1979, when Mac Beverages invested around 
EGP193 million in Coca Cola Egypt. Between 1996 and 2004, British companies 
invested US$44.5 million, accounting for 13 per cent of total British FDI flows into 
inland manufacturing. Figure 7.9 shows that most of this investment occurred in 
1999, when the British company Trefoml Limited invested US$37.8 million in EBC 
Industry (the Egyptian British Canadian Company), and created 120 jobs. That year 
also witnessed a medium-sized investment by the Financial Holdings International of 
just over US$2 million in the Lacto Misr (a company producing milk and food for 
children), creating 120 jobs. The potential for expansion in the food industry also 
encouraged two British entrepreneurs to each invest US$72,647 in the fast food 
company Master Bay in the same year. 
FDI flows into the food industry were far greater in 1999 than 1997 and 1998, 
when British investment accounted for US$1.5 million and US$2.4 million, 
respectively. In 1997, the British E. F. C. Holdings invested a little over US$1.4 
million in the Red Sea Fizzy & non-Fizzy Drinks, resulting in the creation of 55 jobs. 
Two small British investments worth US$104,000 were also made in the Egyptian 
company F&B Manufacturing, creating 22 jobs. In 1998, British Overseas Trading 
and Engineering invested US$1.3 million in the Fantra Beef Industry, creating a 
further 53 jobs. The British company Olay Holdings Limited invested US$579,000 in 
Olay Manufactured Food, creating 110 jobs. Two other investments by the 
International Foodstuffs Co. Limited and Allana Inlerateon Limited of US$4262,000 
and US$226,000, respectively, in the EFCO Foodstuffs created a further 110 jobs. 
Between 2002 and 2004, British FDI flows decreased steadily to their lowest level of 
US$74,000 in 2003, from US$262,000, US$104,000 in 2000 and 2001, respectively, 
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while no investment was made at all in this sector in 2002. In 2004, investment 
stood at USS99,000. 
Figure 7.8: British FDI flows compared to that ofnaijor EU investors into Egypt's 








The pattern of British investment in the food industry. which was marked by a 
single large investment in 1999, was similar to that of other LU investors in the same 
area. For instance, while total French FDI flows amounted to US$11.7 million 
between 1996 and 2004, the Frornage Bel-Sa invested UD$10.6 million in Bel Egypt 
in 1998, gaining almost 100 per cent ownership and creating 100 jobs. I uxemburg's 
total FDI flows were made in a single investment in 2000, when ßR Investment 
invested US$10.2 million in Mashreq Dairy Products, creating 250 jobs. 46S Of the 
three Dutch investments made in the food industry totalling US$7.7 million, the 
SLBA Netherlands BV invested US$7.5 million in the Danoun Mashreq Fine 
Biscuits, creating 388 jobs in 2002. This pattern was seen to a much lesser extent in 
the case of Italian companies, whose total investments (US$5.5 million) spread over 
two large investments in 1997 (US$3 million) and 2000 (US$2.1 million), and was 
165 Luxemburg had four other companies operated in the foods industry, all established in the 1970s 
and 1980s. 
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absent in the German case as the total contribution of German companies to the food 
industry over the nine-year period amounted to less than half a million dollars. 
7.3.4. British FDI in the Chemicals Industry Inland 
Chemicals attracted a total of US$42.9 million, of which British firms invested 
US$25.4 million inland and US$17.5 million in the free zones between 1996 and 
2004. The UK was ahead of the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, France and Germany, 
which invested US$23.7 million, US$20 million, US$17.5 million, US$15 million 
and US$12.8 million, respectively during the same period. Despite their leading 
position in this sector, British companies faced tough competition from their 
European counterparts, particularly the Dutch and Italians. Figure 7.7 shows that 
although the UK contributed the largest share of total EU FDI flows into the 
chemical industry, it was overtaken by the Netherlands in 1997, France in 2000, 
Spain in 2002 and Italy in 2003. 
Unlike most other sectors, the chemical industry was the only one to receive 
constant and continuous FDI flows from the EU during the period of economic 
slowdown after 2001. For example, Austria's single investment in this sector was 
US$5.3 million in 2001, while Spain's largest investment of US$17.2 million was 
made in the following year. In 2003, Italian and Dutch companies invested US$11.3 
million and US$7.3 million, respectively. This European involvement at a time of 
economic downturn highlights the strategic importance of the chemicals sector to 
private and foreign investors, particularly in terms of specialisation and hence the 
monopoly of production and market prices. This also indicates that Egypt was still a 
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resources-seeking market, where the availability of natural materials, constituted a 
major attraction to foreign companies. 
Figure 7.9: British FDI flows compared to that ofnkajor EU investors into 
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* This figure does not include British FDI in the free zones. 
British investment was concentrated mainly in soap and cleaning materials, 
packaging. paper, glass and plastics. Such diversity in the distribution of capital 
flows within this sector, as well as the large number of companies involved, 
highlights the deep commitment of British investors to the chemical sector. The UK- 
based firm Gulf Red Sea made two large investments totalling US$14 million, of 
which US$6 million was invested in Hay Pack Packaging in 1996, creating 161 jobs, 
and US$8 million in Arma Soap and Cleaning in 1999, creating a further 186 jobs. In 
1996, the Egyptian company Alwatania Manufacturing Packaging Materials (NAT 
Pack) received two investments from two British companies, the Arabian Fenter 
Investment Co. and the Plastic Packing Co. worth USS3.5 million and US$3.8 
million, respectively, creating 65 jobs. In 1999, Kokson Overseas Limited invested 
US$1 million in Visofuse Mideast Limited. The majority of investments were small 
in value, but contributed significantly to employment, in particular 450 jobs were 
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created by Water Hall following an investment of US$400,000 in the Egyptian 
company Tanzifico Alalamia in 2001. 
The degree of specialisation exhibited by European companies in the chemical 
sector was notable. While British companies specialised primarily in the 
manufacturing of packaging and cleaning materials, the Dutch concentrated their 
investments in the fibre, coating and plastics materials, with almost 50 per cent 
(US$11.8 million) of total Dutch FDI flows invested by the Future Pipes 
International, in its Egyptian affiliate the Almostaqbal Lisinaat Alanapip (the Future 
for Manufacturing Pipes) in 1997. Meanwhile, the majority of the 34 Italian 
companies operating in this sector specialised in environmental services. For 
instance, the Egyptian company EM Al-Arab Environment received the largest single 
investment of US$7.9 million from the Italian company EM International SBA in 
2003, with a further US$400,000 from the company Semeast SBA, creating a total of 
720 jobs. Also, Aldawlyia Environmental Services received investments from the 
Semeast, the Gakorosy Impress, the Gezenio and the Sechet, which invested 
US$900,000, US$700,000, US$700,000 and US$100,000, respectively, jointly 
contributing to the creation of 3,100 jobs. Meanwhile, the majority of French 
investments in the chemicals sector were in paper production and liquid gas. In 2002, 
the largest French investment of US$11.7 million was made by the CFN Investments 
in the Egyptian company I. P. M (International Paper Manufacturing), creating 600 
jobs. This was followed by another large investment by De Pertoli Brema Gas, which 
invested US$2.6 million in the Egyptian company Liqugas in 2002. 
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7.3.5. British FDI in the Pharmaceuticals Industry 
Some experts have considered the pharmaceutical industry to be one of the most 
promising and fast growing sectors in the Egyptian economy. 466 By 2002, the 
pharmaceutical market was estimated to be worth US$1 billion and local production 
covered almost 94 per cent of local demand by volume, while sales increased by over 
150 per cent between 1991 and 2002 467 This industry benefited from global 
experience and investments made over the past thirty years by international 
companies such as Squibb, Bristol-Meyers, Merck Sharp& Dohme, Pfizer, Hoechst, 
Swiss-Pharma and Glaxo-Wellcome 468 
Between 1996 and 2004, total FDI flows from the EU to this R&D-based 
industry accounted for as little as US$42 million, almost half of which came from 
British companies. The UK was the largest EU investor in pharmaceuticals, with a 
total of US$20.8 million between 1996 and 2004. Figure 7.10 illustrates the leading 
position of the UK among EU investors and shows that the majority of investments 
were made in 1998. In that year, the Egyptian company Almotahyda Llzogag 
Almotaadel (United Treated Glass) received investments of US$7 million, US$8.6 
million and US$1.2 million from Overseas Arab Gulf Limited, Egypt Invest Wan 
Limited and Tely Cab Limited, respectively. This created 300 jobs. In 2004, 
Astrazenica Treasury Limited invested US$3.9 million in Astrazenica Egypt, 
creating 110 jobs. 
°66 Azza El-Shinnawy & Heba Handoussa, "Egyptian Case Studies", in Saul Estrin & Klaus Meyer 
(eds. ), Investment Strategies in Emerging Markets, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004), pp. 98- 
101. 
467 For detailed analysis see American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, The Egyptian Pharmaceutical 
Industry, Business Studies Series, Cairo, Egypt, 2001; and Egyptian Ministry of Health and 
Population, Health Sector Analysis and National Essential Drug List, (Cairo: Ministry of Health and 
Population, 2002). 
468 The majority of investments by these companies were made between 1971 and 1995. 
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Figure 7.10: British FDI flows compared to that of major EU investors into 
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However, it is worth noting that GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) Egypt, which was 
established in 1981 in partnership with the Egyptian company Advanced Medical 
Industries (ABI) and which changed its names in line with the restructuring of its 
London-based parent company, has been one of the most important British 
companies in Egypt. 469 GSK has increased its stake in its Egyptian partner from 51 
per cent to 90 per cent in 1995.47" It was not until 2001, when GlaxoWellcome and 
SmithKline Beecham merged in GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), that the Egyptian 
company changed its name to become GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) Egypt. Despite rich 
resources and raw materials, as well as a skilled labour force, GSK Egypt imports 
bulk chemicals and process them into final dose forms. 471 With the minor exception 
"9 For details on the historical development of the GSK Egypt since 198 1 see Azza El-Shinnawy and 
Heba Handoussa, "Egyptian Case Studies" in Saul Estrin & Klaus Meyer (eds. ), Investment Strategies 
in Emerging Markets, pp. 98-112. 
Between 1990 and 1995, the company increased its assets in Aßt to 69 per cent in 1991 and to 87.8 
per cent in 1992. 
471 Wael Gamal, "Hard choices", A1-, 4hrain Weekly, Issue No. 653,28 August -3 September 2003. 
http: iweekly. ahram. orý,,. ea, '2003/653. ec2. htm 
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of developing some products for the local market, there is hardly any R&D taking 
place in this subsidiary. 472 
However, GSK Egypt remains important not only because of its ranking as the 
number one pharmaceutical company in Egypt but also because of its recent 
progressive restructuring strategies that view the country as an export base to other 
markets. As the only foreign company engaged in exporting Egyptian pharmaceutical 
products to the Middle East and African markets, the success of GSK Egypt's export 
strategy could encourage other foreign subsidiaries in Egypt to follow suit and hence 
make Egypt a potential export base for the wider region. 
Apart from British investment, FDI from other major EU countries was very 
small. Sweden, which was second to the UK, invested US$5.7 million, of which 
US$2.2 million and US$2.9 million were invested by the Swedish companies HIPI 
Health Care AB and HIPI Holding AB, respectively, in the Egyptian company HIPI 
Drug Supplies in 1998. Germany invested US$4.2 million, of which US$1.8 million 
was made by two German investors in the Egyptian company Almotahyda Llzogag 
Almotaadel (Unite Treated Glass) in 1998. The second large investment was made 
by Paul Hartman AG with US$1.3 million into Paul Hartman Medical Industry in 
2003, creating 210 jobs. There were also a number of smaller German investments 
such as Karl Baish GMBH, which invested US$300,000 in Baish Egypt in 1998, and 
German Rhine Biotech, which invested US$200,000 in Rhine Mina Pharm 
Biogenetics, creating 100 jobs in 1999. These investments were not made in the 
472 Azza El-Shinnawy and Heba Handoussa, "Egyptian Case Studies" in Saul Estrin & Klaus Meyer 
(eds. ), Investment Strategies in Emerging Markets, p. 105. 
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development of drugs or in R&D but in secondary services such as the 
manufacturing of glass bottles and packaging. 
7.3.6. British FDI in the Textiles Industry Inland 
Egypt's most strategically important industry - textiles - was one of the least 
attractive areas for British, as well as other European, investors. Total British FDI 
flows into this industry amounted to just over US$16 million, of which US$14.7 
million was invested in the free zones and only US$1.4 million was invested inland 
between 1996 and 2004. The majority of this investment was made in clothing rather 
than textiles. This was due to the deteriorating conditions of most textiles companies, 
their inefficient methods of production, the complexity of their financial records, and 
their huge existing debts. These factors deprived Egypt of one of its main 
comparative advantages, the availability of high quality and long staple cotton. These 
factors diverted much of British FDI flows from Egypt's textiles industry into similar 
industries elsewhere in the Mediterranean, particularly Tunisia, Morocco, and 
Turkey, whose textiles industries developed much faster than Egypt's. 
Between 1996 and 2004, the UK was the largest EU investor in the textile 
industry. Almost 92 per cent of British FDI in this industry was invested in the free 
zones. This is illustrated in figure 7.11. This figure shows that Britain's major 
investment inland took place in 1997, when the Irish Egyptian Linen company 
(IRELAN) received US$1.1 million, of which US$716,000 was invested by Thomas 
Sinton & Co Ltd and US$358,000 from Stanley Deak, creating 220 jobs. During the 
same year, the Egyptian company Alalmyia Weaving and Terrico received 
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US$199.000 from a British investor. creating 60 jobs. The remaining investments 
were small and made by individuals, hence making a less significant managerial or 
technological contribution to this industry. 
Figure 7.11: British FDI compared to that of major FU investors into textiles and 









* This figure does not include British FDI into textiles and clothing in the free zones. 
Egypt's textiles industry also received capital flows from Italian and Belgian 
investors. who contributed US$1.4 million and US$1.1 million, respectively, 
between 1996-2004, occupying the first and the third place, with the UK in second 
place, in terms of total EU investment in textiles and clothing inland. The above 
figure shows a relatively constant Italian involvement in this industry, with 
investments made in eight Egyptian companies during the period under 
consideration. These investments, however, were of small value and tended to 
generate a limited number of jobs. The largest single Italian investment was made in 
2001. It saw US$588,000 invested in Egyptian Vertical, creating 30 jobs. In 2000, 
the Egyptian company Insemi Italy Clothing received US$585,000 from three Italian 
investors, creating a further 60 jobs. The Belgian company NV GOS Vanesta SA 
invested US$1 million in Valley Vanesta Weaving and Textiles, creating 55 jobs in 
2003. In 2004. Luxor Shirts (a clothing company) received US$39,000 from G May 
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Aramco Gilberg, creating 92 jobs, while Salem Shirts received over US$81,000 from 
two Belgian investors, creating a further 80 jobs. 
Total French investment in textiles amounted to US$714,000, of which 
US$428,000 was invested in the Egyptian company Maidany Industrial Fibres in 
2003, and US$200,000 invested in the Egyptian company I. T. I Clothing three years 
earlier (2000), of which the French company Gel Mod invested US$120,000 473 
Spanish companies also made a contribution, with Ecumers A. investing US$44,000 
in the Egyptian company Alalamyia Weaving and Terrico in 1997, creating 60 jobs. 
In the same year, a Spanish businessman invested US$36,000 in the Cairo Madrid 
(CAMA) company, leading to the creation of 175 jobs. Germany only made one 
investment in this area over the past thirty years, when five members of the Shabib 
family invested jointly US$72,000 in the Syrian Socks and Clothing Company 
(FOALA), creating 27 jobs in 1977. 
One can argue that this low rate of European FDI flows into Egypt's textile 
industry, particularly in inland projects, is closely linked to the country's poor record 
of trade in textiles with the EU in comparison with other Mediterranean partners. For 
example, Egypt's trade in textiles accounted for only 17 per cent of total Egyptian 
textile exports in 2001, while those of Tunisia, Morocco and Turkey accounted for 
42 per cent, 33 per cent and 33 per cent, respectively. 474 At the same time, these 
three countries accounted for 90 per cent of the trade with the EU in textiles and 
473 The first investment was made by three members of the Al-Maidany family, who are probably of 
Egyptian origin and resided in France, while the US$80,000 of the second investment was made by 
two members of the AI-Amar family. These investments highlight the role played by individual 
investors in the textiles industry, particularly clothing. 
414 S. Quefelec, "Textile industry in the Euro-Mediterranean region", Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, 
theme 6-3/2003, p. 2. 
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clothing. In 2002, textiles and clothing accounted for nearly 40 per cent of Tunisia's 
total trade with the EU, a third of EU-Moroccan trade and about a quarter of trade 
between the EU and Turkey 475 
Table 7.1: EU trade in textiles & clothing with some Mediterranean partner countries in 1995 and 2002 (Em). 
Country 1995 2002 % variation 
Imp. /exp. Import Export Import Export Import Export 
12-MPCs 9247 4435 16294 7069 76.2 59.4 
Turkey 4274 799 8964 1873 109.7 134.4 
Tunisia 1841 1287 3115 2083 69.2 61.8 
Morocco 1733 1060 2735 1764 57.9 66.4 
Egypt 495 171 596 155 20.2 -9.3 
Israel 453 472 366 367 -19.2 -22.1 
Syria 177 51 271 64 52.7 23.8 
Malta 138 109 170 117 22.8 7.3 
Source: Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, theme 6-3/2003, p. 3 
Data presented in table 7.1 also shows that between 1995 and 2002, Egypt made 
very modest progress in its trade in textiles with the EU compared to that achieved 
by the above mentioned Mediterranean partner states. The table shows that Egypt 
was only ahead of Israel, Syria and Malta, which are not major cotton producers, but 
far behind Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco. Moreover, the nature of EU-Egyptian 
trade in this sector underlines the condition of Egypt's textiles industry. According to 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry, the EU primarily imported clothing and 
exported textiles (fabric and yarn) to Egypt. 476 This means that the Egyptian textile 
industry (spinning, weaving, knitting etc) has failed to develop its manufacturing 
capacity and cannot meet the needs of the domestic market. This also means that 
475 Ibid, p. 2. 
476 Data obtained by the author from the Egyptian Ministry of Trade and Industry, Foreign Trade Unit, 
Cairo, Egypt, December 2004. 
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European investors have kept their capital in EU-based textile industries, while 
investing in the manufacture of clothing in Egypt and other Mediterranean partners. 
which does not require a sizeable investment but is labour-intensive, which means 
lower labour costs. 
7.3.7. British FDI in the Wood Working Industry 
Since 1972. there have only been three joint ventures operating in wood working that 
have received British FDI flows. Figure 7.12 shows that these investments were 
made in 1997,1998 and 2001. They amounted to US$4.6 million, accounting for 
92.1 per cent of the total FDI flows from the EU into this sector. In 1997, the Egypt 
Switzerland Wood Sawing Co (SAWMILL EGYPT) received around US$3.2 
million, creating 70 jobs. In 1998, Egypt Forming received US$226,000 from Formix 
Limited. In 2001. Binomeroni Wood and Metal Industries received US$1.2 million, 
of which US$729.000 was invested by Binomeroni 2000, while three other 
companies invested each US$156,000, creating 200 jobs. 
Figure 7.12: British FDI flows compared to that ofthe EU and Germany into 
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7.4. British FDI Flows into the Free Zones 
Up to this point the case study of British FDI into Egypt focused on activity inland. 
In the free zones, the UK was the second largest EU investor, after Spain, with 
US$272.3 million, accounting for 30.6 per cent of total FDI flows from the EU 
between 1996 and 2004. During this period, British firms invested US$267 million in 
industrial projects, of which engineering received US$234.8 million, while chemicals 
and textiles attracted US$17.5 million and US$14.7 million, respectively. In the free 
zones, all British direct investment was made in engineering, chemicals and textiles. 
With the exception of 1996, the UK was the only EU member state that had 
uninterrupted annual FDI flows into the free zones over this nine-year period. This 
pattern differed dramatically from that of Spain, which invested 99.7 per cent of the 
US$300.9 million in free zones in 2001, and Luxemburg, whose total investment of 
US$48.8 million was made in 1998. This constant flow of British capital not only 
highlighted the importance of the free zones to British investors but also increased 
the diversity of the capital into industries such as engineering, textiles and clothing. 
Unlike most EU companies, British companies operated across 10 public and private 
free zones in Egypt. According to GAFI, the UK invested US$298.9 million in 44 
projects in the free zones between 1972 and 2004, of which US$257.5 million was 
invested in 11 projects in the private free zones and US$41.4 million was invested in 
the remaining 33 projects in the public free zones. 
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Figure 7.13: British FDI flows compared to that ofmajor EU investors into the 









7.4.1. British FDI in the Public Free Zones 
GAFI data reveals that it was not until the mid- I 990s that British companies began to 
pay sufficient attention to the incentives offered by the I gyptian government for 
investing in the free zones. The earliest British investment was made by the Offshore 
Oil Service. which invested USS16.8 million in the Egyptian company Maritime and 
Oil Services (Maredaiv) in 1978, a company located in the Public Port Said Free 
Zone. This created 160 jobs. It was followed by a much smaller investment in the 
Egyptian textiles company Randolina Manufacturing Clothing, which received 
US$375.000 from Mid East Investment Limited in 1981, creating 32 jobs. Randolina 
was based in the Public Alexandria Free Zone. No further British investment was 
made in the public free zones until the early 1990s, when Bariod Limited invested 
US$1.5 million in Bariod Egypt in 1990, and the Bedoria Ch. Z. M. M invested 
US$225,000 in the AgroFood Free Zone. These two investments created 55 jobs 
between them. Since then British FDI flows have entered the free zones at a slower, 
but steadily increasing rate. 
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The Public Cairo Free Zone attracted ten British investments, of which only two 
were made before 1995. The remainder occurred between 1996 and 2002. Almost 
half of these investments were in textiles and the clothing industry. The largest 
investment in textiles was made by Indo-Mediterranean Commodities Limited, 
which invested US$2.2 million (plus an extra US$300,000 from a private investor) in 
Indo-Med Garments in 1997. This investment constituted 100 per cent of the total 
equity of the company and created as many as 600 jobs, hence adding significantly to 
the development of the zone in terms of employment, managerial skills and 
technology transfer. The second largest investment in this zone was worth US$l 
million, which was invested in Euro Textile, creating 125 jobs in 2001. 
Further investments made in this sector, though of less value, were made by Zara 
International, which invested US$500,000 in setting up Zara Egypt Limited 'I'IF, 
creating 35 jobs in 1998. Two years later, a further US$350,000 was invested by a 
British entrepreneur in IKTIVA Manufacturing Clothing, creating 60 jobs. Also, 
some investments made in engineering and chemical companies in the Public Cairo 
Free Zone such as that made in 1991 by International Printing House, which set up 
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an affiliate with an investment of US$592,000, taking 100 per cent ownership of the 
company and creating 110 jobs. Almost ten years later in 2001 Universal Industries, 
together with two entrepreneurs, set up Universal Industries Limited Egypt with 
US$200,000, creating 20 jobs. 
The Public Alexandria Free Zone received a total of US$11.1 million invested in 
16 companies, of which six investments were made prior to the Barcelona process 
and ten since 1995. The majority of these investments were made in engineering but 
most capital also went into textiles and clothing, which took a total of US$6.5 
million. The largest investment in this zone was made in 1998, when Mary Teresa 
Said invested US$5.8 million in the Nile Linen Group. This accounted for almost 50 
per cent of the equity of the company and contributed to the creation of 50 jobs. In 
2002, three British female entrepreneurs invested jointly US$300,000 in setting up 
ASK Clothing, creating as many as 200 jobs. Investments made in engineering were 
also of some significance in number but their values and contribution to employment 
were relatively small. For example, the two British companies Oil Tools Limited and 
Oil Tools International Limited invested jointly as little as US$100,000 in Oil Tools 
Egypt in 1997, while some other investments were made in complementary services 
such as petroleum, environmental products and the mining industry. Nalco Exxon 
Energy Chemicals Marketing Limited also invested US$200,000 in setting up its 
affiliate in this zone in 2001, creating 25 jobs. Despite receiving the largest number 
of investments, this zone was much less attractive than others and total investment 
remained small in terms of value and employment. 
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The other four public free zones received FDI flows from the UK in seven 
separate investments, and each zone was marked by investments in particular 
industries. The Public Port Said Free Zone had two investments in petroleum 
services and the engineering industry. Both came from one British company, 
Offshore Oil Service, which invested US$16.8 million in Maritime and Petroleum 
Services (Maredaiv) in 1978 and US$500,000 in the Maredaiv Offshore Projects in 
1992, creating a total of 237 jobs. The Public Suez Free Zone received also two 
investments in ship building. The first was made jointly by S. L. S Sealand Service 
and Gin Investment Worldwide, which invested US$16,000 and US$304,000, 
respectively in Imprsop International in 1998. The second was made by Coral Stone 
Enterprise, which invested US$1.9 million in Ocean Classic International Yacht 
Manufacturing in 2000. The Public Sixth October Free Zone had two investments in 
the engineering industry in 2002. The Egyptian company Digital Media Systems 
received US$2.4 million from Matron Holdings Limited and US$41.6 million from 
Wellston Investment Inc, creating 150 jobs. Musk International Art Production also 
took US$500,000 from the UK-based Arab Media Company, accounting for 50 per 
cent of the total equity of the company and the creation of 50 jobs. The Public 
Damietta Free Zone received only one investment made by Almaxen Limited, with 
US$80,000 in CST Belgium Manufacturing, creating 10 jobs. 
7.4.2. British FDI in the Private Free Zones 
The four private free zones attracted 11 investments of a total value of US$257.5 
million. The Private Cairo Free Zone had six investments, divided between the 
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maritime services, agricultural products, electronic engineering, and the textiles 
industry. The largest investment was made by SWAIR Pacific Offshore, which 
invested US$5.3 million in the Ocean Marine Service Egypt, creating 250 jobs in 
1997. Cambridge Weavers Limited made the second largest investment of US$3 
million in Cambridge Weavers England-Egypt, leading to the creation of 357 jobs in 
2003. In the same year, Blue Sky Holdings Limited invested US$602,000 in Blue 
Sky Agricultural Products creating 102 jobs. A further investment was also made in 
2003 by Traveller Limited, which invested US$1.8 million in the Cairo Airport Duty 
Free Company, creating 98 jobs. Table 7.2 shows that the Private Port Said Free 
Zone received US$228.9 million from four British companies, accounting for 76.5 
per cent of the total British FDI flows into the free zones. The largest two 
investments were made in the gas industry with US$228 million and a third 
investment was made in the textiles and clothing industry with US$900,000. 
Table 7.2: Number of companies created by British FDI flows in the private free zones. 
Free Zone Number of joint ventures British FDI flows (US$ m) 
Private Cairo Free Zone 6 11.1 
Private Port Said Free Zone 3 228.9 
Private Alexandria Free 
Zone 
1 8.1 
Private Suez Free Zone 1 9.4 
source: Mari. 
As for the Gas industry, the British East Mediterranean Gas Pipeline invested 
US$94 million in the Egyptian company East Mediterranean Gas in 2000, creating 
500 jobs. This was followed by a much larger investment by PB Global Investment 
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Ltd, which invested US$134 million in the Egyptian company UGDC (United Gas 
Products) in 2002 bringing a further 220 jobs to this sector. In terms of job creation, 
the two small investments of US$900,000 made by Bagir Ucky Limited and B. P. 
Tailoring in Middle East Tailoring Clothing (METCO) created 1,400 jobs, a 
significant number for both this free zone and the country as a whole. The Private 
Alexandria Free Zone received one investment from Cornish Management Inc. and 
the Melania Investment Corp., which invested US$2.2 million and US$5.9 million, 
respectively, in Borg Al-Arab Industry. There was no available data on the number 
of jobs created by this investment. The Private Suez Free Zone had one investment 
in the chemical industry worth US$9.4 million. This was made jointly by Lady Well 
with US$7.4 million and Equity Holding International with US$2 million in the 
Egyptian Fertilizers company and created 372 jobs in 1998. 
7.5. The impact of British FDI on the Egyptian Labour Market 
Between 1974 and 2004, British FDI flows contributed to the creation of 252 
companies and joint ventures and led to the creation of 57,644 jobs in Egypt. This 
was a significant contribution to Egyptian employment in a labour market that 
expanded annually by almost half a million people. 77 Over this period, British 
investments in job creation accounted for 0.38 per cent of the new labour force 
entering the market during this thirty-year period, estimated at 15 million people. 
47 The official statistics of the Egyptian government state that the number of new entrants to the 
labour market has increased to 600,000 people every year. This official estimate is based on the 
number of university graduates which is around 500,000 students plus a large number of school 
leavers from vocational schools. However, one has to firmly state here that a substantial proportion of 
these graduates cannot manage to get jobs in the year of their graduation, hence contributing to 
relatively high percentage of unemployment that varies between an official figure of 7.4 per cent and 
an unofficial figure of 17 per cent. 
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Nevertheless, the British contribution was important to Egypt, whose government 
has been unable to sustain an annual GDP growth of around 7 per cent that is needed 
to both increase employment and improve the average income of the majority of the 
population, over one third of which lives under, or close to, the poverty line. 78 The 
British contribution to the labour market was also significant as most jobs were 
created in the private sector, hence taking further pressure of the already over- 
crowded public sector and civil service. 
One can also argue that the impact of British and European investment on the 
development of Egypt's labour market was greater than that made by Arab or local 
companies. This is particularly true in terms of the improvement of skills and 
qualifications of the work force employed in European companies through their 
training programmes and their use of advanced technical and managerial skills. With 
almost 40 per cent of British investment made in the industrial sector, the degree of 
specialisation introduced by British and European companies, particularly in 
chemicals, engineering, pharmaceuticals and the food industry, cannot be 
underestimated. Such specialisation required highly qualified and well-trained 
professionals, and hence the creation of these jobs added significantly to the quality 
of the country's labour force. 79 This was also true in terms of the skills and 
478 See Euro-Med Partnership, Egypt, Country Strategic Paper 2002 & National Indicative 
Programme 2002-2004, p. 12. As for the level of poverty in Egypt, it is argued by the officials at the 
World Bank that poverty affects 17 per cent of the population. Francois Bourguignon, World Bank 
Chief Economist and Vice-President of the Bank, Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 722,23-29 December 
2004. http: //weekly. ahram. org. eg/2004/722/ec5. htm; and Niveen Wahish, "Dividing Lines: overall 
poverty in Egypt may have dropped but there is a growing welfare disparity between urban and rural 
areas", Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 609,24-30 October 2002. 
hLtp: //weekly. ahram. ora. ep, /2002/609/ecl. htm 
479 For discussion on the impact of FDI on employment and the quality of labour see for example: 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), "Foreign Direct Investment, 
Trade and Employment", OECD, Paris, 1995; and Robert Bladwin, "The Effects of Trade and Foreign 
Direct Investment on Employment and Relative Wages", The OECD Jobs Study, Working Paper, No. 
4, (Paris: OECD, 1995). 
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experience acquired by the semi and unskilled labour force employed by British, as 
well as other European, companies in industries such as construction materials and 
clothing that required a vast number of cheap workers. In these cases quality goods 
could not be guaranteed without an improvement in the basic educational and 
training programmes provided both by the Egyptian Government and foreign 
companies, while in turn contributed to the overall welfare of the labour work force 
in Egypt. 







Figure 7.15 shows that British investment created a total of 22,057 jobs in the 
industrial sector between 1974 and 2004, of which construction materials, chemicals 
and the food industry accounted for two thirds of the number of jobs created. 
Construction materials had 7,131 jobs, accounting for 32.3 per cent of the total jobs 
created by British firms in manufacturing, the majority of which were in a cement 
industry that required a large number of cheap labourers. Chemicals and the food 
industry were almost equal in terms of the number of the jobs created, accounting 
together for 8,622 jobs over these thirty years. They were followed by engineering, 
metals, pharmaceuticals. textiles, clothing and wood working, which accounted for 9 
per cent, 7.9 per cent, 5.8 per cent, 4.4 per cent and 1.2 per cent, respectively, of the 
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total jobs created in the industrial sector. Despite attracting 48 per cent of total 
British FDI in manufacturing between 1996 and 2004, jobs in engineering were less 
than that of labour-intensive industries such as construction materials, textiles and 
clothing. For example, the investment of US$134 million made by PB Global 
Investment Limited in the Private Port Said Free Zone in 2002 created only 220 jobs. 
This is insignificant when compared to the 200 jobs created with an investment of 
US$300,000 in clothing in the Public Alexandria Free Zone in the same year. 
Infrastructure attracted investment from 21 British companies that created 15,089 
jobs. Tourism was the second biggest non-industrial sector to benefit as some 11,123 
jobs were created by 28 companies. The expansion of the services sector attracted 35 
British investments but created only 2,363 jobs. The seventeen British investments in 
the financial sector did not contribute to employment, and agriculture, which is still 
an important economic sector for the national economy, attracted only eight 
investments, creating 832 jobs. This distribution highlights the growing importance 
of manufacturing, infrastructure and tourism, not only as attractive sectors for FDI 
but also as employment sectors. 
Moreover, the 44 British investments in the free zones created 6,180 jobs. 
Analysis of these investments indicates that there is no link between the number of 
investments made and number of jobs created. For example, the three investments 
made in the Private Port Said Free Zone created twice as many jobs as the sixteen 
investments made in the Public Alexandria Free Zone. Table 7.3 also shows that the 
single investment made in the Egyptian Fertilizers company, located in the Private 
Suez Free Zone in 1998 created more jobs (392 jobs) than the five investments made 
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in the Public Suez Free Zone, the Public Port Said Free Zone and the Public 
Damietta Free Zone, which accounted together for 378 jobs. 
Table 7.3: Number of companies and jobs created by British FDI in the free zones 1972-2004 
The Free Zone No. of Companies No. of Employment 
The General Cairo 10 1123 
The General Alexandria 16 1092 
The General Port Said 2 237 
The General Suez 2 131 
The General Damietta 1 10 
The General 6 October 2 200 
The Private Cairo 6 895 
The Private Alexandria 1 0 
The Private Port Said 3 2120 
The Private Suez 1 392 
Total 44 6180 
source: uAri 
Since the beginning of the Barcelona era, the overall British contribution to 
employment in Egypt has been 37 per cent of the total jobs created by EU direct 
investment, which is estimated at 99,675 jobs in 611 companies. Between 1996 and 
2004, the 144 firms created by British FDI flows generated some 36,925 jobs. These 
figures put UK ahead of Italy, whose 113 firms created 13,426 jobs; Germany, 
whose 108 firms created 16,238 jobs; France, whose 80 firms created 7,103 jobs; the 
Netherlands, whose 47 firms created 4,672 jobs; and Spain, whose 23 firms created 
9,580 jobs, during the same period. Greece and Belgium had 36 investments divided 
equally between them, creating 1,715 jobs and 1,584 jobs, respectively. By contrast, 
the five investments made by Luxemburg created 2,331 jobs, while the 15 Swedish 
investments created only 1,853 jobs. The eight Irish investments created 1,686 jobs, 
while the 14 and 13 investments made by Austria and Denmark generated 1,258 jobs 
282 
and 1,153 jobs, respectively. Portugal had only three investments creating 121 jobs, 
while the single Finnish investment generated only 30 jobs during this entire nine- 
year period. 
In terms of sectoral distribution of the jobs created by EU investment, chemicals 
was the top sector with 19,517 jobs - of this Italy, Spain and Germany created 5,292 
jobs, 4,936 jobs and 4,242 jobs, respectively, between 1996 and 2004. British 
investment in this sector generated 1,818 jobs, accounting for only 9 per cent of total 
employment created by EU investment in this industry. Tourism was the second 
largest employment sector for EU investment with a total of 15,349 jobs, of which 57 
per cent (8,764 jobs) were created by 17 British firms. The British contribution to 
employment in the free zones accounted for 37 per cent of the 15,030 jobs created by 
86 EU companies. 
British investment also contributed to 94 per cent of total employment (13,570 
jobs) created by EU FDI in infrastructure. Engineering was the fourth largest 
industry in terms of employment, with 11,036 jobs, of which the UK, France, 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands accounted for 35 per cent, 22 per cent, 16 per 
cent, 11 per cent and 8 per cent, respectively between 1996 and 2004. The services 
sector had 5,136 jobs, of which 40 per cent were created by 6 Italian companies and 
24 per cent by 17 British firms. Spanish FDI contributed to the creation of 676 jobs, 
while Dutch, German, French and Swedish firms created 542,282,152 and 105 jobs, 
respectively. EU investment created 4,439 jobs and 4,137 jobs in the food industry 
and construction materials, of which the British contributed 19 per cent and 8 per 
cent, respectively. While textiles, metals and pharmaceuticals each had around 1,500 
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jobs from EU FDI, of which the British contributed 22 per cent in textiles and 26 per 
cent in pharmaceuticals 480 In agriculture, EU investment created 3,321 jobs, of 
which 41 per cent, 18 per cent, 17 per cent, 11 per cent, 5 per cent and 4 per cent 
were generated by Irish, Italian, French, British, Dutch and German firms, 
respectively. 
The overall EU and British contribution to employment, however, was low 
because the majority of investments were made in existing companies (joint 
ventures) that were integrated in the national economy. It was not until the 
promulgation of Law 8 of 1997 that allowed for 100 per cent foreign ownership that 
greenfield investment began to have a positive effect on employment levels with all 
jobs in companies newly created. Since then greenfield investment has become the 
dominant mode of entry accounting for 46 per cent of investment, followed by joint 
ventures, partial acquisition and acquisition at 37 per cent, 12 per cent and 5 per cent, 
respectively. 481 There was also growing opportunities for the improvement in the 
quality of employment as training offered by foreign-owned companies had a direct 
impact on the quality and productivity of labour, though the average share value of 
training expenditure in foreign companies in Egypt over the percentage of their sales 
remained as low as 1.89 per cent. 82 Thus, FDI should be guided by the government 
to where investments are most needed if they are to play a greater role in the 
development of the country. 
480 The UK did not have investment in the metals industry between 1996 and 2004. 
481 Saul Estrin & Klaus Meyer, Investment Strategies in Emerging Markets, (Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar, 2004), pp32-33. 
482 Ibid, p. 48. 
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While this chapter dealt solely with the British FDI flows into the industrial 
sector, the case of the UK retailer Sainsbury's, which withdrew from the Egyptian 
market less than a year after setting up its operation facility in 2000, reflected some 
of the factors that led to the decline of British capital flows between 2000 and 2005. 
It was apparent that Sainsbury's was affected by a general recession in the Egyptian 
market at that time, as well as an economic boycott against western goods in 
solidarity with the Palestinian Intifada, which dropped its sales to 25 per cent of the 
levels prior to the eruption of the Intifada on 28 September 2000 483 However, its 
withdrawal from the market highlighted, according to the British ambassador to 
Cairo, some concerns shared by many British companies in Egypt, in particular the 
lack of competition laws. 84 As such makes it necessary to re-examine the nature of 
the investment climate and the factors affecting business practice in the Egyptian 
market. This has also become vital as the above analysis highlighted clearly the 
modest rate of EU FDI flows into Egypt, which is much smaller than those of 
countries with similar demographic and economic capabilities in Latin America, East 
Europe or South East Asia. Thus, the final two chapters examine some of the main 
internal and external factors affecting the attractiveness of Egypt as a FDI 
destination, with special focus on the EU. 
483 Dina Ezzat, Sherine Nasr and Mona El Fiqi, "The massage is the medium", AI-Ahram Weekly, 2-8 
November 2000, issue No. 506. http: //weekly. ahram. org. eg/2000/506/index. htm 
484 This was stated by H. E. Graham Boyce, the UK Ambassador to Egypt, in his speech at Cairo 
University's Centre for the Study of Developing Countries, where he announced that the case of 
Sainsbury's highlighted some concerns shared by many British companies operated in Egypt. Al- 
Ahram Weekly, 22-28 February 2001, Issue No. 522. http: //weekly. ahram. org. eg12001/ec2. htm 
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Chapter Eight 
Internal Determinants of 
EU FDI into Egypt during the Barcelona Era 
Over the past ten years, Egypt's modest FDI record and its inability to compete with 
East European and Latin American countries, many of whom began their economic 
reforms much later than Egypt, has raised serious concerns over the government's 
economic policies and the country's investment climate. This has become more 
alarming as Egypt - which was in the top ten developing countries receiving FDI 
during the first half of the 1980s - has fallen to the third rank countries in global 
investment tables during the Barcelona era. This ranking is based on four criteria 
charting a country's attractiveness for FDI, in which the US, the EU and Japan are on 
the top, followed by China, the Asian tiger economies, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, 
Chile, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Countries with some investment 
potential such as Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia are ranked third, only ahead of the rest 
of the developing world which is classified in the fourth category as peripheral 
economies 485 
The reasons for such a declining position are both internal and external. These 
determinants affect directly and indirectly the country's investment climate, and 
hence the growth of foreign direct investment. The aim of this chapter is to examine 
some of the internal determinants that impacted on European FDI into Egypt during 
the Barcelona era. It analyses the policies that the Egyptian Government 
aas Bassem Kamar & Damyana Bakardzhieva, "The reforms needed to attract more FDI in Egypt: 
lessons from the CEEC experience", The Ninth Annual Conference of the Economic Research Forum 
for Arab Countries, Turkey and Iran, 26-28 October 2002, p. 6. 
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implemented to attract EU FDI, in particular the introduction of privatisation. It also 
looks at some of the structural challenges facing EU FDI into Egypt, while external 
determinants are examined in the following chapter. 
With regard to improving Egyptian attractiveness to EU FDI, two fundamental 
aspects are considered as pre-requisites. The first, and foremost determinant, has 
been political stability, which has improved in relative terms over the past few 
decades. The second determinant has been Egypt's economic stability and its 
evolution from a socialist to a market oriented system, with a further transition from 
import-substitution to export-oriented growth. The progress achieved along these 
lines has been fundamental to improving Egypt's attractiveness to foreign investors. 
This was evident during the second half of the 1970s, when the sharp growth of FDI 
inflows was due to the peace initiatives that brought about national and regional 
stability and the 1974 Infitah policy which ended in the partial economic 
liberalisation of the country's economic system. As such, the following two sections 
examine how, and to what extent, further progress along these two lines affected 
Egypt's FDI inflows from the EU. This is followed by an analysis of the impact of 
institutional, legal and infrastructural developments on the growth of EU FDI into the 
country. 
8.1. The Political Stability 
From an FDI perspective, political stability is often assessed by the degree of risk 
perceived by foreign investors as a result of political events, particularly when such 
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events lead to a change in the business environment within which foreign companies 
operate. A stable political system and environment means little or no political risk, 
while high political risk is often associated with turbulence in the political system 
and uncertainty about the future of the government or the political leadership. 
Domestic violence, social tension, and terrorism also lead to internal insecurity and 
often affect negatively the stability of the country. This assumption is hugely 
important for foreign investors, who simply do not risk their capital in a country that 
is considered unstable 486 Thus, political stability creates confidence among foreign 
investors as the laws and regulations governing the market and hence their 
investments remain the same over the long term, while political instability causes 
anxiety and reluctance. 87 This is simply how the political stability of a country 
becomes a pre-condition of its FDI attractiveness. 88 
Since the mid-1970s, political stability has become a key determinant of Egypt's 
attractiveness to FDI. Prior to this, the country's political stability discouraged 
foreign investors from taking risks in the Egyptian market. The 1960s saw intensive 
government interference in economic affairs through regulations and the 
nationalisation of foreign-owned companies and private property. The impact of this 
was severe on FDI due to limited private and foreign involvement in the economy. 
After the 1973 October war and the subsequent Egyptian-Israeli peace initiatives, 
486 Reda Ali, The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: a comparative study with reference to 
Ept, PhD thesis, University of Ulster, 2000, P. 266. 
481 There are a few exceptions to this norm where high political risk does not discourage foreign 
companies from investing in a particular country because high returns compensate for political 
instability. This is apparent in the case of extractive industries such as diamonds mines in Angola and 
oil explorations in Nigeria. Reda Ali, The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment, p. 267. 
488 United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporation, The Determinant of Foreign Direct 
Investment: a Survey of the Evidence, (New York: United Nations, 1992), p. 61. 
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Egypt's political situation improved to a level that made the country an attractive 
destination for FDI. 
The effect of political stability was seen in high economic growth and increased 
FDI due to de-regulation in some economic sectors that allowed access to foreign 
investors. Foreign companies were encouraged by lesser governmental interference 
in economic affairs during the era of economic liberalisation. In particular there was 
a cut in subsidiaries for basic commodities such as bread, sugar and edible oil. The 
impact of this was severe on socioeconomic conditions for the majority of the 
population. It also led to the food riots of 1977, which damaged the country's 
internal political stability. Data shows that this event had limited impact on FDI, 
which decreased by only 2 per cent to US$1,721.5 million in 1977, from US$1,878.8 
million in the previous year. Its rise to US$2.5 billion in 1978 indicates that Egypt's 
involvement in the peace process impacted positively on the growth of FDI, hence 
making the country a favoured destination for FDI between the mid-1970s and the 
mid-1980s. 89 
Over the past twenty years, there has been a link between the low rate of FDI into 
Egypt and the slow progress in the country's political evolution. Although Egypt has 
been more politically stable than many Middle Eastern and North African countries, 
the lack of democracy and internal political reform have been hindrances to 
sustaining high levels of FDI. Strict governmental controls over the state's 
institutions and constant intervention in the country's economy were of serious 
concern to foreign and private investors, many of whom identified the lack of 
489 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1994, p 54. 
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political reform as a major obstacle to investment ago While government controls 
provided stability at the level of political leadership, this prevented any real 
development in the internal political process until the 2005 constitutional amendment 
of Clause 76, which allowed various candidates to be nominated along with the 
sitting president for the presidential election. 91 This development, together with the 
surprising electoral victory of the Muslim Brotherhood, which won 88 seats in 
2005,492 indicated a growing political and social frustration among the public and an 
increasing demand for democratisation 493 This recent and sudden change in the 
political situation, which for decades remained stagnant, means that the progress 
achieved in the economic sphere was faster than that achieved in the political system 
over the past two decades 494 
How did this stagnant political situation affect the growth of EU FDI into Egypt? 
A 2000 University of Ulster study on the determinants of FDI argued that 73 per cent 
of foreign investors into Egypt were highly optimistic about the country's political 
490 Bassem Kaurar & Damyana Bakardzhieva , The reforms needed to attract more FDI in Egypt, p. 9. 491 Gamal Nkrumah, "A leap for democracy", Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 732. 
http: //weekly. ahram. or gr2005/732/e lg I. htm ; and Gamal Essani EL-Din, "Road to democracy", Al- 
Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 745,2-8 June 2005. htlp: //weekly. ahram. org. ee/2005n45/epl. htm 
492 According to Essara El-Erian, a leading figure in the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, around 15-20 
per cent of the votes they gained were protest ones against the government and the NDP candidates. 
See Amira Howeidy, "Who's afraid of the Brotherhood? " Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue 770,24-30 
November 2005. http: //weekly. ahram. ora. ea/2005/770/fr2. htm 
493 The victory of Muslim Brotherhood in the 2005 parliamentary election could not be seen as a 
desire or a trend towards an Islamic dominated political system, but a way of exerting pressure on the 
government and the political elites to launch comprehensive social and political reforms. The Muslim 
Brotherhood, though band as a political party, managed to benefit from presenting itself as a socio- 
economic force, which pledged free and inexpensive social and healthcare services, reduction in 
educational fees, and other solutions for alleviating poverty and reducing the cost of living. It also 
managed to benefit from a number of events such as anti-war demonstrations against the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, students protests in Egyptian universities, the role of the Kifaya movement, the 
popular campaign for change, all of which strengthened the organisational structure and improved the 
PR campaign of the Brotherhood. Nabil Abdel-Fattah, "How the Brotherhood won", Al-Ahram 
Weekly, Issue No. 775,29 December 2005- 4 January 2006. 
http: //weekly. ahram. org. eg/2005/775/op2I l . htm 494 Contrary to this statement, President Mubarak argued in an interview with Osama Saraya, editor- 
in-chief of Al-Ahram newspaper, that he was keen to see political progress goes hand in hand with 
economic and social progress. Full interview was published in Al Ahram International, issue No. 
43369, September 2,2005, pp. 1-3. 
290 
situation, and another 24 per cent agreed that the situation under President Mubarak 
was stable, but they had no certainty in the long-term, particularly when Mubarak's 
reign comes to an end 495 The study showed that 94 per cent of the foreign 
companies surveyed believed that Egypt enjoyed political stability and that this had a 
positive effect on Egypt's attractiveness to FDI. 496 This conclusion was largely due 
to the stability of the political leadership over a long period rather than because any 
of the concerns of foreign investors about intensive government interference in 
economic affairs and lack of political reforms and democracy were addressed. 97 
This thesis argues that the impact of political stability has not been as positive as 
the above study claims, and that the growth of FDI between 1996 and 2000 was 
largely due to the acceleration in privatisation. This study also shows that Egypt's 
FDI inflows have been highly influenced by political and security developments at 
national and regional levels. In particular the country's internal security has been a 
matter of concern to foreign investors, especially those considering an investment in 
the tourism industry. 
Table 8.1 shows that terrorist attacks targeting foreign tourists have disrupted this 
sector. For example, the Luxor massacre, in which 58 foreign tourists died in 1997, 
affected negatively the country's attractiveness for FDI. These acts have also 
damaged most economic sectors due to the fact that tourism was the country's main 
source of hard currency; hence its decline caused a shortage in cash flows and 
495 Reda All, The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment, p. 268. 
4% Ibid, p. 269. 
497 Internal political development in Egypt has been discussed in detail in Eberhard Kienle, A Grand 
Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt, (London: I. B. Tauis Publishers, 2001); and 
Bahgat Korany, "Restricted Democratisation from Above: Egypt" in Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen and 
Paul Noble (eds. ), Political Liberalisation and Democratisation in the Arab World:: Comparative 
Experiences, Volume 2, (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), pp. 39-69. 
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directly affected the balance of payments. On many occasions, the government had 
to withdraw hard currency from its foreign reserves to finance its import of basic 
commodities and goods, and its currency reserves fell by almost half from US$20 
billion in the late 1990s to nearly US$10 billion in 2004. 
Table 8.1: Terrorist attacks on tourist sites in Egypt, 1992-2005. 
Year Place Accident Number of Death Nationality 
1992 Dairut, Upper Egypt Attack on a tourist bus I Woman British 
- 26 February 1993 - Cairo -Bomb explosion -2 men - Turk & Egyptian 
-26 October - Cairo -Gunman shot tourists -3 people -2 Americans & 
I French 
-4 March 1994 - Sidfa, Upper Egypt -fire on cruise ship. -1 woman - German 
- 26 August - Nag Hamadi - fire on tourist bus -1 boy - Spanish 
- 27 September - Hurghada - fire on tourists -4 people -2 German &2 
Egyptian 
- 23 October - Naqada, Upper Egypt - fire on tourist minibus -I person - British 
-18 April 1996 - Outside a hotel on the 4 militants opened fire on 18 Greek 
Pyramids Road. tourists. 
- 18 September 1997 - Egyptian Museum, -2 gunmen fired on - 10 -9 German &1 
Cairo tourists. Egyptian 
-17 November -Hatshepsut Temple, - militants opened fire on - 62 people - 58 foreigners & 
Luxor tourists 4 Egyptians. 
2004 (7 October) Taba, Sinai Donated Bomb 34 10 Israelis + 23 
foreigners & 
Egyptians 
-7 April 2005 - Khan al-Khalili - donated bomb -3 -2 French &1 
American 
- 30 April - Cairo - Two women opened -10 -3 attackers 
fire on tourist bus; and &4 foreigners 
Bomber donated. &3 Egyptians. 
- 23 July - Sharm el-Sheik - Series of car bombs on - 88 -mostly 
hotel, coffee shop. Egyptians. 
Total 14 attacks Fire & bombs 233 killed Mix 
source: inc tissociaLcu rrcss, aaruruay is July tuuD. 
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The socioeconomic impact of the 1997 Luxor massacre was severe on the 
country, as almost 2 million people lost their jobs and many hotels and tourist 
companies had to close down. Egypt also lost more than US$1 billion in tourism 
revenue after this incident as a direct loss, while the indirect losses were 
unaccountable. 98 
However, security concerns did not equally affect all foreign companies. Foreign 
investors in tourism and the banking sector, which directly engaged with the public, 
were more affected by terrorist acts than those investing in manufacturing and oil 
exploration 499 Although most factories are located outside urban areas, the impact 
of terrorism has often had an adverse effect on foreign companies, because most of 
them operate for the domestic market and hence stagnation in the internal market 
impacts directly on the performance and revenues of these companies. As such many 
foreign companies faced the choice of bearing the risk of the financial and physical 
damage resulting from terrorist acts or seeking insurance against terrorism, which 
increased further their financial and production costs. 500 
Egypt's internal political stability is related to the stability of the whole MENA 
region; hence it has often been affected by events occurring beyond its borders. This 
was apparent during such regional crises as the 1990/1991 Gulf War, the Palestinian 
Intifada of 2000-2004, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, all of which impacted on FDI 
498 The impact of the Luxor incident affected almost all sorts of businesses from the taxi driver, the 
supermarket, the hotel, the restaurant, the bazaar, the museum, bars and cafe shops, airline companies 
etc. 
499 Reda Ali, The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment, p. 273. 
S0° Insurance against terrorism is rare in Egypt and hence some of the foreign companies had to seek 
insurance from insurance companies in their home countries. Reda Ali, The Determinants of Foreign 
Direct Investment, p. 274. 
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growth in Egypt and the country's GDP. 501 They also led to an increase in the level 
of political risk. This was evident between 2001 and 2004, when some foreign 
companies disinvested while those continued operating in the country reduced their 
cash flows. 
8.2. The Economic Stability 
In the aftermath of the late 1980s financial crisis, Egypt successfully managed to 
improve its economic conditions through the 1991 Economic Reform and Structural 
Adjustment Programme (ERSAP) under the guidance of the World Bank and IMF. 
The most significant development was the stabilisation of the country's main 
macroeconomic indicators, particularly the country's real growth of GDP, and 
controls of the inflation rate and exchange rate policy, all of which have a direct 
impact on foreign companies' revenues and transaction costs. 502 
Data shows that most indicators were positive until 2001, when the global 
economic turndown damaged Egypt's economic performance. For instance, Egypt's 
GDP increased steadily from 1.9 per cent in 1992 to 6.3 per cent and 5.1 per cent in 
1999 and 2000, respectively, but such growth declined gradually in the following 
four years to reach its pre-1993 level. Although this decline occurred at the time of 
global economic downturn, the Egyptian economy began to show signs of recession 
'0' The negative impact of regional crises on foreign investment was once highlighted by the British 
Ambassador to Egypt, with particular reference to the Palestinian Intifada. H. E. Graham Boyce, the 
British Ambassador to Egypt, speech given at Cairo University's Centre for the Study of Developing 
Countries in 2001. Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 522,22-28 February 2001. 
http: //weekly. ahram-orp-. ee/2001/ec2. htm 
502 Bassem Kamar & Damyana Bakardzhieva, The reforms needed to attract more FDI in Egypt, pp. 
10-11. 
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by the late 1990s with an increased budget deficit, large domestic debt, and 
unmatched growth in public revenues to compensate for increased public 
expenditures. '03 By 2004, economic policies were at crossroads, and a lack of 
consensus among senior government officials was apparent in regard to economic 
policies, in particular monetary policy. For instance, the minister of investment 
suggested that higher interest rates could contain inflation and help make the 
Egyptian pound more convertible, which is an incentive to f' UI. This view caused 
mixed reactions among the business community, from outright rejection to 
conditional approval, hence highlighting discrepancies between government policies 
and business interests. 504 









Source: Economic Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Egypt (various issues). 
Figure 8.1 shows that the ERSAP succeeded in bringing inflation under control 
from 19.7 per cent in 1991 to 4.3 per cent in 2003. '0' This programme also reduced 
the budget deficit and inflation. but failed to bring real GDP growth hack to the level 
50' Doha Abelhamed, "The future of fiscal reform", . 1/-. 
Aram Weekhv, Issue No. 699,15-21 July 2004. 
Http: weekly. ahram. ore. eg 2004! 699'ec2. htm. 
504 Mahmoud Mohieldin. minister of investment and head of the I: conontic Committee of the ruling, 
National Democratic Party. A/-Ahram Week/v. Issue No. 702,5-II August 2004. 
http: "weekly. ahram. org. eg2004/702/ec I . 
htm. 
505 The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Report. Egtpt, data collected from various issues 
between February 1996 and May 2005. 
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achieved by the Infitah policy of the 1970s, when Egypt's real GDP growth recorded 
an average of 9 per cent per year between 1974 and 1981.506 Moreover, the ERSAP 
led to price liberalisation in consumer goods and basic commodities. The programme 
eliminated gradually large subsidies and freed consumer prices except on sensitive 
goods such as edible oil, rationed sugar and pharmaceuticals, in order for the 
government to meet IMF targets. For instance, petroleum prices rose from 36 per 
cent of the international price in May 1989 to 90 per cent in June 1995 and reached 
the full international price by the end of 1999. Electricity, water and food subsidies 
were also dealt with in a similar manner. As a percentage of total current 
expenditure, subsidies fell by 21 per cent in 1991,7.7 per cent in 1997, and 6.3 per 
cent in 2002. However, the increase in the international price of basic goods during 
2004 increased once again the subsidies to EGP 15.6 billion. This led to the re- 
emergence of consumer price inflation as a major economic policy challenge after 
2003, and it continued to rise throughout 2004 to reach almost 11.3 per cent. 
0 
On the fiscal side, the ERSAP managed to achieve a relative fiscal sustainability 
through balancing public revenues and expenditures. 507 This was achieved through 
an increase in revenues, which accounted for a fall of 40 per cent of the budget 
deficit, and a reduction in public expenditure, which covered the remaining 60 per 
cent. 508 This achievement reduced the budget deficit from 5.5 per cent of GDP in 
1991-1992 to 1 per cent in 1997-1998. It was also consolidated by an increase in oil 
prices, Suez Canal profits, and the adoption of the sales tax, which boosted revenues 
by an amount equivalent to 1.4 per cent of GDP. Further improvement in the budget 
506 EIU, Country profile Egypt 1995-96, p. 13. 
507A1-Ahram Center for political and Strategic Studies, Arab Strategic Report 1997, Cairo, February 
1998, pp. 325-327. 
508 Doha Abdelhamid, AI-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 698,8-14 July 2004. 
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deficit followed a reduction by US$19.6 billion of the total outstanding foreign debts 
made by the Paris Club in May 1991; in addition to the debt relief offered by the US 
and some Arab countries after the 1991 Gulf War. These developments in fiscal 
policy increased GDP from 1.9 per cent in 1991 to 6.3 per cent in 1999, as shown in 
table 8.1. They restored the confidence of foreign investors in Egypt's financial 
credibility and improved the country's image in the global financial market during 
the 1990s. 
However, the positive impact of these developments was eroded by lack of 
constant modernisation in Egypt's capital and credit market, which remained 
underdeveloped for many years. The incapacity of this market to provide capital and 
financial services forced the majority of foreign companies operating in Egypt to 
depend on self-finance rather than local credit. 509 Data shows that some 66.7 per cent 
of foreign companies were completely dependent on self-finance, while only 6.1 per 
cent depended on the Egyptian capital market. 51° This might have been caused by a 
lack of information on the capital and credit market, including its regulations, 
procedures and operational systems. Egypt's interest rate was also considered high. 
The positive impact of the 1991 ERSAP was also eroded by the failure of the 
Egyptian Government to put in place a second generation of fiscal policies to replace 
this programme, which terminated towards the end of the 1990s. Such failure 
resulted in a serious financial crisis between 2001 and 2004. During this period, no 
509 Reda Ali argued that 42 per cent of foreign companies believed that the capital market in Egypt 
was sustenance to FDI activities, but his general remark confirmed that the capital market was not 
strong enough to sustain foreign companies operation in Egypt. Reda Ali, The Determinants of 
Foreign Direct Investment, 227. 
"'The remaining percentage represented companies partly dependent on either local or self-finance. 
Ibid, p. 229. 
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effective measures were taken to stop the deterioration in either Egypt's economic 
growth or FDI inflows into the country. It was not until 2004 that a new fiscal reform 
programme began, which included "public revenue programmes, public expenditure 
programmes, the corporatisation of public economic authorities, domestic and 
foreign public debt management and the modernisation of the National Investment 
Bank" 511 The most significant of these measures was the new income tax law which 
aimed at moving towards a full value added tax (VAT), reducing tax burdens on 
individual incomes by reducing tax rates and increasing exemptions, simplifying 
taxation procedures, adopting risk management, rationalising tax exemption 
practices, collecting tax debts and prosecuting tax evasion. The impact of these 
policies, however, on the country's overall performance and economic outlook is still 
too early to assess. 
The stability of the exchange rate policy was another significant determinant of 
EU investment into Egypt. Between the early 1960s and the early 1990s, the 
Egyptian Government operated foreign exchange controls and multiple exchange 
rates, a system that created various rates for governmental and commercial 
transactions. This multiple exchange system differentiated between the official rate 
of governmental transactions and the unofficial rates of the market. Such a system 
disadvantaged foreign companies in several ways. They were unable to bid on 
governmental tenders because their offers had to be based on the official exchange 
rate while they had to purchase most raw materials for production from the informal 
market. 
511 Doha Abelhamed, "The future of fiscal reform", Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 699,15-21 July 2004. 
Http: //weekly. ahram. org. eg/2004/699/ec2. htm. 
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Source: IMF, Financial Statistics, various volumcs, and National Bank of I; gyFt, Cairo. 
Also, the official fixed exchange rate had a negative impact on the transi r of' 
some profits back to their home countries, as well as the earnings of their native 
managers and employer. This system not only discouraged new Fl)I flows into the 
country. but also limited the possibility of expansion iör existing companies for 
many years. It was not until the early 1990s that the government unified the 
exchange rate system and adopted - after a minor devaluation of the pound in 1991- 
1992 -a 'managed floating regime', which lasted until . tune 
2000. 'I' During this 
period. Egypt had a stable pound/dollar exchange rate at nearly FG[' 3.40 to US$l. 
This degree of exchange rate stability impacted positively on Fgypt's economic 
performance and explained the relatively high level of' FDI between 1996 and 
2000.51' This, in turn, enabled the country to constantly increase its foreign reserves, 
which amounted to US$20 billion in 1998. 
51' Bassem Kamar & Damyana Bakardzhieva, "Economic 'IYilcmma and Exchange Rate Management 
in Egypt". paper presented at the Tenth Annual Conference of the Economic Research Forum /or. -Irak 
Countries, Turkey and /run, December 16-18,2003, pp. 1-2. 
51' See chapter six on the growth of FDI flows from the EU between 1996 and 2004. 
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The stability in the exchange rate regime was eroded following the 1997 Luxor 
massacre, and by the regional tension emanating from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
These developments affected considerably the exchange rate market equilibrium 
because of a shortage in foreign currency due to a decline in tourist revenues and a 
heavy reliance on foreign reserves to purchase essential imports in hard currency. 
This increased the trade deficit by more than US$12 billion by the end of the 
decade. 514 Also, the deficit in the Egyptian-EU trade balance reached US$4.8 billion 
in favour of the EU in 1998. Such pressure on the balance of payments and foreign 
reserves, together with external shocks such as the attack of September 11 2001 on 
the US led to a general decline in the economy and a depreciation of the Egyptian 
pound, which reached EGP6.20 for one US dollar by the end of 2004.515 The impact 
of these factors was notable in the poor economic performance of the government 
and the dramatic decline in Egypt's FDI inflows during the first half of the present 
decade. 
One can also argue that the delay of trade liberalisation in Egypt was caused by 
the government's fear of losing out on major sources of revenue, in particular 
customs tariffs, which accounted for 18 per cent of tax revenues and 4.4 per cent of 
the country's GDP in 2001-2002.516 It was not until September 2004 that the 
Egyptian government took some serious steps towards reducing the high customs 
tariffs imposed on imported goods, spare parts and materials. This measure was, in 
the words of the Foreign Trade and Industry Minister, "just the first step in a 
spa Data collected by the author from Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry, Foreign Trade Division, 
Data and Information Unit, December 2004. 
515 Central Bank of Egypt, Economic Review, No. 2,2005. 
516 Omnia Helmy, "The effect of trade liberalisation on government revenues in Egypt", (Cairo: 
Egyptian Center for Economic Studies, 2004); and Niveen Wahsh, "Slashing traditional wisdom", Al- 
Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 708,16-22 September 2004. http: //weekly. ahram. org. eW/2004/708/ec4. htm 
300 
government plan to bolster trust in the economy". 517 This measure not only reduced 
customs tariffs on foodstuffs, furniture, durable goods, air-conditioners and vehicles 
from an average of 14 per cent to 9 per cent, but also consolidated the list of goods 
susceptible to tariffs from 13,000 to 6,000 in an attempt to simplify customs 
procedures. 518 Industries of importance to foreign companies such as chemicals, 
engineering and construction materials also benefited from some significant 
reductions. For instance, tariffs on various automotive spare parts were reduced from 
23 and 33 per cent to 12 and 5 per cent, respectively. Imported cement saw a 
reduction from 37 to 22 per cent, while tariffs on fertilisers decreased from 33 and 13 
per cent to just 2 per cent. 519 
Prior to these tariff reductions, most foreign companies complained that high 
customs tariffs, which averaged 21 per cent compared to 15 per cent in most 
developing countries, affected their production costs and increased their prices, 
hence making it difficult for them to compete with local manufacturers who used 
local materials in the production process. Many of these companies were also unable 
to compete with cheap imported goods from China and the Far East. Such conditions 
did not enable many foreign companies to develop their production, raise their 
competitiveness or boost their exports, forcing the majority of them to produce low 
cost products for the local market. On an administrative level, some companies, 
particularly in the Information Technology (IT) industry, complained that they had 
s" Rashid Mohamed Rashid, Foreign Trade and Industry Minister, Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 708, 
16-22 September 2004. http: //weekly. ahram. org. ea/2004/708/ec3. htm 
518 While examining the impact of the customs tariffs reduction on local manufacturers, Galal El- 
Zorba, Chairman of the Federation of Egyptian Industries, argued that this reduction could bring down 
the prices of such products as foodstuffs by five to seven per cent and furniture by ten per cent Al- 
Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 709,23-29 September 2004. http: //weekly. ahram. org. eg/2004/709/ec4. htm. 
519 Mona El-Fiqi, "The Great unknown", Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 709,23-29 September 2004, 
htta: //weekly. ahram. org. eg/2004/709/ec4. htm 
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problems with customs officials, who refused to apply the law on shipments of CDs, 
despite the fact that all imports of IT spare parts and technical components have been 
exempted from duties in an attempt to both promote the sector and meet Egypt's 
commitment to the World Trade Organisation Information Technology agreement. 520 
Other companies also complained about dual taxation and the over-valuation of 
duties. For these companies, the implementation of new customs reforms not only 
eliminate such problems but also exposes industry to competition, which leads to the 
better allocation of resources and cheaper prices for consumers, as well as limits on 
the profitability of producing for the local market, all of which encourage exports. 
As for the link between trade liberalisation and FDI flows, Egypt's experience 
shows that most foreign companies preferred trade protection than trade 
liberalisation, because the majority of them depended on local inputs and produced 
for the domestic market. 521 Only those companies that imported most of their inputs 
and produced for export favoured trade reform. Such a preference weakened the 
inter-relationship between export and FDI in Egypt. Although Egypt's exports to the 
EU increased from US$1304 million in 2002 to US$2026 million in 2003,522 the data 
presented in chapters four, six and seven shows that there is no significant shift in the 
focus of EU FDI from import-substitution industrialisation to export-orientated 
activities. This means that EU FDI into Egypt did not develop the country as a 
platform for exports, particularly in such industries as textiles and processed food 
520 Some of these complaints were filed to the Federation of Egyptian Industries' Information 
Technology Chamber, Cairo. Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 709,23-29 September 2004. 
httD: //weekly. ahram. org. eg/2004/709/ec4. htm. 
521 Reda Ali (2000), The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment, p. 231. 
522 Data collected by the author from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry, International Trade 
Division, Cairo, December 2004. 
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where Egypt enjoyed comparative advantages. 523 This was caused by the high tariff 
barriers that supplemented production costs which resulted in high profits of over 20 
per cent when serving the local market compared with 5-7 per cent when producing 
for foreign markets. '24 This was also caused by the insignificant level of' intra- 
industry trade between Egypt and the EU due to a lack of specialisation in most 
Egyptian industries, '2 and an absence of European horizontal investment into Egypt, 
despite the country's relatively cheap production and labour cost. 












Source: GAPI for FDI and Ministry of Foreign Trade and IndustrN, I: glpl. 
* In 2004, figure for FDI calculated until 30/I 1/2004; and for trade until 30/8/2004. 
Thus, an improvement in this weak FDI-export relationship depends largely on 
the elimination of tariff barriers that could lower the share of profit when investing 
Ahmed Ghoneim (2000), Determinants of the Egyptian Exports Market Access to the European 
Union, Center for Economic and Financial Research Studies, Cairo University, Egypt, Vol. 10, 
December 2000, p. 39. 
524 Nathan Associates Inc. (1998), Enhancing Egypt's Exports, report prepared for the Government of 
Egypt, Ministry of Trade and Supply, cited in Ahmed Ghoneim (2000), Determinants of the Eqi pptian 
Exports Market Access to the European Union, Center for Economic and Financial Research Studies, 
Cairo University, Egypt, Vol. 10, December 2000, p. 40. 
525 This is mainly caused by shortage of fund and lack of research centres to deal with the problems of 
productions. 
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for the local market, an increase in the share of the industrial sector, which took 45 
per cent of total EU FDI flows between 1996 and 2004, in total Egyptian exports to 
the EU, and a fundamental shift in the orientation of FDI towards export-oriented 
investment. 
8.3. Privatisation 
Privatisation was a major component of the 1991 ERSAP. It was not only viewed as 
a means of increasing and enhancing the role of the private sector in the economy, 526 
but also as a mechanism through which foreign companies could purchase equity in 
local companies. 527 Such a mechanism was enhanced by Law 8 of 1997 which 
allowed 100 per cent foreign ownership. This law offered foreign companies a great 
deal of freedom beyond traditional entry modes such as acquisition and joint 
ventures, by allowing them to set up their own affiliates and branches with entire 
control over their equity, management, operations and marketing. 528 This encouraged 
investment in greenfield projects that require foreign companies to create entirely 
new subsidiaries and use their own managerial, technology and capital resources. 529 
Thus, privatisation was an essential element in the attraction of FDI inflows into 
Egypt, particularly during the latter half of the 1990s. 530 
526 Taher Helmy, "The New Social Contract", Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 23-29 December 2004, 
http: //weekly. ahram. org. eg, /2004/722/ec7. htm 
527 Frank Sader, "Privatisation and Foreign Investment in the Developing World: 1988-1992", The 
World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 1202 , October 1993,, pp. 24-30. 528 For details on the varying modes of entry of FDI see B. Kogut and H. Singh, "The effect of 
national culture on the choice of entry mode", Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 19, 
No. 3,1988, p. 12. 
529 Klaus Mayer and Saul Estrin, Investment Strategies in Emerging Markets, (Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar, 2004), pp. 12-18. 
530 For details on the effect of privatisation on FDI see for example: IMF (1998), "Egypt: Beyond 
Stabilisation, Towards a Dynamic Market Economy", IMF Occasional Papers, No. 163; O. 
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The progress made in the privatisation programme has been insignificant. Figure 
8.4 shows that this process has been slow, with only an intermediate peak in 1999, 
when 40 state-owned companies were sold. Between 1991 and May 2005,241 
companies were sold to a value of EGP21.6 billion, 217 of these companies were 
sold under Law 203 for EGP 17.5 billion. Between1999 and 2005,24 joint ventures 
were sold with revenues amounting to EGP4 billion. 
Fib* e84 Number of state-owned companies priv atised betssccn 1991 and May 2005 
_ý 
,, 
Source: Ministry of Investment. 2005. 
A comparison between the data in this figure and that in table 6.5, '31 which 
shows the growth of FDI inflows into Egypt between 1996 and 2004, confirms a 
correlation between the acceleration of privatisation and the growth of FDI and vice 
versa. Figure 8.4 shows that privatisation reached a high level between 1996 and 
2000, with an intermediate peak of 40 companies in 1999; the table also indicates a 
growth in FDI inflows into the country at a steadily increasing rate from US$636 
million in 1996 to US$1.2 billion in 2000. The drop in FDI by more than half to 
US$5 10 million in 2001 was matched by a decrease in the number of companies sold 
from 19 in 2000 to 10,7 and 13 companies in 2001,2002 and 2003, respectively. 
Haveyshyn & D. McGettigan, "Privatisation in Transition Countries: A Sampling of the Literature", 
IAIF Working Paper, No. 99; 6, (Washington D. C.: IMF, 1999); and Klaus Mayer and Saul Estrin, 
Investment Strategies in Emerging Markets, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004). 
531 See p. 222. 
JOS 
ý,; o .:, v ýooS o, ý oo _11,14 NI, 
OS 
This parallel between slow privatisation and a decline in FDI also highlights the 
preference of foreign investors to invest in existing firms in order to avoid the 
complexities of Egyptian bureaucracy and the costly requirements and lengthy 
procedures needed to create a new company. 532 
Since June 2004, available data shows that rapid privatisation has been a key 
objective once again, with 25 companies sold between June 2004 and May 2005. 
This process is likely to accelerate further following the new government decree to 
sell another 43 state-owned companies during 2005-2006.533 The most remarkable 
development in this recent phase was the privatisation of the banking sector, which 
started in August 2005 with the sale of Misr International Bank to the French bank 
Nationale Societe Generale for US$298 million. 534 The process has also been 
extended to cover large, well-established, companies such as Egypt Air's in-flight 
services company, 535 on the basis that a partnership with a foreign investor would 
guarantee extra funding, international marketing and improve service quality. "' 
However, privatisation has yet had limited impact on the private sector in Egypt. 
Despite contributing the largest share of the country's GNP, Egypt's private sector is 
still at an emerging stage and there is still a long way to go before this sector is a 
powerful force in the Egyptian economy. This was confirmed in a previous study, 
532 Al Ahram Weekly, "Privatisation blues", Issue No. 591,20-26 June 2002. 
http: //weekly. ahram. org. eg/2002/591 /ec4. htm 
53; Egyptian Ministry of Investment, "Companies to be privatised in 2005/2006", unpublished report, 
Cairo, 2005. 
"" The total value of the bank was estimated at US$420 million. Al-Shark AI Awsat Newspaper, Issue 
No. 9762, August 20,2005. 
sss Egypt Air's in-flight services company controls the in-flight services of all Egypt Air's 
international and domestic flights, and owns and runs transit hotel, as well as coffee shops in Egypt's 
main airports. 
536 Hassan Musharrafa, the chairman of Egypt Air's in-flight services, Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 
707.9-15 September 2004. http: //weekly. ahram. org. eL-/2004/707/ec I. htm 
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which revealed that 64 per cent of the foreign companies and joint ventures surveyed 
believed that Egypt's private sector is emerging, while 16.5 per cent considered it to 
be weak. Only 19 per cent believed that the sector is strong. 537 Such a modest 
position is due to the fact that neither privatisation nor the entry of MNCs stimulated 
competition among local firms, many of which lacked both efficient management 
techniques and technology. 
The study also concluded that foreign companies found it difficult to find the 
right business partner because many local firms either did not have the capacity to 
provide the inputs required for their production process or provided services at low 
quality standard and high prices. This forced over 65 per cent of foreign companies 
operating in Egypt during the past fifteen years to import their production inputs, 
while the remainder used both imported and local inputs. 538 This condition is 
unlikely to change in the short term as the present phase of privatisation is unable to 
attract FDI flows into manufacturing and finance, the two most dynamic sectors of 
the economy. The government is also targeting Arab investors, particularly after the 
retreat of many European and US firms in the wake of 9/11. Early indications show 
that Arab investment is targeting the retail and services sectors, with the largest 
investment (of EGP300 million) being made by Kuwaiti investors in Omar Effendi, 
one of Egypt's oldest retailers, which has 82 stores nationwide. 539 
537 Reda Ali, The determinants offoreign direct investment, p. 237. 
538 Reda All, The determinants offoreign direct investment, pp. 235-238. 
539 Sherine Abdel-Razeq, "What in store for Omar Effendi? ", Al Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 768,10-16 
November 2005. http: //weekly. ahram. ori. ep-/2005/768/ec2. htm 
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8.4. Institutional Development and Transparency 
The experience of the 1970s Infitah policy shows that the role of institutions is 
pivotal to the success of Egypt's economic liberalisation. The limited success of this 
policy in attracting FDI highlighted the importance of connecting micro-level 
economic activity with macro-level incentives provided by an institutional 
framework. "' The existence of such a framework, which guarantees a continuous 
process of transformation over time, has become an imperative, as the modernisation 
of Egypt's bureaucracy, which is one of the oldest civil services in the world, is very 
slow. 54' As explained earlier, the cumbersome and ineffective nature of the 
administrative system undermined government efforts to liberalise the economy and 
improve the country's investment climate over the past thirty years. This challenge 
has continued to affect both domestic and foreign businesses until today. 
A survey on foreign companies operating in Egypt conducted by Cairo's 
Economic Forum between 2001 and 2002 concluded that this ineffectiveness 
impacted negatively on start-up businesses due to the complexity and lengthy 
procedures needed to complete paperwork and obtain licences. It also concluded that 
existing companies already operating suffered from the ineffectiveness of the 
taxation system and widespread corruption which increased business costs. 542 As 
such the increased efficiency and transparency of institutions is a key determinant in 
540 Adel Beshai, "Privatisation, liberalisation and all that - revisited, ten years on", AI-Ahram Weekly, 
Issue 642. http: //weekly. ahram. org. ez/2003/642/ecl. htm 
54' Derek Hopwood argues that the reform of Egypt's bureaucratic system is a very difficult task 
because such act will require an entire change of attitudes and traditions that affect most aspects of life 
in the country. Derek Hopwood, Egypt Politics and Society 1945-90, Third Edition, (London: 
Routledge, 1993), p. 181. 
542 Meryse Louis et at (2004) "Foreign Direct Investment in Egypt" in Saul Estrin & Klaus Meyer 
(eds. ), Investment Strategies in Emerging Markets, p. 54. 
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the country's attractiveness to FDI. Another study showed that all the foreign 
investors and joint ventures surveyed confirmed that they faced bureaucratic 
problems with administration either during the establishment or the operation of their 
companies. Some 78.3 per cent of these companies confirmed that the economic and 
administrative reforms of the 1990s did not improve the administrative system. 543 
From a foreign company perspective, the underdeveloped and inefficient nature 
of financial institutions was one of the most damaging factors in a company's 
investment activities. This failure to modernise, which is still the case regarding most 
Egyptian banks, is due to the government's tight control over the Central Bank of 
Egypt, whose policies and operations were conducted in accordance with the general 
needs of the government rather than the market. Such controls continued from the 
early 1960s until 2002, when the Central Bank of Egypt became independent and its 
policies began to be formulated in response to market needs rather than political 
considerations. Government interference in business resulted in extensive 
bureaucracy that contributed to the downgrading of Egypt's investment environment. 
Indeed, there was a total absence of FDI inflows from the EU into the banking 
sector between 1984 and August 2005.544 Despite the establishment of almost 38 
private banks and 6 foreign banks since 1972, the role of the public sector in the 
financial system remains dominant. More than half of business loans are still 
provided by the big four state-owned banks: the National Bank of Egypt, Misr Bank, 
sas Only 16.2 per cent of the companies agreed that the 1990s economic reform led to an improvement 
in the bureaucratic system. Ali, The determinants of foreign direct investment, p. 293. 
544 This is according to GAFI's database. For more details see the analysis of EU investment in the 
financial sector presented in chapters four, six and seven. 
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Bank de Cairo and the Bank of Alexandria. 545 The continued dominance of the 
public sector banks together with the reluctance of the government to allow foreign 
participation in banking has delayed the reform of this vital sector and hence reduced 
its attractiveness to FDI. 
The recent attempt by the government to privatise the Bank of Alexandria during 
2004-2005 faced tremendous difficulties, not least upgrading the bank's operational 
system and the introduction of an advanced information system. 546 It was not until 
2002 that this bank had an electronic system to conduct its exchange and transaction 
operations. According to the president of the bank, the main challenge for him was 
not only restructuring and developing a system but finding accurate data which he 
could use to draw up a development strategy or make decisions. He also stated that 
the deteriorating conditions of the bank required the entire restructuring and 
modernisation not only of the physical assets of the bank, including buildings, but 
also the human resources of the bank, including its management and 8,000 
employees nationwide, who have not received sufficient training for many years. 547 
As for transparency, the most challenging issue for foreign and private investors 
was the widespread corruption within the administrative system. This was caused in 
the first place by the inability of the government to improve the socioeconomic 
conditions of underpaid civil servants, who were largely responsible for the 
say Meryse Louis et al, "Foreign Direct Investment in Egypt" in Saul Estrin & Klaus Meyer (eds. ), 
Investment Strategies in Emerging Markets, p. 55. 
546 Mahmoud Abdel Latif, president of Bank of Alexandria, stated that all transactions and exchange 
operations used to be conducted manually until 2002. Al-Ahram A1-Ektysadi, Issue 8,3 July 2005, p. 9. 
5T7 The president of Bank of Alexandria indicated the operational system of the bank has not 
developed for several decades and became almost totally out-of-date with the tremendous 
development occurring in the global financial institutions, particularly in accreditation. The 
assessment of risk was entirely based on the personal judgement of the bankers due to absence of units 
or departments of risk analysis, hence leaving a room for personal negations and in some cases 
corruption. Al-Ahram Al-Ektysadi, Issue 8,3 July 2005, p. 9. 
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implementation of government policies and laws. This made petty corruption a 
common practice among many employees who considered such acts as a way of 
compensating for their low wages and salaries. Such practices increased following 
the sharp rise in the price of basic commodities with the slashing of government 
subsidies. Insufficient training and a lack of incentives for progression made 
bureaucrats resistant to any kind of reforms that might threaten their careers. The 
impact of corruption led Transparency International to rank Egypt fifty fourth out of 
fifty nine countries in terms of corruption and left it with a global score of 3.6 in the 
Corruption Perception Index published in 2001.548 In 2005, the country's ranking in 
Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index increased to seventieth 
place with a global score of 3.4, which indicates that there is a high perceived level 
of corruption. 549 This low ranking affected the attractiveness of the country to 
foreign investors and placed great pressure on the government to establish the rule of 
law, good governance and transparency in order to boost investment. 
8.5. The Role of the Legal System 
The evolution of the Egyptian legal system over the past thirty years impacted 
greatly on the growth rate of FDI into the country. "" This was apparent in the 
resurgence of FDI into Egypt in the early 1970s, which rose to an unprecedented rate 
sas A score of 10 indicates a country clean of corruption, and a score of 0 is for completely corrupt 
country. See Bassem Kamar & Damyana Bakardzhieva, The reforms needed to attract more FDI in 
Ept, p. 12. 
549 Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2005, Berlin, 2005, 
hqp: //www. tansparency-orgLcl2i/2005/cpi2OO5. enhtml#cpi2OO5 
550 Goans, Judy, "Commercial Law: Providing a Framework for Economic Growth", Nassar, Heba & 
Ghoneim, Ahmed (eds. ), Institutional and Policy Challenges facing the Egyptian Economy, (Cairo: 
Center for Economic and Financial Research and Studies, 2003), pp. 15-43; and Hilal, Bahaa Ali E 
(2003), "The Challenge of Building Market oriented Legal Institutions in Egypt", in Nassar, H. & 
Ghoneim, A. (eds. ), Institutional and Policy Challenges facing the Egyptian Economy, pp. 45-66. 
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of US$4.6 billion in 1975, due to the 1971 constitutional amendments and Law 43 of 
1974, which offered guarantees to foreign investors against nationalisation and 
allowed limited foreign ownership. The role of the legal system was extended in Law 
No. 8 of 1997 on investment guarantees and incentives to foreign investors. Foreign 
companies were able to hold 100 per cent ownership and set up their subsidiaries 
with full control over their management, functions, operations and marketing in any 
of the 16 areas of economic activity set out in Article 1. Some of these areas were 
previously restricted, including industry and mining, tourism, petroleum production 
and refining, cinema production, housing and computer software systems. 55' 
While providing investment guarantees, Law No. 8 of 1997 offered incentives to 
foreign companies, including tax exemptions on the revenues of commercial and 
industrial activities for a period of five years from the first fiscal year following the 
beginning of production, and for ten years for companies established in the new 
industrial zones and new urban communities. 552 Also, incentives were extended to 
the assignment of land and to investment in the free zones, where activities 
accounted for almost one third of total FDI into Egypt between 1997 and 2004. 
However, tax incentives were found to be less important than other factors such 
as the investment environment, good economic performance, and political and 
economic stability. The impact of tax incentives was insignificant because Egyptian 
corporate tax was 42 per cent, among the highest rates worldwide, particularly when 
compared with emerging economies such as Vietnam, Singapore, China, Czech 
ssi For details on the 16 area of activities see GAFI, Law No. 8 of 1997 on investment guarantees and 
incentives and its executive regulations, Article 1. http: //www. misrnet. idsc. gov. eg/invest/a-main. htm 
552 For details on all sorts of tax incentives see section 3, chapter 1 on tax exemptions, Articles 16-27 
of Law 8 of 1997. 
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Republic, Hungary, and Brazil, which had 25 per cent, 26 per cent, 33 per cent, 35 
per cent, 36 per cent, and 25-40 per cent, respectively. 
553 This high tax rate impacted 
negatively on Egypt's share of FDI inflows between 1996 and 2004 either by 
discouraging new potential investors or forcing existing investors to evade tax. 
Almost 70 per cent of foreign companies operating in Egypt considered Egypt's 
corporate tax to be higher than international rates. 554 This demanded an urgent 
modification of the investment law and the tax system in a way that simplifies, 
stabilises and provide more certainty and transparency. There is also a need to bring 
the corporate tax rate into line with the international norm. 
Moreover, the inefficiency of the legal system was still perceived to be an 
impediment to private and foreign investment. It is argued that Egypt's legislative 
system was marked by the lack of a unified policy framework for reform, time- 
consuming procedures, the frequent amendment of laws, and an unpredictability of 
regulations, all of which affected the credibility of the legislative process. 555 The 
commercial legal system was also considered by many companies to be slow and 
expensive, as well as marked by petty corruption, while the average time period for 
resolving a case was six years. 556 This system also lacked efficient mechanisms for 
dispute resolutions so that 80 per cent of foreign companies operating in Egypt 
preferred to seek arbitration rather than go to court to resolve their disputes with the 
government or their local partners. 
55' Reda Ali, The determinants offoreign direct investment, p. 255. 
554 Ibid, 260. 
555 N. El-Mikawy & H. Handoussa, Institutional Reform and Economic Development in Egypt, (Cairo: 
American University in Cairo Press, 2001); and Meryse Louis et al, "Foreign Direct Investment in 
Egypt" in Saul Estrin & Klaus Meyer (eds. ), Investment Strategies in Emerging Markets, p. 55. 
ss Ibid, pp. 54-55. 
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Foreign investment in areas based on R&D such as pharmaceuticals and 
agricultural chemicals were very much affected by the lack of proper implementation 
of the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs). This has been a major obstacle 
to the entry of many international companies into the Egyptian market place. Also, 
the institutions required for the implementation of IPRs law have not yet been 
established, though this law has already been ratified by the People's Assembly (the 
Egyptian Parliament). The government is also struggling to build an institutional 
capacity in the IPRs area because of the need for long term large investments and 
technical assistance. The government is also obliged to amend laws and regulations, 
upgrade the judicial and administrative framework, build a human resource capacity, 
and collect and disseminate technical information about IPRs. The lack of progress 
here has increased the reluctance of many European companies to invest in the 
pharmaceutical industry due to the improper implementation of copy right 
protection; hence making total EU investment in pharmaceuticals between 1996 and 
2004 almost equivalent to two thirds of the single investment made by Germany in 
1973. ss7 
In this respect, improper compliance with the Trade-Related Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs) agreement also prevented Egypt from taking advantage of the 
protection of IPRs in areas where it enjoyed a comparative advantage. 558 This was 
particularly true in such areas as agriculture and the food industry. The 
implementation of IPRs could allow Egypt to develop certain products, such as fruit 
and vegetables, for local markets and the EU, as it did with the use of high-yield 
557 See EU FDI flows into Egypt's pharmaceutical industry in chapter four. 
558 The implementation of IPRs in agriculture has been essential for making substantial technological 
advances, particularly in areas with limited agricultural resource base. 
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varieties of cereal crops to increase food production during the last fifteen years. 559 
Most considerations were given to the negative impact of the IPRs on the 
socioeconomic well-being of the majority of farmers, who were not allowed to 
develop and sell certain seeds without paying royalties. The government feared that 
differential access to high cost seeds of high yielding varieties between small and 
large farmers could lead to increased income inequalities and endanger food security 
at the household level. It also feared that improved varieties could be monopolised 
by large firms and MNCs which for the sake of high profit might raise the cost of 
new technologies at a rate that the majority of Egyptian farmers could not afford. 560 
The long, inconclusive negotiation of the Egyptian-US Partnership over the past 
ten years was also due to lack of compliance with IPRs. 561 The US argued that a lack 
of copy right protection could harm its trade and investment relations with Egypt, 
and hence no progress could be made towards a partnership until serious steps were 
taken to amend the judicial system and to comply fully with the TRIPS agreement. 
Such measures, once implemented would entail some financial loss, but is also likely 
to change the market outlook and allow some major MNCs with research-based 
activities to consider Egypt as a base for their regional operations. 
559 See a report by the FAO on Egypt at http: //www. fao. orgt/DOCREP/005/Y4632E/4632e32eOc. htm 
560 This is because the majority of farmers have small pieces of land and tend to use large part of their 
corps for household consumptions. 
56' Ahmed Galal & Sahar Tohamy, "Towards a Free Trade Agreement between Egypt and the US: 
The Egyptian Perspective", in Ahmed Galal & Robert Lawrence (eds. ), Building Bridges: An Egypt- 
US Free Trade Agreement, (Cairo: The Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies, Cairo & John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, US, 1998), p. 24. 
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8.6. Infrastructure Facilities 
Egypt's infrastructural facilities simultaneously benefited and spoiled the country's 
FDI attractiveness during the period under consideration. Compared with other 
developing countries, Egypt's infrastructure was considered satisfactory by foreign 
investors. The Global Competitiveness Report of 2000, for example, ranked Egypt 
fifth out of 59 countries whose governments gave high priority to investment in 
infrastructure. 562 This high ranking was due to the government's long term strategy 
of rebuilding the country's infrastructure and the growing role of the private sector in 
activities related directly to the improvement of key physical and human 
infrastructural assets. The government's long-term strategy aimed at increasing 
inhabitable areas from only 3 per cent around the valley of the Nile to 20 per cent by 
the year 2020 through the creation of industrial zones and new communities in the 
desert. The establishment of new industrial cities such as Sixth October and Tenth 
Ramadan, with tax exemptions for ten years, encouraged new FDI inflows and 
contributed to the socioeconomic development of these cities, at least in terms of 
employment. 
This objective, however, has only been partially fulfilled: many of these zones 
have managed to emerge as well-established industrial centres, but none has so far 
attracted the population that would allow for their development into fully-fledged 
cities. 563 Infrastructure was also improved through the growing role of the private 
562 World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2000, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000). 
563 Sherine Nasr, "Real Cities at Last? " AI-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 722,23-29 December 2004. 
http: //weekly. ahram. orp,. ee/2004/722/ec6. htm 
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sector in economic development, in particular its participation in large scale projects 
in telecommunications, roads, airports, railways, water, power stations, gas, schools 
and hospitals. For example, widespread participation by the private sector in the 
construction industry during the 1990s led to the revival of the construction materials 
industry, which took over 40 per cent of the total FDI inflows from the EU between 
1996 and 2004,564 
Regarding human capital, Egypt's cheap and skilled labour force added a 
significant comparative advantage to the country's FDI attractiveness. The 
importance of human development, which has been an integral element of the 
country's infrastructure, was evident in nature of FDI, which was made in vertical 
investments that aimed at utilizing national resources and human capital to meet the 
needs of the local market. Data shows that Egypt's labour force increased the 
country's comparative advantage vis-a-vis many other developing countries, 
particularly Eastern Europe. In 2001, the average nominal cost of labour in Egypt 
was US$3 per day, while the average nominal cost of labour in Poland and the Czech 
Republic was US$2.9 per hour and US$11.6 per hour, respectively. 565 Despite such 
an advantage in terms of cost, Egypt was behind these countries in relation to 
secondary school enrolment, qualified engineers and scientists, training, and R&D 
expenditures. 
A previous study showed that 91 per cent of foreign companies in Egypt believed 
labour skills to be one of the most important factors in attracting FDI, while only 9 
per cent considered the skill factor as unimportant. The study found that foreign 
S64 See the sectoral distribution of EU FDI inflows into Egypt in chapter six. 
565 Bassem Kaurar & Damyang Bakardzhieva, The reforms needed to attract more FDI in Egypt, p. 
13. 
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companies operating in tourism, banking, electronics, chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
gave more consideration to labour skills than labour costs. 566 Companies in other 
sectors such as the food industry and metals gave more consideration to labour cost 
than labour skills. 567 It also revealed that 95 per cent of foreign companies found it 
difficult or very difficult to recruit local workers and advisors who have the 
necessary skills. When compared with other emerging markets, 57 per cent of 
foreign companies operating in Egypt considered the skills of Egyptian workers as 
moderate, while 26 per cent believed they were lower than levels in other emerging 
countries. 568 This led to the recruitment of some 18,000 Asian workers at a time 
when Egypt has over 7 million unemployed. According to foreign companies, these 
low skills are due to the nature of the Egyptian educational system (57 per cent), 
training (20 per cent), experience (13 per cent), as well as labour laws and cultural 
factors. 569 Thus, the skill factor is not only a major problem in the Egyptian labour 
market but also an obstacle that will continue to undermine the country's ability to 
attract more technical and R&D-based FDI. 
Egypt's low R&D standard has negatively impacted on the growth of EU FDI 
into the country. Apart from some government-funded R&D programmes in 
agriculture, there have been no large-scale R&D activities in Egypt. Those smaller 
ventures that have been undertaken aimed at solving specific problems for Egyptian 
end-users or specific problems identified by the government. This lack of 
consideration for R&D was reflected in the quality of foreign companies investing in 
Egypt, of which 48.6 per cent considered R&D as unimportant, while only 13.5 per 
566 Reda Ali, The determinants offoreign direct investment, pp. 244-245. 
567 For example, foreign companies such as Cadburys, Coca-Cola, Inco-Steel SAE, and Mobil Oil 
depend largely in their operation on physical energy rather than highly technical skills. 
568 Reda Ali, The determinants offoreign direct investment, p. 246. 
569 Reda Ali, The determinants offoreign direct investment, p. 250. 
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cent and 27 per cent saw it as very important and important, respectively. 
570 Data 
also shows that 51.4 per cent of foreign companies believed Egypt's R&D standard 
is lower than those in emerging markets, while 40.5 per cent did not give any 
consideration to the country's standard of R&D. - Only 2.7 per cent of these 
companies considered it higher than standards in other emerging countries and 8.1 
per cent believed it to be the same as levels in other markets. 571 Indeed, the impact 
of this low R&D standard was reflected in the small share of EU FDI in industries 
such as electronics, computers, chemicals and pharmaceuticals. 
Egypt also lagged behind many developing countries in terms of access to 
business information. The role of GAFI was insufficient for foreign investors, who 
hoped to obtain sufficient information about the rules, procedures, legal framework 
and environment within which they operated. It was not until 2005 that GAFI 
underwent a radical transformation to meet the needs of foreign investors. The most 
noticeable development was the "one-stop-shop" style of bureaucracy that enables 
foreign investors to complete all the procedures and documentation in one, rather 
than several government departments. 572 Also, the growing role of the Investment 
Promotion Agencies in the attraction of FDI, which only attracted the attention of 
Egyptian officials in the past five years, has, as yet, had a limited impact on the 
growth of FDI inflows into Egypt. 573 The London-based Investment Promotion 
Office Egypt (IPO Egypt), which was created in 2001 with responsibility for Europe, 
370 Ibid, p. 298. 
371 Ibid, pp. 299-301. 
572 GAFI's website http: //www. ag fi_org. eg 
573 For detailed discussions on the growing role of investment promotion agencies in attracting FDI 
see for example, Louis Wells and Alvin Wint, "Marketing a Country: Promotion as a tool for 
Attracting Foreign Investment", Foreign Investment Advisory Service Occasional Paper, No. 1, 
Washington D. C.: FIAS, 1990); Debora Spar, "Attracting High Technology Investment: Intel's Costa 
Rican Plant", Foreign Investment Advisory Service, Washington D. C., 1998; UNCTAD, "The World 
of Investment Promotion at a Glance: A Survey of Investment Promotion Practices", United Nations 
Advisory Studies, No. 17, (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2001). 
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has had a limited role in the promotion of Egypt's investment potential, and has 
tended to focus its activities on the UK and Ireland. 574 
The IPO Egypt, which is located within the Egyptian-British Chamber of 
Commerce, has only one staff member and cannot adequately provide services and 
information for the 25 member states of the EU. Despite the tremendous efforts of 
this office to organise four annual conferences between 2001 and 2004, most 
attendees were representatives of Egyptian companies operating in Egypt and British 
companies already established in the country, many of whom used the conference as 
a forum to raise their problems and meet government officials. 575 No serious efforts 
were made to target new investors. The impact of such agencies as IPO Egypt is 
unlikely to contribute to a real increase in FDI inflows into Egypt, unless a 
substantial increase in their size and capacity takes place. 576 According to the UN's 
Foreign Investment Advisory Service, the size of the agency does matter because 
small agencies are not really effective in attracting FDI. 
Undoubtedly, the above determinants have had a mixed impact on the 
investments made by foreign companies in the Egyptian market during the period 
under consideration. Indeed, the accessibility of the market depended largely on its 
574 Over the past four years, the Egyptian-British Chamber of Commerce held four annual conferences 
in London, which tended to be held in July every year at London's Churchill Intercontinental Hotel. 
The first event held in Ireland was "Egypt: Priorities for Business and Investment", Dublin, 30 June 
2003. 
sn This argument is based on my personal experience as a participant in the annual conferences 
organised by the Egyptian British Chamber of Commerce. 
576 In 2004, a study by the Foreign Investment Advisory Service on 58 investment promotion agencies 
worldwide concluded that the effectiveness of investment promotion agencies depended largely on the 
wide range of the size of their budgets and human resources capacity. The study concluded that the 
average budget for FDI promotion was about US$2.6 million per year for developed countries and 
about US$1 million for developing countries. The number of staff in a developing country agency is 
about ten permanent professional staff members. Jacques Morisset and Kelly Andrews-Johnson, "The 
Effectiveness of Promotion Agencies at Attracting Foreign Direct Investment", Foreign Investment 
Advisory Service Occasional Paper, No. 16, Washington D. C., 2004, pp. 14-15. 
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stability and the continuity in the growth of domestic consumption. Most foreign 
investors found it more profitable to invest for the local market as the country's 
population, which accounted for 71.2 million in 2004,577 was increasing at an annual 
rate of over 2 per cent. This high population growth rate has meant large aggregate 
consumption, and subsequently more demands for domestic and inward investment 
to meet this expansion. Such a trend in the market determined to a large extent the 
nature, and quality, of FDI into Egypt rather than increasing the value of FDI inflows 
into the country. The dominance of vertical over horizontal investment since the 
early 1970s has resulted in FDI aimed only at serving the local market. This has also 
led to the growth of FDI inflows into the Egyptian market at the expense of outward 
investment. 
s" This figure is based on the calculation of the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics, 
the main office of the government's public consensus; see the Ministry of Investment, Egypt's 
Business Profile, httl2: //www. investment. pov. eg/MOI Portal/Egypt+Business/Profile/ 
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Chapter Nine 
External Determinants of 
EU FDI into Egypt during the Barcelona Era 
EU direct investment into Egypt has been influenced by a number of regional and 
international developments, most of which resulted from the acceleration of the 
process of globalisation and regionalism. The impact of these two parallel, but 
contradictory, phenomena was evident in the rise and decline in Egypt's economic 
growth, in particular in the area of FDI, between 1996 and 2005. How, and to what 
extent, the major external determinants affecting the sustainability of the growth of 
EU FDI into Egypt is examined in this chapter. It first looks at regional 
considerations in Egypt's investment strategy; this is followed by a detailed 
examination of the development and the impact of south-south economic integration 
on FDI inflows into Egypt. It also examines the impact of EU enlargement eastward, 
and how it can lead to a possible diversion of FDI flows from Egypt and the wider 
Mediterranean region to the ten new EU member states. It concludes by looking at 
the impact of international trade regimes on Egypt's investment strategy and the 
country's investment climate, particularly in relation to foreign investors. 
9.1. Regional Considerations in Egypt's Investment Strategy 
Prior to the 1995 Barcelona process, Egypt's investment strategy depended largely 
on internal political and economic developments in order to attract FDI. This took 
place through the promulgation of laws that allowed foreign participation in 
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economic activities, providing guarantees against nationalisation and incentives such 
as tax exemptions, as well as allowing the acquisition of state-owned enterprises by 
foreign investors. These regulations prevailed over structural changes in the 
institutions concerned with investment policies, as well as the overall strategy 
concerned with attracting FDI. This situation defined Egypt's investment strategy 
until the mid-1990s due to the fragmentation of the Arab regional order after Egypt's 
peace treaty with Israel and the exclusion of Egypt from the Arab League between 
1979 and 1989. Even with the restoration of inter-Arab diplomatic relations, Egypt's 
attempt to revive its regional role through the creation of the Arab Cooperation 
Council with Jordan, Iraq and Yemen in 1989, was aborted as early as August 1990, 
due to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the 1991 Gulf war, which added further to the 
deterioration in the inter-Arab regional order. 578 
It was not until the mid-1990s that the regional dimension began to emerge as a 
cornerstone in Egypt's foreign policy and the country's strategy for economic 
development. The intention was to use regionalism to eliminate trade barriers in a 
manner consistent with the WTO multilateral approach to global trade liberalisation. 
It also aimed to increase Egyptian exports to regional markets through the 
maximisation of the access benefits of regional economic integration. Such a strategy 
could also lead to the revival of the fragmented Arab economic system, which was 
under strain in a period of globalisation and regionalisation in the international 
system. 579 It also became apparent during the negotiation of the EU-Mediterranean 
S'$ More discussions on the impact of the 1990/1991 Gulf crisis on the Arab regional order are cited in 
works of. Y. Sayigh, "The Gulf crisis: why the Arab regional order fail", International Affairs, Vol. 
67, No. 3,1991; and I. Karawan, "Arab Dilemmas in the 1990s", Middle East Journal, Vol. 48, No. 3, 
1994. 
579 Gamal Bayoumi, Egypt's Assistant Foreign Minister who headed Egypt's team during the 
negotiations of the EU-Egyptian association agreement between 1994 and 200, stressed that the 
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partnership, which was conducted on a bilateral rather than a multilateral basis, that a 
south-south regional and sub-regional grouping could aggregate the economic 
leverage of the developing partner states in trade negotiations with developed 
countries. 580 
During the latter half of the 1990s, Egypt negotiated five trade partnership 
agreements with the US, the EU, the Arab states, Turkey, and the East and South 
African countries (COMESA). 581 The successful conclusion of negotiations with the 
Arab states and COMESA in 1998 and with the EU in 2001 led to an expansion in 
Egypt's regional market in a way that also enhanced its domestic market and 
increased its investment potential to foreign investors. This was an imperative if 
Egypt was to integrate into the global economy, particularly as in the post-Cold War 
era the global system has become increasingly defined more by geo-economics than 
geo-politics, at least until the September 11,2001 attacks on the US. 582 The 
objective of these trade partnerships, which developed parallel to the restructuring of 
the national economy, was also to make the country a `regional hub' of a vast market 
that covered the EU, the Arab world and the wider Middle East and Africa, an area 
with a population of nearly one billion people. 
partnership with would make Egypt and the Arab states part of the all-out European-Mediterranean 
free trade area. European Union, "Partnership agreement with Europe bolsters Egypt's economic 
policies", Arabic New. Com, Egypt, Economics, July 11,2001. 
http: //www. arabicnews. com/ansub/Daily/Day/011107/2001110733. html. 
sso The EU exercised political and economic pressures then conducting the association agreements 
with southern Mediterranean states because the bilateral framework of the negotiations did not allow 
these states to take advantage of their economic leverages and potentials. 
S81 Hassan Amer, "Among five free trade agreements with Egypt, the EU Partnership wins" World 
Today, Issue No. 2912, August 21,2000. 
582 Rory Miller and Ashraf Mishrif, "The Barcelona Process and the Euro-Arab Economic 
Cooperation: A Decade On", Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 9, No. 2, 
June 2005. http: //meria. idc. ac. il/journal/2005/issue2/Miller%2ORoly%2Opdf. pdf Also, more details on 
structural changes in the international system in the post-Cold War era are discussed in chapter five. 
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Indeed, of the five free trade agreements negotiated by Egypt in this period, the 
1995 Barcelona process, and its subsequent EU-Egyptian Association Agreement of 
2001, was the most significant. The negotiations towards a partnership with the US, 
which started in September 1994, have not been concluded as of the beginning of 
2006, the time of writing up this study. 583 Apart from signing a Trade and 
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in 1999 to provide a platform for 
discussion towards a free trade arrangement, no significant progress has been made 
in US-Egypt trade relations. Such a delay highlighted the severity of the conditions 
laid down by the US government for an agreement, some of which were defined by 
US Ambassador to Cairo, Daniel Kurtzer, as follows: 
1- Egypt must implement the provisions of the World Trade Organisation's 
Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement. 
2- Egypt must comply with the WTO's Customs Valuation Agreement, after the 
one year extension granted upon the request of the Egyptian government. 
3- Egypt should join the WTO Information Technology agreement, which 
eliminates tariffs on computers, computer equipment, computer software 
products, telecommunications and related products. 
4- Egypt should join the WTO Basic Telecommunications Agreement, which 
liberalises a wide range of telecom services. 
5- Egypt should make additional tariff reductions. 
6- Egypt should increasingly liberalise services. 
583 In December 2005, Egypt's Foreign Trade and Industry Minister, Rashid Mohamed Rashid, visited 
the US in an attempt to persuade the US administration to open negotiation on US-Egyptian free trade 
area. Al-Ahram, "Egypt and the US agree to begin negotiations towards a free trade area within 
weeks", Issue No. 43462, December 4,2005. 
http: //www. ahram. org. eg(Index. asR? CurFN=econ7. htm&DID=8690. 
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7- Egypt should provide more IPR protection through the passage of a new IPR 
law. 
8- Egypt should sign the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) 
Copyright Treaty and the Performances and Phonograms Treaty. 
9- Egypt should consider joining the WTO Government Procurement 
agreement. 584 
Though these demands were severe, their aim was to force Egypt to make rapid 
progress towards economic liberalisation. This can lead to rising investments and an 
increase in exports. It can also generate jobs and enable the country to better compete 
in the global economy. This pressure was also meant to bring Egypt, the second 
largest recipient of US foreign aid after Israel, to a position, where it can rely less on 
economic aid in its economic development. 585 
Progress in the Egyptian-Turkish Free Trade Agreement was also very slow over 
the last ten years. This was due to the limited scope of the agreement and the length 
of time, which was extended to twelve years, for implementation. From an 
investment perspective, the agreement neither defined mechanisms through which 
Egyptian and Turkish businesses could work together to launch joint projects in the 
short or medium terms, nor did it include reference to cooperation in areas such as 
tourism and construction, where Egypt has comparative advantages. 586 It was also 
saa These conditions were spelled out by Daniel Kurtzer, US Ambassador to Egypt (1997-2001) in his 
speech at the Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies in Cairo on 18 July 2000. See also Niveen 
Wahsh, "Condition for agreement", Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 429,27 July -2 August 2000. 
http: //weekly. ahram. org. ew2000/429/ec4. htm. 
585 Bessma Momani, "Promoting economic liberalisation in Egypt: from US foreign aid to trade and 
investment", MERIA, Vol. 7, No. 3- September 2003. 
586 This argument was shared by some scholars such as Hanaa Khair Eldin, Samyha Fawzy and Liala 
El-Khawaga of the Center for Economic, Financial Research & Studies at Cairo University and cited 
in World Today, where Hassan Amer highlighted some of the benefits and disadvantages of the five 
trade agreements Egypt engaged in during the mid 1990s. Hassan Amer, "Among five free trade 
agreements with Egypt, the EU Partnership wins", World Today, Issue No. 2912, August 21,2000. 
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limited to trade liberalisation in industrial goods, not in services or agricultural 
commodities, and it ignored the issue of freedom of movement of capital flows 
between the two countries. Even in the industrial domain, there was no substantial 
cooperation in vital areas such as power stations, the automobile industry, foodstuffs, 
electric and electronic industries, where both countries have made some significant 
progress during the past decade. These factors narrowed the possibility of any benefit 
to be gained from the agreement in the short or medium term, hence highlighting that 
this agreement was primarily driven by political objectives rather than economic 
ones, not least the improvement of Arab-Turkish relations. 
Similarly, advances on the African side has been very slow due to the 
underdeveloped nature of the economies of the 21 member states of the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which was established in 
1993.587 Despite the large size of the market, with a population of 370 million and 
combined gross national products (GNP) estimated at US$165 billion in 2004, there 
was no evidence of any improvement within the market in relation to FDI or joint 
investment projects. Foreign investors are very much affected by the restrictions in 
many African states on travel procedures and the movement of both capital and 
588 individuals within the market. The lack of FDI in this vast market is also due to 
the absence of information on the market, investment opportunities, and potential 
business partners in the region. 
s$' The COMESA member states are: Zambia, Uganda, Malawi, Angola, Burundi, Moon Islands, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Namibia, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Sudan, Swizerland, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, 
Cecil, Moriches, Congo, Djibouti, and Egypt. 
SS. Adel Gazarin, Chairman of the Egyptian Businessmen Association, Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 
690,13-19 May 2004. http: //weekly. ahram. org. eg/2004/690/ec4. htm 
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Moreover, a lack of trust, as well as an underdeveloped financial system needed 
to facilitate transactions hindered trade and investment cooperation among member 
states so that many partners import goods and commodities that are available in this 
market. For example, many COMESA members satisfy their demands for fertilisers, 
cement and pharmaceuticals from countries other than Egypt, while Egypt seeks 
cereals from producers outside the COMESA. 589 Moreover, only 11 of the 21 
member states have yet signed the free trade agreement of October 2000 to facilitate 
trade movement and remove obstacles related to the issuance of certificates of 
origins, taxes and customs fees. In terms of trade, data shows some improvement in 
Egypt's trade record with the COMESA, as its value of exports of pharmaceuticals, 
tires, iron and steel, cement, ceramic, construction materials and textiles to the 
market increased from US$48 million in 2000 to US$64 million in 2002, while its 
imports from the COMESA, which are mainly agricultural products such as tea and 
tobacco, increased from US$188 million to US$300 million during the same 
period. 590 This assessment not only indicates a lack of development on the 
investment side but also a growing imbalance in Egypt's trade relations with 
COMESA. 
As will be explained in detail in the following section, Egypt's 1997 efforts along 
with other Arab states to develop an inter-Arab regional economic order have been 
undermined by some structural and functional difficulties in the process of 
integration. In particular, the small share of trade and investment of Arab states in 
589 Comment made by Mr. Erastus Mwencha, Secretary-General of the COMESA during his visit to 
Cairo in May 2004. Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 690,13-19 May 2004. 
http: //weekly. ahram. org. e. w/2004/690/ec4. htm. 
590 Sherine Nasr, "Empowering COMESA", Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 690,13-19 May 2004. 
http: //weekly. ahram. org. eg/2004/690/ec4. htm. 
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each other's economy remained a hindrance to inter-Arab regional integration. 
591 
Slow progress along these lines due to various political and economic reasons, 
minimised the impact that the rights to cumulate origins could have had on industrial 
development in some of these countries, including Egypt. Intra-industry trade 
between these countries and the EU is also very limited. Egypt has yet to coordinate 
its economic and industrial policies with Arab states in a way that encourage MNCs 
to spread their investments across the industrial sectors in the region in order to take 
advantage of their different comparative advantages. The successful implementation 
of this strategy could greatly benefit Egypt and Arab states through horizontal FDI, 
in which manufactured goods are partially produced in one country and assembled or 
completed in another partner state. Such a process not only leads to the revival and 
expansion of the industrial base of Egypt and the Arab states, but also encourages 
these states to develop south-south economic integration in order for these products 
to be eligible to free custom duties when exported to the EU market. 
9.2. South-South Economic Integration 
The Barcelona process encouraged horizontal integration between Egypt and its 
Mediterranean partners. 592 This was expected to improve the trade-FDI relationship, 
by increasing Egyptian exports to the EU market through the rights of cumulation of 
591 For details on intra-industry trade among Arab states see Rory Miller & Ashraf Mishrif, "The 
Barcelona Process and the Euro-Arab Economic Cooperation: A Decade On", MERIA, Vol. 9, No. 2, 
June 2005; Oleh Havrylyshyn & Peter Kunzel, "Intra-Industry Trade of Arab Countries: An Indicator 
of Potential Competitiveness" in Bernard Hoekman & James Zarrouk (eds. ), In Catching Up with the 
Competition: Trade Opportunities and Challenges for Arab Countries, (Michigan: The University of 
Michigan Press, 2000); and Hassan Al-Atrash & Tarik Yousef, "Intra-Arab Trade: Is It Too Little? " 
IMF Working Paper, No. 00/10, Washington D. C., January 2000. 
592 Gonzalo Escribano & Josep Maria Jordan, "Sub-regional Integration in the MENA Region and the 
Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area", Mediterranean Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, summer 1999, pp. 133- 
134. 
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origins. 593 However, the rules of origin set out in the partnership were not as 
advantageous as it was originally thought. 594 As mentioned above, low intra- 
regional trade between Egypt and its southern partners and the adoption of a number 
of rules in Egypt that differed from those in the Maghreb countries minimised the 
595 effect of the right to cumulate origins. This made investment in Egypt less 
advantageous, particularly after the accession of CEECs, with similar FDI potentials, 
to the EU in May 2004. This accession created a hub and spokes596 type effect on 
Egypt and other Mediterranean states, with a negative impact on FDI growth in these 
countries. 597 
Foreign firms may find it attractive and profitable to invest in the new EU 
accession countries that have low production costs and cheap labour, hence 
benefiting from the right to cumulate origin in all the members of the EU and the 10 
countries of the EU-Med Partnership, rather than to invest in Egypt. This will remain 
the case as long as Egypt and its Mediterranean neighbours are unable to deepen the 
process of their sub-regional integration among themselves, which can increase their 
FDI attractiveness and maximise the rights of cumulation of origins. Progress along 
593 Nihal El Megharbel, "Rules of Origin: Impact on Firms' Competitiveness in Egypt", in Heba 
Nassar & Alfonse Aziz (eds. ), Egyptian Exports and Challenges of the 21 S' Century, (Cairo: Center for 
Economic & Financial Research & Studies, 2000), pp. 274-291. 
594 Sherine Nasr, "The key to growth: trade and more trade may be the only answer to MENA's fragile 
rates", Al Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 646,10-16 July 2003. 
http: //weekly_ahram. org. eg12003/646/ec3. thm 
595 Ahmed Ghoneim, "Rules of origin and Trade Diversion: the Case of the Egyptian-European 
Partnership Agreement", paper presented at The Economic Research Forum's Eighth Annual 
Conference, Cairo, January 2002; and Ahmed Ghoneim (2000), "Determinants of the Egyptian 
Exports Market Access to the European Union", Center for Economic and Financial Research 
Studies, Cairo University, Vol. 10, December 2000, p. 37. 
596 The Hub and Spoke model is often used to examine the effect of a trade agreement between a large 
and small country on the welfare of the small country, when the large country engages in similar 
agreements with other small states. This model argues that when a small country concludes a free 
trade agreement with a large country, the welfare incidence will most likely be positive for both of 
them. But, if the larger country (the hub) signs similar bilateral agreements with other small countries 
(the spokes), the welfare of the original small country will decline as a result of trade diversion. A 
similar effect is expected regarding FDI. 
597 For details on the hub and spokes model see: C. Kowalczyk & R. Wonnacott, "Hub and Spokes, 
and Free Trade in the Americas", National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, No. 4198, 
Cambridge: Massachusetts, 1992. 
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those lines is examined below in relation to the GAFTA, the Agadir Agreement and 
Egypt's relations with non-Arab regional partners in the Barcelona process. 
9.2.1. The Greater Inter-Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) 
The creation of the Greater Inter-Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) in 1998 revived 
the idea of inter-Arab economic integration. Some progress was made in the area of 
trade, but no significant attention has yet been given to the promotion of FDI. The 
GAFTA lacked a viable intra-regional FDI strategy for the utilisation of vital capital, 
human and natural resources that existed in the region but were not fully utilised for 
regional development. This is the case despite the fact that GAFTA's investment 
potential is much greater than many other regional groupings in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America. This is particularly true in regard to the huge capital resources of the 
oil producing countries, the human resources from labour exporting countries such as 
Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Yemen, and the availability of physical and natural 
resources, in particular oil and energy resources. This region experienced huge intra- 
regional capital and labour flows over the past three decades. The remittance flows 
from the oil producing countries to recipient states such as Egypt, Lebanon and the 
Palestinian Territories played a significant role in economic development. 598 This 
was also true in the case of Jordan and Yemen, who both relied greatly on workers' 
remittances for their economic development. 
599 
598 Denis Eby Konan, "Alternative paths to Prosperity: Economic integration Among Arab Countries", 
paper prepared for the conference Arab Economic Integration: between Hope and Reality, Cairo, 
October 21,2001, p. 3. 
59 Giyas G6kkent, "Regional Integration in the Middle East and North Africa", unpublished paper, 
July 2004, p. 6. 
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Despite such potential, inter-Arab regional integration through GAFTA has been 
very slow. This is largely caused by the fragmentation of the Arab economic system 
due to some structural and functional factors that existed prior to the creation of 
GAFTA in 1998. Many of these developments not only undermined the efforts of the 
Arab states to form an Arab Common Market in 1964 but also continued to obstruct 
some of the attempts launched by these states to develop an inter-Arab regional 
economic order. GAFTA has also been impeded by several legal and practical 
obstacles that threaten the development of free trade area in the medium term. 600 For 
example, the GAFTA agreement lacks precise definitions and fails to specify exactly 
what products are excluded from the evolving trade liberalisation programme. This 
was highlighted as early as the first year of its creation when 16 member states 
submitted a list of almost 600 commodities and goods to be exempted from free trade 
regulations. There is also a lack of effective enforcement mechanisms, which 
provides the opportunity for some member states to delay, or postpone, their trade 
liberalisation beyond agreed deadlines. 601 
The GAFTA also continues to suffer from the contrasting visions that have been 
adopted by the Arab League's Economic Council and its Social and Economic 
Council, on how to revive the Arab economic system. While the latter has promoted 
and initiated economic cooperation through trade liberalization and the gradual 
establishment of a new Arab free trade area, the former has continued to insist on the 
need to revive and ratify the 1964 Arab Common Market as a vehicle for pan-Arab 
cooperation through trade, something that has so far proved unworkable in the face 
600 Rory Miller and Ashraf Mishrif, "The Barcelona Process and the Euro-Arab Economic 
Cooperation: A Decade On", MERIA, Vol. 9, No. 2, June 2005. 
http: //meria. idc. ac. il/j ournal/2005/issue2/M iller%Rory%pdf. pdf 
60` Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Arab Strategic Report 1998, Cairo, 1999, pp. 
170-171. 
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of numerous political difficulties including the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the Lebanese 
Civil War of the 1970s, and the polarization inside the Arab League following the 
Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement of the same decade. 
On a functional level, the development of the GAFTA is undermined by the 
similarity of the goods and commodities produced by its member states. This is due 
to the limited industrial and technological capacity of most Arab economies, which 
make the share of manufactured goods as a percentage of foreign trade very small. 
Data shows that only three of the GAFTA member states - Tunisia, Morocco and 
Egypt - have managed to improve their industrial performance to 18.6 per cent, 17.7 
per cent and 17 per cent of GDP, respectively, from an average percentage of 
industrial sector share of GDP, which varied between 6.7 per cent and 11.2 per cent 
in the Arab region in 1997.602 Unless these factors are improved, they will continue 
to undermine the development process of the GAFTA and hinder the efforts of its 
member states to reform their economic systems in accordance with the rules of free 
trade. 
Indeed, the impact of this slow pace of inter-Arab economic cooperation has 
greatly impacted on the growth rate of FDI flows into the GAFTA member states. 
Data shows that inter-Arab FDI flows amounted to only US$15.2 billion between 
1985 and 2002.603 This was highly insignificant in comparison with Arab FDI 
outflows into the US, Europe and Asia, which accounted for US$800 billion in 
602A1-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Arab Strategic Report 2000, Cairo, 2001, p. 
159. 
603 Giyas Gökkent, "Regional Integration in the Middle East and North Africa", unpublished paper, 
July 2004, p. 5. 
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2002.604 It also shows that inter-Arab investment declined from US$6.2 billion in the 
1980s to US$2.6 billion in the 1990s, accounting for only 2 per cent of total Arab 
GDP. 605 This decline was caused by the continued political differences among Arab 
states and a lack of economic development, especially in the area of privatisation. 606 
This was also caused by the insignificant level of capital investment by the rich Arab 
oil producing countries, in comparison with their investments overseas, particularly 
in the US and Europe. Data reveals that almost 90 per cent of the total inter-Arab 
investment was made by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, with 
the majority of capital flows concentrated in services sectors such as real estate and 
tourism. Egypt received almost a one third of total Arab FDI flows into the 
GAFTA. 607 This pattern of FDI distribution within the GAFTA indicates not only the 
negative effect of the underdevelopment of the Arab industrial bases, but also the 
slow pace of economic liberalisation, which discourages Arab investors to invest in 
projects in other Arab countries. 
Similar to the Arab League, which failed to formulate a coordinated long-term 
economic strategy for the Arab states over the past fifty five years, GAFTA lacks the 
capacity to formulate unified trade and investment policies for its member states. The 
most notable result is the considerable attention given by the Arab states to develop 
coordinated efforts at a sub-regional level. This has led to the establishment of the 
several Arab sub-groupings over the past decades, most notably the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), and the Arab 
604 Abdel Motaleb Abdel Hamid, Arab Common Market: Reality and Prospect in the Third 
Millennium, (Cairo: Arab Nile group, 2003), p. 184. 
605 Ibid, pp. 184-185. 
606 Alfonse Aziz, "The Arab Nation and Encountering the Economic Challenges of Globalisation", in 
Salah Salem Zarnouka (ed. ), The Globalisation and the Arab Nation, Development Issues, No. 23, 
(Cairo University: Center for the Study of Developing Countries, 2002), p. 182; and Al-Ahram Centre 
for Political & Strategic Studies, Strategic Economic Trends 2002, Cairo, 2002, pp. 153-170. 
607 Giyas G6kkent, "Regional Integration in the Middle East and North Africa", July 2004, p. 6. 
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Cooperation Council (ACC). These sub-regional groupings developed outside the 
grand strategy of the Arab League; hence their objectives and focus tended to be 
limited to the interests of their member states. The successful investment policies 
adopted by the member states of the GCC, improvement in their investment climate 
and the incentives offered to foreign and Arab investors made it more attractive to 
FDI than other sub-groupings such as the AMU. 608 This two-tier development in the 
Arab economic system reinforced the huge financial and economic gap between the 
rich and the poor Arab states. Although these sub-groupings, apart from the GCC, 
have either stagnated or been hampered in their effectiveness by political 
considerations, the formation of the 2001 Agadir Agreement by Egypt, Jordan, 
Morocco and Tunisia reopens the debate as to whether such sub-regional groupings 
can be considered to be a workable alternative to a comprehensive and collective 
Arab economic system. 
9.2.2. The Agadir Agreement of 2001 
The Agadir Declaration of 2001 between Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco has 
gone beyond the traditional measures of trade liberalisation, with the aim to deepen 
sub-regional economic integration through policy coordination at the macroeconomic 
level. 609 The objective of this approach is not only to liberalise their trade by 2005 
but also to minimise the hub and spoke effect of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership 
608 Alfonse Aziz, "The Arab Nation and Encountering the Economic Challenges of Globalisation", in 
Salah Salem Zarnouka (ed. ), The Globalisation and the Arab Nation, Development Issues, No. 23, 
(Cairo University: Center for the Study of Developing Countries, 2002), pp. 193-195. 
609 Bassem Kamar, "Euro-Med Partnership, Agadir Agreement and the Need for Exchange rate Policy 
Cooperation", paper presented at The International Conference on The Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership, Ten Years after Barcelona, Cairo, April 19-20,2005, p. 3. 
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on the four member states of the agreement. 61 0 The deepening of sub-regional 
integration, while the rest of the GAFTA maintain high-intra-trade barriers, can 
encourage foreign companies to invest in their economic (spokes) instead of the EU 
(hub) in order to benefit from their cheap production and labour costs. It is also 
argued that the four signatories of the agreement have a base to build on, namely 
their partnerships with the EU and all the accompanying conditionality, including the 
EU rules of origin, anti-dumping and anti-subsidy mechanisms, which give the 
Agadir Agreement an advantage over the GAFTA. 611 This is particularly true as the 
existing rules of origin with the GAFTA are weak, which means that EU products 
can enter freely into Arab countries, while commodities from other Arab countries 
would be subject to customs. 
While having partnership agreements with the EU, the Agadir Agreement allows 
companies from different member states to manufacture jointly and then export the. 
end product to the EU. This means also that a company can use any raw material or 
component from the Agadir area in the manufacture of finished products, without 
running the risk of losing free trade status if it is exported within the area. For 
example, Egyptian textile producers may export their intermediate products to 
Tunisia and Morocco where they are manufactured into ready-made garments and 
then exported to the EU. This can attract investment and encourage manufacturers to 
produce goods not only for local consumption, but for the regional market and the 
wider EU market. 
610 The four member states of the Agadir Agreement have trade agreements with the EU, while not all 
member states of the GAFTA have trade agreements with the EU. 
611 Gamal Bayoumi, Former Assistant Foreign Minister and head of Egypt's team during the negations 
of EU-Egyptian Association Agreement and currently Secretary-General of the Arab Investors' 
Union, Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 680,4-10 March 2004. 
http"//weekly. ahram. org. ea/2004/680/ec l . htm. 
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However, the Agadir Agreement missed out on some of the fundamental 
elements of the promotion of FDI, namely the liberalisation of trade in services, 
capital and labour movement, the right to establishment, and the creation of a 
customs union. An assessment of the trade among the four Agadir member states in 
the past four years shows that it was minimal. For example, Egypt's trade with 
Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco in 2004 stood at US$136 million, US$99 million and 
US$74 million, respectively. 612 Indeed. the case was almost the same with regard to 
FDI between themselves. The Agadir member states made insignificant investments 
in each others economies. This is probably due to the fact that these countries are 
major recipients of FDI, and none of them has yet reached the status of an outward 
FDI investor. This argument is supported by the available data, which shows that 
Jordan. Morocco and Tunisia had very small investments in Egypt between 2001 and 
2004, even when compared with their investments prior to the Agadir Agreement. 
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Source: GAFI. 
612 Niveen Wahsh, "Hold your breath", Al-Ahram Weck/v, Issue No. 680,4 - 10 March 2004. 
http: '/weekly. ahrarn. org. eg/2004/680.! ec I. htm 
337 
Figure 9.1 shows that Jordan invested relatively more than the two Maghreb 
states between 2001 and 2004, but its contribution was far less than that recorded 
prior to the signing of the Agadir Agreement. Of the total of US$128.5 million 
invested between 1996 and 2004, almost 75 per cent of this investment occurred 
before 2001. Morocco and Tunisia invested US$271,000 and US$325,000 between 
2001 and 2004, but their FDI flows during the whole nine-year period amounted to 
US$9.5 million and US$0.6 million, respectively. Morocco made one major 
investment of US$9.1 million in 1997, which accounted for almost 95.8 per cent of 
total Moroccan FDI into Egypt between 1996 and 2004. The remaining 4.2 per cent 
was made up of four minor investments, only one of which was above US$100,000. 
If this was the case in the first four years of the Agadir Agreement, what benefits 
can this agreement offer to its member states, and have Arab states learned the 
lessons of their past experience in economic integration? The analysis of the Agadir 
Agreement, the most recent development in horizontal integration, found that there 
are no benefits to be gained from this agreement, unless its member states intensify 
their efforts to liberalise their trade and investment regimes, unilaterally in the first 
instance. This may help these countries to attract FDI, whose capital flows can serve 
to build up a strong industrial base for manufacturing, hence increasing their 
capacities to export to the regional and the wider EU market. It also found no 
evidence to indicate that the Agadir Agreement added significantly to the 
institutional structure of the Arab states. Lack of development at the GAFTA level 
could not automatically provide an increased importance to the Agadir Agreement, 
on the hope that this agreement may serves as a process for economic development, 
institution-building and political cooperation. If the existing institutions cannot 
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develop the capacity to build consensus and further a collective approach to the 
common concerns of their member states, how can this agreement do so? The 
successful application of deep integration, which allowed the CEECs, 613 to 
accumulate FDI stock of almost US$150 billion between 1990 and 2002614 does not 
necessarily mean that this strategy will be successful in the Arab region. The success 
of the Agadir Agreement to improve the FDI attractiveness of its member states 
depends largely on the pace of economic growth, the degree of liberalisation in trade 
and investment, the quality of economic reforms, the restructuring of the 
administrative systems, and the development of their institutions, infrastructures and 
physical and human resources, as well as the willingness of these governments to 
sacrifice some of their internal policy control and to adopt common strategies and 
policies that strengthen the regional market and increase FDI attractiveness. 
9.2.3. Egypt and non-Arab Regional Partners in the Barcelona Process 
The impact of the Barcelona process on Egypt's economic relations with non-Arab 
southern partners, namely Turkey, Israel, Cyprus and Malta, has been limited to 
some positive links on institutional and trade levels. 615 The level of integration has 
not gone beyond the superficial integration provided by the Barcelona framework. 
This is probably due to the preoccupation of each partner state with seeking means to 
strengthen ties with the EU, rather than deepening their south-south economic 
613 The ten CEECs are the eight new EU member states plus Bulgaria and Romania. 
614 Bassem Kamar (2005), Euro-Med Partnership, Agadir Agreement and the Need for Exchange rate 
Policy Cooperation", p. 4. 
611 The institutional links between Egypt and non-Arab southern partners has been created through 
regular annual ministerial and governmental meetings and workshops by officials and academics from 
these countries within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. 
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relations. This was very much the case with Cyprus and Malta, whose objective prior 
to May 2004 was to prepare their political and economic system for accession to the 
EU. Political considerations undermined any possible development in the 
relationship between Egypt and Israel between 1996 and 2004. For instance, 
Egyptian-Israeli relations were severely affected by the breakdown of' the Israeli- 
Palestinian Oslo peace process. with Egypt withdrawing its ambassador in protest 
against Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories. " 16 The Palestinian Intifada also had 
a negative impact on the Israeli economy, as well as other neighbouring economies 
such as Egypt. 617 Turkey's relationship with Egypt was also affected by its military 
cooperation with Israel, which was perceived in some Arab countries as a threat to 
Arab national security. 618 The impact of these factors was clearly reflected in the 
small shares of FDI flows into Egypt, as well as the minimal amount of FDI stocks 
accumulated by these countries during period under examination. 
Figure 9.2 : FDI stocks in Egypt by non-Arab regional partners in the 








616 Graham Usher, "The cost of vengeance", Al-Abram Neck/v. 23-29 November 2000, Issue No. 509 
http: //wveeklv. ahram. ora. ei/2000'509/index. litm 
617 AI-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, "Israel and the Intifada: The Absolute 
Security Formula", Arab Strategic Report 200/, Cairo, 2001, pp 269-290; and Ibid, "Arab-Israeli 
Interactions: the State of War", pp. 305-316. 
618 Ahmed Foad Raslan, "The Turkish-Israeli Rapprochement" in A/ Siivacsa AI-Dawliva 
(International Politics). Issue 130, October 1997, pp. 115-118. 
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Turkey Israel Cyprus Malta 
Data shows that the two small economies of Cyprus and Malta accumulated 
together a higher rate of FDI stocks than the two larger economies. Figure 9.2 shows 
that Cyprus accumulated around US$27.8 million, of which 54 per cent was invested 
between 1992 and 1995, while the remaining 46 per cent was made between 1996 
and 2004. Turkey had the second largest share with US$11.1 million, of which 96 
per cent was invested between 1998 and 2004. Israel was in the third place with 
US$4.8 million, all of which was invested in two projects in 1996.619 Malta invested 
least in the Egyptian market, with total FDI stock of just over US$1.1 million. 
Table 9.1: Turkey's FDI in Egypt 1995-2004 (US$ thousand) 
Sector/Industry 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 
Textiles 0 0 39.7 0 0 0 0 0 39.7 
Food 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1623.4 1623.4 
Chemical 0 0 0 3908.6 107 0 2255.5 0 6271.1 
Wooden 0 0 0 0 0 0 25.4 0 25.4 
Engineering 442.5 0 0 0 0 0 145.8 1988.5 2576.8 
Metals 0 58.8 0 0 48.2 108.7 0 0 215.7 
Services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 78.7 78.7 
Tourism 0 0 0 13.9 0 0 0 292.2 306.1 
Total 442.5 58.8 39.7 3922.5 155.2 108.7 2426.7 3982.8 11136.9 
Source: GAFI 
Turkey was the only country of the four-non-Arab southern partners to invest 
most of its FDI flows in Egypt during the Barcelona era. Turkey's FDI flows into 
Egypt increased from US$442,500, which was made in a single investment in the 
engineering industry in 1995 to US$11.1 million in 2004. Most Turkish investment 
619 According to GAFI's data, Israel had only one major investment with US$4.5 million and a minor 
investment in the free zones with US$0.3 million; both projects were made in 1996. 
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occurred in the industrial sector, with only 0.7 per cent in medical services and 2.8 
per cent in tourism. Almost 56.3 per cent of total Turkish FDI flows were invested in 
the chemicals industry, followed by engineering and food industries with 23.1 per 
cent and 14.5 per cent, respectively. Some 2.6 per cent of total FDI flows went into 
other industries such as metals (1.9 per cent), textiles (0.35 per cent) and wood 
working (0.22 per cent). In the free zones, in 2001 a Turkish entrepreneur invested 
US$75,000 in the Egyptian Turkish Greek Free Zone company, located in the Public 
Ismailia Free Zone. Table 9.1 shows that Turkey made no investment in Egypt 
between 1996 and 1997, nor did it have any FDI stocks prior to its first single 
investment, which was made in 1995. 
Table 9.2: Cyprus's FDI in Egypt 1992-2004 (US$ thousand) 
Industry 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 total 
Chemical 751.5 8922.4 0 0 1504.4 455.9 0 2193 0 0 0 0 13827.2 
Engineering 0 0 0 0 0 0 205.3 0 0 0 0 375.5 580.8 
Construction 
Materials 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 467.8 2500 0 0 0 2867.8 
Agriculture 0 0 0 0 0 0 364.7 13.1 0 0 53.1 0 430.9 
Financial 
Services 
0 0 0 0 0 0 77.8 0 0 0 0 0 77.8 
Services 
(free zones) 
0 0 5091 247 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5338 
Infrastructure 0 0 0 0 0 0 287.4 0 0 0 0 0 287.4 
Tourism 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4386 0 0 0 0 4386 
Total 751.5 8922.4 5091 247 1504.4 455.9 935.2 7059.9 2500 0 53.1 375.5 25795.9 
JourcG: Ut%f I 
Cyprus made its first investment in Egypt with US$751,500 in the chemicals 
industry in 1992. In the following year, Cyprus made its largest investment in the 
country with a further US$8.9 million investment in the same industry. It also 
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invested US$5.1 million and US$247,000 in the petroleum services, respectively in 
1994 and 1995. Table 9.2 shows that all investments in the industrial sector were 
made in chemicals, construction materials and the engineering industries, which 
received 53.6 per cent, 11.1 per cent and 2.2 per cent, respectively. Tourism and 
agriculture were relatively similar in value and each received around US$4.3 million. 
The services sector recorded 21 per cent of Egypt's total FDI inflows from Cyprus, 
though infrastructure accounted for only 1.1 per cent of total investment. 
Malta invested just over US$1.1 million, of which three investments were made 
in the engineering industry with US$511,200, while US$625,000 was invested in the 
free zones. Malta's first investment was made in the petroleum services (in the free 
zones) in 1980, when the Edgo Holding Limited invested US$615,000 in the Mina 
Petroleum Services. This same company made a further investment of US$10,000 in 
1999. The remaining investment was in the inland. In 1994, the Arabia for 
Manufacturing Radiators Company received an investment made by 4 Maltese 
companies equivalent to 34.7 per cent of the total FDI flows into the engineering 
industry. In 2001, Egyptian Credit Cards also took 51.8 per cent of the total 
investment in engineering from I. T. M Holding Malta, which also invested 
US$68,500 in Egypt R. S. T. for Programming and IT in the same year. There is no 
data available to see whether Malta's accession into the EU in May 2004 had any 
impact on its FDI into Egypt. 
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9.3. The EU Enlargement Eastward 
Since the collapse of Communism in 1989, the EU has been strengthening its 
economic ties with the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). These ties 
developed through a series of association agreements in the early 1990s and reached 
their peak in May 2004 with the accession of eight of these countries, as well as 
620 Malta and Cyprus, into the EU. 
These developments increased the size and capacity of the EU market, and their 
impact has been negative on Egypt in a number of ways. 621 The most affected 
economic sectors in Egypt were trade and investment, with a possible higher 
diversion in trade and FDI to the new member states after May 2004. Such a 
diversion stimulated competition between Egypt and some East European countries, 
particularly those which have a high similarity in products exported to the EU. The 
impact on FDI emanated from the higher comparative advantages in countries such 
as Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Latvia and Lithuania, which have better 
human capital, a skilled labour force, and a higher degree of industrialisation, 
particularly in heavy industries. 622 Such comparative advantages, together with the 
620 The eight countries are Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, 
Slovakia and Estonia. 
621 The negative impact of the EU relation with CEECs on Egypt was discussed in Sandro Sided, "The 
Impact of the EU's Partnership for Action on the Mediterranean Economies: Dependent Development 
or Regional Integration? ", paper presented in The FEMISE Network First Annual Conference, 
Marseilles, 17-18 February 2000; Sergio Alessandrini, "Consequences of EU Enlargement for the 
Med Countries", paper presented in The FEMISE Network First Annual Conference, Marseilles, 17-18 
February 2000; and Ahmed Ghoneim, "Determinants of the Egyptian Exports Market Access to the 
European Union", Center for Economic and Financial Research Studies, Cairo University, Egypt, 
Vol. 10, December 2000. 
622 Barnard Hoekman & Simon Djankov, "Catching up with Eastern Europe? The European Union's 
Mediterranean Free Trade Initiatives", in Raed Safadi (ed. ), Opening Doors to the World. A New 
Trade Agenda for the Middle East, (Cairo: The American University Press, 1998), pp. 281-312. 
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cultural affinity and geographical proximity between the EU and Eastern European 
countries, add further attractiveness to these countries investment potential, hence 
attracting more FDI flows from the EU at the expense of Egypt and other 
Mediterranean partners, as explained below. 
9.3.1. The Impact of EU Enlargement on the Mediterranean Countries 
Since the beginning of the economic transition in East European countries, FDI has 
increased significantly in the CEECs due to rapid economic liberalisation and the 
removal of restrictions on capital movements. 623 This trend was accelerated further 
by the opening of negotiations for EU accession in 1998. The structural economic 
and political reforms, which were launched in order to meet the accession criteria, 
led to a stable market economy, a transparent legal framework for the business 
environment, and a modernised industrial base through privatisation. Such progress 
contributed to a significant increase in the volume of FDI into CEECs. 624 The growth 
in FDI inflows increased significantly during the 1990s, from US$1.8 billion in 1991 
to US$17.8 billion in 1999.625 This was a tremendous achievement compared to the 
record achieved by the Mediterranean countries, whose FDI inflows increased from 
US$2.2 billion to US$7.2 billion during the same period, though the CEECs did not 
have FDI stocks during the Communist era. 
623 The most significant development was improving market access for international firms, which was 
a major determinant in the rise of the value of FDI and trade in CEECs. For details see Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Market Access: FDI/Trade Linkage in Eastern 
Europe", OECD Working Paper, Paris, Vol. 2, No. 43,1994. 
624 Carlo Altomonte & Claudia Guagliano, "Competing Locations? Market Potential and FDI in 
Central and Eastern Europe vs. the Mediterranean ", LICOS Centre for Transition Economics, 
Belgium, Discussion paper 108/2001, p. 3. 
625 Ibid, p. 16. 
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Data shows a relatively close link between the rise in FDI inflows into the 
CEECs and the gradual decline in FDI flows into the Mediterranean. Figure 9.3 
illustrates the changing position between the two regions in relation to their share of 
the total FDI inflows into the developing countries during the 1990s. Among the 
causes that led to a rise in FDI flows into the CEECs was the gradual improvement in 
their political stability and democratisation. 
Figure 9.3: Percentage of FDI inflows of CEECs and Mediterranean partner 
states to total global FDI inflows to developing countries, 1989-1999 
12 
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--* Central and East European Countries --ý--- Mediterranean Partner States 
Source: Carlo Altomonte & Claudia Guagliano (2001). p. 16. 
Meanwhile, the Mediterranean countries continued to softer from political and 
economic instability, as explained in the previous section. Also, the CF, ECs 
exhibited a relatively higher degree of transparency in government attitudes towards 
FDI than those exhibited by Egypt and some other Mediterranean states. 62 These 
factors not only enhanced the FDI attractiveness of the CEECs but also increased 
their share of FDI inflows, which accounted for 7 per cent of extra EU outflows 
626 For details on the impact of possible accession of CEECs into the EU on their development process 
prior to 2004 see Barry Eichengreen, "The External Sector: The State and Development in Eastern 
Europe", Centre for Economic Policy Research London Discussion Paper, Series No. 1904, London, 
1998; and Brenton, Paul, Mauro, Francesca Di & Lucke, Matthias, " Economic Integration and FDI: 
an empirical analysis of foreign investment in the EU and in Central and Eastern Europe", Kiel 
Institute of World Economics 14'orking Paper, No. 890, Kiel, 1998. 
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1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
compared to only 2 per cent by their Mediterranean partners during the second half 
of the 1990s. 627 
Between 2000 and 2004, available data shows that the CEECs structurally 
exhibited a greater potential for attracting FDI than Egypt and other Mediterranean 
countries. The degree of harmony between most economies in East Europe 
strengthened the regional market, which increased their attractiveness to EU 
companies. This was particularly true in the case of market-seeking investments, 
where firms paid considerable attention to the regional market, as a large part of total 
demand often comes from consumers outside the country of their foreign production 
base. 628 Such a determinant gave CEECs an advantageous position in relation to the 
Mediterranean region, whose regional market segmentation, together with non-tariff 
barriers, reduced the attractiveness of the region compared to CEECs. 629 
One can also argue that the enhanced capacity of CEEC markets and their 
growing FDI attractiveness minimized the impact of the global economic slowdown 
627 Carlo Altomonte & Claudia Guagliano, "Competing Locations? Market potential and FDI in 
Central and Eastern Europe vs. the Mediterranean", LICOS Centre for Transition Economies, 
Discussion Paper, 108/2001, Belgium, p. 16. 
628 For details on the impact of regional market on FDI see K. Head and T. Mayer, "Market potential 
and the location of Japanese investment in the European Union", CEPR Workshop on the Economic 
Geography of Europe: Measures, Testing and Policy Simulations, Villars, January 12-13,2001; L. 
Resmini, "The determinants of foreign direct investment in the CEECs: new evidence from sectoral 
patters", Economics Transition, Vol. 8, No. 3,2000, pp. 665-689; S. Alessandrini and L. Resmini, 
"The determinants of FDI: A comparative analysis of EU FDI flows into the CEECs and the 
Mediterranean countries", paper presented at The Economic Research Forum Sixth Annual 
Conference: Regional Trade, Finance and Labour, Cairo, October 28-31,1999; and D. Davis and D. 
Weinstein, "Market Access, Economic Geography and Comparative Advantage: An Empirical 
Assessment", NBER Working paper, No. 6787,1998. 
629 This was indeed the case, despite the efforts by the Southern Mediterranean countries to improve 
their economic policies and conditions. Darina Malova & Timthoty Haughton, "MENA countries in 
the competition for FDI: designing an exchange rate strategy", European University Institute Working 
Paper RSC, Italy, No. 45,2001. 
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and the related decline in global FDI flows in 2001,630 While this decline impacted 
dramatically on Egypt's FDI inflows, which decreased by 58 per cent in 2001 from 
US$1.2 billion in the previous year, FDI inflows into CEECs decreased by only 17 
per cent (reached £18.8 billion in 2001 from £22.6 billion in 2000), with Hungary 
and Estonia recording a surplus of 53 per cent and 42 per cent, respectively. 631 This 
decrease in FDI inflows did not affect dramatically FDI stocks in these countries, 
which amounted to ¬78.3 billion in 2000,632 of which Poland accounted for E36.8 
billion and the Czech Republic £23.4 billion. Together they made up to 77 per cent 
of total FDI stocks. 
Unlike Egypt and its Mediterranean partners, CEECs also gained a growing share 
of FDI outflows of 4.7 per cent and 5.4 per cent of the total FDI transactions in 2000 
and 2001, respectively. 633 Despite a reduction in FDI outflows from some countries 
such as Poland and Latvia, three countries - Hungary, Slovenia and Estonia - 
accounted for 82 per cent of total FDI outflows from the CEECs in 2001. In the same 
year, FDI inflows accounted for 4.6 per cent of the GDP of CEECs, 634 highlighting 
the growing importance of the role of FDI in their economic growth. 
While data is unavailable to examine the impact of FDI on the accession of 
CEECs into the EU after May 2004, theoretical and empirical studies suggest that the 
630 Irene Lovino, "Acceding Countries still attractive for Foreign Direct Investment: 1997-2001 Data", 
Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, theme 2-51/2003. 
631 Ibid, p. 2. 
632 The CEECs did not have FDI stocks before 1989 because their legal systems under Communist 
regimes did not allow for foreign ownership. 
633 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, p. 64. 
634 This percentage of FDI ratio to GDP amounted to 16 per cent on average between 1997 and 2000 
in the CEECs. This was largely due to the tremendous growth rate of FDI stocks by 171 per cent, from 
E28.8 billion in 1997 to ¬78.3 billion in 2000. Irene Lovino (2003), "Acceding Countries still 
attractive for Foreign Direct Investment: 1997-2001 Data", Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, theme 2- 
51/2003, p. 3. 
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Eastern part of the EU would become the main destination for FDI outflows from the 
Community for at least the next decade. This argument is supported, on the one 
hand, by the Spanish experience after the country's accession into the EU in 1986, 
when Spain not only experienced rapid economic growth and the expansion of 
private enterprise in both manufacturing and services but also huge inflows and 
outflows of FDI accounting, respectively, for 4.2 per cent and 1.2 per cent of GDP in 
1991 635 Accession almost doubled Spain's FDI inflows and the destination of its 
FDI outflows to roughly two-thirds of total FDI compared to 30-50 per cent prior to 
1986. This experience also revealed a relatively high degree of FDI diversion from, 
and to, the US and Latin America when European countries became popular with 
Spanish firms. Spain's accession was also reflected in closer regional cooperation 
with non-EU member states such as Morocco, which became attractive to Spanish 
FDI outflows, particularly in the manufacturing sector. 636 
Data from 2001-2003, the two years prior to the CEECs' accession to the EU, not 
only supports the above argument but also highlights the growing gap between the 
position of the new EU member states and that of the Mediterranean countries in 
terms of share of FDI flows from the EU-15 member states. This was evident in 
2002, when Egypt, together with the Mediterranean partner states, accounted for 2.8 
per cent of EU FDI outflows (from 1 per cent in 2001), compared to 17.5 per cent 
received by the eight CEECs. 637 This gap is likely to grow further post-2006 as the 
EU is currently intensifying its efforts to improve the infrastructure capabilities of 
635J. M. Campa & M. F. Guillen, "Spain: a boom from economic integration", in Dunning, J. H. 
&Narula, R. (eds. ), Foreign Direct Investment and Governments: Catalysts for economic 
restructuring, (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 214. 
636 Ibid, p. 214. 
637 Eurostat, Statistics in focus, theme 2-12/2004, p. 2. 
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the new member states as well as their social and economic conditions. 638 Indeed, 
this deepening process of integration of the new member states into the EU will 
certainly provide an advantageous position for EU firms to invest within the 
geographical boundaries of the enlarged EU market at the expense of peripheral 
Mediterranean partners, including Egypt. 
9.3.2. The Impact of EU Enlargement on Egypt 
Egypt has been negatively affected by the EU enlargement eastward. In terms of 
foreign investment, data shows that Egypt saw a gradual decline in FDI flows from 
the CEECs over the past thirty years, particularly with the improvement in these 
countries ties with the EU in the last decade and a half. For example, East European 
FDI flows into Egypt declined from US$233.7 million in 1976 to US$87 million in 
1988 and US$5.5 million in 1992. Between 1994 and 2004, total FDI inflows from 
CEECs into Egypt accounted for only US$2 million, of which US$367,600 was 
invested in 2004. This means that of the total US$386.2 million invested by the 
CEECs in Egypt, only a half of one per cent was invested during the past ten years. 
This latter minimum involvement is probably due to the fact that the majority of 
CEECs, with the exception of Romania, have little experience with FDI, and their 
outward flows have just begun since 2001-2002,639 
Also, the rapid economic development of the CEECs over the past ten years 
made these countries host rather than source countries for FDI. As such, Eastern 
638 A. Bevan, "Institution Building and the integration of Eastern Europe in International Production", 
University of Sussex at Brighton Economic and Social Research Council Working Paper, No. 16/01,2001. 
639 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, p. 64. 
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European investors might find more business opportunities at home than in Egypt. 
They might also have been affected by Egypt's economic slowdown between 2001 
and 2004, which negatively affected the country's economic growth and its FI)I 
attractiveness. 
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Figure 9.4 shows that between 1976 and 2004, Romania was the main East 
European investor in Egypt, with US$378.8 million. It was followed by Poland, 
which made its largest investment with US$5.5 million in 1992. Prior to the 
Barcelona process, most of this investment was made by Romania in the financial 
sector and tourism, which took 61.7 per cent and 38.2 per cent of total Romanian 
FDI. 
Between 1996 and 2004, Poland and Slovenia were the main investors with only 
US$726,100 and US$543,500, respectively. Figure 9.5 shows that they were 
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followed by the Czech Republic, Romania and I lungary with each accounting, 
respectively, for US$375,100, US$341,900 and US$180,100 during the same period. 
Poland Hungary Czech Slovenia Romania 
These statistics reveal that Romanian FDI flows dramatically declined over the past 
thirty years. The other four countries of the CEECs, which became members of the 
EU in May 2004. had a very marginal involvement in the Egyptian market in the 
post-1995 Barcelona declaration. 


















The sectoral distribution of FDI flows from the CEECs shows a concentration in 
the financial sector and tourism industry, with minimal interest in the manufacturing 
sector and infrastructure. No investment was made in agriculture or the services 
sector. The financial sector received US$239.2 million over the past thirty years, of 
which 97.7 per cent was invested by Romania in 1977 and the remaining 2. per cent 
by Poland in 1992. Tourism took US$145.6 million, of which 99.4 per cent was 
invested by Romania in 1976 (US$136 million) and 1988 (US$87 million). The 
remaining 0.6 per cent was made by Poland, the Czech Republic and i lungary, which 
invested US$617,600, US$146,100 and US$73,000, respectively, over the past ten 
years. The manufacturing sector received US$1.1 million, of which 81.9 per cent 
went to engineering, 9.7 per cent to metals, 8.3 per cent to chemicals and 0.07 per 
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cent to textiles. Almost all investment in the engineering industry was made by 
Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary, whose investments accounted for 48.6 
per cent, 20.5 per cent and 9.6 per cent of total FDI in the manufacturing sector. 
Hungary had only one investment in the chemicals industry in 1990, while Poland, in 
2002, was the only country to invest in the metals industry. 
Though not all CEECs had invested in Egypt prior to the Barcelona process, 
these statistics show a gradual decline of FDI flows from these countries since the 
early 1990s, with a further negative effect after May 2004 due to a possible FDI 
diversion from the EU-15 to the new member states from Eastern Europe. 640 
Although there is not sufficient data available to assess precisely the impact of EU 
enlargement on FDI diversion between the EU and its partner states, early indications 
show that Egypt may find it difficult to compete with the new entrants to the EU in 
attracting investment. This is, according to Peter Goepfrich, executive director of the 
German Arab Chamber of Industry and Commerce, due to an increasing tendency, 
especially in Germany, to look towards the East to relocate factories or invest in new 
projects because Central and Eastern Europe offers proximity, relatively low labour 
costs, minimal language barriers and competitive quality. 641 
In terms of trade, the 2004 enlargement of the EU will have a major impact on 
the prospect of Euro-Egyptian economic relations. Despite reassurance from the EU 
640 Possible diversion of FDI flows from the EU to CEECs at the expense of the southern partner 
countries was highlighted in some studies see for example: Claudia Buch, Robert Kokta & Daniel 
Piazolo, "Does the East Get What Would Otherwise Flow to the South?: FDI Diversion in Europe", 
Kiel Institute of World Economics Working Paper, No. 1061, Kiel, 2001; and Alan Bevan (2001), "The 
impact of EU Accession Prospects on FDI Inflows to Central and Eastern Europe", University of Sussex at 
Brighton Economic and Social Research Council Policy Paper, No. 06/01, Brighton, 2001. 
641 This has been argued in an interview by Niveen Wahsh, journalist, with Peter Geopfrich, executive 
director of the German Arab Chamber of Industry and Commerce, Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 688, 
29 April -5 May 2004. http: //weekly. ahram. org. ee/2004/688/ec l . htm 
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prior to the enlargement that this process would not affect its relations with the Arab 
countries, 642 the accession of the CEECs will be a considerable challenge to Euro- 
Egyptian trade relations. The demographic structure of the EU, whose population 
increased by 20 per cent to a total of 450 million people, neither guarantees an 
increase in Egyptian exports to this vast market nor a substantial increase in EU 
funds to assist Egypt in its economic development programmes. This is because the 
EU's current economic priority is to reduce the socio-economic gap and improve the 
standard of the accession states. Past experience shows that the EEC exerted 
considerable pressure on Egypt, and other Arab states, to amend its cooperation 
agreement in 1987 in order to offset the economic consequences of Spain and 
Portugal's entry into the Community the previous year. The level of quotas and the 
volume of exports into the EC market were reduced so that similar Spanish and 
Portuguese goods and commodities would have greater access to the EC's internal 
market. 
643 
Although a recent study at Cairo University has concluded that the increase of 
exports from the CEECs to the EU prior to the 2004 enlargement only had a nominal 
negative impact on Egyptian agricultural exports to the EU, this is very likely to 
change as these countries are now full members of the Community. 644 This means a 
rapid improvement in the quality of their goods and commodities as they have to 
comply with the specifications and quality standards demanded by the EU health and 
safety regulations. It also means that their agricultural commodities now enjoy 
642 Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, "Minister Cowen visits Egypt to meet Arab League", Press 
Release, Dublin, March 29,2004, http: //foreignaffairs. gov. ie. 
643 Rory Miller and Ashraf Mishrif, "The Barcelona Process and the Euro-Arab Economic 
Cooperation: A Decade On", MERIA, Vol. 9, No. 2, June 2005. 
http: //meria. idc. iUiouman005/issue2/Miller%2ORor /y°o20pdf. pdf 
644 R. Gomaa, Egyptian Agricultural Exports and the European Union Barriers, MA Dissertation, 
Cairo University, 2001 (in Arabic). 
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preferential treatment under the Common Agricultural Policy, at the time when the 
EU has become increasingly self-sufficient in agricultural products and, 
consequently imports fewer commodities from non-EU states. 645 This puts Egypt 
under extreme pressure as some of its main agricultural exports, which account for 
12 per cent of its exports to the EU, such as molasses, strawberries, green peas, 
potatoes, oranges, and onions, are produced in large quantities by the 10 new EU 
member states. 
646 
Egyptian exports are now guaranteed tariff-free access to the markets of the 10 
new member states of the EU under the 2001 Association Agreement, whereas they 
previously were subject to customs duties. 647 However, this advantage is unlikely to 
substantially increase Egypt's exports to these markets in the short term. This is 
primarily due to the stringent EU rules on the importation of agriculture products that 
these countries now abide by as EU members. It is also because Egypt's trade with 
the new entrants to the EU is currently minimal, with a trade balance in favour of 
these countries. For example, in 2002 Egypt's exports to these countries did not 
exceed US$30.2 million, while imports were US$222.4 million, with most of these 
transactions with Poland, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. The export capabilities 
of these states are likely to improve much faster than those of Egypt because of the 
technical and financial support provided by the EU to improve such capabilities. The 
prospect of an increase in Egypt's exports to the new member states of the EU will 
645 Ibid, p. 120. 
646 In an interview with the journalist Niveen Wahsh,, Naji El-Fayyoumi, Executive Director of the 
Egyptian Exporters Association, argued that some of the new member states of the EU such as Poland 
have product structures similar to that of Egypt, hence the development of their products structures 
much faster than Egypt will threaten Egyptian exports to the EU. Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 688,29 
Aril -5 May 2004. ht! p: //weekly. ahram. org. eg/2004/688/eci. htm 64P In the meantime, customs duties charged by Egypt on the exports of the new member states of the 
EU will be gradually eliminated over a transitional period of 12 to 15 years, in accordance with the 
schedules set out in the annexes of the association agreement. 
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largely depend on the speed of improvement in their socio-economic conditions and 
the standard of living, hence the ability of their markets to absorb more imports. It 
also depends on Egypt's capacity to improve its manufacturing and exporting 
capabilities and enhance its competitiveness in a way that enables its products to 
compete not only in the markets of the 10 new member states but also in the wider 
EU market. 
9.4. The EU, the Arab World & the US: A Comparison of FDI Flows into 
Egypt 
Analysis of the performance of Egypt's main foreign investors - the EU, the Arab 
World, and the US - reveals that each investor has its distinctive features and 
characteristics, and none of them has seriously competed with one another to 
dominate the Egyptian market. Data shows that the EU and Arab states changed 
their position after 1995, with the EU slightly ahead of the latter with total FDI flows 
of US$2,509 million between 1996 and 2004. During the same period, Arab states, 
which were the main foreign investor in Egypt prior to the Barcelona process, were 
second with total FDI flows of US$2,493 million. 648 As explained below, there is no 
evidence to indicate direct competition between these two investors. The US took 
third place far behind the EU and Arab states, with only US$173.2 million invested 
64$ Between 1972 and 1995, Arab states were the main foreign investor in Egypt, followed by the EU. 
See figure 4.1, p. 141. 
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in non-petroleum sectors, while 65 per cent of US FDI stocks in Egypt were in 
petroleum and natural gas. 649 
Figure 9.6 illustrates the performance of FDI flows by the three main foreign 
investors in Egypt in relation to one another between 1996 and 2004. The most 
distinctive feature was the minimal involvement by US private investors, whose 
investments remained small and constantly below US$42.3 million, the record 
achieved in 1996. By contrast, Arab and Eli FDI flows were on a bigger scale and 
fluctuated more during the period under consideration. The rise and lall in FDI flows 
was much sharper in the case of the EU than Arab investment, which gradually 
increased between 1996 and 1998 and similarly slowed down until 2004. Unlike 
Arab investment, EU FDI saw a sharp rise and fall between 1997 and 1999 and to a 
lesser extent between 2000 and 2003. 











This figure also shows that Arab and EU FDI exchanged positions in terms of 
being the largest investor on an annual basis, with the Arab states being the top 
64' GAFI's data does not include investments in the petroleum sector at all. It only includes 
investments made in services related to the oil industry and these are classified as "petroleum 
services" under the services sector. See the methodology section in the introduction. 
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1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
foreign investor in 1996,1997,1999,2003 and 2004, while the EU was the main 
investor in 1998,2000,2001, and 2002. But it was not until 2004 that the record of 
US FDI flows approached that of the EU. This was caused by a slight increase in US 
FDI to US$17.4 million and by a dramatic decline in EU FDI flows, which recorded 
its lowest share of US$32.8 million in the same year. 
The data presented above highlights that EU FDI flows hardly faced any real 
competition from other foreign sources. Arab direct investment, which was almost 
equal in value to that of the EU, lacked, to a large extent, the technological and 
managerial capabilities required for manufacturing, R&D and technology-based 
industries such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and engineering. This lack of vital 
capabilities in Arab investment led most Arab investors to distance themselves from 
technology and knowledge-based projects and hence was concentrated in areas such 
as real estate and the establishment and management of hotels and tourist resorts. 
There was no significant Arab involvement in industrial activities; hence Egypt's 
largest economic sector - manufacturing - was competition-free, at least with regard 
to Arab FDI. This situation not only provided EU firms with great business 
opportunities in manufacturing but also a monopoly over some vital industries such 
as chemicals and cement. 
Between 1996 and 2004, Arab FDI flows into Egypt amounted to US$2,493 
million, of which 41.1 per cent and 23.4 per cent came from Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait, respectively. Table 9.3 shows great disparity regarding the origin of Arab 
capital flows into the country during the Barcelona era, with 74 per cent originating 
in the 6 member states of the GCC, followed by 18.9 per cent from Mashreq 
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countries, and 3.4 per cent from Maghreb countries. Such a disparity makes the 
growth in Egypt's FDI inflows from the Arab states highly dependent on the political 
stability of the Gulf region and the wider Middle East. The impact of the Palestinian 
Intifada and the 2003 Gulf war on Egypt was reflected in the decline of Arab FDI 
flows into Egypt between 2000 and 2004,650 hence reducing the Arab states to the 
second rank during the Barcelona era. 651 
Table 9.3: Arab FDI flows into Egypt 1996-2004 (US$ thousand) 
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 
Algeria 2000 0 0 0 194 0 0 0 0 2194 
Bahrain 717 2242 4000 2848 1222 2096 0 18608 16 34749 
Iraq 619 29498 2588 968 3417 1687 4283 186 958 44204 
Jordan 12153 23763 17947 17097 26317 3880 5848 15080 6463 128548 
Kuwait 35224 150221 201676 104663 7083 20410 5435 12542 23716 584686 
Lebanon 25634 7699 14647 2815 9500 10214 652 5424 2632 79217 
Libya 20506 3274 15206 5513 3750 5494 18500 102 1769 74114 
Morocco 0 9115 0 88 83 0 174 0 97 9557 
Oman 796 737 59 0 0 2410 0 68 0 4070 
Palestine 3864 4784 19682 19560 24389 14651 16174 7186 7289 117579 
Qatar 1799 3077 79265 352 0 1223 1404 0 0 87120 
Saudi 
Arabia 
229278 255276 250476 140089 68522 20958 25652 7425 28152 1025828 
Sudan 1180 2419 1618 1056 2361 24 283 0 6867 15808 
Syria 23935 30041 39741 3578 3833 4906 21804 9586 8490 145914 
Tunisia 0 0 0 0 250 0 0 0 325 575 
UAE 1475 18496 4147 6158 8287 1880 1152 37288 29901 108784 
Yemen 4425 1563 1059 8446 2972 1036 174 0 10221 29896 
Other Arab 0 20649 0 1994 1667 0 0 0 0 24310 
Total 366605 562854 652111 315225 163847 90869 101535 113495 126896 2493437 
Source: GA11, Egypt. 
650 On the impact of the Palestinian Intifada on the Arab regional system see: Al-Abram Centre for 
Political & Strategic Studies, "The performance of the Arab Regional Institutions", The Arab 
Strategic Report 2001-2002, Cairo, pp. 27-31. On the impact of the Gulf wars on inter-Arab relations 
see: Ahmed Ibrahim Mahmoud, The Gulf and the Iraqi Question: from the Invasion of Kuwait to the 
Occupation of Iraq 1990-2003, (Cairo: Al-Abram Centre for Political & Strategic Studies, 2003) (in 
Arabic). 
651 Wael Gamal, "Oiling the slump", Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue 641,5-11 June 2003. 
http//we ekly. ahram. org. eg, /2003/641 /ec2. htm 
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Meanwhile, US firms, with their comparable financial, technological and 
managerial capabilities to those of the EU, had a lesser involvement in the Egyptian 
economy, outside of the petroleum sector which is not included in this analysis. 
Between 1996 and 2004, almost 91.7 per cent (US$159 million) of total US 
investment was made inland and 8.3 per cent (US$14.3 million) in the free zones. 
Some US$8.3 million was invested in the Private Cairo Free Zone, while US$4.6 
million was invested equally in the Private Alexandria Free Zone and the Public Suez 
Free Zone. Figure 9.7, below, shows that the manufacturing sector received 43 per 
cent of total US FDI flows into Egypt. The chemical industry had the largest share 
with US$26.1 million; followed by the food industry, engineering, textiles and 
metals, which accounted for US$12.6 million, US$11.9 million, US$10.3 million and 
US$6.6 million, respectively. Construction materials, which had the largest share of 
EU investment, were the least attractive sector to US firms, who invested only 
US$152,000 in 2002. The pharmaceutical industry received around US$1 million 
over this nine-year period. 
Between 2000 and 2002, Egypt's industry experienced a dramatic decline in US 
investment due to the withdrawal of many US firms from the Egyptian market. 652 
The share of US investment in industry decreased from US$73 million in 1999 to 
minus US$58 million and minus US$330 million in 2000 and 2001, respectively. 
653 
This withdrawal increased further after the September 11 attack on the US to reach 
652 By the end of 2002, the US trade representative, Robert Zoellick, expressed some dissatisfaction 
about this and argued that Egypt was still no closer to a free trade agreement. Al-Ahram Weekly, 
"Egypt-US: no FTA in sight", Issue No. 590,13-19 June 2002. 
httn: //weekly. ahram. org. eg/2002/590/ec3. htm 
653 Lobna Abdel Latif, "American Direct Investment in Egypt", Centre for American Studies, Cairo 
University, Issue No. 2, January 2003, pp. 12-13. 
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its lowest level in 2002.654 US FDI into Egypt was also affected by the growing anti- 
American sentiment in the region after the US involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
which led to boycotts of products made by US iirms. 6 The most notable cl ects 
were a reduction in the size of the American community in Egypt, which has shrunk 
by almost half since September 2001, and a growing tendency towards franchising 
US companies as an alternative to FD1, a method through which McDonald's, the 
largest US food chain, reduced its presence in Egypt from an investor to franchiser in 
October 2002.656 











Infrastructure was the second largest sector with US$27 million, of' which 
US$14.8 million was invested in 1999. It was followed by the financial sector with 
US$25.2 million invested between 1996 and 1997.657 The tourism sector attracted 
US$20.1 million, of which 39.3 per cent was invested in 1996. The services sector 
654 Figure 9.6 shows that 2002 experienced the lowest record of US FDI flows, which amounted only 
US$I. 2 million in all non-petroleum sectors. 
655 Sherine Nasr, "Just say no", AI-Ahrarn Week/i, Issue 633,10-16 April 2003. 
http:, 'week1,. ahrain. orIZ. eQ,! 2003! 633/'ec4. htm 
656 Yasser Sobhi, "Casualties of conflict", Al-Abram Week/v, Issue 630,20-26 Mach 2003. 
http: 'weeklv. ahram. org. ee 2003.1630 ec I . 
htm 
657 The entire amount was made in the investment sector and no investment was made in the banking 
sector at all between 1996 and 2004. 
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had 10 per cent, of which US$6.5 million invested in financial services, US$4.8 
million in petroleum services, US$4.1 million in the general services and US$1 
million in hospitals. Agriculture was the least attractive sector to US investors, and 
received US$1 million between 1996 and 2004. 
This modest US investment in Egypt was due to a number of factors. Chief 
amongst them was the negative perception among American investors of the 
Egyptian market, a perception that has been aggravated by the uncompromising 
position of the US government regarding the US-Egyptian partnership over the past 
decade. Despite its strategic relationship with Egypt, the US has insisted that no such 
partnership would be concluded until Egypt's economic and political conditions met 
the necessary criteria. 658 Egypt was also required to alleviate impediments to a free 
trade area through serious tax and customs reforms, stiffer protection of intellectual 
property rights (especially for US pharmaceutical firms), improvements in the 
regulatory climate in the areas of investment and procurement and an overall 
increase in liberalisation and privatisation. 659 
Another factor was the model upon which the partnership would be concluded. 
While Egypt preferred the EU-style partnership that allows gradual liberalisation of 
trade and investment, the US insisted on a NAFTA-style agreement, which calls for 
total liberalisation. 660 The Egyptian view was that the NAFTA model that applied to 
Mexico in 1994 was difficult for Egypt given its economic and political conditions, 
658 David Welsh, US Ambassador to Egypt, Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 644,26 June -2 July 2003. 
http: //weekly. ahram. orgeg/2003/644/ec I . htm 659 William H Lash, US Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Market Access and Compliance, Al- 
Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 697,1-7 July 2004. http: //weekly. ahram. org. eg/2004/697/ec2. htm 
660 Hugh Moeser, "Investment Rules in the NAFTA", in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, Investment Policies in Latin America and Multilateral Rules on Investment, (Paris: 
OECD, 1997), pp. 127-131. 
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particularly given the EU's willingness to conclude the EU-Egyptian partnership of 
2001. 
A third factor was the possible diversion of US capital flows from Egypt to other 
destinations that were more attractive to US firms. 661 Given their geographical 
proximity and market size, Latin American countries, in particular Brazil, Argentina 
and Chile, became favoured markets for many US companies. 662 In political and 
economic terms, Mexico was a more attractive market for US firms than Egypt, not 
only because of its membership in NAFTA but also because of its liberalised 
investment regime that offered the right to establishment and national treatment to 
foreign investors without any restrictions with regard to export, the use of local 
materials and repatriation of profits to source countries. 663 Also, the Asian markets 
were similarly attractive to US firms, with Hong Kong and Singapore as the most 
preferred markets, followed by those of Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand and 
Taiwan. 
With regard to the Middle East region, Egypt's share of US FDI flows was 
relatively similar to that of Israel and Turkey, but the majority of US investments in 
these two countries were made in manufacturing, while the majority of Egypt's share 
went to the petroleum sector, 664 with minor shares in chemicals and textiles 665 
`' When discussing Egypt, the US administration cites the slow progress of economic reform as a 
major obstacle to an FTA. This includes the implementation of commitments under the WTO, 
particularly in the areas of privatisation, transparency of decision-making, customs reform and IPR. 
The US is also concerned about foreign-exchange stability and taxation. These reasons stated by 
Samuel Bodman, US undersecretary of Commerce, Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 605,26 September -2 
October 2002 http: //weekly. ahram. org. e2/2002/605/ec2. htm. 
662 Ahmed Galal & Robert Lawrence, Building Bridges: An Egypt-US Free Trade Agreement, (Cairo: 
the Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies and John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1998), p. 8. 
663 Ahmed Galal & Sahar Tohamy (1998), in Galal & Lawrence (eds. ), Building Bridges, p. 23. 
664 Foreign investment in the petroleum sector is excluded in the data base of GAFI. It is also not 
added in the statistics of the World Investment Reports published annually by the UNCTAD. 
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Although the current phase of privatisation in 2005-2006 appeared to have stimulated 
the interest of US firms in some Egyptian companies such as Sidi Kreir for 
Petrochemicals, Egypt's biggest producer of polyethylene, no substantial investments 
have been made, 666 confirming once again the unattractiveness of the Egyptian 
market to US companies. One can also attribute the decline of the US investment in 
Egypt to the fall of the US share of global FDI from 25.9 per cent in 1995 to 12.1 per 
cent in 2000, compared to the EU, which provides 49.2 per cent of all global FDI. 
These factors neither enabled the US nor the Arab states to compete with the EU. 
Despite providing almost half of all global FDI and becoming Egypt's main foreign 
investor in the Barcelona era, EU investment into Egypt remained less significant 
compared with the Community's investment in other developing countries in Eastern 
Europe, Latin America and East Asia. 
9.5. International Trade Regimes and Egypt's FDI Liberalisation 
In the Barcelona era, Egypt's modest performance in attracting FDI was largely due 
to the slow liberalisation of the country's investment regime. This was a result of the 
considerable attention paid to regional arrangements that led to partial liberalisation 
at the expense of international trade and investment regimes which call for the total 
liberalisation of FDI. Although Egypt was one of the original 23 countries that 
signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) on 9 May 1947, its 
665 The textiles and clothing were the main Egyptian exports to the US market, after petroleum. The 
US market accounts for 40 per cent of Egypt's total textile and clothing exports, a figure that would 
have been drastically reduced in the face of cheaper exports from the Far East. Al-Ahram Weekly, 
Issue No. 723,30 December 2004 -5 January 2005. http: //weekly. ahram. org. eg/2004/723/ec3. htm 
Oxford Business Group, Emerging Markets Economic Briefings, FDI-Fuelled Growth: Egypt, Vol. 
102,2 February 2005. http: //www. oxfordbusinessgroul2. com/weekly0l. asp? id=1208 
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trade and investment liberalisation did not start until almost the mid-1990s, and since 
then has developed very slowly. For example, the elimination of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to trade did not start until the 1994 Uruguay Round and the subsequent 
creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995.667 Most efforts along this 
line were made within regional and bilateral arrangements such as the EU-Egyptian 
association agreement, but no serious efforts have yet been made by the Egyptian 
government to liberalise trade on a unilateral or multilateral level. 
Compared with trade, there has been a delay in the liberalisation of FDI. This is 
partly due to a lack of clear and defined multilateral rules for investment policies 
such as the right of establishment and national treatment for foreign investors. 668 The 
WTO has also been pre-occupied with trade and trade-related aspects, while far less 
consideration is given to the liberalisation and protection of FDI. 669 This means that 
the evolution of the multilateral investment rules remained limited to three areas 
related to FDI, namely the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); 670 the 
protection of FDI in intellectual property rights (IPRs); and the Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMS) associated with FDI and FDI-competitiveness. Such 
a limitation of the multilateral rules of FDI enabled only developed countries to 
achieve a higher degree of FDI liberalisation, while developing countries like Egypt 
sought other means such as offering incentives and guarantees to attract FDI. 
667 Marie-France Houde, "OECD Instruments for Promoting the Liberalisation of Foreign Direct 
Investment", OECD Working paper, Pairs, 1995, Vol. 3, No. 24, p. 12. 
668 Stephen Young & Thomas Brewer, "Multilateral Investment Rules, Multinationals and the Global 
Economy", in Nicholas A Phelp & Jeremy Alden (eds. ), Foreign Direct Investment and the Global 
Economy: Corporate and Institutional Dynamics of Global-Localisation, (London: The Stationary 
Office, 1999), pp. 15-25. 
669 Bernard Hoekman & Michel Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System: The 
WTO and Beyond, Second edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 418. 
670 The GATS agreement resulted of the 1994 Uruguay Round and came into force on January 1, 
1995, to set a global framework of rules and commitments to all forms of international trade in 
services. 
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Under the GATS agreement, which was the only multilateral framework to deal 
directly with investment, Egypt had to comply with the rules that applied to trade in 
services with all WTO members, with the schedule of commitments tabled by its 
government specifying for each service sector the degree of liberalisation, and with 
other rules affecting trade in services elaborated in the GATS or Ministerial 
Decisions. 671 However, the implementation of these rules was far less effective in 
the extension of Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) Treatment, National Treatment, and 
Market Access to other WTO members, as well as in transparency in the 
administration of regimes governing trade in services and FDI. While there was no 
discrimination against any nationality, some restrictions undermined the principle of 
national treatment and limited market access to some economic sectors. 672 This latter 
aspect was evident in law 8 of 1997, which limited market access to foreign investors 
to only 16 sectors as specified in Article one. 673 This law fell short of full FDI 
liberalisation because it depended largely on offering incentives and guarantees 
rather than eliminating restrictions to foreign investors. 
Similarly, Egypt failed to benefit from the transition periods offered by the WTO 
to readjust its policy framework and regulations to the WTO/GATS rules and 
principles. Taking the maximum exemptions of transition periods offered to 
developing countries did not produce a gradual readjustment or improvement in the 
671 Nathan Associates Inc., Egypt: Obligations and Commitments under the GA 7T/WTO Agreements, 
report prepared for the Egyptian Ministry of Trade and Supply in August 1999, p. 45. 
67 As for market access, the CATS prohibited such restrictions as the number of foreign services 
suppliers allowed, the value of service-related transactions or assets, the total volume of service 
outputs, the number of local employees, the type of legal entity through which services may be 
supplied, and the participation of foreign capital via either a maximum percentage limitation on 
foreign equity or on the absolute value. Ibid, p. 45. 
673 For details on the 16 area of activities see GAFI, Law No. 8 of 1997 on investment guarantees and 
incentives and its executive regulations, Article 1. http: //www. misrnet. idsc. aov. eg/invest/a-main. htm 
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business environment, but a further delay in the liberalisation process of trade in 
services and FDI. For example, of the 620 separate commitments specified by the 
GATS, Egypt tabled only 104 specific service sector commitments in its GATS 
schedule, 674 hence committing itself to only 16.7 per cent of the total commitments 
of liberalisation of trade in services and investment. Further delays in liberalisation 
were caused by the restrictions imposed by the Egyptian government on trade in 
services and FDI, under Article XII of the GATS, 675 to address its balance of 
payments and maintain a level of reserves adequate for its development programmes. 
The agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), which 
identified issues often associated with investment and investment-promotion that are 
considered inconsistent with the GATT because of their negative impact on trade, 
had more or less no effect on enhancing Egypt's investment climate. Under this 
multilateral agreement, Egypt was obliged to report all TRIMS inconsistent with 
GATT provisions within three months of entry into the WTO, 676 and to eliminate all 
measures inconsistent with the GATT by 1 January 2000. During this five-year 
transition period, the introduction of new measures inconsistent with the agreement 
were not permitted, nor was Egypt allowed to increase the number of existing 
674 The 12 basic service sectors were business, communications, constructions and related 
engineering, distribution, educational, environmental, financial, health related, tourism and travel- 
related, recreational, cultural and sporting, transport, and other services not included elsewhere. They 
were divided into 55 sub-sectors based on the International Standard Industrial Classification system 
utilised by the WTO, making a total of 165 in all. The WTO made 10 sub-sectors to overlap and thus 
the operative number is 155. To make a commitment, the country had to apply the 155 to the 4 mode 
of supply for services with a result of 620 separate specific commitments. The 4 specific modes of 
supply for services were: cross-border supply of a service, consumption abroad, commercial presence 
and natural persons such as labourers and consultants. Nathan Associates Inc. (1999), Egypt: 
Obligations and Commitments under the GA 7T/WTO Agreements, P. 47. 
67s Article XII of the CATS permits states to impose restrictions on trade in services with regard to 
commitments in order to address the serious balance of payments situation, on condition that these 
restrictions do not discriminate against WTO members, nor cause unnecessary damage to the interests 
of other members.. 
676 The notification had to be made before 1 October 1995. 
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measures inconsistent with GATT provisions. 677 Egypt was also compelled by the 
agreement not to apply any TRIM that was inconsistent with Article III on national 
treatment678 or Article XI on the prohibition of quantitative restrictions. 679 With no 
distinction made between FDI and domestic investment, products of another WTO 
member must be treated in Egypt no less favourably than domestically-produced 
products. As such the effect of this agreement was only notable in preventing Egypt 
from imposing further restrictions rather than forcing the country to eliminate 
existing barriers to FDI. 
Table 9.4: Intellectual Property Rights and their protected periods (per year). 
Product Period of protection Product Protection Period 
Computer Programmes 50 Patents 20 
Film Production 50 Industrial Designs 10 
Sound recordings 50 Integrated Circuits 10 
Broadcasting Materials 20 Trademarks 7 
Source: Nathan Associates Inc. (1999). 
The impact of the Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement 
was severe on the growth of FDI into Egypt, particularly over the past ten years. 
Under this agreement, Egypt was obliged to provide adequate and effective 
protection to intellectual property rights (IPRs), and must not discriminate between 
foreign investors (as stated in MFN) and against foreigners (National Treatment) 
with regard to IPRs. It must also comply with the rules and obligations of Copyright 
677 Nathan Associates Inc. (1999), Egypt: Obligations and Commitments under the GATT/WTO 
Agreements, p. 96. 
67 Article III of the agreement prohibited domestic contents in products and limited percentages of 
imported inputs or supplies in terms of volume or value of domestic products. 
679 Article XI prohibited the use of quantitative restrictions on imports or exports, as well as 
restrictions on firms' access to foreign exchange to pay for imports to a percentage reflecting their 
foreign exchange earnings from exports. 
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and Related Rights to ensure the protection of products during their period of 
protection as specified in table 9.4, above. 
However, the reluctance of the Egyptian government to comply fully with the 
obligations and commitments of IPRs affected negatively FDI in such vital industries 
as pharmaceuticals 680 The lack of patent protection discouraged international 
pharmaceutical firms in Egypt either to invest in new drugs or to allocate substantial 
capital for R&D in their Egyptian affiliates. These firms also found it difficult to 
invest in a country where the government was unwilling to crackdown on imitators 
of copyable products in industries such as pharmaceuticals and agricultural 
chemicals because such a crackdown would mean both the end of many small 
domestic industries and would result in products at unaffordable prices. Although 
there were some benefits to be gained from full compliance with IPRs in areas such 
as industrial design, particularly in textiles and clothing where Egypt enjoys a 
comparative advantage, 681 this had little impact on the government position on IPRs 
between 1996 and 2004. The expiry of the transition period on 1 January 2005 means 
that Egypt must comply with the rules of IPRs by allowing patent applications to be 
filed for those submitted after that date, as well as those submitted during the 
transition period of 1995-2004. Such a workload is likely to cause severe disruption 
to Egypt's regulatory regime for some years to come due to the sudden shock of 
compliance with these multilateral rules and obligations. 
680 See the sectoral distribution of EU FDI flows into the pharmaceutical industry in chapter six. 
681 Full compliance with IPRs would have protected Egypt's rights in textiles and clothing by stopping 




This thesis has presented a detailed analysis of EU direct investment into Egypt 
between 1972 and 2004. Such analysis was undertaken by comparing the growth of 
EU FDI flows into Egypt under the 1972 Global Mediterranean Policy with growth 
levels following the Barcelona process of 1995, to determine whether the EU- 
Egyptian partnership conducted within the latter framework has led to a sustainable 
growth in EU FDI into Egypt. In the course of examining this key issue, this thesis 
provided a descriptive analysis of EU direct investment into Egypt between 1972 and 
2004, while it also examined the impact of the institutional development of EU- 
Egyptian economic relations, in conjunction with Egypt's political, legal and 
economic reforms, on the growth of EU FDI into Egypt. The Barcelona process and 
its subsequent EU-Egyptian partnership were also examined in detail in order to 
determine their impact on the growth of EU FDI into Egypt, with special focus on a 
case study on British FDI in the manufacturing sector. 
This study made several important findings. In terms of EU-Egyptian investment 
relations, it revealed that the growth of European direct investment into Egypt was 
often determined by the degree of liberalisation in Egypt's political and economic 
system. The flow of capital might have been encouraged by positive political and 
economic ties between Egypt and the EU, but the level of involvement by European 
investors in Egypt's economic activities varied considerably depending on the degree 
of economic liberalisation and government interference in economic affairs. 
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The study found no evidence to conclude that either the Cooperation Agreement of 
1977 or the 2001 Association Agreement had an immediate impact on the growth of 
EU FDI into Egypt. Rather the analysis revealed that the resurgence and growth of 
EU FDI flows into Egypt, which reached its peak in 1975, were hardly attributable to 
the 1972 GMP, the 1974 EAD or the 1977 Cooperation agreement. This growth was 
largely due to the legal, economic and political reforms introduced by the Egyptian 
government itself during the 1970s. Similarly, the record level of FDI into Egypt of 
US$4.6 billion in 1975 was not a product of the 1974 EAD but a direct response by 
foreign investors to the 1974 Infitah policy which initiated Egypt's economic 
liberalisation and Law 43 of the same year that allowed foreign ownership of up to 
49 per cent of a company. 
Surprisingly, the Cooperation Agreement signed in 1977 failed to sustain either 
this high level of FDI growth or prevent its sharp decline from US$2.5 billion in 
1978 to US$768.6 million, US$258.2 million, US$75.2 million and US$267.9 
million in 1979,1985,1990 and 1994, respectively. Analysis showed that this 
decline occurred because of the failure of the Egyptian government to follow up, or 
continue with, the political, legal and economic reforms introduced during the early 
1970s. 682 The government maintained strict control over the country's main financial 
resources, including the Central Bank of Egypt, the exchange rate, the power to 
devalue the Egyptian Pound, employment policies and prices of a number of strategic 
commodities, all of which affected directly the desire of foreign companies to 
operate in the country. 
682 The only attempt made by the government to address the concern of foreign investors was in the 
Law 32 of 1977, but this law had very limited impact on the growth of FDI, which declined 
dramatically after only one year of the promulgation of this law, as explained in chapter three. 
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As for the Barcelona era up to this point, the study concludes that the EU- 
Egyptian partnership has had some notable achievements. The most important 
development was the upgrading of the EU from its second place, behind the Arab 
world prior to 1995, to become the largest foreign investor in Egypt between 1996 
and 2004. This indicates the growing role of EU FDI in Egypt's economic growth, 
though the gap between EU and Arab FDI in this period was small. 
This study also shows that the Barcelona process has had significant impacts on 
Egypt's domestic situation. This was apparent through the substantial financial and 
technical assistance provided through the MEDA programmes and European 
Investment Bank (EIB), allowing for further investment in infrastructural projects 
vital to the attraction of foreign investors. EU financial and technical assistance 
increased, and was effective, particularly through the Industrial Modernisation 
Programme, which provides assistance to small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), many of which have a crucial role in providing support services to foreign 
companies and multinational corporations. 683 These efforts attempt to strengthen the 
role of the private sector in the country's economic development. Successful 
implementation of these measures will eventually stimulate internal political, 
economic, legal and institutional reforms, which aim to readjust the legal framework 
and prepare the domestic market for the conditions of free trade. 
This partnership made Egypt an integral part of a vast regional market under the 
upcoming the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area and it encouraged south-south 
683 Lack of supporting services and the low quality of service and delivery time were among the most 
common complaints by foreign companies in Egypt. 
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economic integration, which stimulated the creation of the 1998 GAFTA and the 
MAFTA of 2001. Despite such structural developments, these arrangements were 
undermined by functional factors that limited deep integration among southern 
partners and minimized their benefits from accessing the EU market, at least in terms 
of cumulation of rules of origin. 
In terms of the pattern of investment, the study found no fundamental change in 
the pattern of EU FDI into Egypt. EU FDI flows have been marked by periodical 
single large investments rather than a consistent level of capital flows between 1972 
and 2004. The most apparent, and recent, case was Spain's US$300 million 
investment in the free zone in 2001, a record that ranked Spain the third largest EU 
investor in Egypt, after the UK and the Netherlands, between 1996 and 2004.684 FDI 
in Egypt remained vertical and aimed at serving the needs of the internal market. 
Horizontal FDI was limited due to low intra-industry trade between Egypt, and the 
wider MENA region, and the EU. 
In terms of the static distribution of EU FDI, the UK has been the largest EU 
investor in Egypt and a major investor in most economic sectors, especially 
manufacturing, between 1972 and 2004. In the Barcelona era, the Netherlands, Spain 
and France have been major investors, while the Republic of Ireland has emerged as 
a new EU investor in Egypt, with US$43.7 million FDI stock accumulated between 
1996 and 2004. 
684 Spain was ranked 11 of the 14 EU member states that had FDI in Egypt between 1972 and 1995. 
Portugal was the only country that did not have FDI in Egypt at that time. 
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The sectoral distribution of EU FDI was marked by a large shift in the 
concentration of capital from the financial sector to the areas of manufacturing and 
infrastructure. While the share of the financial sector dropped from 56 per cent 
between 1972 and 1995 to 2 per cent of total EU FDI flows into Egypt between 1996 
and 2004, the share of manufacturing and infrastructure increased from 39 per cent 
and 1 per cent to 64 per cent and 22 per cent, respectively, during the same period. 
Such a concentration of capital, if it continued at a sustainable rate, could lead to an 
expansion in Egypt's industrial capacity, and hence an increase in its exporting 
capabilities. The share of tourism, services and agriculture also increased from 2 per 
cent, 1 per cent and 1 per cent between 1972 and 1995 to 6 per cent, 4 per cent and 2 
per cent, respectively, between 1996 and 2004. Despite these small shares, such an 
increase highlights the growing importance of tourism and services to European 
investors during the Barcelona era. 
In industry, this study also showed that European investors shifted their focus 
from pharmaceuticals and the food industry, which respectively received 38 per cent 
and 26 per cent of EU FDI flows between 1972 and 1995 to engineering (32 per 
cent), chemicals (29 per cent) and construction materials (20 per cent), which 
together accounted for 81 per cent of total EU FDI into manufacturing between 1996 
and 2004. The fact that the share of pharmaceuticals and processed food decreased to 
3 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively, during the latter period highlights the concern 
of EU firms over Egypt's legal system, particularly in regard to copy right protection. 
This also indicates that the manufacturing sector is no longer dependent on 
capital-intensive and R&D-based industries, but rather on labour-intensive industries 
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such as building materials, chemicals, non-Information Technology engineering 
projects and clothing. Analysis also showed that most investment in textiles went to 
clothing rather than actual raw materials, as the manufacturing of the latter is capital- 
intensive and technology-based industry, while the former depends largely on the 
availability of cheap labour. This trend was evident in the case study of chapter 
seven, where FDI flows in engineering (especially projects related to natural gas 
pipelines) and building materials (particularly cement) together accounted for 79 per 
cent of total British investment in manufacturing during the first nine years of the 
Barcelona era. 
In terms of economic development, the impact of EU FDI on Egypt was far less 
than expected. This was due to the fact that EU FDI had a minor share in knowledge- 
based and capital-intensive industries, which highlighted the lack of a transfer of 
capital, knowledge and advanced technology into the country. From a socio- 
economic perspective, the analysis showed that EU FDI had a positive impact on 
employment in terms of the significant number of jobs created as most investments 
were made in labour-intensive industries. This was important as Egypt suffered from 
both a high rate of unemployment which averaged 9 per cent between 1996 and 2004 
and the inability of the government to absorb annually half a million new entrants 
into the already overcrowded public sector. But the lack of investment in knowledge- 
based and capital-intensive industries minimised the impact of FDI on the quality of 
the Egyptian labour market and labour skills at the professional and technical levels, 
though foreign companies tended to spend more on educational and training 
programmes for their employees than their local counterparts. 
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This study revealed the limitations of FDI in the EU-Egyptian Partnership 
Agreement. The agreement only acknowledged the importance of FDI and the 
freedom of movement of capital, but failed to set out specific measures through 
which the EU could divert substantial proportions of FDI flows into Egypt. It did not 
contain provisions dealing with the free mobility of capital, the unrestricted 
repatriation of profits, the right to establishment, and effective mechanisms for the 
settlement of commercial and legal disputes between local partners or the 
government and foreign companies. Nor did the agreement call for negotiations with 
regard to the attraction of FDI between the EU and Egypt or within the Euro- 
Mediterranean zone. 685 Such a limitation not only showed the failure of Egyptian 
officials to learn from the experience of CEECs with the EU, whose 1992 association 
agreements paid considerable attention to the attraction of FDI, 686 and their limited 
recognition of the growing importance of FDI in economic development, but also 
their pre-occupation with trade that was the top priority throughout the negotiation of 
the agreement. 687 
This affected considerably the position of FDI in EU-Egyptian economic 
relations and weakened the inter-relationship between FDI and exports in Egypt. 
Analysis showed that the agreement also failed to shift the focus of EU FDI from 
import-substitution to export-oriented activities that could develop the country as a 
6s5 The first Euro-Mediterranean investment conference took a place after ten years of signing the 
Barcelona declaration. This conference was held in Marseille, France, on 13-14 January 2005. 
http: //www. animaweb. orz/Newsletters/Newsletter9E. pdf 
686 Bassem Kamar & Damyana Bakardzhieva, The reforms needed to attract more FDI in Egypt, p. 
17. 
687 The partnership agreement focused primarily on the establishment of free trade in manufactured 
goods, preferential access for agricultural products and gradual liberalisation in trade in services, 
which could lead to a gradual liberation in trade according to the schedule specified in the agreement. 
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platform for exports. 688 This was even evident in industries such as textiles and 
processed food, where Egypt enjoyed a comparative advantage. An improvement in 
the FDI-export relationship will now depend largely on the progressive liberalisation 
of trade and investment and an expansion in Egypt's industrial capacity in a way that 
increases the share of the industrial sector in total Egyptian exports to the EU, as well 
as a fundamental shift in the orientation of FDI towards export-oriented investment. 
EU direct investment into Egypt was also affected by internal and external 
factors. At the internal level, this thesis revealed that EU FDI was greatly influenced 
by Egypt's political and economic stability, particularly macroeconomic indicators 
and political risk index. It highlighted parallels between the growth of FDI and 
economic liberalisation. In particular the acceleration of privatisation during the 
latter half of the 1990s attracted a relatively high level of FDI; which in turn 
decreased as the number of companies privatised reduced from 40 companies in 
1999 to 19,10,7 and 13 in 2000,2001,2002 and 2003, respectively. The study also 
showed that EU FDI into Egypt was negatively affected by the exchange rate, 
taxation and fiscal policies, inflation, the country's real growth GDP, institutional 
development and transparency, and infrastructural facilities. If Egypt is to attract a 
high growth rate in EU FDI, the government must embark on a radical 
transformation of its political, economic, legal and bureaucratic systems and must 
develop its institutions and infrastructure on ongoing basis. 
688 It is argued that foreign companies preferred to invest for the local market because of the high tariff 
barriers that supplemented production costs which resulted in high profits of over 20 per cent when 
serving the local market compared with 5-7 per cent when producing for export. Nathan Associates 
Inc. (1998), Enhancing Egypt's Exports, report prepared for the Government of Egypt, Ministry of 
Trade and Supply, cited in Ahmed Ghoneim (2000), "Determinants of the Egyptian Exports Market 
Access to the European Union", Center for Economic and Financial Research Studies, Cairo 
University, Egypt, Vol. 10, December 2000, pp. 39-40. 
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There were also a number of external factors that impacted negatively on the 
growth rate of EU direct investment into Egypt between 1996 and 2004. On the 
European side, EU enlargement eastward had a negative impact on Egypt due to the 
diversion of FDI funds from the Mediterranean region. The region's share of FDI 
stood at only 2 per cent, compared to the CEECs, which accounted for up to 7 per 
cent of extra EU outflows by the end of the 1990s. Also, Egypt's share of FDI flows 
from the CEECs decreased dramatically to 0.5 per cent (US$2 million) between 1994 
and 2004, down from US$384.2 million between 1972 and 1993. This was due to the 
tremendous development achieved by the CEECs, which differentiated them from 
Egypt and the wider Arab world over the past ten years in terms of the pace of 
economic growth, the degree of liberalisation in trade and investment, the quality of 
economic reforms, the restructuring of the administrative systems, and the 
development of their institutions, infrastructure and physical and human resources. 
On a regional level, Egypt failed to make FDI a principle aspect of its regional 
economic arrangements. Market expansion and added values such as the cumulation 
of rules of origin were not effective in increasing Egypt's share of FDI from the EU 
due to low intra-regional trade, a lack of unified rules between Egypt and its southern 
partner states, and structural and functional impediments in the GAFTA and 
MAFTA. The Agadir Agreement of 2001 neither added significantly to the 
institutional structure of the Arab states, nor stimulated the growth of FDI among its 
partner countries. 
At a multilateral level, Egypt's external trade and investment policies did not 
help to improve its attractiveness to FDI. This was not only evident in the reluctance 
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of the Egyptian government to fully comply with such multilateral rules as IPRs, but 
in the policy of the government to use the maximum limit of concessions and 
exemptions in terms of transition periods granted to developing countries to readjust 
their policy framework and regulations to the rules and principles of the WTO and 
GATS between 1995 and 2005. 
These factors damaged the country's attractiveness to FDI, and the lack of 
implementation of IPRs and copy right protection severely affected the 
pharmaceutical industry, whose share decreased to 3 per cent of total EU FDI flows 
into manufacturing between 1996 and 2004, from 38 per cent between 1972 and 
1995. The impact was also noticeable not only in the minor share of US FDI into this 
industry, which stood at only US$1 million between 1996 and 2004, but also in the 
minimum transfer of new technologies and R&D activities by most international 
pharmaceutical firms to their affiliates in Egypt. 
Egypt's practices during the past ten years suggests that it is unlikely to adopt a 
strong IPR regime, which is likely to limit the growth of FDI because MNCs tend to 
allocate high percentages of their FDI to R&D and final products to affiliates that 
have strong IPR protection. 89 To achieve a reasonable rate of FDI growth similar to 
countries such as Mexico, the Egyptian Government must adopt unilaterally a 
programme of full liberalisation in trade and investment. Not only will this 
encourage the US to conclude its partnership agreement with Egypt, but it will allow 
689 The most notable example is India, where weak IPRs discouraged almost 80 per cent of 
international chemical firms to engage in joint ventures or transfer new technologies to their 
subsidiaries or related firms operating in the country. Keith E. Maskus, "IPRs and FDP", in Bijit Bora 
(ed. ), Foreign Direct Investment: Research issues, (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 198. 
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the country also to maximise the benefits of regional integration and enhance its 
attractiveness to foreign investors, in particular those from the EU. 
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